Emerging Economic Geographies of Higher Education: A complex negotiation of value (and values) in the face of market hegemony. by Pani, Erica Margaret
Emerging Economic Geographies of Higher Education: A complex
negotiation of value (and values) in the face of market hegemony.
Pani, Erica Margaret
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/12998
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
 1 
Emerging Economic Geographies of Higher Education:  
A complex negotiation of value (and values) in the face of 
market hegemony 
 
 by Erica Margaret Pani 
 
 
 
Photo: Erica Pani 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
 Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
  
 2 
Statement of Originality 
 
I, Erica Margaret Pani, confirm that the research included within this thesis is my own 
work or that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported by 
others, that this is duly acknowledged below and my contribution indicated. Previously 
published material is also acknowledged below. 
 
I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and 
does not to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s 
copyright or other Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. 
 
I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to check the 
electronic version of the thesis. 
 
I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree 
by this or any other university. 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or 
information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the 
author. 
 
Signature: 
  
 
Date: 20/10/2015 
 
Details of collaboration and publications: 
Not applicable  
  
 3 
Abstract 
 
Taking higher education (HE) in England as its case study, this PhD adapts and re-
poses Roger Lee’s thesis on the Ordinary Economy to help understand how neoliberal 
market values become negotiated, embedded and transformed in and through complex 
emerging economic geographies. In 2011, pursuing a somewhat neoliberal theme, the 
HE White Paper sought to further organize the sector through the application of certain 
market values and metrics, whereby a demand-led system would increase efficiency 
and competitiveness by making universities more directly accountable to their student-
consumers than ever before. Since the late 1970s, ascendant forms of neoliberalism 
have come under scrutiny with some political economy and governmentality scholars 
underscoring neoliberalization’s processual and variegated nature wherein geographies 
and extant political economic relations matter to its concrete manifestation. However, 
some studies have encountered difficulties in accounting for how top-down political 
programmes become “anchored into” the complexity of everyday life, and/or in pre-
supposing that their desired “subject-effects” will be either automatically realized or 
successfully resisted (Barnett, 2005). Thus, by residualising “the social”, theories of 
hegemony and governmentality often fail to illuminate the complex interplay between 
abstract policy programmes and the complexity of the Ordinary Economy. To 
overcome such weaknesses, this PhD follows Lee’s assertion that economic 
geographies are always emerging and inherently relational entities in and through 
which value emerges from the practice and performance of socio-economic life. Thus, 
studying the economy means grappling with the multiple values, social relations and 
notions of value that constitute economic geographies. Adapting a framework to 
examine four universities in England, the PhD illuminates the transformative power of 
both political programmes and socio-economic relations as, in this case, market 
hegemony was (re)-produced in multiple and complex forms. Neoliberalization is thus 
shown to be a bottom-up as well as top-down process that is constructed in practice. 
For it is the practice of socio-spatial economic relations that determines what is and is 
not value. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In June 2011, the release of the UK Government’s White Paper, Higher Education: 
Students at the Heart of the System, (BIS, 2011a) signaled an apparent further rolling-
back of the state out of a previously held public service in favour of the market. With 
the notion that creating a demand-led system would increase efficiency, drive forward 
competitiveness, and make universities more directly accountable to their student-
consumers than ever before, this ‘technology of government’ (Foucault, 2000) thus set 
out a conceptual and operational framework for the higher education (HE) sector, 
which in part reflected a distinctly neoliberal theme: that the best way to organize the 
economy and society is through the mechanisms of the market; and it is to the values 
of the market – not government – that a society of free individuals and organizations 
should turn. 
 
Following the defeat of New Labour in the 2010 UK General Election, it had fallen to 
the newly elected conservative-liberal coalition Government to consider the 
recommendations set out in Lord Browne’s Independent Review of HE Funding and 
Student Finance in England: Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education 
(Browne, 2010). Having inherited “the largest budget deficit in post-war history” (BIS, 
2011a: 4) following a global financial crisis that had begun in 2007, the Coalition had 
considered Lord Browne’s recommendations as part of their Comprehensive Spending 
Review, which required substantial fiscal savings right across government. Indeed, on 
the 12 October 2010, the day of the Browne Review’s release, Vince Cable MP, then 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, had addressed the House of 
Commons stating: 
“Browne acknowledges that ‘the current funding and finance systems for higher 
education are unsustainable and need urgent reform’. The issue is how; and it has been 
framed in terms of how the higher education sector contributes to the deficit reduction 
programme” (Hansard, 2010a: column 155, emphasis added). 
To that end, the how that the Browne Review recommended comprised: 
“…a radical departure from the existing way in which HEIs are financed. Rather than 
the Government providing a block grant for teaching to HEIs, their finance now follows 
the student who has chosen and been admitted to study. Choice is in the hands of the 
student. HEIs can charge different and higher fees provided they can show 
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improvements in the student experience and demonstrate progress in providing fair 
access and, of course, students are prepared to entertain such charges” (Browne, 2010: 
3). 
 
For the academic and social commentator Stefan Collini, full political implementation 
of the Review’s recommendations would have meant that HE in England could no 
longer be thought of as “a public good, articulated through educational judgment and 
largely financed through public funds” (2010: 23). Rather it would become “a lightly 
regulated market in which consumer demand, in the form of student choice” would be 
“sovereign in determining what [was] offered by service providers – i.e. the 
universities” (ibid). Certainly, the Review proposed that the financial effects of its 
metrics should not undermine the existing principle of increasing social mobility via 
access to HE. No one, no matter what their socio-economic background, should be put 
off from studying because they could not afford to live whilst they were at university 
(Browne, 2010: 26). However, according to Collini, the almost complete withdrawal of 
ex-ante Government funding which the universities had long-relied upon to underwrite 
their teaching, represented far more than a ‘simple, draconian cut’. Rather, it signaled 
“a redefinition of higher education and the retreat of the state from financial 
responsibility for it” (2010: 23, emphasis added). Thus, with the Review’s emphasis 
on the private gains accrued to the individual graduate over a lifetime’s earnings, and 
the need for institutions to respond to what students felt offered them “value for 
money”, both students and universities would need to think of themselves as “rational 
actors” taking part in a competitive market – guided by the metrics of competition 
theory and the socio-economic relations and values of the market (2010: 23-25). 
 
While the 2011 HE White Paper differed from the Browne Review in terms of the 
tactics and techniques it proposed for achieving its aims, the ideological how by which 
the Coalition intended to ‘redefine’ HE was the same. By attaching up to £9000 per 
annum in cost-covering tuition fees to the home undergraduate, “more power” would 
be placed in the hands of HE’s consumers. As a result, “institutions that [could] attract 
students by showing them that they [could] offer good quality and good value for 
money” would have the opportunity “to grow and prosper”. Institutions that could not 
attract students would simply “have to change” (BIS, 2011: 15, emphasis added). 
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Although the specifically market-orientated discourses and metrics set out in the White 
Paper largely conform to the neoclassical economic logics of supply and demand, this 
PhD, while not wishing to eschew the structural significance of Governmental policy 
programmes, contends that such fundamental changes in the evaluations, values, 
actions, activities and subjectivities that the White Paper was seeking to impose are far 
from straightforward. For as Peck et al assert, the ideological how of neoliberalism – 
that is, marketisation – is never fully capable of becoming manifest in “a pure form”, 
as some “comprehensive regulatory whole” (2012: 271). 
 
Certainly since the late 1970s, ascendant forms of neoliberalism have been extensively 
examined, with scholars from across the social sciences exploring neoliberalism’s 
power geometries; its social, economic and political consequences and compromises; 
its uneven geographies; and its contestations, contradictions, mutations and 
variegations (e.g. Bourdieu, 1998; Brenner et al, 2010; Harvey, 1990; Held et al, 1999; 
Jessop, 1995; Larner, 1997, 2000a, 2000b; Massey, 2007; Peck and Tickell, 1994; 
Peck et al, 2012; Stiglitz, 2003). In addition, with processes of marketization still 
apparently hegemonic, academics, politicians and members of the public alike have 
questioned what alternatives there are to the market model, and how neoliberalism 
actually survives (Peck et al, 2012). 
 
Of particular interest to this PhD, some scholars of political economy and 
governmentality have pointed to the processual and variegated nature of the neoliberal 
project, preferring to understand the imposition of market rule not as a singular 
political ‘ism’ in which a “starkly utopian vision” would somehow be realized as a 
defined “political economic destination” (Peck et al 2012: 271, paraphrasing Peck, 
2010), but, rather, as a process of neoliberalization in which geographies and extant 
socio-economic and political relations matter in terms of how neoliberal processes 
unfold in time and space. For example, taking a geographical political economy 
perspective, Brenner and Theodore (2002), Peck and Tickell (2002), and Brenner et al 
(2010) emphasize the need to examine “actually existing neoliberalisms” in which the 
contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring projects matters insofar as they 
have necessarily collided with national, regional and local regulatory landscapes that 
have been inherited from earlier rounds of policy regimes, regulatory practices and 
political contestation. As such, they underscore the “ongoing creative destruction of 
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political-economic space at multiple geographical scales” as existing institutional 
landscapes are “transformed into emergent neoliberal projects” (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002: 4). 
 
Not dis-similarly, from the post-disciplinary perspective of cultural political economy 
(CPE), Jessop and Sum (2001, 2003) stress the path-dependent, contingent and always 
tendential nature of neoliberal capitalism, thereby rejecting the claims of orthodox 
Marxist’ accounts (or indeed, neoclassical economics) that it is possible to interpret the 
world as a closed totality. For these authors, taking the cultural turn seriously in 
political economy has meant analyzing “the articulation between the economic and the 
political and their embedding in broader sets of social relations” (Jessop, 2009: 336). 
In this regard, as well as focusing on the “existential necessity of complexity 
reduction” in the process of meaning making, and as well as illuminating “the role of 
evolutionary mechanisms in shaping the movement from social construal to social 
construction”, CPE has underscored the centrality of, what Foucault termed, 
“governmental technologies” as “the mechanisms involved in the governance of 
conduct and, a fortiori, in the production of hegemony” (ibid: 336-342). 
 
Without doubt, analyses from the perspectives of both political economy and 
governmentality that have stressed the centrality of context as an inescapable concrete 
necessity in neoliberalization’s progress have made an enormous contribution to 
academic and scholarly knowledge – particularly in their culturally- and/or 
geographically- grounded forms. Yet, as Barnett (2005) has argued, despite their 
sensitivity to path-dependency, contingency and tendential transformation, some such 
studies have still presented neoliberalization as an inescapably “hegemonic” project by 
which a clearly defined neoliberal logic of capital is perfectly capable of dominating 
social relations by subordinating public values to those of the market. As a result, they 
have often encountered difficulties; for example, in accounting for the “suturing 
together” of top-down political programmes with the complexity of everyday life, 
and/or in pre-supposing that their implied “subject-effects” will be automatically 
realized or more-or-less successfully contested and/or resisted. Thus for Barnett, by 
treating “the social” as a “residual effect” of hegemonic political programmes, neither 
political economy- nor governmentality- inspired theories of hegemony have been able 
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to provide adequate insights into the complex interplay between society and polity in 
the seeming re-production of neoliberal domination. 
 
In order to overcome these perceived weaknesses, this PhD adapts and re-poses the 
work of Roger Lee (2006, 2012) on the Ordinary Economy to help understand how 
neoliberal values of the market that are espoused in policy programmes like the 2011 
HE White Paper become negotiated, embedded and transformed in and through 
multiple and complex emerging economic geographies. However, rather than 
attempting to bolster political economy and/or governmentality approaches by adding 
on further lenses, theories and concepts as other authors have done (for example, Keil 
2002; Larner, 2000; Sum 2004) the PhD takes as its starting point a central element of 
all economic geographies over which there are perpetual social and political struggles: 
that is, value. 
 
Following Lee, I argue that economic geographies are always emerging and inherently 
relational entities in and through which value emerges from the practice and 
performance of socio-economic life. As such, studying the economy means grappling 
with what Lee (2006: 416) calls the “social relations of value” – i.e. the multiple 
values; social, economic and political relations, and notions of value – that constitute 
economic geographies, which in turn are reflective of the multiple contradictions, 
power relations, ethical dilemmas and material circumstances of socio-economic life. 
Whilst there is an imperative on Government to attempt to maintain political-economic 
coherence across time and space through politically imposed programmes – from 
neoliberalism to socialism – the economy is far more complex than much political (or 
disciplinary) thinking allows. For as Chapter Two of this PhD will demonstrate, it is 
the way in which economy is normally practised in time and place that 
neoliberalization, most centrally, seeks to change. As such, the PhD suggests that 
through the conceptual lens of Emerging Economic Geographies and the Ordinary 
Economy, the political economic process of neoliberalization can be understood to 
connote: the (attempted) transformation of existing socio-economic spatial relations 
into emerging economic geographies, more-or-less governed by the metrics and values 
of the market. 
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The PhD adapts a framework from Lee’s insights to examine the experiences of four 
very different universities in England as they made meaning of the HE White Paper in 
relation to their emerging economic geographies. In so doing, the thesis illuminates the 
transformative power of both political programmes and socio-economic relations as (in 
this case) market hegemony was (re)-produced in multiple and complex forms. Given 
what I claim in Chapter Three, Methodology, is the ontological necessity for 
normalisation and diversity to co-exist with one another in the Ordinary Economy, this 
PhD holds that neoliberalization is a bottom-up as well as top-down process that is 
constructed in practice in the context of an attempted normalisation of a particular 
understanding of value in the face of a diversity of values. As a result, the PhD 
concludes that hegemonic values such as those of the market are only ever partially 
constituted; and this has profound implications for what is meant by neoliberal 
hegemony and, indeed, for the political and social possibilities for its successful re-
negotiation. The practice and performance of emerging economic geographies in light 
of new policy metrics offers both opportunities and constraints for actors to move on in 
the world. And it is the practice and performance of socio-spatial economic relations 
that determines what is and is not value. 
 
1.1 The marketisation of higher education in England as a case study 
The overarching aim of this PhD is to resolve the complex interplay between 
neoliberally informed policy programmes of marketisation, which are, themselves, 
geographically diverse, and the diversity of ordinary socio-economic contexts into 
which those policy programmes are inserted or imposed. As such, the marketisation of 
HE, with a specific focus on England, offers a highly interesting and relevant case 
through which to pursue that aim (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 for why a case study 
approach was appropriate for this research). 
 
1.1.1 The market order: shaping the social organisation of higher education 
Over the past thirty-five years or so, the marketisation of HE has become a central 
focus for scholars concerned with the growing trend for national governments to 
deregulate their HE sectors and introduce market-oriented policies. Indeed, “the 
increasing influence of market forces on academic life”, as Dill puts it (2003: 136), is 
reported to have significantly transformed the framework of action for innumerable 
higher education institutions (HEIs) around the globe. Certainly since Leslie and 
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Johnson critiqued the United States’ (US) HE system for pursuing a market model as 
early as 1974, studies from Australia to the Americas, Asia and throughout Europe 
have sought to unpick just how far a neoliberally informed ‘market order’ (Marginson, 
2004: 180) has increasingly come to shape the social organisation of HE’s core 
functions – its research, its staff, and its teaching of a variety of student bodies (e.g. 
Chevaillier, 1998; Douglass, 2009; Geiger, 2004; Marginson, 2003, 2004; McBurnie 
and Ziguras, 2001; Neave, 2004, 2012; Robertson, 2006, 2010a, 2010b; Salerno, 2004; 
Teixeira et al, 2004, 2014; Young, 2002). 
 
Central to many of these explorations has been how a significant, and often politically 
purposeful, increase in the number of ‘home’ undergraduate students – that is, the 
‘massification’ of HE – has led to substantial pressure on the public purse and, 
therefore, to problems in directing the management of HEIs to make more efficient use 
of their public resource allocations. As Teixeira et al put it: 
“The political pressures for the control of public funds invested in the higher education 
system and the need to invent more effective and accountable models of organisation 
and management for the system have become prominent items on the agenda of policy 
makers and administrators” (2004: 1). 
 
Back in 1974, for example, Leslie and Johnson argued that from the late 1960s the 
perceived need in the United States to equalize educational and economic opportunity 
across the population intertwined with a funding crisis in HE to produce a series of 
policy measures aimed at increasing efficiency into the system via some form of 
market competition. Rather than opening up public HE to the full onslaught of a ‘free 
market’, the aim was to encourage ‘market-like behaviour’ through a series of grants 
that gave individual students more geographic flexibility in choosing their HEI. Since 
the cost of student grants was largely offset by reductions in both federal and state 
block grants to institutions, HEIs would have to compete for students and increase 
internal efficiency just to maintain their financial resources. In this context, Leslie and 
Johnson (1974) argued that the student grant prompted an important market condition 
by casting the student in the role of the consumer to whom producer institutions would 
need to respond. 
 
Similarly, in the UK strain on the public purse through massification became 
increasingly discursively produced as a problem that required intervention from the 
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late 1960s onwards. However, as Chapter Four of this thesis details, it was not until the 
early 1980s following the election of the “New Right” Conservative Government led 
by Margaret Thatcher (Bosanquet, 1981) that government began to employ strategies 
to induce greater efficiency within both universities and polytechnics on the basis of 
what Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) might call “quasi-market” principles. For example, 
in their first year of government, and as part of their wider agenda of public service 
reform, the Thatcher-led Government cut all public subsidies for overseas students and 
introduced full cost-covering fees instead, thereby opening up a full-blown 
international market. In their second year of government, the Conservatives reduced 
the universities’ block grant by some 15% and capped the Local Education Authority 
(LEA) funding pool for polytechnics, thereby attempting to drive internal efficiency on 
the basis of per-capita funding. As Gareth Williams argued in his account of the 
progression of a UK HE market, taken in combination the policies prompted the HEIs 
to recognize that “government could no longer be relied upon to guarantee [their] 
financial survival” (2004: 245). Instead, it became apparent that “the more efficient use 
of resources” and “income generation from other sources” would be “essential” if the 
universities and polytechnics “were to survive” (ibid: 244). 
 
Importantly, and as illustrated by Teixiera et al (2004, 2014), Brown (2011) and 
Brown and Carasso (2013), the extent to which the mechanisms and values of a market 
imaginary have been implemented to co-ordinate the evaluations, actions and activities 
of, particularly, institutions but, also, students has differed greatly between nations. 
But not dissimilar strategies of market coordination have been implemented in 
countries around the globe as HE has been discursively produced as inefficient and a 
strain on public monies. This has included Australia – which closely followed the 
trajectory of the UK from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (Marginson, 2003); Canada 
– whose HE system has expanded greatly whilst undergoing restructuring through 
market mechanisms (Young, 2002); the Netherlands – whose Governments since the 
mid-1980s have put considerable effort into “steering” HE “at a distance” through 
market principles (Jongbloed, 2003; Salerno 2004); and even France – whose HE 
system (whilst still highly centrally administered) implemented New Public 
Management (NPM) structures and more flexible working contracts for staff during 
the 1980s following rapid growth in student numbers (Chevaillier, 1998). Indeed, as 
early as 1990 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
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noted that most member countries were either considering, developing or 
implementing more sophisticated apparatuses for allocating funding on a more 
competitive basis in order to induce efficiency. Moreover, the role of student fees was 
becoming increasingly accepted as a central component of university finance and 
sustainability (OECD, 1990). 
 
Thus, as Brown (2011) and Brown and Carasso (2013) have underscored, the term 
‘marketisation’ has been applied to quite an array of policy measures ostensibly 
designed to make HEIs more competitive, efficient and more accountable to a range of 
external stakeholders including students, their families, employers, the taxpayer, and 
society at large. The term has also been applied to a variety of relationships within HE, 
with scholars often drawing clear distinctions between the possibilities for markets in 
staff (both nationally and internationally); markets in research (both in terms of 
funding and ‘outputs’); markets in PhD and Masters students (from both ‘home’ and 
‘abroad’); and markets in undergraduates (e.g. Barnett, 2000; Dill, 1997a, 1997b; 
Deem, 2008; Douglass, 2005; Locke, 2011; Marginson, 2003, 2004; Musselin, 2005; 
Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). 
 
1.1.2 An accidental market or deliberate political act? The wider political economy 
For some authors the application of market principles to HE has seemed almost 
accidental: defined as a ‘sort of discovery’ (Jones and Young, 2004). Gareth Williams, 
for example, suggested that the UK HE sector “stumbled into a closely regulated 
market through a series of ad hoc responses” by both Government and the HEIs 
following the global economic depression of the late 1970s (2004: 243, emphasis 
added). Thus, for Williams, HE could be understood as no more than “an incidental 
actor” in the “radical changes” that took place during the 1980s, and the governmental 
policies designed to elicit such changes could be understood as no more than necessary 
elements of “a wider set of economic policy choices” rather than “debated ideas about 
the finance and organisation of higher education” (2004: 243-244). For other scholars, 
with opportunities for further cuts in public spending diminishing due to fears that the 
quality of HE teaching and research might fall, marketisation has seemed like “the 
only policy game in town” (Marginson, 2003: 3) in the steering, funding and social 
organisation of the sector (Barr, 2004, 2010; Bar and Crawford, 2005; Barr and 
Shephard, 2010; Brown, 2011; Brown and Carasso, 2013; Teixeira et al, 2004, 2014). 
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Yet, as Neave (2004) has argued, since the collapse of the Keynesian settlement, the 
purposeful application of market principles to HE has brought to bear the values and 
rationalities of a neoliberal political imagination at multiple spatial scales. According 
to Neave, this has been due to broader shifts in contemporary capitalism that have been 
taking place not only at the national level, but also across the globe. As such, scholars 
from across the social sciences have argued that whilst the national context of HE 
policy development clearly matters, in an era of globalization the market-orientated 
changes that have been taking place across the HE landscape cannot be seen as 
extraneous to the wider political economy and, more specifically, to the progression of 
neoliberalization (Jessop et al, 2008; Marginson, 1997, 2003; Neave, 2004, 2012; 
Robertson, 2010a, 2010b; Peters, 2003). 
 
For Simon Marginson (1997, 2003, 2004, 2006) and Susan Robertson (2010a, 2010b), 
many of the market-orientated policy shifts in HE that have taken place since the fall 
of Bretton Woods are reflective of an increasingly dominant neoliberal paradigm in 
which market-based responses to perceived inefficiencies in public services have 
become the contemporary structuring framework in both the global North and South. 
Indeed, both authors have asserted that in an era of globalization a growing neoliberal 
political rationale has sought to mobilize state power in, what Tickell and Peck refer to 
as, “the contradictory extension and reproduction of market(-like) rule” (2003: x). As a 
result, neoliberal values of market efficiency, competition and economic rationality 
have affected the policy responses of both regional authorities and nation states in their 
attempts to rationalize and situate their HE systems, not simply within a globalizing 
economy but, also, as an evermore crucial sector of the global economy (see also 
Marginson and Rhodes, 2002; Marginson and Sawir, 2006; Marginson and van der 
Wende, 2007). 
 
For example, Robertson (2010a), writing from a critical political economy perspective, 
has argued that following the shift to a new international division of labour in which a 
large proportion of the production of goods and services moved overseas from the 
‘advanced’ economies of the West to (predominantly) the rising ‘Tiger’ economies of 
Asia, and parts of South America (see Dicken, 2011), many Western economies turned 
to the high-value end of the service sector in search of a new economic development 
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model capable of underpinning a new long-wave of accumulation (see also Harvey, 
2007). Drawing on influential intellectuals writing in the early 1990s such as Robert 
Reich, Robertson has suggested that a dominant neoliberal view was that the global 
North needed to identify itself as a high-value producer and innovator that invested in 
the training of highly-skilled problem solvers who would provide the essential 
resources for a competitive economy fuelled by, and founded upon, knowledge. For 
Reich, there was a direct correlation between the income that workers could generate 
and their education; and it was the latter that was central to the innovation of new 
knowledge-based industries and opportunities for accumulation (Reich, 1991, cited in 
Robertson, 2010a: 12). 
 
According to Robertson (2010a), the 1990s, thus, saw the political emergence of ‘the 
knowledge-based economy’ – a concept originally formulated during the 1960s. 
Innovations in technologies, communications and transportation, which are often seen 
as central facilitators and signifiers of globalization, were seen as potential markets 
that offered high-value returns for states capable of pushing their boundaries. Thus, 
any nation state wanting to compete effectively within this increasingly important 
global economy would need to expand its HE sector; making it leaner, more efficient 
and more competitive through processes of marketisation (see also Marginson and van 
der Wende, 2007). 
 
Certainly, as Chapter Four of this thesis will detail, since the Dearing Report of 1997, 
HE policy in England has been firmly situated in a discursive context of the 
knowledge-based economy, perhaps bearing some witness to its apparent domination 
of national policy contexts as, what Sum (2004, 2009) has referred to as, a ‘global 
economic imaginary’. Indeed, through a fusion of (neo)-Gramscian notions of 
hegemony and (neo)-Foucauldian governmentality Sum has underscored that the 
(re)making of a distinctly neoliberal form of capitalism has required the specification 
of such imaginaries. It has also required specific actors, organizations, and knowledge 
networks that have had both the capacity and power to “simplify a complex reality by 
selectively defining the ‘economy’ as an object of calculation, management and 
governance” (2009: 185; see also Jessop 2004, 2008; and Jessop et al, 2008). 
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In the arena of HE, Jessop et al (2008) and Robertson (2010b) have argued that one 
such organisation, the OECD, has played a central role in advancing both the 
knowledge-based economy and competitiveness as key to the successful reproduction 
of neoliberal capitalism through sustained economic growth, with HE strategically 
positioned as an indispensable material component thereof. Often through the lens of 
globalization, publications such as the statistics series Education at a Glance (first 
published in 1992), Education Ministerial Papers, Education Working Papers, Best 
Practice Guides, and a variety of Policy Briefs, have underscored the vital role that HE 
has to play in training the world’s workforce in order to fuel the engine of innovation 
and ensure the economic future of OECD countries. As one OECD Policy Brief puts it: 
“In a globalising knowledge economy, OECD countries face competition in a number of 
markets. They are turning to knowledge intensive products and services, which 
increases the dependency on access to new technologies, research results and knowledge 
and skills… Higher education institutions are among the most important sources of 
knowledge and innovation. As a result, governments are rethinking how to maximise the 
benefits from higher education… not only at the national, but also the regional level” 
(2007: 1). 
 
The OECD has also been a key international agent in promoting the expansion of HE 
within nation states and discursively reinforcing neoliberally informed strategies for 
effectively funding massification with a view to ‘ensuring’ the economic sustainability 
of the HE sector. In their publication Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society: 
Pointers for Policy Development, the OECD suggested that a nation’s funding 
approach should be consistent with goals such as expansion, competitiveness and cost 
effectiveness. Indeed, primarily through deregulation, the OECD stressed that HE 
funding should: facilitate the freedom to innovate; ensure institutional autonomy; be 
demand-driven; and be open, wherever possible, to private institutions (OECD, 2011). 
 
Such selective definition, reinforcement and structuring of HE within neoliberally 
informed discourses of competitiveness and the global knowledge-based economy has 
been a central theme in OECD knowledge networks since the early 1990s. And again, 
as Chapter Four of this thesis will illustrate, OECD publications have enabled 
individual nation states such as the UK (specifically, England) to evaluate their actions 
and activities against other nations’ performances (e.g. OECD, 1992, 2010). 
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Apart from being positioned as a key driver or facilitator of a global knowledge-based 
economy, a second and important argument put forward is that HE has been 
discursively and materially produced as an important global market in and of itself 
(Brown, 2009, 2011; Deem, 2008; Dill, 2003; Douglass, 2009; Marginson, 2003; 
Marginson and Sawir, 2006; Teixeira et al, 2004, 2014). For instance, as newly 
industrializing countries have moved up the ‘value hierarchy’ of global production 
networks, so countries such as China, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico and Colombia 
have become major ‘importing’ countries of HE services – seeking to up-grade their 
workforces in terms of knowledge and human capital by encouraging both 
undergraduate and post-graduate students to study abroad (see Marginson, 2004; 
Newman and Couturier, 2002; OECD, 2010a, 2010b; Sirat, 2010). In this sense, the 
cross-border flows of international students seeking a higher education has been 
positioned as an opportunity for individual nations to increase their income through an 
international trade in tertiary qualifications. Indeed, for ‘advanced’ economies of the 
West, HE has been positioned as a valuable ‘export’ market in which states such as the 
UK, the US and Australia have ‘comparative advantage’, particularly due to their long 
established and highly ranked HEIs (Collins, 2007; Marginson and van der Wende, 
2007; Marginson and Rhodes, 2002; OECD, 2010a).  
 
Once more, scholars from across the social sciences have argued that the OECD has 
played a central role in discursively positioning HE in this way. In addition, other 
regional policy assemblages and instruments, such as the EU’s Bologna Process 
(launched in 1999) and Lisbon Agenda (launched in 2000), as well as global 
agreements such as the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (first 
established in 1995) have been shown to have structured HE as an evermore valuable 
international market (as much as a collection of national markets) that is ‘open for 
trade’ (see Collins, 2007; Giroux, 2002; Marginson, 2003; Robertson, 2010b; Sauvé 
2002). 
 
Thus, for Marginson (2003, 2007), Marginson and van der Wende (2007), and 
Robertson (2006, 2010a, 2010b), national HE systems have been influenced by an 
increasingly pervasive neoliberal rationale of marketization, liberalization and 
privatization to look both “inwardly” to a variety of national markets and “outwardly” 
to various international markets in order to make the most of the value-producing 
 23
opportunities that HE now affords. Looking inwardly, for some nation states this has 
progressed only as far as the implementation of NPM structures to induce market-like 
behaviour amongst their universities and other HEIs. For others, it has meant allowing 
private interests to partake in HE provision while employing the ideal of market 
competition to discursively and materially construct the actions and activities of 
traditional HE providers. Looking outwardly, for some nations it has meant simply 
opening up their borders to an inward flux of overseas students, whilst for others it has 
meant encouraging their HEIs to ‘chart new waters’ by looking beyond the borders of 
the nation state to establish overseas alliances, off-shore branch campuses and 
franchise programmes. 
 
Given the dramatic shifts towards policies of marketisation that have taken place at 
multiple spatial scales, it could be easy to argue as Marginson (2003) has that the 
seemingly “engineered” structuring effects of an evermore hegemonic neoliberal 
paradigm would be impossible for HE’s actors and institutions to escape. Indeed, 
drawing on Hayek, Marginson has argued that the ideal of market competition, which 
“rests on the assumption of rational behaviour”, seems to be “as much a method for 
breeding certain types of mind as anything else” (2003: 3, citing Hayek, 1979: 74-76 
emphasis added). Thus for Marginson, writing on both the world-wide HE 
environment and the Australian national system, the decision by nation states to 
marketise their HE sectors is a “momentous” one for it (apparently) “imposes on the 
education system an arid neoliberal imagination in which society, culture and 
personality are mere outcomes of the economy, and [institutional] strategy is a trading 
game, in which the world is nothing more than opportunities for self enrichment” 
(ibid). 
 
Yet, as Marginson himself asserts in an argument that he fails to address (at least in 
this paper), HE is “not the same in all places, nor does it remain constant. It is made 
and unmade by human action” (2003:6). There is, indeed, “much else” to HE “apart 
from markets or economy” (ibid). And what Marginson calls HE’s “endogenous 
economic dynamics” – what in this PhD are referred to as HE’s social relations of 
value – can, indeed, “only be understood in the larger social and cultural context” 
(ibid). As Chapter Two of this thesis will argue, it is the examination of the multiple 
and complex interactions between governmental policy programmes of marketisation 
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and the diversity of ordinary socio-economic contexts that holds the potential for 
understanding how processes of neoliberalization are constructed in practice. 
 
1.1.3 The English HE sector: a brief overview 
As Chapter Four of this PhD will detail, the English HE system has developed largely 
as a result of HE policy since 1902, and has a long and diverse history. Universities 
range in type and form from the so-called ‘ancient’ universities such as Oxford and 
Cambridge that date back to as early as 1100, to the so-called ‘new’ universities – not 
of the ‘Robbins’ expansion’ of the 1960s, but of the post-1992 variety formed, 
predominantly, of former polytechnics and some HE colleges. Although it has been 
argued that much system diversity has been lost since the Conservative Government of 
‘92 granted university status to the latter – almost doubling the number of home 
undergraduate students attending university overnight (see Brown, 2011) – individual 
institutions remain inherently dynamic, socio-spatial, relational entities; each with their 
own history, identity, geographies, and path-dependencies that will variously inform 
and help shape the ways in which they implement (or not) new policy metrics. 
 
In broad terms, English universities have organised themselves into four main groups: 
the Russell Group, the 1994 Group, the Universities Alliance, and the Million+ 
Group1. Each of these groupings broadly relates to the universities’ various missions 
with an emphasis on research and/or teaching. For example, in 2011 when the 
Coalition’s HE White Paper was released, the Russell Group comprised a collaboration 
of twenty UK universities that placed enormous value on research and research 
funding, and for whom both national and international prestige, reputation and status 
were of paramount importance. For these universities, what Marginson (2003: 11) 
calls, the “positional goods” that they had to offer were of great value, as were their 
reputations for taking only the ‘brightest undergraduate students’; producing ‘world-
leading research and research training’; benefiting the UK economy through ‘the 
commercialization of innovation and knowledge exchange’; and leading the UK’s 
university system in the face of ‘fierce international competition’ (Russell Group, 
2011). In comparison, the Universities Alliance comprised twenty-three UK 
universities that had a strong orientation towards business and teaching – the majority 
                                                        
1
 In 2011, in addition to the four main Mission Groups, a small number of universities were affiliated to 
the Cathedral Group while other universities had no group affiliation. 
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having sought university status as polytechnics in 1992. Whilst in 2011, the Alliance 
was seeking to foster a ‘world-class, dynamic and innovative research base’, their 
commitment to teaching and social responsibility was apparent in their mission to 
‘enable social mobility, increase social inclusion, and transform local communities’. 
For these universities, a core value was the education of over 25% of the country’s 
home undergraduate students through the provision of a higher education that the 
universities believed was ‘flexible enough’ to supply the number of graduates that the 
UK economy needed if it were to remain globally competitive (Universities Alliance, 
2011). 
 
England’s universities were, also, highly differentiated in terms of their relational 
geographies and the socio-economic makeup of their student bodies (specifically, their 
home undergraduates). For example, looking at the 98 multiple-subject universities in 
England that carried a Times Higher Education ranking for the 2008 Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE), the top-tier Russell Group institutions (which 
consistently dominate national and international league tables) were considered to be 
‘selective’ universities with a wide spatial reach, tending to draw their home 
undergraduate bodies from across the nation (HESA, 2011a). Furthermore, they were 
considered to be ‘elite’ institutions given that the majority of their home 
undergraduates came from relatively well-off families from National Statistics Socio 
Economic Classifications (NS-SEC) 1 to 3 (ibid). Although all English universities 
under the existing legislation had to demonstrate strategies that would help to widen 
participation in under-represented groups (see the Higher Education Act 2004 and the 
2011 HE White Paper), in 2009/10 the three most highly ranked universities of the 
2008 RAE recruited, on average, just 14.1% of their home undergraduates from NS-
SEC 4 to 7 – well below the national average of 30.1% (HESA, 2011a). The same 
universities also drew significant numbers of both undergraduate and postgraduate 
students from non-EU countries, teaching, for instance, an average of 2975 
‘international’ post-graduates in 2009/10 compared to a national average of 995 
(HESA, 2011b). Of these postgraduates, many would have been Masters students 
taking part in a world-wide market in HE in which extremely high fees were being 
exchanged for the positional goods that the students received – backed by the 
reputations and ‘super-brands’ of their universities (THE, 2011). 
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In contrast, at the lower end of the 2008 RAE rankings, the socio-economic makeup of 
universities from, predominantly, the Million+ Group was significantly different from 
that of the ‘selective’ universities (HESA, 2011a). For example, in 2009/10 the three 
lowest RAE-ranked universities of this mission group recruited on average 40% of 
their home undergraduates from NS-SEC 4-7, with an average of 15.3% of the home 
undergraduate population coming from low participation neighbourhoods compared to 
just 3.5% for the Russell Group’s top three HEIs. In addition, the vast majority of the 
so-called ‘recruiting’ universities of the Million+ Group drew significantly higher 
proportions of their home undergraduates from local communities (see Chapter Three), 
perhaps reflecting the fact that many of these institutions, at some point in their 
histories, came under the direction and funding of the LEAs. However, whilst all of the 
highest-ranked universities of the English HE sector recruited well above the national 
average in terms of postgraduate students from both home and abroad, the three lowest 
ranked universities of the Million+ Group demonstrated marked variation in their total 
postgraduate recruitment, ranging from 810 for the lowest-ranked university to 3835 
for the highest-ranked of the three. And this variation was reflected in their recruitment 
of, solely, international postgraduates (ranging from 270 to 1245) suggesting that there 
was a great deal of diversity to be found in the strategies that individual HEIs had 
adopted in their attempts to secure their long-term survival. 
 
Thus, at the time of the HE White Paper’s release, there were clear differences 
between the ordinary contexts of a wide variety of universities that made up the 
English HE sector. In part, mission, status and reputation, and the socio-economic 
makeup and geographies of their various student bodies differentiated these 
institutions. So too did their individual histories, identities, physical geographies and 
path-dependencies. Taken together with the apparently hegemonic progression of a 
neoliberal rationale at multiple spatial scales aimed at shaping the universities’ 
evaluations, actions and activities, the marketisation of HE in England presents an 
interesting and valuable case study through which to pursue the aims of this thesis (see 
Section 1.1 above and Chapter Three, Methodology). 
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1.2 Thesis structure 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter Two opens by setting out the theoretical 
argument for adopting a different approach to resolving the complex interplay between 
geographically diverse relations of neoliberalization and the diversity of ordinary 
contexts into which those relations are inserted or imposed. It then adapts and reposes 
the work of Roger Lee (2006, 2007, 2012) on the Ordinary Economy, thereby setting 
the theoretical foundations for examining the marketisation of HE in England with a 
specific focus on the universities’ emerging economic geographies and the social 
relations of value that shape them. 
 
Chapter Three, then sets out the methodology adopted for examining how four diverse 
HEIs in England negotiated their way through the 2011 HE White Paper. The Chapter 
begins by elaborating the ontological and epistemological foundations of my 
interpretation of Lee’s thesis. It then details why a multiple case study approach was 
appropriate for this PhD, setting out the aims of the research, how the four HEIs were 
selected, and the qualitative methods adopted for their in-depth exploration, including 
the ethical issues that a researcher needs to consider when undertaking semi-structured 
in-depth interviews. The methodology also details the discourse analysis approach 
taken to analyze the primary and secondary documentation surrounding three 
important legislative/policy moments in the marketisation of England’s HE sector 
following the Dearing Report of 1997: The Teaching and Higher Education Act, 1998; 
The Higher Education Act, 2004; and the 2011 White Paper, Higher Education: 
Students at the Heart of the System. 
 
Just how far a neoliberal ‘market imaginary’ as a ‘semiotic order’ (Jessop, 2004) has 
come to penetrate HE policy in England is set out in Chapter Four. My analysis begins 
in the early 1900s with the establishment of the primary funding bodies that would 
come to shape the iterative emergence of HE’s economic geographies: the LEAs, 
whose funding structures underpinned the so-called “public system” of HEIs, and the 
University Grants Committee, whose system of grant funding would help to support 
the Liberal-based values of university autonomy and freedom for over sixty years. 
Drawing on both primary and secondary documentation, the first half of the chapter, 
thus, unravels the longue durée of politically imposed marketisation that followed an 
expansion of HE provision that wholeheartedly took purchase just after the Second 
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World War and continued post Lord Robbins’ Review of 1963. The second half of the 
chapter then examines the progressive neoliberalization of HE policy, which from 
1979 increasingly aimed to: a) induce the market metrics of competition and 
efficiency, and b) introduce consumer-producer relations and subjectivities, into HE’s 
framework of action. Overall, the chapter’s aim is to set out the social, political and 
economic context for HE’s emerging social relations of value. 
 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven detail the empirical analysis of how the four case study 
institutions made meaning of the 2011 HE White Paper in relation to their emerging 
economic geographies. Together, the chapters form what I am stylistically calling an 
“iterative emergence”, the full meaning of which is set out in the Preface to Part II of 
the thesis. Importantly, each chapter underscores the concomitant power of a 
neoliberally informed market imaginary to shape the HEIs’ social relations of value 
and the immediate variation of the market imaginary as it was interpreted, made 
meaningful and put into action (or not) in and through the universities’ diverse 
concrete emerging economic geographies. 
 
Chapter Five, Meaning Making: Complexity Reduction, argues that whilst the 
economic imaginary of the market put forward in the HE White Paper was central to 
the Government’s aim of structuring the evaluations, values, actions, activities and 
(thus) subjectivities of HE’s actors and organizations, in its real-world negotiation the 
reduced understandings of the White Paper were immediately (and inevitably) 
confronted by the multiplicity and complexity of semiotically- and materially- 
constituted social relations of value that make up the Ordinary Economy. The chapter 
seeks to illuminate this notion through an examination of how the universities reflected 
on certain aspects of their emerging economic geographies in order to: a) fix their 
undergraduate fees, and b) decide whether or not to participate in either of the primary 
policy initiatives devised by Government to bring further competition into the sector: 
i.e. the AAB+ competition and the ‘flexible margin’. 
 
Chapter Six, Putting Strategies into Action: Complexity Re-Introduction and the 
Fallacy of Dualities, empirically challenges overly simplistic assumptions that 
neoliberally informed policy programmes of marketization either become 
embedded/normalised into ordinary socio-economic relations or are successfully 
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contested and/or resisted. Through an examination of ‘the Student as Consumer’, the 
empirical evidence suggests that as the universities put into action certain strategies 
that, to varying degrees, were based on key discourses and metrics from the White 
Paper, so a whole host of HE’s actors evaluated what could stay and what could go; 
what needed to be altered; and what new actions and activities (if any) could be 
introduced into their framework of action. As such, the White Paper had the potential 
to displace, diffuse and possibly, even, ‘crowd out’ the ‘non-market’ orientated 
practices and values of the HEIs. However – and of utmost importance – there was an 
immediate variation of the policy metrics as multiple and diverse values and 
understandings of Value shaped the universities’ actual economic practices. 
 
Chapter Seven, Emergence: The Multiple and Complex Economic Geographies of 
Higher Education, empirically demonstrates that, in the ontology of the Ordinary 
Economy wherein normalisation and diversity necessarily co-exist with one another, 
any apparent political-economic coherence that is achieved through the 
implementation of market-orientated policies will always be permeated by 
inconsistencies and variation. Through the lens of one particular market metric that 
every UK Government since 1979 had sought to embed throughout the HE sector – 
that is, efficiency – the empirical evidence presented suggests that as understandings of 
the value of HE emerged as multiple and complex following the release of the White 
Paper, so it became harder for my interviewees to disentangle their actions and 
activities as either ‘market’ or ‘non-market’. For sure, each interviewee was adamant 
that they were not market actors and universities were not businesses; and indeed, 
adopted practices that would have been considered inefficient from a market 
perspective. Yet, at the very same time, they each found it virtually impossible to not 
think or speak of themselves as market actors and businesses – adopting practices that 
conformed to the Government’s emphasis on market-led efficiency. The overwhelming 
result for each HEI was that they now thought of themselves as more “market-like” 
and more “business-like” than they had before the implementation of the White Paper. 
 
Chapter Eight draws upon the evidence arising from my empirical investigations to 
present the conclusions of this thesis. Having taken an Emerging Economic 
Geographies and the Ordinary Economy approach to examining the complex interplay 
between geographically diverse relations of neoliberalization and the diversity of 
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ordinary, everyday socio-economic contexts, the chapter provides empirically 
grounded insights into: a) the processual nature of neoliberalization; b) how processes 
of neoliberalization become anchored at the level of everyday social life; and c) what 
this implies regarding the nature of neoliberal market hegemony. In so doing, the 
thesis suggests that the diverse practices of value that make up the economy 
underscore that emerging economic geographies are full of political possibilities. They 
therefore present actors and organizations with a plethora of shared values, practices 
and subjectivities around which to solidify a common voice of opposition to processes 
of marketization rather than remain divided by the political imposition of market-(like) 
rule – provided, of course, they possess, and can gather, the collective will to do so. 
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2 Neoliberalization and the Ordinary Economy: Arguments for a 
Different Approach 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the theoretical underpinnings for examining the marketisation of 
HE in England through a conceptual lens that, I suggest, has the capacity to resolve the 
complex interplay between neoliberally informed policy programmes of marketisation, 
which are, themselves, geographically diverse, and the diversity of ordinary socio-
economic contexts into which those policy programmes are inserted or imposed: that 
is, Emerging Economic Geographies and the Ordinary Economy. The chapter, first, 
sets out a working definition of neoliberalism as a political ideology, which serves as a 
foundation for understanding what will be referred to throughout this thesis as the 
metrics and values of the market. I then move beyond this somewhat utopian view of 
neoliberalism to examine the processual nature of the neoliberal project – what 
Brenner and Theodore (2002), Brenner et al (2010) and Peck (2010) refer to as 
neoliberalization – in which context, as an inescapably concrete necessity, matters in 
terms of how neoliberal processes unfold in time and space. Bearing in mind this 
necessity, I then elaborate on the work of Clive Barnett (2005) to offer a constructive 
critique of two of the most dominant approaches that have underpinned innumerable 
scholarly analyses of neoliberalization’s progress: i.e. political economy and 
governmentality. Although I place great emphasis on the enormous contribution that 
these two approaches have made to academic and scholarly knowledge – particularly 
in their critical and geographically grounded forms – I conclude that their analytical 
capacity to deal with the complex interplay between policy programmes and the 
multiple social, political and economic relations of the Ordinary Economy is limited. 
However, rather than attempt to ‘fix’ their limitations by adding on a further lens as 
other authors have attempted to do – for example, Keil’s (2002) utilization of the 
everyday as a ‘category’ that ‘links’ the economy to individual experiences – I draw on 
the work of Roger Lee to set out an entirely different approach: one, which in essence, 
strips back the focus to a central element of all economic geographies over which there 
are perpetual social and political struggles: that is, value. 
 
 32
2.2 Neoliberalism: a working definition 
In the opening chapter to A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey (2007) 
writes that “[f]or any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has 
to be advanced that appeals to our institutions and instincts, to our values and our 
desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit”. “If 
successful”, he continues, “this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in 
common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question” (2007: 5). Thus, for 
Harvey, the founding figures of neoliberal thought, such as Friedman, Hayek, Simons 
and Röpke, “chose wisely” by placing the compelling ideals of human dignity and 
individual freedom at the heart of their political project: as “the central values of 
civilization” (ibid). Importantly for this disparate band of economists and intellectuals 
who would eventually, though unevenly, ‘conjoin’ as the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 
(Peck, 2010), these central values were threatened not only by the extreme dictatorial 
regimes of fascism, Nazism and communism, which they witnessed curtailing the 
advance of capitalism and human dignity around them. They were also threatened by 
any form of state economic intervention such as Keynesianism that sought to substitute 
collective values “for those of individuals free to choose” (Harvey, 2007: 5; Foucault, 
2008). Whilst the neoliberals (if it is even possible to summon such a collective) 
disagreed ardently on important aspects of their political thinking, one fundamental 
unifying notion was held by all: that the best mechanism for the organisation of society 
was that of the market, and it was predominantly to the values of the market – not 
government – that a society of free individuals should turn. 
 
Of course, as Peck (2010) underscores, the differences between the main pioneers of 
neoliberal thinking are not insignificant in attempting to chisel out a working definition 
of neoliberalism, even if the “explicit attempt to remake laissez-faire for twentieth-
century conditions remains one of its definitive features” (2010: 39). Hayek of the 
Austrian School, for example, drew heavily from moral philosophy, probing Adam 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments as much as The Wealth of Nations in elucidating 
the process of ‘politicisation’ and how (for neoliberals) it should be stopped or 
curtailed. Indeed, whilst Hayek was convinced that the conscious, central design and 
organisation of society in the political sphere would inevitably lead society along The 
Road to Serfdom, he brought a rich, subjectivist, position to his analysis of 
spontaneous market order, eschewing the neo-classical preference for the clinical 
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separation of market values from the multiplicity of concepts, views and values held 
by individuals (see, for example, Hayek’s series of articles in Economica from 1942 to 
1944). That is not to say that Hayek did not concur with his contemporaries such as 
Friedman, that progress depended on man “giving an unthinking deference to the 
market” (Bosanquet, 1989: 31). Rather, his ‘philosophical mission’ was to defend the 
free market as a concept of moral choice in which morals are not merely (and 
necessarily) a phenomenon of individual conduct, but also “that they can exist only in 
a sphere in which the individual is free to decide for himself” (Hayek, 1944: 156). 
Hayek, then, was far more concerned with neoliberalism’s “antithesis”, as Bosanquet 
calls it: that “politics presents extreme dangers” to society, and any “attempts to bring 
about improvements through conscious design, however well intentioned, will almost 
always go wrong” (1981: 325; 1989: 7, emphasis added). As Hayek puts it: 
“Though the pursuit of the selfish aims of the individual will usually lead him to serve 
the general interest, the collective actions of organised groups are almost invariably 
contrary to the general interest” (Hayek, 1976: 138)… 
“Nobody with open eyes can any longer doubt that the danger to personal freedom 
comes chiefly from the Left, not because of any particular ideals it pursues, but because 
the various socialist movements are the only large organised bodies which, for aims 
which appeal to many, want to impose upon society a preconceived design” (Hayek, 
1979: 129). 
 
On the other hand, Friedman, the “economists’ economist” of the Chicago School, 
whilst also concerned with the “evils of Government rule” (Peck, 2010: 42), centred 
his writings around neoliberalism’s “thesis” arguing that, in fact, society has a natural 
tendency towards spontaneous order, and the economy has an inherent tendency 
towards growth – making the organisation of society through capitalist markets a 
natural and integrating force for good (Bosanquet, 1989). Indeed, writing in Free to 
Choose published in 1980 Friedman restates a conviction apparent throughout his 
work from the mid-1950s, and clearly stated in Capitalism and Freedom published in 
1962: that the natural sciences share an affinity with economics in describing and 
testing an unintentional and natural order. As Friedman notes: 
“Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is generally regarded as referring to purchases or sales 
of goods or services for money. But economic activity is by no means the only area of 
human life in which a complex and sophisticated structure arises as an unintended 
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consequence of a large number of individuals cooperating while each pursues his own 
interest” (1980: 25). 
 
For Friedman, the complex structure of language, the development of scientific 
knowledge, a society’s values, culture and social conventions, all develop in the same 
way as markets: “through voluntary exchange, spontaneous cooperation, [and] the 
evolution of a complex structure through trial and error, acceptance and rejection” 
(1980: 26). Like Hayek, Friedman underscores the multiplicity of values that may 
underpin an individual’s pursuit of his or her own “self interest” – rejecting the notion 
that “self interest” can be defined exclusively in terms of “immediate monetary 
reward” (1980: 27). However, and contra Hayek’s thinking (see Bosanquet, 1989; 
Caldwell, 1988; and Tomlinson, 1990), his emphasis on positive economics as an 
‘objective science’ – devoid of any normative judgements, and based on statistical 
testing and modelling – underpins his conviction that neo-classical economic theory 
can demonstrate the validity of markets by the robust nature of its predictions rather 
than the “real-life” complexity of its assumptions (Friedman, 1953). 
 
Superficially, Friedman’s primary focus on the “thesis” and Hayek’s emphasis on the 
“antithesis” merely suggest two different, yet intertwined approaches to the same 
utopian project: the organisation of society through markets rather than centrally 
planned government. Yet the differences between these two leading protagonists of 
neoliberal thinking – Hayek’s deep concern with the inescapably subjective and 
situated nature of economic activity and its ramifications2, and Friedman’s confidence 
in the power of objective economic science to disentangle, model and predict the 
validity of markets – underscore the central question in their twentieth-century re-
formulation of nineteenth-century liberalism. To what degree should, and can, the 
state be involved in the organisation of economy-society? Put another way, it 
underscores a central dilemma that, in fact, all modern societies must face – and one 
that is of central concern to this thesis (developed below). Who decides what value is 
and how value should or can be practised?3 
 
                                                        
2
 See for example, Hayek’s writings on economic knowledge and urban economy in Individualism and 
Economic Order (1949). 
3
 This reference to value and how it is practised refers to the ex-ante ‘fixing’ of value through state 
regulation versus ex-post emergence of value through the market. As my thesis develops, this (often 
unsupportable) duality will become clear. 
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Putting the thesis and antithesis together, Nick Bosanquet (1981) adeptly illustrates the 
neoliberal problem, predicted in its modelling, borne witness to in history, and named 
in Polanyi’s classic “double movement” in which the crisis tendencies of laissez-faire 
capitalism are responded to by a variety of social forces struggling to re-embed and re-
regulate the market. As Jessop puts it, “if [neo]liberalism can be interpreted as a more 
or less “spontaneous philosophy” rooted in capitalist social relations, one should also 
recognize that it is prone to “spontaneous combustion” due to tensions inherent in [the] 
same” (2002: 109). 
 
For Friedman, the answer to the neoliberal problem lay in the strength of the thesis and 
the predictability of short and long-term modelling. With society’s tendency towards 
spontaneous order and “certain propensity to truck, barter and exchange” (Smith, 
1776), his view of government is rooted in the role of the market (Bosanquet, 1981). 
Drawing heavily on Schumpeter, Friedman underscored the ‘economic miracle’ 
produced by laissez-faire capitalism in both Britain and the United States during the 
19th century, not merely in terms of the accumulation of capital and wealth made 
possible by the ex-post emergence of value through markets, but also, “the 
opportunities it has offered to men and women to extend and develop and improve 
their capacities” (1962: 169). Driven by the search for surplus value, competition and 
the courage of the entrepreneur to innovate, take risks and embrace uncertainty, such 
improvements took place through the long waves of “recurrent rejuvenation of the 
productive apparatus” inherent in capitalism’s “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 
1942). 
 
For Friedman (1962), society simply needed to understand that in the long run, free 
from government interference, capitalist market forces would lead to constantly rising 
minimum incomes and the alleviation of absolute poverty. Market forces would even 
lessen inequality, more so than alternative systems of organisation such as 
Keynesianism or socialism, and certainly with less coercion. Although people would 
experience capitalism’s ‘destructive moments’ in the short term – and certainly rally 
against them – the, so-called, democratic political process could never proportionally 
represent as many plural interests and valuations as could the market. As such, the 
primary role of government was to “determine, arbitrate and enforce the rules of the 
game” such as private property rights and the provision of a monetary framework 
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(1962: 27). And by-and-large the game could be defined as that of “voluntary 
exchange”, free from coercion, and practised through competitive capitalist markets4 
(see also, Friedman, 1980). 
 
For Hayek, the answer to laissez-faire capitalism’s crisis tendencies lay in the 
totalitarian consequences of the antithesis in which politicisation arises, in part, from 
the public outcry against capitalism’s ‘moments of destruction’, but also from the 
nature of the political process itself (Bosanquet, 1981). Drawing heavily on De 
Tocqueville in his three volumes of Law, Legislation and Liberty, Hayek underscores 
the inherent dangers of a democracy based on “a form of government where the will of 
the majority on any particular matter is unlimited” (1973:1). Here, driven by a desire to 
expose the intellectual errors and ‘fatal conceit’ of all forms of socialism in their 
claims that central planning can better co-ordinate the social division of labour, the 
division of knowledge, and information in a superior manner to markets, Hayek asserts 
that government has come to be about coercion based on ‘social’ interests and 
misplaced ideals rather than the maintenance of general rules that would uphold the 
necessary conditions for liberty and “the spontaneous order of a free society” (1973: 2; 
Tomlinson, 1990). 
 
Certainly, the economic misfortunes and ‘moments of destruction’ that Hayek 
recognized as “an inseparable part of the steering mechanism of the market” (1976: 
94) could lead individuals “to follow the marsh lantern of ‘social justice’” (Bosanquet, 
1989: 17) – a form of politically imposed egalitarianism, which Hayek saw as 
anathema to market functioning and the values it embodies. But it was the democratic 
process itself if left untamed and open to calls for legal social entitlements, the ex-ante 
‘fixing’ of value through extended public services and nationalisation, urban planning 
and the like, that was the greatest threat to liberty and the route to totalitarianism. 
Thus, for Hayek, democracy is acceptable – and necessary – only in so far as it is 
constrained by a constitution that limits the power of government. It is not acceptable 
to allow a temporary majority of citizens to grant unlimited powers to government in 
order to coerce individuals and “impose a different system of valuation” from that of 
the market (Tomlinson, 1990: 22). 
                                                        
4
 My thanks to Roger Lee for pointing out how remarkable it is that Friedman in particular, but also 
other neoliberals, was seemingly unable or unwilling to see capitalism as anything other than a 
manifestation of individualism organised through market relations rather than as a heavily structured 
mode of production. 
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In line with Friedman, then, Hayek believed that government was about setting the 
abstract ‘rules of the game’ – particularly around the institution of liberty, the meaning 
of law, the meaning of justice, and the democratic process. However, whilst in each of 
these arenas the game is the organisation of society through competitive markets, 
Hayek was more distant from the laissez-faire ‘dogma’ than Friedman. Instead, he 
envisioned a system of market rule in which there was a positive role for the state in 
“planning for competition” (1944: 31). He advocated local collectives as a democratic 
means of facilitating pluralism. He also went much further than Friedman and other 
Chicagoans in underscoring the need for limited government interventions in terms of 
mitigating some market failures (for example, he advocated a minimum income and 
compulsory social insurance), and providing for some public goods – although these, 
too, should be open to private competitive tender and/or internal competition in order 
to instill market values (Hayek, 1944, 1973, 1976, 1979). 
 
Neoliberalism, thus, began life as a somewhat ‘un-unified’ project that was never a 
cookie-cutter remake of laissez-faire liberalism. It was a product of time and place that 
had to be “constructed anew”, evolving as a working project that contained many 
differences and perspectives, particularly around the role of the state (Peck, 2010: 52). 
In so doing, it set “a foundation for a designed market order” that could be seen as a 
viable alternative to the Keynesian orthodoxy and more socialist (and fascist) projects 
of the time (ibid). Yet, as Peck asserts, the contestations and differing perspectives that 
were apparent within the neoliberal project might actually be telling us something very 
important about the “unattainability” of its central goal: “frictionless market rule” 
(2010: 16, emphasis in original). If, as an ideology, neoliberalism is complicated, put 
into practice in and through existing political economies and socio-economic relations, 
it can only be more so. 
 
2.3 Neoliberalization: from ideology to process 
What began as a utopian project based on the antagonisms of free-market economic 
theory and politicisation, neoliberalism has, since the late 1970s, “become the 
dominant ideological rationalization” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 33) of political 
economic activity both at a national level in the form of contemporary state 
restructuring, and globally – setting the framework for the deeper functional 
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integration of the world’s economies (Brenner et al, 2010; Dicken, 2011). Indeed, in 
what Peck and Tickell (2002: 33) refer to as “the new religion of neoliberalism”, this 
“ideological software” has combined a profound commitment to the extension of 
market values through commodification and the logics of competitiveness and 
efficiency with a deep aversion towards all manner of Keynesian or other “collectivist 
strategies”, both “inspiring and imposing far-reaching programs of state [reform] and 
rescaling across a wide range of national and local contexts” (ibid: 33-34). 
 
Thus, for Jessop (2002), as a new strategic political response to the perceived failures 
of Keynesian or analogous modes of interventionist regulation to manage, displace or 
defer the crisis-tendencies of their associated regimes of accumulation (such as 
Atlantic Fordism), this “neoliberal regime shift” has involved a necessarily 
contradictory process. On the one hand, neoliberalism seeks to “roll back” the state 
calling for the liberalization and deregulation of economic activity and transactions 
both within and across national borders; the deregulation of industry and/or 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services; the dismantling of 
welfare programmes; opening up the public sector to (at minimum, partial) private 
provision; and the utilization of market mechanisms or ‘proxies’ in whatever public 
sector services remain. On the other hand, it involves “rolling forward” and rescaling 
“new forms of governance… that are purportedly more suited to a market-driven 
(and… knowledge-driven) globalizing economy” (ibid: 107). The internationalization 
of policy regimes to international economic organizations such as the WTO, the IMF 
and World Bank; key strategic roles for urban and regional governments, growth 
coalitions and business partners; a shift of power from government to market forces 
and partnership-based forms of governance – all have been variously instigated with 
the view of promoting supply-side competitiveness and securing smooth operating 
conditions for national and international markets (see also Dicken, 2011). As such, 
undertaking the neoliberal political project has paradoxically involved an increase in 
state intervention (even if, as neoliberal supporters claim, the state will eventually 
retreat in deference to the market) (Jessop, 2002: 106-107). Or, as Peck and Tickell 
more forcefully assert, it has entailed a “formidable and robust pattern of proactive 
statecraft and pervasive ‘metaregulation’” in the “purposeful construction and 
consolidation” of market rule (2002: 37). 
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Since the initial rise of neoliberalism in Chile in 1973, followed closely by the US and 
the UK from the late 1970s, many economies have provided “fertile ground” for 
political, economic and social transformation in the name of neoliberal capitalism: 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia being well-documented examples (e.g. Argent, 
2005; Keil, 2002; Kipfer and Keil, 2002; Kelsey, 1995; Larner, 2000a, 2005; Larner 
and Walters, 2000; O’Neill and Moore, 2005). And whilst many nations of the Global 
South have suffered neoliberal structural adjustment under the conditionalities 
imposed by the International Financial Institutions – first aggressively during the 
1980s and then with a more “human face” following the Washington Consensus of the 
1990s (Jolly, 1991; Gould, 2005) – many have since unilaterally adopted a variety of 
neoliberal policy strategies in order to gain purchase in the geographically and socially 
uneven neoliberal market game (Stiglitz, 2008). Even social democratic economies 
such as Norway (Pani and Holman, 2013) and Denmark (Neilsen and Kesting, 2003) 
have become ‘unusual suspects’ caught up by the ‘common sense’ meter of the market. 
And with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in the late 1980s (Smith and Rochovska, 
2007; Smith and Stenning, 2006) through to China’s, now, specific brand of market-
led growth (Ong, 2007) it is difficult to name but a handful of countries that have not 
opened up their economies and societies to some degree of discipline through 
(capitalist) market values (Brenner et al, 2010). Perhaps, then, Harvey is right to 
suggest that towards the end of the 1990s Blair and Clinton could have easily reversed 
Nixon’s earlier statement and proclaimed that “we are all neoliberals now” (2007: 13). 
But possibly more shockingly given the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, 
perhaps President Obama and the Cameron-Clegg Coalition could quite easily have 
done the same (Peck et al, 2012). 
 
However, as Peck (2010) underscores, such “purposeful construction” or “planning for 
competition” (Hayek, 1944) does not connote – indeed, cannot connote – that we are 
dealing with some coherently formed “ism” or “end-state”. Rather, the necessity for 
neoliberal ideals to be put into practice by, in and through existing state forms and 
sociospatial relations highlights the inherently path-dependent, geographical, 
historically specific, contradictory, relational, emergent, and tendential nature of 
neoliberal projects. As such we should consider the contemporary construction of 
capitalist market hegemony as a process of neoliberalization rather than a fully 
actualized policy regime. And its uneven or “variegated” concrete manifestations are 
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best thought of as “actually existing neoliberalisms” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; 
Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner et al, 2010). For Brenner and Theodore this means 
emphasizing: 
“…the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring projects insofar as they have 
been produced within national, regional and local contexts defined by legacies of 
inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political 
struggles” (2002:4, emphasis in original). 
 
This is not to ignore or underplay the hegemony of market disciplinary discourses in 
the “worldwide imposition of neoliberalism” and its attempts to “restructure the 
present” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner et al, 2010). Rather, it is to underscore 
the “ongoing creative destruction of political-economic space at multiple geographical 
scales” as “existing institutional forms [and landscapes] are transformed into emergent 
neoliberal projects” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 4). Indeed, although the market 
oriented restructuring projects of the past three decades have variously ‘flailed and 
failed’ forward in their attempts to secure sustainable capitalist economic growth (Peck 
et al, 2012: 274), if as Marx (1971) asserts capitalist regulation takes place through the 
habits, rules, norms and valuations of particular institutional social relations, then the 
various geographically and historically situated politico-institutional infrastructures 
that neoliberalization confronts are not unproblematic. 
 
As such, Brenner and Theodore’s reworking of Schumpterian creative destruction to 
describe the necessarily dialectical moments and processual nature of political-
economic change – no matter its Left/Right orientation – entreats the researcher to 
explore the variegated character of neoliberalization. Moreover, there is a need to 
recognize the multiple variations that arise as neoliberal reform initiatives are imposed, 
contested and struggled over “within contextually specific institutional landscapes and 
policy environments”: 
“Most crucially… the notion of actually existing neoliberalism is intended to illuminate 
the complex, contested ways in which neoliberal restructuring strategies interact with 
pre-existing uses of space, institutional configurations, and constellations of socio-
political power:… the (partial) destruction of extant institutional arrangements and 
political compromises through market-oriented reform initiatives; and the (tendential) 
creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, 
and the rule of capital” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 14-15, emphasis original). 
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To couple this understanding of actually existing neoliberalism with Schumpeter’s 
original formulation of creative destruction in which society will inevitably rally 
against the inherent crisis tendencies of capitalist markets (and with which Polanyi, 
Hayek and Friedman were so deeply concerned) is surely to describe an ‘actually 
existing’, circuitous, ongoing, and increasingly destructive neoliberal perfect storm. 
For on the one hand, neoliberalization necessarily challenges and seeks to dismantle 
the extant social relations and modes of valuation that contradict or resist the 
regulatory values of the market (Gough, 1996a, 1996b, 2002), whilst on the other, if 
left unfettered, it creates the very tensions that solicit calls for social justice and fairer 
social and economic conditions that are a potential challenge to (neo)liberal market 
rule (Hayek, 1944; Polanyi, 2001/1944). 
 
Yet, as Brenner et al (2010) assert, where market-orientated regulatory projects have 
failed to overcome the putative shortcomings of the ‘collectivist strategies’ they have 
sought to displace, the neoliberal meter has hardly been abandoned. Instead, “endemic 
policy failure has tended to spur further rounds of reform within broadly neoliberalized 
political and institutional parameters” (ibid: 209), driving forward a “spiraling” 
process of regulatory transformation – “crisis-induced, crisis-managing and crisis-
inducing” (ibid: 210) – that is inherently combative. As they argue: 
“Each round of neoliberalization profoundly reshapes the institutional landscapes in 
which subsequent neoliberalization projects unfold. The substantive character of each 
round of neoliberalization is forged through the contextually specific forms of friction, 
resistance, conflict and crisis that are engendered through this combative encounter. In 
effect, the interplay between neoliberalization projects and inherited landscapes 
produces a propulsive ricocheting of multiple, differentially spatialized yet 
interconnected double movements across places, territories and scales”. 
Nonetheless: 
“By way of successive, crisis-riven and often profoundly dysfunctional rounds of 
regulatory restructuring, the ideological creed, regulatory practices, political 
mechanisms and institutional geographies of neoliberalization have been repeatedly 
reconstituted and remade… In this sense, neoliberalization has never represented a 
stable institutional ‘fix’, despite being repeatedly animated by the search for this fix… 
This is not simply a matter of movements in the global tides: currents, eddies, and 
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blockages in regulatory dynamics at all spatial scales make a (constitutive) difference” 
(Brenner et al, 2010: 197-210). 
 
It is little wonder, then, that the neoliberal regime shift of the past thirty-plus years has 
become such a focus of academic attention with scholars from across the social 
sciences having interrogated neoliberalization’s power geometries; its social, economic 
and political consequences; its uneven geographies; its social and political 
compromises; its contestations, contradictions, mutations and variegations (e.g. 
Bosanquet, 1981; Harvey, 1990; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Jessop 1995; Held et al, 
1999; Bourdieu, 1998; Stiglitz, 2003; Massey, 2007; Brenner et al, 2010). And with 
the metrics of the market and processes of marketization still, apparently, hegemonic – 
despite the increasing frequency, scale, and extent of neoliberal capitalism’s crises – it 
is also little wonder that academics, politicians and lay people alike are questioning 
what are, and where are, the alternatives; and how neoliberalism actually survives 
(Peck et al, 2012). 
 
2.4 Political Economy and the problem of hegemony 
One common framework shaping many such accounts of neoliberalization is political 
economy, which can be broadly understood as the examination of how the political 
environment (including political behaviour, institutions, policy and ideology) and the 
economic system (be-it capitalist, socialist or mixed) either influence one another 
(Weingast and Wittman, 2008) or, indeed, are inseparable from one another (Polanyi, 
2001/1944). Brenner et al (2010) for example, root their analysis of variegated 
neoliberalization in geographic political economy arguing that any sufficient 
examination of marketised modes of regulatory restructuring and their alternatives 
must take into account how successive waves of uneven neoliberal forms of capitalism 
have had cumulative impacts on uneven institutional landscapes across all spatial 
scales: first, through the establishment of “interconnected, mutually recursive policy 
relays within an increasingly transnational field of market orientated policy transfer”; 
and second, through the “infiltration and re-working of geoinstitutional frameworks, or 
‘rule regimes’, within which regulatory experiments [necessarily] unfold” (2010: 182). 
However, despite the theoretical, methodological and empirical purchase that political 
economy has had (and still has) across the social sciences (Massey and Meegan, 1985; 
Barnes et al, 2007), this ‘family of approaches’ has come in for much criticism (Payne, 
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2006). Indeed, scholars working both within the field and beyond it have expressed 
dissatisfaction with its totalizing and essentialising tendencies (e.g. Gibson-Graham, 
1996; Harraway, 1985; Jessop and Sum, 2003; Sayer, 1995). Still others have not been 
wholly satisfied with its explanatory power of how neoliberal capitalism has gained 
such purchase (e.g. Cox, 1987; Jessop, 2004; Joseph, 2012; Larner, 2000, 2003; Ong, 
2006, 2007; Sum, 2004, 2009). 
 
Jessop and Sum (2003), for example, root their approach to a more ‘culturally 
inflected’ political economy firmly within the Marxist tradition, which “examines the 
specificity of the basic forms, contradictions, crisis-tendencies and dilemmas of 
capitalism” as well as “their conditions of existence and potential impacts on other 
social relations” (Jessop, 2004: 161). Certainly, the authors state that the relevance of 
Marxism comes, in large part, from its “ambition to provide a totalizing perspective on 
social relations as a whole” in terms of the existence, dynamics and social organization 
of capitalist (re)production (Jessop and Sum, 2003: 1001). However, they reject any 
claims that it is able to interpret the world as a closed totality – particularly when 
expressed by one-sided deterministic arguments such as economism, politicism, 
ideologism, voluntarism or class reductionism. Thus, taking the ‘cultural turn’ 
seriously in its readings of neoliberalization, CPE stresses the contingent and always 
tendential nature of the different moments of capital accumulation rather than reifying, 
naturalizing or essentialising them as “objective forces” as often found in orthodox 
Marxist accounts, or, indeed, neo-classical economics (Jessop and Sum, 2003; Jessop, 
2004). 
 
However, for Barnett (2005, 2008) the sensitivity to contingency and tendential 
transformation such as that expressed in the culturally- and/or geographically- inspired 
accounts of Jessop and Sum (2003) and Brenner et al (2010) merely illuminates 
“distinctive manifestations of what, nevertheless, remain varieties of a single genus” 
(2005: 8). As such, they help to produce a narrative of neoliberalism as a “hegemonic” 
project. Indeed, Barnett (2005) argues that no matter the sensitivity with which it is 
handled, neoliberalization is still presented as a programme of ideas, policies and 
governance arrangements that vigorously pursue privatization, the liberalization of 
markets, competition, private property rights and the like. Furthermore, all are done in 
the interest of capital accumulation, and all are diffused downwards and outwards 
 44
through an ideologically grounded project sustained by an identifiable set of 
institutions located, predominantly, in the West. As a result, authors in the political 
economy tradition are basically proposing “a new variant of a hegemonic class-driven 
project of state restructuring in the interests of free markets and expanded 
accumulation” – often further inflecting their conceptions of neoliberalization through 
the lens of Gramscian state theory (ibid: 8). 
 
For Barnett, the inflection of Gramsci entails two important propositions: first, “that 
political dominance is exercised by the formation of coalitions amongst different 
interests”; and second, “that the primary medium for suturing together such formations 
is a set of coherent ideas and images of the world” (ibid). In turn, the latter proposition 
involves tying together elite actors within a “ruling bloc” around these hegemonic 
ideas, which must, then, also do the “more ordinary ideological work of legitimizing 
the political subordination of entire populations” (ibid). In light of Gramsci’s desire to 
escape any economic determinism associated with Marxism, he theorized the capitalist 
state as two over-lapping spheres: a ‘political society’, which rules through force, and 
a ‘civil society’, which must rule through consent (Heywood, 1994; Morton, 2007; 
Strinati, 1995). In Gramsci’s eyes, the latter was the public sphere in which ideas, 
norms, values and beliefs are shaped and where the hegemony of the ruling class is 
reproduced in and through cultural life, assisted by the media and respected institutions 
such as universities and the church to ‘manufacture’ consent and legitimacy 
(Heywood, 1994: 100-101). As Strinati’s rendering of Gramsci explains: 
“Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the ruling 
class, maintain their dominance by securing the ‘spontaneous consent’ of subordinated 
groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political 
and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominated and dominant groups” 
(Strinati, 1995: 165). 
 
In this sense, the accomplishment of hegemony signifies that dominant groups have, 
somehow, succeeded in persuading other groups (or classes) to accept a set of moral 
positions, ideas, and political and cultural values that are not, strictly speaking, their 
own. Consent is thereby “given” by a majority of the population to reproduce a 
particular direction that is put forward by those in power. As such, a sort of “common 
sense” prevails in and through which an ideological consensus is practised and 
dispersed (Heywood, 1994; Morton, 2007; Strinati, 1995).  
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Much to Barnett’s chagrin, the turn to Gramscian notions of hegemony to help explain 
the political legitimation of neoliberalization thereby “…conveniently resolves the 
analytical problem of the relationship between politics and economy” (2005: 8). 
Neoliberalism as hegemony presents a clearly defined, purposive project in which the 
logic of capital is a “directive ideology” perfectly capable of dominating social 
relations by subordinating public values to those of the market. It, thus, ‘bridges the 
gap’ between the economic and political elements of political economy by subjugating 
the public to the private, the state to the market, and the social to the economic 
(Barnett, 2005, 2008; Brown, 2003; Clarke 2006). As Clarke puts it: “we [no longer] 
have to worry about how to think about ‘relative autonomy’ since we (apparently) live 
in a period when politics and economic interest are so directly fused” (2006: 91). Yet, 
as Barnett argues, the problem with many political economy accounts of neoliberal 
hegemony is that “they lack any clear sense of how consent is actually secured, or any 
convincing account of how hegemonic projects are anchored at the level of everyday 
life, other than implying that this works by ‘getting at’ people in some way or other” 
(2005: 9). 
 
2.4.1 The turn to Foucault 
In this regard, many scholars have turned to Foucault’s understanding of 
governmentality to help explain ‘the how’ of neoliberal government (Dean, 1999; 
Rose, 1999). The potential salience of governmentality becomes apparent from a series 
of lectures delivered by Foucault towards the end of the 1970s in which he develops an 
understanding of “the art of government”, particularly in terms of (advanced) liberal 
forms of government, which have at their core the notion of individual freedom 
(Foucault, 1980, 1997, 2000, 2004). According to Foucault (2000), through the genesis 
of political knowledge and the advent of statistics during the late-17th/18th century 
period of enlightenment, government became centrally concerned with understanding 
the population and the mechanisms, apparatuses, tactics and techniques by which it 
could be regulated and governed (Dean, 1999; Elden, 2007). In recognizing that 
“population has its own regularities, its own rate of deaths and diseases, its cycles of 
scarcity, and so on” the population as a whole, rather than the family unit, became the 
ultimate end of government: its welfare, its improvement, the increase of its wealth, 
health, etc (Foucault, 2000: 216). At the same time, the economy became re-centred at 
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the level of the state, inseparable from population as a specific and principal sector of 
its reality and, therefore, a domain in and through which government would need to 
operate in order to achieve its ends (ibid; Dean, 1999: 19).  
 
In elaborating this ‘art’, Foucault uses the term ‘governmentality’, which, as Lemke 
explains, “demonstrates Foucault’s working hypothesis on the reciprocal constitution 
of power techniques and forms of knowledge” (2001: 191). Indeed, governmentality 
links the meaning of to govern (‘gouverner’) to systems of thought (‘mentalité’) 
indicating that in order to understand the apparatuses, tactics and techniques of 
government we must, first, understand the political rationality that subtends them 
(Lemke, 2001: 191). For Rose and Miller (1992), political discourse is a technical 
domain in and through which reality is represented, analyzed and rectified. In part, this 
suggests that political rationalities are ‘morally coloured’ addressing the appropriate 
powers and responsibilities of authorities and directing them towards a whole host of 
political and social ideals, for example: economic efficiency, economic growth, 
competitiveness, freedom, justice, equality, and so on. Furthermore, they are 
‘grounded in knowledge’ in that they express or embody some understanding or 
account of the nature of the objects to be governed. Finally, political rationalities are 
‘made thinkable through language’. Here, political discourse is far from mere rhetoric. 
It forms an ‘intellectual machinery’ for problematizing reality within the 
considerations of a political rationale (see also Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001). 
 
Indeed, it is through problematizations that seek to understand certain failings or 
difficulties in society that practical and technical ‘programmes’ or ‘regimes’ of 
government are devised (Dean, 1999; Rose and Miller, 1992). Problems of regulation, 
market freedom, economic competitiveness and the like, may all elicit the attention of 
government, which draws upon the expert knowledge of economists, academics, 
professionals and other authoritative parties, to calculate ways in which a problem may 
be rectified. Although the problems upon which government focuses are intrinsically 
linked to the ideals, desires and values of government itself, programmes of 
government thereby claim legitimacy through embodying a “rationalised knowledge” 
of the problem to be dealt with whilst concomitantly assuming that the problems faced 
by society “appear susceptible to diagnosis, prescription and cure by calculating and 
normalising intervention” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 183). 
 47
 
This brings us to the second element of Foucault’s hypothesis: power. 
Governmentality involves a complex form of power, which has at its core not 
principals of domination and discipline or instruments of the law (though these cannot 
be excluded) but rather, the normalisation of processes through the conduct of 
individuals and collectives in a population. As such, through the employment of 
various tactics, techniques and what Foucault (2000: 217) refers to as “technologies of 
government”, Government seeks to get the population to “self-govern”: to act upon 
and within itself in order to achieve its needs and aspirations whilst remaining (largely) 
oblivious to its manipulation. In this sense, government becomes the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ encompassing both the government of others and the government of the self. 
It is a “calculated means of the direction of how we behave and act” (Dean, 1999: 2). 
 
For Rose and Miller technologies of government are the multitude of mechanisms 
through which political rationalities and the desires, ideals and values of government 
become “capable of deployment” and, potentially, “normalised” (1992: 183). Within a 
multifarious network of connections, diverse forces (be they legal, professional, 
administrative, financial and so on) seek to regulate the actions of groups and 
individuals in relation to “authoritative criteria” based on calculations, knowledge and 
expertise. As such, we see the emergence of a central concept of governmentality, 
which is the ability to “control at a distance” through mechanisms immanent to the 
population (ibid: 184). In this sense the state becomes part of a vertical and horizontal 
network of actors, able to ‘steer’ individuals toward achieving specific outcomes rather 
than (solely) disciplining them into doing so (Dean, 1999; Joseph, 2012). 
 
Dean (1999) argues that conceiving human conduct, identity and agency as attributes 
that can be regulated, shaped and normalised through surreptitious actions implies 
some amount of autonomous reflexivity on the part of the individual or collective. In 
part, this has a distinctly moral undertone if morality is to be taken as “the attempt to 
make oneself accountable for one’s own actions” (ibid: 11). In addition, there is an 
assumption that those being governed are free and capable of making rational and 
responsible decisions regarding their own actions. As such, government presumes “a 
set of standards or norms of conduct by which actual behaviour can be judged, and 
which act as a kind of ideal towards which individuals as groups should strive” (ibid: 
 48
10). In this sense, the “authoritative criteria” set out in the technologies of government 
encourage actors to work out “where they are” in relation to “where they should be” 
and to come up with strategies for “improvement” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 186-187). 
Thus, in modern liberal forms of government, “power is not so much a matter of 
imposing constraints upon citizens as of ‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing a kind 
of regulated freedom” (ibid: 174, emphasis added). 
 
Whilst it is tempting to view Foucault’s understanding of governmentality as a 
rejection of power as centralized, top-down and hierarchical, Joseph suggests that it 
“helps qualify” and “give nuance” to our understanding of how power works (2012: 
13). For, rather than rejecting the idea of sovereignty or state power, Foucault is 
concerned with understanding how the disparate arenas of rule and governmental 
techniques through which identities must be shaped, behaviors must be regulated, and 
the population must be governed become incorporated into the state’s juridical and 
administrative procedures (1980:121). As Foucault puts it: “rather than asking 
ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we should be trying to discover 
how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are 
gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects” (2004: 28, 
emphasis added). 
 
A key implication of this technical aspect of government is that it contests those 
models that wish to see government as solely, or predominantly, a manifestation of an 
ideology or world-view. If government is to achieve its ends or to realize its values, it 
must use technical means. As Dean summarises: 
“[Government] therefore involves various forms of thought about the nature of rule and 
knowledge of who and what are to be governed… it employs particular techniques and 
tactics in achieving its goals… it establishes definite identities for the governed and the 
governors, and… it involves a more or less subtle direction of the conduct of the 
governed” (1999: 18). 
 
2.4.2 Governmentality and the production of hegemony 
Before I turn to some of the substantive difficulties associated with governmentality 
and its implementation alongside political economy, it is worth exploring how various 
studies of neoliberalization have utilized governmentality to great effect (although the 
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examples presented here also need problematizing, which I undertake in the next 
section). For example, in exploring the possibilities for liberal democracy’s5 survival 
in a post-9/11 America, Wendy Brown (2003) underscores the pervasiveness of a 
neoliberal political rationality, which (in her eyes) has, over the past quarter century, 
emerged “as governmentality”, eroding liberal democratic institutions and practices 
through the extension and dissemination of market values, not only in terms of the 
economy but, moreover, “to all institutions and social action” (ibid: 7, emphasis in 
original). Indeed, eschewing the inevitable historical unfolding of capitalism’s laws 
and the “ontological givenness” of rational economic behaviour found in many 
traditional political economy accounts, Brown argues that neoliberalism is a 
constructivist project which, through discourses, policies, tactics and techniques that 
promulgate its criteria, has deliberately set out to produce rational, self-interested 
actors, instill entrepreneurial behaviour, and impose a hegemonic market rationale for 
decision-making in all spheres of life. Whereas, over the past two centuries, liberal 
democracy has provided a modest ethical gap between economy and polity through 
sustaining the relative moral, economic, and political autonomy of certain institutions 
both from one another and from the market – for example, the law, elections, the 
police and the public sphere – a neoliberal political rationality has closed it by 
submitting every aspect of political and social life to economic calculation. Thus, for 
Brown, “liberal democracy cannot be submitted to neo-liberal governmentality and 
survive” (2003: 23). As she explains: “there is nothing in liberal democracy’s basic 
institutions and values… that inherently meets the test of serving economic 
competitiveness or… withstands a cost benefit analysis” (ibid). 
 
Wendy Larner (1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2007) and Aihwa Ong (1999, 2006, 2007, 
2008) have also applied the analytical weight of governmentality to great effect in their 
respective accounts of neoliberalization in New Zealand and Asia. Indeed, rejecting 
neoliberalism as a top-down ideology or, as Ong (2007) more forcefully puts it, a 
capitalist “economic tsunami”, both authors underscore that the technical 
implementation of neoliberal policies has set a framework of market governance, 
attempting to re-constitute and mobilize very particular identities and subjectivities 
                                                        
5
 Liberal Democracy in the USA should not be confused with neo-liberalism. Whilst the latter puts 
forward the notion that the best mechanism for the organization of society is that of the market with 
very limited government intervention, the former – in the USA – often signifies a progressive political 
position that supports, for example, the welfare state and other components of New Deal politics, 
alongside relatively high levels of social and political intervention (see Brown, 2003). 
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cast along market lines. For example, Larner’s (1997) examination of when New 
Zealand’s telecommunication’s sector first came under neo-liberal calculation, 
emphasizes how political technologies such as the “Telecom Pledge” and the “Kiwi 
Share” enabled the Government to propagate ideals of efficiency and competitiveness 
in its attempts to produce a “hegemonic consumer identity” and a  “neo-liberal self” 
(ibid: 384). Similarly, Ong (2007) describes how, in China, neoliberal calculations 
have identified spaces and populations in and through which global market 
opportunities can be optimized. Here, on the one hand, market reforms have been 
introduced through “zoning technologies” that encode alternative territorialities for 
experiments in economic freedom and entrepreneurial activity. On the other, pro-
market policies have sought to foster self-enterprising and highly skilled subjectivities 
capable of creating surplus value and economic growth through rational, self-interested 
behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, a number of scholars have sought to develop productive dialogues 
between neo-Foucauldian understandings of governmentality and neo-Marxian 
structural accounts of capitalism and/or neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony in order 
to examine the neoliberal remaking of capitalist market social relations (e.g. Ekers and 
Loftus, 2008; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Jessop, 2007, 2009; Jessop and Sum, 2003; 
Kiersey, 2009; Peet, 2002; Springer, 2012; Sum, 2004, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2005; 
Watts, 2003; Weidner, 2009). Indeed, Sum’s (2004, 2009) rendering of cultural 
political economy specifically seeks to ‘creatively interweave’ Gramsci and Foucault 
by addressing not only the “discursive and extra-discursive dimensions” of their 
analyses but, also, by integrating “their respective strengths into a broader historical 
materialist framework” (2009: 186). On the one hand, Gramsci provides “the lens for 
studying how hegemony is produced and re-produced in class divided and otherwise 
inegalitarian social formations” as well as “the ‘real’ mechanisms, tendencies and 
counter-tendencies that interact to produce the processes and events at the level of the 
actual” (Sum, 2009: 185-186). On the other hand, Foucault provides “a valuable 
corrective to studies that naturalize and reify economic and political objects and 
categories” (Sum, 2004: 2) by providing “an entry point into the discursive aspects of 
subject formation and techniques of subjectivation” (Sum, 2009: 186). As such, Sum 
argues that CPE is able to: 
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“…examine the relationship between the micro-dynamics of disciplinary-governmental 
power relations and their strategic codification to produce specific hegemonic effects [or 
“imaginaries” such as that of ‘the market’] at more encompassing levels of social 
reality. [CPE thereby] …facilitates a deeper examination of the discursive features of 
capitalist social relations and how they are mutually implicated with structural features 
in the production of hegemony” (ibid, emphasis added). 
 
2.4.3 Governmentality and its problematizations 
Although such accounts claim a hegemonic inculcation of a neoliberal market rationale 
across various spatial scales, even some of the authors themselves recognize problems 
with governmentality’s explanatory powers. For instance, Larner (1997) and Ong 
(2007) are highly sensitive to the intensely geographical and uneven nature of political 
processes. As such, they stress that the tactics, technologies and techniques 
implemented by respective governments have necessarily had to take into account the 
uneven social, political and economic norms and values of already existing contexts. 
Larner, for example, emphasizes how the “Telecom Pledge” and the “Kiwi Share” 
were necessarily shaped by “a legacy of the social”, explicitly responding to public 
concern about the risks of deregulation and privatisation by pinning down certain 
values through the ex-ante implementation of regulatory safeguards to protect 
domestic and rural consumers (1997: 383). Similarly, Ong (2007) describes how the 
zoning technologies she examines have been implemented and market subjectivities 
called upon “without annulling the existing political matrix of socialist planning” (ibid: 
6). Hence, in China, pro-market policies “are interwoven with a socialist state, private 
enterprises flourish alongside repressive laws, [and] consumer culture cohabits with 
the lack of inalienable rights” (ibid). 
 
Attempting to account for such tendential variegation in terms of hegemony, Sum 
underscores that “even when hegemonic projects seem to create social unity and 
consensus, these are always partial, unstable, and temporary” (2004: 2). As she 
explains: 
“…hegemony is vulnerable to de-stabilization at the personal, institutional, and macro-
structural levels. On the personal level, the multiple subjectivities of individuals and the 
gap between discursive justifications and actual practices open a space for alternative 
conceptions of society and counter-hegemonic subjectivities. Similarly, on the 
institutional and macro-structural levels, because hegemonic projects exclude, 
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marginalize, or suppress some identities and interests in creating an ‘illusory 
community’, space opens for subaltern forces to engage in tactics of resistance, demands 
for reform, and counter-hegemonic strategies” (ibid). 
 
Given such problematizations, it would seem that the turn to Foucault in some 
theorizations of neoliberalization is simply insufficient to overcome the limitations or 
shore up the weaknesses in Marxist or neo-Gramscian theories of contemporary socio-
economic change (see also Ekers and Loftus, 2008 for a valuable critique). Again, 
Barnett (2005: 7) takes up this argument positing that the dominant interpretation of 
governmentality mistakenly supposes that the desired subject effects of policy 
programmes or ‘rule regimes’ are either: a) “automatically realized”; or b) “more or 
less successfully contested and resisted” (see also Bevir and Rhodes, 2006). This leads 
the author to a two-fold argument. Firstly, given that governmentality must account for 
both the precise regulation of conduct at the very detailed level of everyday practice 
and the extension of state power across large territorial scales, it has “exactly the same 
problem as theories of neoliberalism-as-hegemony” (ibid: 9). For Barnett, Foucault 
avoids this problem in his illumination of disciplinary power “wherein detailed and 
bounded spatio-temporal routines automatically inscribe precise subject effects” (ibid). 
Yet, across the spatial scales implied by “control at a distance” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 
184), governmentality ignores the necessary trade-off between “scope and intensity”, 
thereby continuing “to present the reproduction of power-relations as a matter of social 
control” (Barnett, 2005: 9; see also Allen, 2003). As such, the turn to Foucault still 
fails to address what Barnett calls “middle ranges of agency” by remaining enslaved to 
a constructivist version of subject-formation “that privileges mechanisms of 
recognition and subjection” (2005: 9). Furthermore, these mechanisms are seemingly 
un-problematically sustained across time and space in an environment where social 
relations and subjectivities are, otherwise, apparently “free” (see The turn to Foucault, 
above) (see also Clarke, 2006). 
 
Secondly, Barnett argues that the instrumental or “technical” (Dean, 1999) application 
of governmentality proffers an overly simplistic, two-dimensional image of political 
power in which a multitude of actors “out there” are forever engaging in acts of 
resistance and contestation against imposed policy programmes. As a result, between 
an overtly economistic rendition of political economy, and an overly statist 
interpretation of governmentality, neoliberalization manages to “squeeze out” any 
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thicker sense of social relations, reducing them to nothing other than “residual effects” 
of hegemonic governmental projects (2005: 10). Indeed, drawing on the example of 
the UK, Barnett argues that, whilst the privatization, deregulation and marketisation of 
public services may form “one dimension” of a hegemonic project that has contrasted 
the freedom of market provision against the rigidities of the state, state restructuring 
has in fact involved a multiplicity of factors “that add up to a much more dispersed 
populist reorientation of policy, politics and culture” (ibid). For Barnett, populist 
tendencies such as changing consumer expectations, the decline of deference, refusals 
of subordination, and the emergence of contested inequalities cannot be understood 
simply as technically induced expressions of a hegemonic neoliberal rationale. Rather, 
“they are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change” that have emanated 
“from the bottom up”, complicating and confounding simplistic understandings of the 
past forty years or so as a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from 
collective-public values to values of the market, or a binary opposition between good 
and bad (ibid). Thus, the technical focus of governmentality has tended to overlook 
“the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of 
governance, policy and regulation” (ibid). Moreover, it has also tended to oversimplify 
the multiple and complex nature of social, economic, cultural and political practice and 
change. 
 
Although, echoing Brenner et al (2010), I would question Barnett’s assertion that the 
market oriented restructuring that has been witnessed since the late 1970s can just as 
plausibly be viewed as “a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations” as it 
can the outcome of relatively coherent political/ideological neoliberal projects (2005: 
10), his overall argument is still important. For the combination of Foucauldian 
renditions of governmentality with neo-Marxist/Gramscian narratives of neo-
liberalism leaves too many unanswered questions regarding the multiple and complex 
processes that take place at the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted 
policy programmes – their tactics, their discourses, and their imaginaries – and the 
multiplicity and complexity of socio-spatial relations at the level of everyday practice 
(see also, Clarke, 2004; Keil, 2002; Tilly, 1999, 2000, 2002). 
 
Some scholars of political economy and/or governmentality have turned to a variety of 
theories, concepts and authors to try to overcome such perceived weaknesses, 
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including: feminism to help illuminate oppositional identities and the often contested, 
messy and hybrid nature of discursive practices and political imaginaries (Larner, 
2000); De Certeau (1985) and Spivak (1988) to provide insights into the dilemmas, 
negotiations, tactics and ‘weapons’ of subalterns as everyday resistances to market 
values provide counter-hegemonic narratives (Sum, 2004); Rancière (2003) to theorize 
how the constitution, organisation and normalisation of space confers on some the 
power to govern while leaving others to be dominated (Dikeç, 2007); and Lefebvre 
(1972, 1991) to underscore the everyday as “the decisive category linking the economy 
to individual experiences” (Keil, 2002: 235, quoting Ronneberger, 2002: 43). Each of 
these studies has provided important insights into how processes of neoliberalization 
are necessarily made problematic through particular ‘categories’ such as subjectivity, 
values, geographies and the everyday – reminding us that the potential reproduction of 
a neoliberal market hegemony is neither a straightforward restructuring of the political 
economy nor a simple application of technologies of power. 
 
However, it is my contention that deepening our understanding of single ‘categories’, 
whilst useful, is simply insufficient when considering the multiplicity and complexity 
of everyday socio-spatial economic practice in and through which the abstract policies 
of neoliberalization such as deregulation, privatization and, most centrally, 
marketization, must necessarily be negotiated (see Pollard et al, 2015 for a not dis-
similar argument). As my arguments have demonstrated, it is, most centrally, the way 
that economy is normally practised in time and place that neoliberalization seeks to 
change. Identities and behaviors, geographies and temporalities, evaluations and 
activities, values and the construction of value, and a multitude of (often politically 
charged) social relations and their materialities – all interact to make up ‘economic 
life’. As such, I suggest that an approach is needed to grapple with the intersections 
and interstices between regulation and the multiple and complex nature of the 
Ordinary Economy (Lee, 2006, 2011). Such an approach will provider deeper insights 
into how or if neoliberalization emerges in time and place – even if such insights will 
always, and inevitably, be only partial. Through such a lens the term neoliberalization 
would be understood to connote the (attempted) transformation of existing socio-
economic spatial relations into emerging economic geographies, more-or-less 
governed by the metrics and values of the market. 
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2.5 Emerging Economic Geographies and the Ordinary Economy: a conceptual 
lens 
It is precisely the multiple intersections, tensions and negotiations between abstract 
regulatory policies and the complexity of everyday socio-economic practice that is the 
focus of Lee’s (2006, 2011) thesis on the Ordinary Economy. Deeply concerned with 
the irreducible material need for actors to produce value and to maintain economic 
coherence across time and space such that social reproduction can be sustained, Lee 
argues that, whilst productive arrangements must always be in place to enable 
sustenance, there are multiple ways in which this irreducible need can be met. In as 
much as, together, it is the production, consumption, exchange and circulation of value 
that constitute the inescapable material relations that people must engage with in order 
to make a living, economic geographies are, quite obviously, economic. However, the 
centrality of such materiality does not signify, indeed cannot signify, that economic 
geographies are necessarily driven by a purely material set of economic logics that can 
be inculcated through the insistent promulgation of market metrics. For as Lee (2011: 
368) asserts, “both the potentially infinite variety of ways in which people may make 
their living across space and time… as well as the necessary non-economic relations 
involved in all economic activity” underscore the diverse social relations of economic 
geographies that give rise to such variety and shape the material forms, dynamics and 
trajectories of the economy (see also, Carrier, 1997; Massey 1997; Sayer 1997; Jessop 
2009; Pollard et al, 2015). 
 
As such, the Ordinary Economy can be understood as a diversity of economic 
geographies that are performed and practised through a continual tension between: a) 
“certain material imperatives of societal reproduction”; b) “the potentially infinite, 
day-to-day variability of economic practices, social relations and conceptions of 
value”; and c) “the regulatory and calculable frame of ‘the economy’” (Lee, 2006: 
413). Whilst economic geographies are certainly subject to varying degrees of 
politically reflexive modes of evaluation, regulation and normalisation, they always 
already involve multiple forms and relations of value that are simultaneously practised 
as an integral part of ordinary, everyday social life. As a result, Lee contends that 
“economic geographies are always hybrid and always in a state of becoming” and, 
therefore, we should expect normalisation and diversity to constantly exist alongside 
one another in the Ordinary Economy (ibid: 413-421). 
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To consider political economy – in this case, neoliberalization – through a complex 
lens is not altogether straightforward (Jessop, 1997). Yet that is precisely the point. 
For, as can be seen from my argument set out above, the economy is far more complex 
than much disciplinary or political thinking allows. It is both comprised of and, in turn, 
comprises a complex range of social relations and understandings of value, and is an 
inescapably integral part of ordinary, everyday life – “full of the contradictions, ethical 
dilemmas and multiple values that inform the quotidian business of making a living” 
(Lee, 2006: 414). As such, there can be no simple separation of (political)-economy 
from society, or the economy from place (Mitchell, 1998, 2008). Indeed, both the 
practicality of economic activity and the relationality of its construction reveal the 
inseparability of polity, economy and society and, thus, the inherently geographic 
nature of (political)-economic practice (Lee, 2006, 2007, 2011). 
 
2.5.1 Value in economic geographies 
To help us deal analytically with such complexity, Lee (2006) tackles head-on the 
question of value in economic geographies, which is of central concern to all forms of 
modern society: particularly those who seek to regulate the economy. Although Clarke 
suggests that in practicing the economy (and perhaps, even, studying it) “it is 
necessary to have done with value” (2010: 265), Lee echoes Gunnar Myrdal’s (1969: 
15) claim that value is “the starting point for all economic analysis which really tries to 
probe beneath the surface”, arguing that: 
“…economic geographies are the geographies constituted through peoples’ struggles to 
construct circuits of value sustainable across space and time, and so to make a living 
through the consumption, exchange and production of value” (2006: 417). 
Explicit here is the imperative of the practical consistency of economic practice 
without which material social reproduction would be untenable, or at minimum, 
extremely difficult. Whilst there is ample evidence that economic geographies are not 
easy to sustain over the long-term – particularly under the inherent crisis tendencies of 
capitalism and/or the chronic conditions of underdevelopment (Harvey, 2005) – they 
must have some degree of “economic coherence” if the anticipated coordination of 
activities in circuits of value is to be sustained (Storper and Salais, 1997: 20). 
However, privileging the question of value asks us to interrogate not only what 
economic geographies are about but, also, how the economy is practised. Economic 
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geographies are made by people. They are socially constructed, not simply pre-given 
(Sayer, 1995). As such, Lee enjoins us to consider “the relationships between the 
materially inescapable feature of economic activity… and the diversity of values 
shaping such materialities” (2006: 417). 
 
Let us consider, then, what Lee proposes value to be and how value becomes valuable: 
i.e. “what it is that endows things and practices with worth” (Lee, 2007: 22, emphasis 
added). For Lee, “the nature, value and evaluation of value, emerge from economic 
practice” – the latter being shaped by three distinct notions of value that are interlinked 
(2006: 415). 
 
First, value refers to the contribution made to the (re)production of social life by the 
vital “life-sustaining” things, ideas, labour power, relations and practices etc., that are 
produced, exchanged and consumed in circuits of value. Whilst life-sustaining value 
may be evaluated and valued in diverse ways, the point is that it enables the sustenance 
or improvement of economic activity through the circulation of material and 
immaterial items that are of value, worth or use – if only for a period of time and in a 
particular place. 
 
Second, Value refers to the Theories of Value that seek to interpret, understand and 
identify the bases, origins and nature of Value. Theories of Value ask the important 
question: “where does Value come from?” On the one hand, Theories of Value may be 
somewhat philosophical, for example, in proposing that Value is derived from the 
labour process (following Ricardo and/or Marx). On the other, they may be more 
practical or ‘ordinary’ in proposing, for instance, that Value is embodied in a 
commodity (be it a thing or practice) that reflects certain values of the producer. These 
are themselves derived, at least in part, from prevailing social relations of value and 
may be considered as the basis of the commodity’s Value. Thus, a belief in individual 
human creativity – as espoused by Hayek, for example – may itself be understood as a 
profoundly significant basis and source of Value. It is not surprising, then, that 
interpretations and understandings of where Value comes from are “brought to bear 
on, and contested in the practice, performance and regulation of economic life” (Lee, 
2006: 415). 
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Finally, values are the “forms of life, relations, things, thoughts and practices that are 
held dear and [to some] are considered inalienable”. They are, also, the norms, 
standards and ethics that both inform social activity and, by which, evaluations are, in 
part, made (Lee, 2006: 415-416). 
 
Importantly, unlike Ricardo’s labour theory of value, wherein the prices of goods are 
directly determined by the amount of labour time embodied in their production; and 
unlike Marx’s subtle, yet notable, modification of Ricardo’s theory, wherein Marx 
asserted that the value of a commodity is determined by the labour that is socially 
necessary6 to produce it, Lee is in no way essentialising value. Indeed, as I will 
elaborate in a moment, Lee is concerned less with searching out the essence of value 
than with recognizing that – whatever its bases – value is, in practice, always a 
relational construct that cannot exist outside of time and space or, somehow, pre-exist 
the material and social relations of production, consumption and exchange. Not dis-
similar to Brenner et al’s (2010) emphasis on the processual nature of 
neoliberalization, Lee’s account of value is wholly contextual; for value, per se, is not 
the author’s concern. Rather, Lee is interested in value in terms of practice: in what 
makes economic geographies work in time and place, and what material and social 
relations shape their trajectories. 
 
Thus, for Lee, the implications of his triptych of value raise two key questions. First, 
how are value, societal reproduction, and understandings of Value linked? And second, 
whether, therefore, interpretations of where Value comes from “may, or may not be 
validated in social practice or imposed in political practice” (ibid: 415, emphasis 
added). 
 
Given the necessity for economic practice to enable social reproduction, one might 
assume that the answer underlying both these questions is the achievement of ‘material 
success’: i.e. the capacity to produce enough value in circuits of production, 
consumption and exchange in order for society to reproduce itself (Sheppard and 
Barnes, 1990). However, Lee argues that material success is “a necessary but 
insufficient condition of life-sustaining value in economic geographies” (2006: 415). 
                                                        
6
 Where socially necessary signifies that both the techniques of production and the commodities 
themselves are socially necessary in order to co-ordinate – through the price mechanism – supply and 
demand (see Sheppard and Barnes, 1990: 36-37). 
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Certainly, to be successful “economic geographies must be capable of producing at 
least as much value as is necessary to enable those involved in them to stay alive and 
to be fit enough to continue to produce value” (ibid). And for this to occur, a surplus of 
value (wherein outputs exceed necessary inputs) is always required to deal with life’s 
ups and downs and disruptions. However, as the author asserts, not only is value 
practised and performed in diverse ways across the multitude of circuits and networks 
of value that make up economic geographies, but various understandings and practices 
of Value are “simultaneously present within such circuits” (ibid). Crucially, this is 
because: 
“…the values (embodied, for example, in individualism, egalitarianism, 
environmentalism… [and] modernism) that inform social activity, shape the particular 
forms and evaluations of ‘life-sustaining’ value produced, consumed and exchanged 
within economic geographies… Such values can never be merely suppressed, ignored or 
reduced to trivial relations of economically marginal significance. Indeed, they shape 
the conduct and consequences of economic geographies in myriad ways” (ibid). 
 
This is an important insight, for Lee is not merely underscoring the multiplicity of 
values and notions of Value that help shape economic geographies per se. Rather, 
despite the fact that value is the means of economic success in the reproducibility of 
society, the author is calling into question the notion that all economic geographies 
either tend towards or operate under some iron Law of Value – such as the labour 
theory of value elaborated by Marx7 – or, indeed, can be guided by just one particular 
set of values – such as that elaborated through a “directive” neoliberal ideology 
(Barnett, 2005). 
 
Certainly, a commodity may embody Value that reflects the values of the producer – 
for example, in the form of aesthetics, certain environmental considerations, or notions 
of social justice. However, such Value may not enable the spatial and temporal 
sustenance of economic geographies by embodying the value necessary to facilitate 
material social reproduction. For what is of value to one person (or in one context) 
may not be of value to (or in) another. Thus, as Lee underscores, the reproducibility of 
society is never resolved, solely, in material terms. Rather:  
“… it is the social relations of value – involving shared or imposed understandings 
                                                        
7
 See Harvey, 2006: 14-38.  
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about the nature of value, Value and values – which establish the criteria through which 
the performance of economic geographies may be evaluated” (ibid: 416). 
 
I will return to the social relations of value in more detail in Section 2.5.2 below. 
However, of central importance, here, is what Sheppard and Barnes (1990: 37) refer to 
as “validation through exchange”. The act of exchange links consumption and 
production (and, of course, use-values to exchange-values – see Harvey, 2006). But it 
does far more than simply transfer value between parties. Value is valued for a reason 
– if only in a particular time and place (Lee, 2011; Miller, 2008). Thus, if value is to be 
exchanged and validated it must be valued in some way or other by both the producer 
and consumer. Yet, as Lee (2006, 2011) underscores, there are multiple understandings 
of Value and values that may facilitate this crucial process in the Ordinary Economy. 
 
The implications of such complexity for regulation are profound, as Lee expounds: 
“The dialectic between material practicality and social diversity is forever present. 
Unless effective mechanisms of regulation and evaluation are in place to maintain 
specific criteria by which value is assessed – and thereby to impose a particular 
trajectory upon economic practices and the spaces through which they take place – value 
may be ever changing, not only in form and specification, but also in the mode and 
criteria of its evaluation. Under such circumstances, the sustenance of the practical 
coherence of economy across time and space may be severely hampered” (ibid: 416). 
 
What Lee is highlighting here is the constant struggle that all modern societies must 
face, that is: the struggle to control what is and is not value (see also, Smith, 1984, on 
the struggle for socialism). And this is particularly true for those forms of governance 
where neoliberal values and processes dominate and, thus, power and regulation are 
seemingly pursued ‘at a distance’ (Barnet, 2005; Dean, 1999). For the valuation of life-
sustaining value is never resolved simply via the metric of material success, but also 
via the multiple and complex social ideals, beliefs, values and notions of Value that 
constitute economic practice. In short, value is socially constructed: it means nothing 
outside the environmental, geographical, social, historical and practical context in 
which it is evaluated (Lee, 2011: 374). As a result, value is inherently diverse and full 
of political possibilities. 
 
Since, then, as Marx posits, “value cannot stalk around with a label describing what it 
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is” (1967: 74, cited in Harvey, 2006: 37), Lee enjoins us “to discover how value is 
valued through social practice” (2006: 416). Indeed, following Daniel Miller’s (2008: 
1122) suggestion that the question to be asked is not “what value is” but “what value 
does”, and David Harvey’s (2006: 38) assertion that “the goal is to find out exactly 
how value is put upon things, processes, and even human beings, under the social 
conditions prevailing”, Lee underscores that “some iron Law of Value is never simply 
pre-given to economic practice or to its analysis” (2006: 416; see also Doel, 2009). As 
Lee explains: 
“Like the economic practices through which it is created, circulated and consumed, 
value is geographically and historically variable. But, at the same time, the imperative of 
adding – and not subtracting – value through the practices of economic activity is vital 
to the sustenance of social life. It is the political and often violent negotiation of this 
space between variability and constraint in circuits of value that defines ‘what is and is 
not value’ and so shapes the trajectories of economic geographies” (2006: 416-417). 
 
2.5.2 Social relations of value 
Given the above account, it would seem that in attempting to regulate the economy 
across time and space it is necessary for government and/or other parties with vested 
interests to try to shape the ways in which value is practised in economic geographies, 
and to try to ‘crowd out’ other forms of valuation that oppose the values and notions of 
Value they seek to promulgate. And yet, as indicated above, choosing between and 
practising various understandings and relations of value through constantly dynamic 
circuits of production, consumption and exchange are, as Lee puts it, “the central 
purposes of economic geographies” (2006: 417). Indeed, if we return to the 
ruminations of Hayek set out at the opening of this chapter, his dislike of neo-classical 
economics as an ‘objective’ science that could purportedly disentangle, model and 
predict the validity of markets stemmed primarily from his deep concern with the 
inescapably subjective and situated nature of economic activity and its ramifications. 
 
Certainly, the diversity of economic practices that has been demonstrated to exist in 
modern society is not at question in this thesis (e.g. Carrier, 1997; Cellarius, 2000; 
Gibson-Graham, 1995, 1996, 2010; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Humphrey and Hugh-
Jones, 1992; Smith, 2002; Smith and Stenning, 2006). Rather, it is how, or if, 
neoliberalization emerges in and through such diversity that is of concern (and, indeed, 
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what this might tell us about the nature of neoliberal hegemony). For it is the diversity 
of human economic activity – its inescapably subjective and situated nature – with 
which politics must become entangled – and dominate – if the trajectory of the 
economy is to be shaped: ideologically, materially and practically. 
 
As demonstrated above, it is simply not possible to consider economic geographies 
merely in material terms; for the fact that they have social purpose, are meaningful and 
intentional, tells us that “[t]he social relations that shape and guide them are a 
necessary component of their materiality and their trajectories” (Lee, 2011: 3). It is 
not, then, that ‘anything goes’ in the circuits and networks of value that make up 
economic geographies. Where applicable, the material characteristics and social 
relations of, say, capitalism cannot be discounted in understanding the form and 
dynamics of modern socio-economic practice. But nor can we take such characteristics 
and relations as simply ‘given’. This is because the diversity arising from history, 
space and place – that is, from human geography – cannot be reduced to a single entity 
like capitalism as “the bedrock of explanation” (Barnes, 1989: 299, emphasis added). 
As Lee confirms:  
“…the social and material circumstances… in which ‘capitalist acts’ may emerge are 
themselves shaped in part by earlier relationally formed circuits of value, with the 
conditions prevailing there and then formed by earlier circuits still, and so on back” 
(2006: 420). 
As such, it is the examination of the formative nature of the multiple and complex 
social relations of value in economic geographies that result from this space and time 
path-dependence that I suggest will deepen our understanding of “how hegemonic 
projects become anchored at the level of everyday life” (Barnett, 2005: 9). 
 
Taking a relational view of economic geographies recognizes that all economic 
activity is strongly shaped by the particular context in which it literally takes place, 
thereby underscoring the temporal and spatial path-dependency of economic 
geographies and the “political responsibilities” that they carry (Lee, 2006, 2011; 
Massey, 2004, 2005; Bathelt and Glückler, 2011). Indeed (and, again, reflecting back 
on my arguments above), this unavoidable grounding and placing of economic activity 
in concrete economic geographies is highly formative of political practice, highlighting 
that, whilst power relations are certainly important, a two-dimensional understanding 
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of political power is insufficient in interrogating how economic geographies emerge 
(as Foucault, himself, recognized8). 
 
Certainly material diversity is inherent in economic geographies in that the nature and 
organisation of production, consumption and exchange in circuits of value are 
inescapably spatial and temporal (see for example, Polanyi, 1944; Carrier, 1997; Lee 
and Wills, 1997; Peck et al, 2012, etc.). However, given that such materiality is itself 
socially constructed, it is through the social relations of value that economic diversity 
primarily arises. For Lee (2006: 419), social relations of value can be understood as: 
“…relations of shared, or imposed, understandings about the nature, norms, purposes 
and parameters of circuits of value within particular spaces and times… They make 
sense of, legitimate and give direction to value and circuits of value and so provide the 
ties that bind economic geographies together…” 
It must be noted that this latter point is highly problematic for neoliberal forms of 
governance that seek to inculcate individualistic, rational, profit-maximizing behaviour 
on the part of economic actors, and hence attempt to reduce the space for political 
reflexivity – a point that I’ll return to in a moment. Nevertheless, Lee continues: 
“…Critically, social relations of value offer a framework of evaluation of circuits of 
value (what is good/bad; better/worse), thereby mapping the limits of the (economically) 
desirable and setting the agenda for economic regulation. By so legitimating (if only 
through relations of power or by force) the distribution of value amongst those engaged 
in economic geographies, social relations of value shape the ways in which people 
engage in consumption and production and condition the ways in which they come to 
understand their relationship to the natural and social world…” 
However, and most crucially: 
“…Social relations of value reflect the diverse socialities of human being… and so deny 
the possibility of the autonomous individual reacting mechanically and independently to 
external stimulae” (ibid). 
 
Again, these are important insights. Social relations of value help people to make sense 
of their economic life-worlds by shaping their understandings about why, normally, 
                                                        
8
 Indeed, in his lecture on “governmentality” Foucault argued that in recognizing the importance of the 
population with regards to the economy, government would necessarily need to take into account the 
needs and desires of the population in order to govern. Interestingly, Hayek argued the same noting that 
government could not, successfully, ignore the historical trajectory of the economy and society in 
setting out its policies. 
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they do what they do in economic practice. By offering a framework of evaluation, 
social relations of value are necessarily politically charged, reflecting, for example, the 
struggles over: how value is distributed through society (e.g. through the market or 
through the state); the nature, form and dynamics of the material and social conditions 
of production and consumption (for instance, Fordism versus flexible specialization); 
the possibilities of what is economically desirable or even attainable; the form and 
parameters of the regulatory system, itself; and not least, therefore, the meanings of the 
socio-economic geographies of evaluation and understanding that emerge and which 
establish the (always contingent, yet ever emerging) social bases of what value is and 
how it should or can be practised. 
 
However, offering a framework of evaluation does not imply that diverse forms of 
value cannot be simultaneously present or co-exist in circuits of value. Nor are the 
social bases of value purely economic. In fact, the diverse socialities of being human – 
what Sum (2004) might term, the “multiple subjectivities” that both individuals hold 
and which differentiate actors from one another – alongside the non-economic 
relations that inevitably influence all economic activity intimate that “multiple logics” 
are necessarily at play in the evaluation of economic practice (Lee, 2006). Indeed, for 
Lee (2006, 2011) the sustainability of circuits of value across time and space requires 
a diversity of norms, values and evaluations of Value such that socio-economic life can 
be reproduced. Put another way, given the fragility and relative “improbability” of the 
smooth reproduction of complex economic geographies, retaining a “repertoire” of 
social and material practices and resources is essential in responding successfully to 
disturbances and crises (Jessop, 2004: 162, drawing on Grabher, 1994). 
 
The implications of such multiplicity for neoliberal forms of regulation that seek the 
organisation of society through the market are insightful – revealing neoliberalism’s 
double nature, its contradictions and its inherent crisis tendencies. For on the one hand, 
the central purpose of neoliberalization is to set value free and enable its “frictionless” 
evaluation through the vast expanse of the capitalist market and the practice of ex-post, 
voluntary exchange (see Friedman, 1980; Sayer, 1995; Peck, 2010). Yet, on the other 
hand, one of its most foundational bases of maintaining economic coherence in terms 
of social relations of value is to narrow down the diverse socialities of being human 
and the multiple logics of evaluation through the inculcation of a particular 
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“economizing” identity: i.e. homo œconomicus (see Callon, 1998; Caliskan and 
Callon, 2009a, 2009b). It is not only, then, that some theorizations of political 
economy and governmentality are unable to account for such contradictions in the 
production of hegemony. Neoliberalization is, itself, inherently contradictory. It is, at 
once, both expansive and constraining, requiring enormous work and regulation if it is 
to be maintained at all. 
 
Very much in line with Polanyi’s (1944) “double movement” there are two primary 
factors to emphasize here. First, as Lee asserts, the more work that neoliberal 
regulatory practices put into emphasizing the individual and self interest in the 
economy “the less that politics involving any form of collective action is seen as either 
relevant or desirable” (2011: 377). Second – and as witnessed by the recent global 
financial crisis (Pani and Holman, 2013) – setting value free to the evaluative criteria 
of the capitalist market can severely undermine the “economic coherence” of concrete 
economic geographies that Storper and Salais (1997: 20) note is central to their 
ongoing coordination and reproducibility. Both of these factors underscore the 
potential loss of “the ties that bind economic geographies together” (Lee, 2006: 419) 
and highlight the intense probability of neoliberalism’s variegation (Brenner et al, 
2010); or, as Baudrillard (1994) and Malin (1990) might argue, the unattainability of 
its utopian imaginary. 
 
That said; “the political effort” required to sustain economic coherence across time and 
space against any tendencies towards incoherence is a constant feature of all economic 
geographies (Lee, 2006, 2011). Full as they are of the multiple and complex social 
relations of value, diverse materialities and the recursive and reflexive evaluations of 
actors regarding their past experiences and potential futures, economic geographies are 
constantly prone to interruptions. As Lee puts it: 
“…[E]conomic geographies are always becoming, always a product of interior and 
exterior influences, always fragile and always perpetually interrupted and reconfigured 
by the diverse relations, ethics and subjectivities of daily life in and around which value 
flows or is unable to flow. At the same time, social and material imperatives interrupt, 
reconfigure and constrain daily lives which must come to terms with [those 
imperatives]” (2006: 418). 
 
Again, Lee draws us back to the constant tension that exists in the Ordinary Economy 
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between the material imperatives of social reproduction, the potentially infinite 
variability of day-to-day social relations and practices of value, and the regulatory 
frame of the economy. And yet, the emergence and embedding of particular sets of 
social relations of value – such as those of a neoliberally informed capitalism – cannot 
be simply understood as powerless, innocent or benign. Indeed, as Lee (2006, 2011) 
confirms, once particular social relations of value have begun to take hold in society 
through their successful operationalization and institutionalization those actors 
involved in them and/or benefiting from them have an interest in maintaining their 
practical economic coherence. 
 
2.5.3 Economic imaginaries, semiosis and the (always partial) production of 
hegemony  
Drawing on cultural political economy (Jessop and Sum, 2001; Jessop, 2004, 2009; 
Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008), Lee suggests that one particular “political effort” to 
achieve such coherence is the variation, selection and retention of specified “economic 
imaginaries”, which is enabled by the process of “semiosis” (2006: 420). However, as 
I will elaborate in a moment, Lee also stresses that when confronted by the inherent 
diversity of the economy, the political application of such imaginaries is far from 
unproblematic. 
 
According to Jessop, economic imaginaries – such as that of the market or the 
knowledge-based economy – are “semiotic systems that frame individual subjects’ 
lived experiences of an inordinately complex world and/or inform collective 
calculation about that world” in light of some representation of economic success 
(2009: 344). They “identify, privilege, and seek to stabilize some economic activities 
from the totality of economic relations and transform them into objects of observation, 
calculation, and governance” (Jessop, 2004: 163). Semiosis implies “the 
intersubjective production of meaning” (Jessop, 2004: 161), and all social relations 
have a semiotic nature (although they are not reducible to such) in that meaning and 
meaning making are central to social practice. Indeed, Jessop (2004, 2009) argues that 
semiosis is both causally efficacious and meaningful in that it both enables actors to 
interpret the world and helps to explain it. As a condition for “going on in the world”, 
individuals and organizations must first make sense of it through what Jessop refers to 
as “complexity reduction” (2009: 337); and a central mechanism by which complexity 
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is reduced is semiosis wherein actors focus in on particular aspects of the world and 
attribute meaning to them either on their own terms or on the terms of others. Thus, as 
actors interact with complex environments, only salient data is given their full 
attention, implying that they hold some sort of model or understanding of the real 
world that enables them to relate semiotically to their social and material environments 
– allowing them to rank or select between meanings (Bains, 2006; Hoffmeyer, 1997). 
 
Given the reductive nature of economic imaginaries, Jessop differentiates “‘the 
actually existing economy’ as the chaotic sum of all economic activity (broadly 
defined as concerned with the social appropriation and transformation of nature for the 
purposes of material provisioning) from ‘the economy’… as an imaginatively narrated, 
more or less coherent subset of these activities” (2004: 162). As the author expounds: 
“The totality of economic activities is so unstructured and complex that it cannot be an 
object of calculation, management, governance or guidance. Instead, such practices are 
always oriented to subsets of economic relations (economic systems or subsystems) that 
have been discursively and perhaps organizationally and institutionally fixed as objects 
of intervention. This involves economic imaginaries that rely on semiosis to constitute 
these subsets (ibid).” 
 
Thus, for Jessop, meaning making not only serves to reduce complexity: it also gives 
meaning to the world, as some aspects of it are deemed more salient than others. 
Hence, as economic imaginaries are operationalized as semiotic referents, their 
discursive representations of the world – as well as how they are construed by 
individuals and organizations – “contribute to the construction of the natural and social 
world in so far as they guide a critical mass of self-confirming actions premised on 
their validity” (2009: 338; see also Sum and Jessop, 2013: 149). Given that economic 
imaginaries are semiotic systems that comprise genres, discourses and styles, they may 
represent distinctive ways of acting and interacting; particular social practices and 
corresponding materialities; and certain identities – all represented from a particular 
vantage point regarding the social world, and all attempting to regularize that vantage 
point within the social world. 
 
Importantly, Jessop argues that economic imaginaries develop across spatial scales as 
political, economic and intellectual forces attempt to delineate and (re)define “subsets 
of economic activities as subjects, sites, and stakes of competition and/or as objects of 
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regulation” (2004: 163). In so doing, they articulate visions, strategies and projects 
that, in Lee’s terms, reflect the practices of value, values and Theories of Value that 
such forces hold in relation to these imagined economies. Furthermore, the 
regularization and construction of specific economic imaginaries may involve – 
amongst other forces – political parties; organised business interests; organizations 
such as the WTO and OECD; unions; policy transfer networks; as well as education 
through the mass media and the like. Such forces turn to a variety of “governmental 
techniques” – in the broad sense of government (Miller and Rose, 1992) – employing 
power and knowledge to gain recognition of, and institutionally and structurally 
embed, the preferred social relations and materialities of these imagined economies 
(Jessop, 2004: 163). As such, Jessop (2004, 2009) follows a similar line of critical 
inquiry to Sum (2004) by combining a neo-Gramscian political economy and neo-
Foucauldian governmentality in exploring the production of hegemony. 
 
However, as Lee argues, to become hegemonic, economic imaginaries – such as that of 
the market – must necessarily be understood and constructed “through the diverse day-
to-day practices and social relations of making a living” (2006: 421). Furthermore, if 
economic imaginaries are to be borne out as more than “arbitrary, rationalistic, and 
willed” (Gramsci, 1971: 376-377) they must significantly correspond to real material 
and social relations in the ‘actually existing economy’, which includes relationships 
between economic and non-economic factors (Lee, 2006: 414; see also Jessop, 2004, 
2009). As a result, relatively successful economic imaginaries may well have a 
somewhat “performative” role (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie et al, 2007) in shaping socio-
economic relations as they become temporarily fixed in and through economic 
geographies as actors move from construal to construction or from complexity 
reduction to, what I term in this thesis, ‘complexity re-introduction’ (elaborated in 
Chapter Six). However, they must, as Lee asserts, “draw upon prevailing social 
relations of value” to achieve any relative success (2006: 421). 
 
The practical and material coherence and particular notions of value that are 
represented through economic imaginaries are “constantly confronted by social 
diversity” (ibid). As such, by virtue of competing understandings, evaluations and 
practices of value, and through the inevitable shortcomings in their capacity to specify 
the totality of the economic and non-economic relations involved, each imagined 
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subset of the economy can only ever be partially realized (see also Jessop, 2004: 163; 
see also Jessop, 2009; Jessop and Sum, 2001; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008). As Lee 
concludes: 
“Semiotically- and materially- constituted social relations of value, and the calculations 
and Theories of Value through which economic activity is evaluated are the very 
language through which economic geographies are performed… More than that, they 
are what make for the relationality and diversity of economic geographies and the value 
produced, exchanged, and consumed through them… Thus, notwithstanding the 
powerful and insistent constraint on creative economic thought and the inhibition of 
economic geographies asserted through the practice and performance of Laws of Value, 
it is hardly surprising that normalisation and diversity are constantly co-present in the 
ordinary economy” (2006: 421). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
As the above arguments suggest, it is simply not possible to reduce economic 
geographies to a single set of dominant social relations of value that remains static 
across time and space. Although the material and social form and relations of 
economic geographies may be imagined as subsets of economic activity before they 
are put into action, they are, as Lee argues (2006, 2011), in a constant state of 
emergence, and are full of multiple, complex, competing and often conflicting social 
relations of value that make up the Ordinary Economy. Thus, whilst the political-
economic process of neoliberalization can be understood to connote the (attempted) 
transformation of existing socio-economic spatial relations into emerging economic 
geographies more-or-less governed by the metrics and values of the market, the 
arguments set out in this chapter underscore that any attempted transformation will 
only ever be partial. In the transition from “imagination to practice” (Lee, 2006: 421), 
or as Jessop puts it, in the movement from “social construal to social construction” 
(2009: 336), innumerable modifications, interruptions, displacements, values, logics, 
and often competing logics are involved, which inevitably disrupt the normalisation 
and embedding of reductive policy metrics and values. 
 
However, I have also argued that an entirely relativist position cannot be taken in 
examining the economy. It is not that ‘anything goes’ in the circuits and networks of 
value that make up economic geographies. The material and social characteristics and 
the power relations involved in neoliberal forms of capitalism – which are themselves 
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geographically diverse – cannot be ignored in understanding the form and dynamics of 
socio-economic practice as economic geographies emerge under processes of 
marketisation. Indeed, the fact that economic geographies have social purpose, are 
meaningful and intentional underscores that the social relations of value that shape and 
guide them, as well as the non-economic relations involved, are central to their 
materiality and their trajectories. And this is true of any form of modern socio-
economic practice.  
 
Hence, as I argued in Section 2.5.2 above, it is the examination of the formative nature 
of the multiple and complex social relations of value in economic geographies that I 
suggest will deepen our understanding of “how hegemonic projects become anchored 
at the level of everyday life” (Barnett, 2005: 9). Social relations of value are, as Lee 
underscores, “the very language through which economic geographies are performed” 
(2006: 421). 
 
As set out in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of this chapter, geographically- and critically- 
grounded approaches to political economy and governmentality that have emphasized 
the importance of context as an inescapable concrete necessity have contributed 
enormously to academic and scholarly knowledge regarding neoliberalization’s 
progress. Yet questions regarding how purportedly ‘top-down’, hegemonic policy 
programmes of marketisation become anchored in the complexity, diversity, and 
apparent fragility of ordinary, everyday economic contexts remain unanswered. For 
even where critically grounded fusions of neo-Gramscian understandings of political 
economy with neo-Foucauldian renditions of governmentality are claimed to have 
facilitated “a deeper examination” of “the production of hegemony” (Sum, 2009: 186, 
emphasis added), such studies still, as Jessop states, “pose questions about the 
regularization of [economic] practices in normal conditions” (2009: 341). 
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, identities and behaviors, geographies and 
temporalities, evaluations and activities, values and the construction of value, and a 
multitude of often politically charged social relations and their materialities all interact 
to make up ordinary economic life. Thus, as Jessop states somewhat problematically 
(see Chapter Six below), although the medium- to long- term effects of relatively 
successful economic imaginaries may or may not tend to “narrow the scope” for 
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variation in economic practice, in the transition from imagination to practice, “there 
are always interstitial, residual, marginal, irrelevant, recalcitrant, and plain 
contradictory elements that escape any attempt to identify, govern, and stabilize a 
given economic arrangement or broader economic order” (2004: 163). 
 
The relational approach of Emerging Economic Geographies and the Ordinary 
Economy that I have set out here recognizes, as Lee asserts, that “economic 
geographies are constituted geographically, politically and socially” and, hence, are 
practised “as co-present and dynamic hybridizations of alternative, complementary or 
competing social relations which may vary over the shortest stretches of time and 
space” (2006: 421). And it is this diversity of human economic activity and contexts 
with which politics must become entangled – and attempt to dominate – if the 
trajectory of the economy is to be shaped: ideologically, materially and practically. 
 
Thus, it is the suggestion, or hypothesis, of this thesis that neoliberalization – with the 
emphasis on its processual nature – is a bottom-up as well as top-down process, which 
is constructed in practice in the context of an attempted normalisation of one particular 
notion of value in the face of a diversity of values. And this has implications for what 
is meant by neoliberal market hegemony. 
 
2.7 Overall research aim and questions 
The overarching aim of this PhD is to resolve the complex interplay between 
neoliberally informed policy programmes of marketisation, which are, themselves, 
geographically diverse, and the diversity of ordinary socio-economic contexts into 
which those policy programmes are inserted or imposed. Thus, given the theoretical 
arguments set out in this chapter for examining processes of marketisation through the 
conceptual lens of Emerging Economic Geographies and the Ordinary Economy, the 
thesis explores the following research questions: 
• To what extent do neoliberal policies of marketization succeed in shaping the 
subjectivities of economic actors – their values, evaluations, actions and 
activities? 
• In order to move on in the world, how do actors make meaning of, and 
negotiate their positions within, the multiple and complex social relations of 
value that make up their economic geographies? 
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• Given the inherent temporal and spatial path-dependency of economic 
geographies, what impact do the existing economic geographies and identities 
of actors have on their future trajectories? 
• As economic geographies emerge under processes of neoliberalization, what 
happens to the inherent diversity of understandings and practices of value? 
 
The empirical findings of these research questions are detailed in Chapters Five, Six 
and Seven. Chapter Eight then draws conclusions from these investigations. 
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3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Ontological and epistemological foundations 
Ontologically, this thesis holds that our economic material forms and social practices 
are shaped by multiple and complex social relations of value, and that normalisation 
and diversity are constantly co-present in the Ordinary Economy (Lee, 2006, 2011). 
Economic geographies and the circuits of value of which they are constituted are, as 
Lee puts it, “a condition of social survival”, and in order to sustain social life they “are 
constituted of certain necessary processes involving the establishment of social 
relations and the material practices of consumption, production and exchange” (2011: 
376). At the same time, the specific circumstances in and through which these 
necessary processes literally take place are not only geographically and socially 
variable, they are profoundly influential and the consequence of political and social 
struggles. As such, I argue that economic practice is at once structured/constrained – 
in that it is comprised of relations of power, institutions, norms, and certain material 
and social imperatives, dynamics and tendencies – and variable, in that it is subject to 
multiple and complex interpretations, evaluations, values, logics, beliefs, dilemmas, 
and relations – all of which emerge relationally in time and place in the struggle to 
define what is and is not value. 
 
To further clarify this ontological position, let me set out what I reject and what I 
accept in terms of other approaches to, or understandings of, the economy. Firstly, it is 
not that I reject critical approaches to political economy and/or governmentality. For, 
as a critical realist might argue, people do not make the world just as they please, nor 
do they make it under circumstances that are wholly and directly chosen by themselves 
(Sayer, 1992: 19). Structuring factors do exist and do have causal effects (Jessop, 
2005). 
 
Yet, the concrete practices of economic geographies cannot be understood as singular, 
linear or essentialising processes (Lee, 2011; Sayer, 2007). As Sayer states in general 
terms: 
“…In changing our social and natural milieux we change the forces and conditions 
which shape the character of society and its people. As new kinds of work and social 
relations develop, people develop new needs. In other words, human beings have a 
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capacity for ‘self change’, for making their own history.... [which] not only happens to 
people but is made by them consciously or unconsciously” (1992: 19, emphasis added). 
 
Everything that is of the social world is made in and through social relations. Hence, 
we must reject the tendencies of orthodox political economy to naturalize and/or reify 
its theoretical objects. Similarly, we must reject the tendencies of some political 
economy and governmentality accounts to offer scant explanations of how subjects 
and subjectivities are formed, how different modes of calculation emerge and how 
these become normalised and get modified (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008: 1157). 
However, the social world that we encounter in our everyday lives is no less real for 
the fact that it has been produced and is continually being reproduced, by people. 
 
Secondly, therefore, I do not accept the entirely relativistic notions of society that arise 
from the “immaterial discursivism” (Springer, 2012: 134) or “babble of voices” (Ley, 
2000: 620) put forward in some postmodernist or constructivist accounts (e.g. Olsson, 
1991). Certainly, I hold that the semiotic process of meaning making plays a central 
role in the constitution and reproduction of society. The moment that the economy is 
either imagined or put into practice by individuals and organizations it is confronted by 
a multiplicity of subjectivities, interpretations, logics, and social relations of value that 
are both economic and non-economic. For this is precisely what the economy is: it is 
complex, it is multiple, it is ongoing, and it is relational. 
 
However, social relations of value necessarily reflect political struggles and power 
relations over the shaping of identities, subjectivities, and economic geographies; and 
these struggles and power relations constrain the limits of social and material 
reproduction, which are a fundamental reality or necessity to economic practice (Lee, 
2006, 2011). As such, we must reject the tendencies in some postmodernist and/or 
constructivist accounts to suggest that nothing really exists outside of discourse or 
thought, or that through discourse, almost anything can be conjured into being. As 
Springer argues, such discursivism “dismantles the possibility of any apparatus that 
might be used to effectively talk about the ‘real world’” (2012: 134). 
 
Thus, my ontological position arises from a fundamental recognition of the 
inescapable intersections between the material and the discursive: their co-evolution, 
co-constitution and co-existence in the Ordinary Economy. Since economic 
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geographies are necessarily relational – in other words, since they are socially 
constructed, and historically specific both temporally and spatially – they are 
inherently diverse. However, multiple, intersecting material and social relations of 
value that are intrinsic to those economic geographies, and often involve 
considerable relationships of power, concomitantly constrain, and/or seek to 
constrain, that diversity. In the ontology of the Ordinary Economy where 
normalisation and diversity necessarily co-exist with one another, this is an 
inescapable truth. 
 
The ontological position that I have outlined almost refuses to be pigeon holed by 
narrow disciplinary thinking. Epistemologically, I understand Lee’s thesis on the 
Ordinary Economy as similar to – but different from – the cultural political economy 
project (or post-disciplinary paradigm) set out by Ngai-Ling Sum and Bob Jessop 
(2013). For these authors, to know what we know about contemporary political 
economy, CPE is best understood “as a response not only to a one-sided emphasis on 
the materiality of economic and political institutions but also to a one-sided cultural 
turn in political economy” (ibid: 22, emphasis in original). Indeed, in attempting to 
find a suitable analogy to describe such a disciplinary dilemma, Jessop and Sum refer 
to the Greek myth of Scylla and Charybdis in which the challenge is to steer a perilous 
path between two sea monsters on either side of the narrow straits of Messina with the 
dangerous structuralist rocks of Scylla on one side and the inescapable constructivist 
whirlpool of Charybdis on the other (ibid). 
 
However, in my interpretation of Lee’s work, I am not trying to navigate my way 
through two opposing extremes – either ontological or epistemological. Economic 
geographies are at once constrained and variable, and the extremes of structuralism 
and constructivism simply don’t provide a valid epistemological position or horizon 
for “knowing what the world is like” (Gregory, 2000: 226). The oppositional positions 
of Scylla and Charybdis necessarily exclude the Other, meaning that from either 
perspective nothing socially real can ever be seen. Thus, even if, as Rose (1997: 319) 
so accurately underscores, as researchers “we cannot know everything, nor can we 
survey power as if we can fully understand, control or redistribute it”, in order to 
know that the world is complex, my epistemological position must be complex in and 
of itself. Subsequently, as an economic geographer, in order to “deal analytically with 
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the complex multiple relations between the inescapable material singularity, dynamics 
and tendencies of economy and the diverse economic practices shaped by multiple 
social relations of value”, as Lee (2006: 422) enjoins us to do, I must accept the 
realities of an inescapably situated social complexity – its geography, its temporality 
and its relationality – and, thus, I must accept the limitations of any academic research 
that seeks to explore it. 
 
In the sections that follow, I set out my research methodology, which adopts a case-
study-orientated, mixed methods approach. Understanding that my explorations of a 
socially complex reality can only ever be partial and never fully impartial (Rose, 
1997), the best that I can hope is that the methods chosen and my subsequent 
application of them will shed some light on the complex interplay between variability 
and constraint in the Ordinary Economy. 
 
3.2 The case study approach 
3.2.1 Introduction: The marketisation of higher education in England 
As set out in Chapter One, this thesis undertook an examination of the marketisation of 
HE in England, which presented a rich and interesting case through which to 
investigate my research questions. Very briefly, HE in England holds a strategically 
important position in a global HE market, itself a vital element of an expanding global 
knowledge economy. As a state funded public service, it was long-held as a public 
good – particularly in terms of its home undergraduate student body – even if in purely 
economic terms HE fails to reach the exacting criteria that may be expected (see 
Calhoun, 2006). However, like many other national HE systems around the world, HE 
in England has been consistently challenged to marketise as part of a wider neoliberal 
agenda of public sector reform. Indeed, since the early 1980s when a neoliberally 
informed Conservative Government first attempted to induce a “cult of efficiency” 
(Stein, 2001) into HE, a variety of policy measures have been introduced to instill 
market values, including: new public management structures and culture; metrics to 
induce competitiveness and efficiency; the incremental introduction of undergraduate 
student fees; and the dismantling of the block teaching and capital allocation grants. 
With the implementation of the HE White Paper in 2011 (BIS, 2011a), the most recent 
aim of a Conservative-led coalition Government has been to induce a “demand-led 
system”. This has been seen by many critics as a deliberate attempt to steer the 
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evaluations, actions and activities of HE’s actors through the mechanisms, criteria and 
values of market relations, and to induce market subjectivities – transforming 
institutions into producers and students into consumers (Collini, 2010). 
 
However, as in most other countries, the HE system in England is inherently diverse, 
differentiated by: mission; wealth; status and reputation (often indicated by both 
national and international rankings); geographies (in terms of location and both 
national and international spatial reach); and the socio-economic makeup and 
geographies of their student bodies (specifically, home undergraduates). As such, I felt 
that the varying histories, identities, geographies and, hence, path-dependencies of 
institutions would, likely, impact HEIs’ evaluations and negotiations of any neoliberal 
market imaginary set out in policy and the possibilities for its transformation; thereby 
helping to shape the economic geographies of HE that emerge. Thus, in order to fully 
explore my research questions, I undertook a multiple-case study, examining four 
diverse HEIs in England, selected for either their “representative” or “deviant” 
qualities (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Yin, 2003). The methodology for selecting the cases is 
detailed in Section 3.2.3, below. 
 
3.2.2 Why undertake a case study approach? 
Reframing my research questions to reflect the field of HE, and positing one further 
question regarding the penetration of a market discourse into English HE policy itself, 
the aims of my research were: 
• To set out how far a neoliberally informed strategy of marketisation has 
penetrated HE policy in England, with a particular focus on the current White 
Paper; 
• To elucidate to what extent neoliberally informed policies of marketization are 
succeeding in shaping the subjectivities of HE’s institutional leaders – their 
values, evaluations, actions and activities; 
• To understand how, in light of recent policy measures, individual HEIs make 
meaning of and negotiate their positions within the multiple and complex social 
relations of value that help shape their economic geographies; 
• To explore what impact the existing economic geographies and identities of 
individual HEIs have on their future trajectories – particularly given the 
inherent temporal and spatial path-dependency of economic geographies; and 
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• To illuminate how understandings of the value of HE, alongside the 
subjectivities of the HEIs, may or may not emerge as more multiple and 
complex under processes of neoliberalization. 
 
Given the above aims, I felt that a case study approach was appropriate. For Yin, a 
case study signifies “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (2003: 13). Similarly, Flyvbjerg 
(2011: 301) draws on the definition set out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary (2009), 
which states that a case study is “an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a 
person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment”. In 
both instances, the authors underscore that a researcher would undertake a case study 
where she (or he) particularly wishes to explore contextual conditions because she 
believes that they may be “highly pertinent” to the object under investigation (Yin, 
2003; Flyvbjerg, 2011). Furthermore, a well-designed case study allows the researcher 
to “retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” such as policy 
implementation and organizational and managerial processes (Yin, 2003: 2). 
 
As noted above, having recognized the diversity of the English HE system, it seemed 
clear to me that to fully explore my research questions I would need to examine 
multiple cases. Indeed, Yin had suggested that a multiple-case design was preferable to 
a single-case design due to the analytical benefits that could be derived from 
comparing and contrasting across cases (2003: 53). On the one hand, analytic 
conclusions that arose independently from two or more cases would be “more 
powerful” than conclusions from a single case. On the other, where common 
conclusions arose from diverse situated contexts the “external generalizability” of 
findings would be “immeasurably expanded” compared to a single-case study (ibid). 
What mattered was that there should be a clear rationale for selecting the cases. For 
instance, what Flyvbjerg (2011) calls a “deviant” case might help underscore a point 
more dramatically than a “typical” or “representative” case; or a “paradigmatic” case 
as an “exemplar” of my field could potentially offer a valuable reference point for 
developing theory and understanding. 
 
 79
The positions set out by Flyvbjerg (2011) and Yin (2003) resonated strongly given my 
ontological position and object of enquiry. I felt that a multiple-case study of HE in 
England comprised of appropriately selected HEIs would provide a solid foundation 
for exploring my research questions, testing ideas and building theory. Indeed, 
following Flyvbjerg (2011) and Yin (2003), the main strength of the approach was the 
depth of understanding it would afford me in the exploration of contemporary, 
complex social phenomena: that is, the detail, richness, completeness, and within-case 
variance that I could bring to life and illuminate through the in-depth study of real-life, 
situated economic practice across diverse HEIs. Recognizing that cases evolve over 
time, often as a string – or what I call in this thesis, an ‘iterative emergence’ (see Part 
II, Preface) – of meaningful, concrete events and developments that are historically 
and geographically grounded, helped me to consider my cases and research questions 
holistically. In this sense, through exploring the material and social relational context 
of my selected universities, my aim has been to make a significant contribution to 
academic knowledge in relation to the more abstract questions set out in Chapter Two. 
 
Of course, although case studies can provide opportunities for the researcher to explore 
particular situations in great depth, I was aware of suggestions that they were somehow 
inferior to investigations involving a large sample (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Simons, 2009; 
Yin, 2003). For example, Abercrombie et al (2006) argued that the detailed 
examination of one or two examples could not provide reliable information regarding 
the broader class. Thus, the authors suggested that generalizations from case studies 
were impossible, and that their contribution to scientific knowledge was limited. 
Moreover, they argued that the case study was primarily useful as a “preliminary 
investigative tool” and for “making hypothesis” rather than testing them. As such, they 
suggested that the approach was limited in theory building and in analytical rigour 
(ibid: 46-47). 
 
In contrast, Flyvbjerg (2011) and Yin (2003) have both argued that the concerns 
regarding transferability, theory building, dependability, credibility and validity have 
stemmed from some basic misunderstandings of what research and case studies are all 
about (see also Baxter and Eyles, 1997). Yin, for instance, suggested that it is a 
mistake to think that case studies can produce the sort of “statistical generalizations” 
about a population that arise from inferences made on the basis of “empirical data 
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collected about a sample” (2003: 32). Rather, the mode of generalization that case 
studies can underpin – particularly where multiple cases have been undertaken – is 
“analytic generalization” wherein the empirical results of the cases can be compared 
to, and contrasted with, previously developed theory. This allows the researcher to 
either uphold or refute the claims of existing theories or to propose new theories. 
Indeed, according to Simons (2009), this is one of the great strengths of the case study. 
 
Further, both Flyvbjerg (2011) and Yin (2003) have suggested that social science has 
rarely, if ever, succeeded in producing general theories that are context-independent. 
Rather context-dependent knowledge is essential to theory building – bearing in mind, 
of course, that any academic knowledge can only ever be partial (Rose, 1997). This 
resonated strongly for me as a geographer, particularly given the complexity, 
relationality and situated nature of economic practice. Through the in-depth 
exploration of ideas and research questions, causes can be successfully linked to 
outcomes provided that the researcher remains sensitive to concepts, context and 
historical explanations, and provided the study is undertaken with due rigour. 
 
3.2.3 Selecting the cases for in-depth study: the first steps 
As noted above, the English HE sector is diverse, serving a broad range of students 
from home and abroad and holding different “missions”, which can be primarily 
distinguished as teaching-led or research-led. As such, I felt that the varying histories, 
identities and geographies of HEIs would impact their evaluations and negotiations of 
policy and the possibilities for its transformation. In addition, my analysis of the HE 
White Paper (BIS, 2011a) – the method for which is detailed below – indicated that the 
Government was attempting to steer the HE sector on two, potentially, competing 
fronts – specifically regarding home undergraduate students. On the one hand, 
Government was attempting to free-up value to market relations – at least, to a greater 
extent than ever before – and to induce competition in both higher and lower ranked 
institutions9. On the other hand, it was attempting to pin down a certain understanding 
of the value of HE through the ex-ante regulation of institutions to promote social 
mobility (see Chapter Four, Section 4.3.3). Understanding the diversity of the system 
                                                        
9
 Wherever the term ‘rank’ is used throughout this thesis, it refers to the widely employed process of 
placing HEIs into a hierarchy based on certain sets of criteria found in a variety of both national and 
international league tables. 
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alongside the competing discourses of policy, helped form my rationale for selecting 
the HEIs that would comprise my multiple-case study. 
 
Lower-ranked and, often, more teaching-led HEIs, are frequently considered to be 
‘recruiting’ universities with relatively high populations of home undergraduate 
students from National Statistics Socio Economic Classifications (NS-SECs) 4 to 7. 
Such HEIs are often thought of as ‘local’ as they recruit relatively high numbers of 
undergraduate students from schools and further education (FE) colleges within their 
immediate locales – particularly in highly populated catchment areas (see, for 
example, Maclennan et al, 2000; McNay, 2006). Conversely, higher-ranked, research-
led HEIs are thought of as ‘selective’ with relatively high populations of home 
undergraduates from NS-SECs 1 to 3, and a much broader spatial reach in that highly 
qualified students compete for places from all over the country (ibid). 
 
To a degree, such suggestions can be verified using statistical data freely available 
from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). HESA Table T1a (HESA, 
2011a) provided variables pertaining to the participation of young, full-time, first-
degree undergraduates entering HE in 2009/10, giving a detailed breakdown of home, 
first-year, undergraduate student bodies of all HEIs in England: their recruitment from 
state schools and colleges, NS-SECs 4 to 7, and low-participation neighbourhoods. 
Unfortunately, the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS), which 
provides HESA with its student data, had altered its data definitions and recording 
procedures significantly across the period 2006-2009, thereby precluding any time 
series comparisons due to validity issues. I therefore utilized the most recent data 
available (i.e. 2009/10). When examined alongside the Times Higher Education (THE) 
rankings of the 2008 RAE10, a preliminary examination of Table T1a – specifically, 
the ‘location-adjusted benchmark’ – seemed to suggest that there might be some 
correlation between the rank and mission of a university and the spatial reach of the 
institution. However, as detailed by HESA (2011a), their location-adjusted benchmark 
is only ‘suggestive’ of this. In order to overcome this problem, specific data regarding 
the number and percentage of students recruited from the ‘local’ area and their socio-
                                                        
10 Ranking by the RAE enabled me to distinguish broadly between research-led and teaching-led HEIs 
without noise from other variables (such as National Student Survey scores) fuzzying the data. This is 
dealt with further below. 
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economic backgrounds (NS-SECs 1 to 3 and 4 to 7) was purchased from HESA, which 
I then analyzed. 
 
Problematic in requesting the computed data from HESA, was the arbitrary definition 
of ‘local’. Unfortunately, HESA’s only means of establishing a measure for ‘local’ was 
by creating a ‘within X distance’ radius around the main campus of each HEI 
(indicated by postcode), and relating this to the postcode of students’ normal residence 
(domicile) at the time of recruitment/application. The two postcodes were then linked 
to Ordinance Survey Gridlink datasets to give the Easting and Northing of each student 
domicile and institution location. The difference between the Northings and Eastings 
(obtained using the National Statistics All Fields Postcode Directory) of each were 
then squared and added together. The square root of the result provided the distance 
between the two in a straight line (according to Pythagorean theorem) (HESA, 2011c). 
 
Whilst, technically, the method available was robust (being accurate to within 50 
meters in line with Ordinance Survey grid reference inaccuracies), methodologically 
deciding upon some arbitrary distance to define ‘local’ that would suit all HEIs was 
problematic in a number of ways. First, some HEIs are relatively isolated by their 
physical and human geographies. For example, the University of Exeter is situated in a 
sparsely populated area of Devon, just six miles North East of Dartmoor National 
Park. Further, it is some 35 miles from Plymouth and 70 miles from Bristol both of 
which have their own universities. Yet still, the population of Exeter is just 117,000 
(ONS, 2012), which is not large enough to maintain the relatively large size of the 
university’s undergraduate student body which in 2010 stood at 17,720 compared to an 
average of 18,401 for THE/RAE ranked institutions in England. Second, some HEIs 
have multiple campuses that are spatially dispersed. For example, the University of 
Brighton (whose main campus sits in the heart of the city) also has major campuses in 
Hastings and Eastbourne, which are over 15 and 30 miles away respectively. Any 
definition of ‘local’ based on the situation of the university’s main campus would, 
thus, likely omit candidates living locally to distant branch-campuses. 
 
Given such difficulties, any robust methodology for defining ‘local’ would need to 
take account of the size of the university and the location of its various campuses; the 
size of surrounding populations; the proximity of other institutions; and a ‘distance’ 
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that would be deemed ‘local’ – commutable perhaps – by potential or attending 
students. Since HESA informed me that it was able to link its spatial data to other 
sources provided they were grid-referenced and compatible for use with GIS, 
following Mateos (2007) I undertook an exacting search of literature to see if other 
researchers had produced such data, but to no avail. Certainly, some studies had been 
undertaken, which defined ‘local’ as students attending university while living in the 
parental home (e.g. Charles, 2003; Christie, 2007; Holdsworth, 2006, 2008). However, 
such studies would have included students with long commuting distances as well as 
students who chose to designate their parental address as their term-time address even 
though the addresses were different. Additionally, UCAS held mobility data on 
undergraduate acceptances to universities within their domicile region. However, such 
data would have been problematic for regions such as London in which a high number 
of universities are located. Thus, I needed to make a choice between undertaking such 
a study myself (which would have been both time consuming and costly) and making 
my choice of ‘distance’ as robust as possible given the data at hand. 
 
In order to do the latter, I began by mapping out different radii for a wide selection of 
universities around the country and found that 15 miles seemed a reasonable figure for 
the vast majority of HEIs. Whilst a 10-mile radius would have excluded myriad towns 
that neighbour numerous HEIs (thereby significantly reducing the populations upon 
which they might draw ‘locally’), a 20-mile radius (suggested by HESA) often 
overlapped significantly with towns and cities where other institutions were located. 
For example, a 10-mile radius around the University of Portsmouth excludes 
Chichester to the East, Petersfield to the North and much of the Isle of Wight – all 
areas traditionally counted into the wider Portsmouth catchment area (ONS, 2011a). 
Yet a 20-mile radius significantly impacts Southampton to the West whilst reaching 
beyond Bognor Regis to the East – both of which have universities or university 
branch-campuses, and neither of which are classified as ‘local’ to Portsmouth’s “urban 
area” (ONS, 2011b). 
 
Almost inevitably, a fifteen-mile radius was found to be problematic in some cases and 
for similar reasons. For example, London has over twenty universities. Given their 
proximity to one another, fifteen miles may well be deemed too high. And for 
universities that are quite isolated like Exeter (see above) and Lincoln (which has a 
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large open hinterland up to Grimsby and Skegness) it may have been too low. 
However, by mapping out diverse radii around HEIs; checking them against the extent 
of the relevant ONS urban areas; checking them against potential population draw 
(ONS, 2011a); noting the proximity of other institutions; and examining the 
institutions’ widening participation agreements to see what areas (if any) they classed 
as ‘local’, fifteen miles was deemed a ‘reasonable fit’ for the purpose of helping to 
select case studies. Once calculated, I was able to establish: 
1) The socio-economic backgrounds by NS-SECs 1 to 3 and 4 to 7 of young, 
home undergraduate students recruited locally in 2009/10 for all HEIs in 
England; and 
2) The percentage of HEIs’ ‘local recruitment’ compared to their overall student 
populations. 
 
A further set of variables from HESA Table T1b (HESA, 2011b) provided domicile 
data (numbers and percentages) on all students attending English HEIs in 2009/10 
including, home, other European, and non-European undergraduates and post-
graduates. Together with the first set of variables, this data provided a general profile 
of the HEIs’ ‘spatial reach’ in terms of their total student populations in 2009/1011. 
 
3.2.4 Computing the data set and making the selection 
In order to select my case studies, the above data was interrogated by university 
against: national THE/RAE 2008 ranking; mission – derived broadly from either, a) 
Mission Groups – i.e. the Russell group, 1994 group, the Universities Alliance, the 
Million+ group, and the Cathedral group; or b) individual mission statements where no 
group affiliation was noted; university ‘type’ (for example, ‘plate glass’, Victorian red-
brick, etc.); and proposed fees for 2012/13. 
 
Based on Table T1a, HESA provided data for 122 HEIs in England12. Of these, ninety-
eight carried a THE/RAE 2008 ranking for multiple-subject institutions. All single-
subject institutions, which are ranked separately, were excluded, as were institutions 
with incomplete data. Of the remaining ninety-eight HEIs, ten were excluded from 
calculations due to the spatial dispersion of multiple campuses, and ten were excluded 
                                                        
11 Unfortunately, HESA restrictions prohibit me from publishing the full data set purchased from them. 
12 One HEI from the 123 HEIs in Table T1a withheld data. 
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on the grounds of isolation (see above explanation). This left a working data set of 
seventy-eight HEIs. In order to establish if there was any correlation between rank and 
degree of ‘local recruitment’, a simple linear regression was run between the two 
variables. An R2 value of 0.27 indicated that just 27% of institutions’ degree of local 
undergraduate recruitment for 2009/10 could, perhaps, be explained by THE/RAE 
rank. Examining the data showed that almost all London institutions had a higher than 
average percentage of undergraduates living in the local area at the time of 
recruitment/selection (see Table 3.1, below). 
 
Data Set Average Local Recruitment 
(Students with known ‘recruitment 
distance’ and NS-SEC upon 
application) 
Range 
Ex London (56 HEIs) 23.9% 1.3% to 81.7% 
London Only (22 HEIs) 49.3% 23.7% to 74.1% 
Table 3.1 Average Local Recruitment of First-time, First-year, Home Undergraduate 
Students in England, 2009/10. Source: Author’s calculations using HESA Data. 
 
To adjust for this anomaly, standard residuals (SR) were calculated for the data set (78 
HEIs), and thirteen London outliers (with SR scores of more than +1) were 
temporarily excluded. For the remaining sixty-five HEIs, an R2 value of 0.48 
demonstrated that almost 50% of institutions demonstrated a significant correlation 
between local undergraduate recruitment and THE/RAE ranking – underscoring just 
how different London is from the rest of the country. However, from the scatterplot 
below (Figure 3.1), it was clear that correlation decreased as university ranking 
lowered. 
 
Indeed, a regression for the top 30 HEIs (RAE rank 2 to 58) produced an R2 value of 
0.46, whilst those ranked 59 to 127 produced a negligible correlation of just 5%. 
Certainly, ‘selectivity’ and ‘RAE Rank’ were well correlated for the top 30 HEIs. 
However, some lower-ranked HEIs showed much lower levels of ‘local’ recruitment 
than I had expected while others were extremely high (see Table 3.2). As such, my 
data analysis demonstrated that the HE system in England showed a much more 
complex picture than received wisdom had previously suggested. 
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Figure 3.1  Scatterplot of Local Undergraduate Recruitment (2009/10) Against 
THE/RAE Rank (2008) – 65 HEIs in England. Source: Author’s calculations using HESA 
& THE data. 
 
Ex London Outliers (65 HEIs) Correlation (R2) SR Range 
Top 30 (RAE, 2 to 58) 46% -0.055 to 1.034 
Lower half (RAE, 59 to 127) 5% -2.563 to 2.211 
Table 3.2 Correlation Scores (R2) for Local Undergraduate Recruitment (2009/10) 
Against THE/RAE Rank (2008) – 65 HEIs in England. Source: Author’s calculations using 
HESA & THE data. 
 
Replacing all London institutions in order to examine potential ‘deviant’ cases, and 
taking all data into consideration, a shortlist of twenty-five institutions was drawn up 
from which I selected four HEIs that I would, ideally, like to investigate. These 
included: 
• One ‘representative’ high-ranking, research-led university from the Russell Group 
with a broad spatial reach and a relatively low percentage of students from NS-
SECs 4 to 7 – demonstrating its selectivity; 
• A second high-ranking, research-led university from the 1994 Group that 
demonstrated some ‘deviant’ characteristics from the norm for high-ranking 
institutions: i.e. relatively high local recruitment of students and from hard to 
reach groups; 
• One lower-ranking, teaching-led university from the Million+ Group with a high 
proportion of locally recruited students and from hard to reach groups; and 
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• A second lower/mid-ranking, teaching-led university from the Universities 
Alliance with a low proportion of locally recruited students and some ‘deviant’ 
characteristics from the norm for lower-ranked institutions: i.e. a relatively high 
percentage of students from NS-SECs 1 to 3 and an above average mix of 
overseas undergraduate and postgraduate students. 
 
Detailed, anonymized profiles of the four selected HEIs are provided in the Preface to 
Part II of this thesis. 
 
3.3 Methods 
Debates regarding methodological rigour have been intense in the field of economic 
geography (see, for example, Amin and Thrift, 2000 vs. Martin and Sunley, 2001 vs. 
Barnes, 2001). It was, therefore, essential to adopt a plausible research design and 
methodology that, in Yin’s terms, would provide a “logical sequence” that would 
connect my empirical study/data to my initial research questions and, ultimately, to my 
conclusions (2003: 20). In light of the ontological and epistemological position of this 
thesis, a critical engagement with political economy, semiotic analysis and 
governmentality was methodologically essential. Moreover, in order to explore my 
research questions thoroughly it was vital to examine the case study universities and 
their social and material relations in action. For, as Lee asserts, it is the “shared or 
imposed understandings about the nature of value, Value and values, which establish 
the criteria through which the performance of economic geographies may be 
evaluated” (2006: 416). In order to move on in the world, all actors must make 
meaning of it; engaging with, reflecting on and attributing meaning to some aspects of 
the world rather than others. As such, it was imperative to explore the situated 
evaluations, interpretations, actions and activities of individuals and organizations 
within the complex social relations of value that help shape their economic 
geographies. 
 
To this end, following a comprehensive literature review regarding the marketisation 
of HE in England, I employed a mix of complementary qualitative methods across two 
phases: first, an analysis of policy documentation; and second, in-depth study of my 
HEIs. The implementation of complimentary qualitative methods, including discourse 
analysis, observation, archival research and in-depth interviews, provided deeper 
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insights into my research questions than would a single method. Furthermore, it 
enabled the triangulation of data between sources thereby allowing well-supported 
conclusions to be drawn (Baxter and Eyles, 1997; Davies, 2007; James, 2006; Patton, 
1990). 
 
Before detailing my methods, it is worth noting the crucial underpinnings that a logical 
sequence of research provided. First, the literature review provided vital context for 
my research as it allowed me to consider HE as a complex field of social relations. In 
my reading, the literature highlighted the competing discourses of policy instruments; 
the diversity of the system; the complex spatialities and power relations of HE; and the 
multiplicity of values, theories of Value and practices of value that impact and 
influence its economic geographies. Second, both the literature review and analysis of 
policy documents were integral to selecting my four cases (detailed above) and 
forming my interview schedule. Without a good grasp of the field of HE, and without 
an in-depth knowledge of what diverse HEIs were being asked to make meaning of, 
implement and negotiate, it would have been impossible for me as a researcher to 
elucidate the multiple and complex nature of emerging economic geographies and of 
my interviewees’ life-worlds. Through a systematic undertaking of procedures and 
analysis, following Baxter and Eyles (1997) and Yin (2003), I have sought to uphold 
the transferability, dependability, credibility and validity of my research throughout 
my thesis. 
 
3.3.1 Exploring the production and strategic-selection of marketisation as a 
technology of government for steering HE in England 
As discussed in Chapter Two, a key argument concerns the role that political 
rationalities and their economic imaginaries play in the semiotic process of complexity 
reduction as those who seek to regulate the economy attempt to shape the material and 
social practices and relations of actors in time and space (Lee, 2006; Jessop, 2004, 
2009; Jessop and Sum, 2001). From a governmentality perspective, political discourse 
is central to the process of semiosis in that it forms an “intellectual machinery” for 
problematizing reality, and proffering certain tactics and techniques within the 
constructions of a political rationale (Rose and Miller, 1992). Yet, most fundamentally, 
it is in and through the diverse social relations of value that the strategies and policies 
of those who seek to govern must work if they are to become anchored in the Ordinary 
 89
Economy. Thus, shaping and forming the values and evaluations of actors is an 
immanently contextual and situated process that is confronted by diverse histories, 
geographies, subjectivities, positionalities and power relations etc. 
 
In order to assess how far a neoliberally informed strategy of marketisation has 
penetrated higher education policy in England, I undertook a systematic analysis of 
primary and secondary documentation surrounding the production of three legislative 
manoeuvres since the Dearing Report of 1997: The Teaching and Higher Education 
Act, 1998; The Higher Education Act, 2004; and the 2011 Government White Paper, 
‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ (BIS, 2011a). The documents 
analyzed included: 
• The primary policy Report informing the subsequent legislation; 
• Selected consultation documents gathered in reference to the Reports and the Acts 
(primarily from the four academic Mission Groups, Universities UK, HEFCE and 
prominent intellectuals/advisors); 
• Selected submissions to the House of Commons Select Committees – these 
included views from business, MPs (as individuals), the main political Parties, 
academic interests and student representatives; 
• Official policy texts from the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) and its predecessor departments; 
• Specific addresses to the House of Commons by the relevant Minister outlining 
intended policy, and the debate surrounding those addresses – sourced from 
Hansard; and 
• The 1998 and 2004 Acts and their White Papers, and the current White Paper 
(CM 8122). 
 
In addition, for the most recent legislative manoeuvre I examined a selection of news 
articles (from the press and the BBC’s website) covering the development of policy 
since, and including, the Browne Review (Browne, 2010). During this time, various 
potential initiatives had been ‘tested’ by government in the news media in order to 
gauge public and organizational opinion, and were either selectively retained or 
discarded. In order to avoid my own arbitrary and, perhaps, biased selection of 
newspaper articles, the research utilized a database of articles provided daily to staff by 
Queen Mary, University of London’s Communications Office. These articles came 
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from newspapers that cover the political spectrum (from the Daily Mail to the 
Guardian), and included ‘tabloid’, ‘broadsheet’ and specialist higher education press. 
 
Finally, between early 2011 and 2013, I attended a number of seminars as a participant 
observer held by the Westminster Higher Education Forum13 (WHEF). Not only was I 
able to access the transcripts from these events, which in and of itself was very useful, 
but I was also able to observe a policy network in action, witnessing what the 
participants said and how they interacted with one another. The seminars included: 
The HE White Paper – Next Steps for England’s Universities; The Student as 
Consumer; UK Universities in a Global HE Market; Exporting UK Education; Social 
Mobility in HE; Fair access and Widening Participation; and The Future and Value of 
Research in UK HE. 
 
Whilst the WHEF has no policy agenda of its own, it organizes seminars on public 
policy at a senior-level aiming to “raise the quality of debate on public policy 
developments and so create opportunities for informed discussion” (WHEF, 2014). 
Ministers, academics, university officials, the National Student Union, UCAS, 
OFSTED, teachers, head teachers, and other interested parties regularly attend the 
seminars. As such, the organizers suggest that the seminars are “structured to facilitate 
the formulation of ‘best’ public policy by providing policy makers and implementers, 
and those with an interest in the issues, with a sense of the way different stakeholder 
perspectives interrelate” (ibid). From a research perspective, attending these events and 
analyzing the transcripts gave me first-hand and invaluable insight into how discourses 
are both constituted and constitutive, and how policies are both shaped and shaping in 
their development and implementation. 
 
In all cases, it was important for me to engage with the neoliberal ‘imaginary’ of 
marketisation broadly understood from a CPE perspective. This meant thinking about 
the language of markets as well as references to HE as a field of economic and non-
economic practices; and this needed to be considered both within the national context 
and beyond. For example, in a global context, competition, efficiency, market 
freedoms, comparative advantage, information, notions of supply and demand, 
                                                        
13 I am extremely grateful to WHEF for allowing me to attend these events as a PhD Student at a 
complimentary rate of “zero cost”. Without such subsidisation, I would never have been able to attend 
on such a regular basis. 
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economic growth and the knowledge economy have all been discursively and 
materially reinforced in relation to higher education through the OECD and the WTO 
(e.g. OECD, 2007; Robertson, 2006; Suavé, 2002). Such reinforcement has also 
occurred at a regional scale through the EU’s Lisbon Strategy and Bologna Process 
(Jayasuriya, 2010; Robertson, 2007). Furthermore, it was important to engage with the 
“extra-economic” language (Jessop, 2004) expressed in various discursive arenas – 
particularly regarding the social and cultural benefits that higher education is said to 
offer society, and what might be thought of as “competing discourses” to the market 
rationale. In so doing, the research sought to explore the potential (re)production, 
contestation and (re)contextualization of marketisation as a hegemonic discourse. I 
also sought to explore how HE was being valued in the production and contestation of 
legislation, and what government was seeking in its attempts to shape the evaluations, 
actions, activities and subjectivities of HE’s actors – most specifically the strategic 
leaders of its HEIs who would need to make meaning of and implement the 2011 
White Paper but, also, its students. 
 
Given the number of documents I wanted to consider, the time I had available, and my 
limited access to funding I broke my analysis into two levels of granularity. First, in 
tracing the penetration of marketisation discourses leading up to, but not including, 
current legislation, following Robertson (2007), I “stood back” from the 
documentation rather than take “a close reading” of each text. This allowed me to 
examine broadly the discursive shifts that have incrementally altered higher 
education’s framework of action without getting bogged down in the identification and 
close analysis of “genres”, “discourses” and “styles” (see below). Second, in 
examining the most recent policy I undertook a discourse analysis of selected 
documents and most specifically the Government’s HE White Paper (BIS, 2011a). 
Given that some critics hold that this policy instrument is the most radical departure in 
English HE regulation since Dearing (1997) recommended the implementation of the 
student fee, this document and the context of its production was central to my research. 
 
3.3.2 The discourse analysis 
Brown and Yule (2003) and Reisigl and Wodak (2009) both offered useful approaches 
to critical discourse analysis, which supported the systematic analysis of the 
representational, ideational, material, institutional and relational moments in the 
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construction and constitution of the strategically selected policy measures under 
investigation (see also, Fairclough et al, 2003). 
 
Brown and Yule (2003) put the speaker or writer at the heart of the communication 
process, noting that it is they who have topics and presumptions, assign information 
structure, and make references regarding the world in order to construct semiotic 
messages that can be directed towards “addressees”. Conversely, it is the hearer or 
reader who must interpret and draw inferences from such messages (ibid: ix). As such, 
the authors appealed for a pragmatic approach that included the study of the sentences 
and phrases that made up discourses. However, this could not be undertaken in 
isolation from their communicative contexts. Rather, it needed to include “considering 
the general principles of interpretation by which people normally make sense of what 
they hear and read” (ibid: x, emphasis added): 
“Everything must be studied from the point of view of itself, as near as we can get to 
this, and from the point of view of its relations, as near as we can get to them. If we try 
to see it absolutely in itself, unalloyed with relations, we shall find… that we have… 
whittled it away. If we try to see it in its relations to the bitter end, we shall find that 
there is no corner of the universe into which it does not enter” (ibid, quoting notes from 
Samuel Butler). 
 
Brown and Yule’s (2003) emphasis on relational context resonated strongly for me as 
a researcher on two key fronts. First, given my concern with the subjective and situated 
nature of economic practice and the multiplicity of values, evaluations and dilemmas 
that are involved, it urged me not to take policy documents as “meanings that exist as 
quasi-structures” that simply have to be set in motion to have full effect (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2006). Policy documents both arise from relational contexts and are thrown 
into relational contexts. It is, therefore, simply not possible to understand them as 
static, once and for all events. Second, their emphasis reminded me that as an 
independent researcher I had to accept that, contra Actor Network Theory’s engrained 
ontology of association, it is impossible to follow the connections – “the actors 
themselves” – to the bitter end via some ‘and… and… and…’ process (Latour, 2005: 
179). Instead, I had to understand my limitations and choose wisely in the selection of 
documentation. 
 
 93
Further, the central critical discourse analysis concepts put forward by Reisigl and 
Wodak (2009) were very useful in setting out my strategy for the interrogation and 
analysis of policy and policy-related documents. These were “critique”, “ideology” 
and “power”. First, critique can broadly be understood as “gaining distance from the 
data… embedding the data in the social context, clarifying the political positioning of 
discourse participants, and having a focus on continuous self-reflection while 
undertaking the research” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 87). I was prompted to look for 
“inconsistencies, self-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas” (ibid: 88) in the 
discursive structures of the texts and specifically, how these related to marketisation 
and the field of higher education. I was also very aware that as a researcher I should 
render transparent the objects of my investigations, “demystifying” – as Reisigl and 
Wodak put it – the “manipulative character” of their discursive practices (ibid). This 
also held true for my own positionality, wherein I needed to justify, theoretically, why 
certain interpretations of discourses seemed more valid than others. 
 
Second, the authors saw ideology as a rather “one-sided” view of the world made up of 
“ related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluations” that 
are shared by members of a specific social or political group in time and space (ibid). 
Ideologies may (or may not) establish and maintain unequal power relations – or, 
indeed, radically transform them – for example, through the production of hegemonic 
relations or particular “identity narratives”. As such, in my analysis I paid particular 
attention to how, why and with what social and material consequences linguistic and 
other semiotic practices could potentially both mediate and reproduce a neoliberal 
ideology and hegemony. However, similar to Brown and Yule (2003), Reisigl and 
Wodak (2009) also sought to understand the ways in which hegemony is negotiated, 
contested and transformed. I therefore took the position that the discursive strategies 
embodied in policy and policy-related documents were attempts at reproducing 
hegemony, which could not be understood separately from their historical (contingent) 
and prospective (tendential) relational contexts. 
 
Finally, the authors suggested that language alone is not powerful – although as 
Fairclough et al (2004) assert, language (as utterances that are understood) is 
‘performative’ in that it has an effect. Rather, powerful people who have the means and 
opportunities to alter material conditions and social relations make use of language in 
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order to maintain or gain power. In this sense, power relates to an “asymmetric 
relationship”, or “power over” (Stone, 1989): that is, “the possibility of having one’s 
own will within a social relationship against the will or interests of others” (Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2009: 88). For the purposes of my research, power in its authoritative form 
(i.e. establishing the rules, punishments and rewards of the game, and power over 
objects) was certainly significant. However, given what Foucault (2000) tells us about 
power in its neoliberal form – that is, gaining power at a distance – and how this was 
problematized in Chapter Two, I was again brought back to the importance of context. 
As Reisigl and Wodak (2009) assert, in discourses power can be legitimized or de-
legitimized, and any political texts bare the traces of struggles over ideas, ideals, 
ideologies and dominance. As such, I remained focused on the ways in which power 
was both reflected and opposed in my chosen texts thereby offering invaluable insights 
into the struggles to produce material and social outcomes in the emerging economic 
geographies of HE. 
 
To analyze my chosen documents, I followed Jessop’s (2004) understanding of the 
economic imaginary as a semiotic order (see Fairclough, 2003). For Jessop, “a 
semiotic order is a specific configuration of genres, discourses and styles” in which: 
discourses “represent… social practices… as well as the material world from 
particular positions in the social world”; genres “are ways of acting and interacting 
viewed in their specifically semiotic aspect and, as such, serve to regularize 
(inter)action”; and styles identify “ways of being – identities”. This sat well with, but 
added texture to, Reisigl and Wodak’s understanding of discourses, genres and texts 
wherein texts are an element of discourses that can be assigned to genres but, 
importantly, “make speech durable over time” thereby bridging “two dilated speech 
situations”: i.e. the situation of the speaker/writer and that of the hearer/reader (2009: 
89-90). I, therefore, probed the texts around the semiotic order of marketisation but 
always in relation to HE, and always with an understanding of the multiplicity and 
complexity of social relations of value involved. My findings from this phase of 
analysis are detailed in Chapter Four. 
 
3.3.3 The in-depth study of the four HEIs 
Selecting HEIs that one would ideally like to study and actually recruiting them are 
two quite different things. Having read various studies that warned of the difficulties of 
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recruitment (e.g. Mountz, 2007), and given the tense climate that surrounded HE in 
England at the time, I felt that I needed a strategy that would help demonstrate, first, 
why I wanted to explore the experiences of any particular HEI, and second, the 
qualities about me as a researcher that an HEI might appreciate. To this end I wrote a 
short proposal that briefly presented the research context, my research questions, my 
objectives, methods and ethical considerations. This was tailored to each of my 
preferred HEIs setting out why the institution could, potentially, add depth to our 
understandings of how processes of marketisation are negotiated through complex 
social relations in time and place. Each proposal was attached as a PDF to an e-mail, 
which professionally set out the above but in a much shorter format: enough to make 
the approach meaningful, but not so much as to take up too much of the reader’s time. 
Each e-mail ended with the following polite request: 
If you feel, in principle, that it may be possible for (name of HEI) to participate as a case 
study, perhaps we could either meet briefly or talk by phone to discuss how to take this 
forward? 
 
As I had friends working in two of my selected HEIs, they were able to advise me who 
best to approach. The person would need to hold a strategic position at the university 
and be senior enough to consider taking the request further. Having initial contacts 
proved very helpful, as I was able to mention in my e-mails that I was ‘known’ via 
colleagues. For another institution, one of my supervisors knew the Vice Chancellor 
very well and wrote a very brief and non-committal e-mail stating that I would make 
contact in the next few days, and this helped to ‘open the door’. For my final HEI I 
knew no one, so I set about using the Internet to find a contact at the Pro-Vice 
Chancellor (PVC) level who seemed to have interests in HE as a field of research. This 
meant searching through the profiles of all the PVCs, examining their job descriptions, 
histories, teaching and research interests. Eventually I selected one and sent my 
request. 
 
Three institutions came back immediately with “yes, we think so”. Of these, one asked 
me to travel in for a chat with the Deputy VC; one handed me over to their ethics 
committee who cleared my proposal and put me straight in touch with the VC; and the 
third handed me straight over to their Academic Registrar with whom I spoke on the 
phone. In all cases, I was given the opportunity to talk through my research objectives 
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and set out a plan for moving forward. The fourth institution was more cautious and 
arranged for the VC to call me at home on such-and-such a day at such-and-such a 
time. If this was designed to intimidate, it worked. At ten minutes to the hour I was 
pacing the floor wondering if I could hold my nerve. When the phone rang I could feel 
my heart in my chest, but that was nothing compared to how much I quivered as the 
VC told me: 
“We don’t allow research on this institution”. 
“Oh”, I replied gingerly. “Is that the end of the matter or is there some room for 
persuasion?” 
The VC laughed. 
“Well, I’ve read your proposal and I do think it’s good. But I’m wondering why I 
should take this before our board when we reject other researchers. What makes you 
so special?” 
I thought for a moment. 
“Well, it’s not me”, I said. “I’m so small you would hardly notice me in a well lit 
room, which could of course be a bonus. It’s your institution that matters: the position 
that you hold, the geographies that you have, the students that you serve, and your 
stated values. I really think your institution could add enormous texture to 
understanding what’s happening in higher education at the moment in terms of its 
value and marketisation.” 
Perhaps my reply was a little ‘cheesy’. But it clinched the deal! A week later I heard 
back from the VC’s secretary that the board would allow my research and that I should 
send a list of potential interviewees for agreement. That was four-out-of-four. 
 
3.3.4 Archival research 
Having successfully recruited my four HIEs, I constructed detailed profiles for each, 
gathering data from web-archives and primary documentation regarding their histories, 
mission statements, current Vice Chancellors and strategic directors, access 
agreements, outreach programmes, strategic plans, fees, bursaries and fee-waiver 
programmes. I also examined the geographies of the HEIs utilizing web-archives and 
HESA data. Here, I explored their connections with other universities overseas; any 
existing or planned branch campuses; the geographies of their student bodies (i.e. 
home, EU and abroad for undergraduate and postgraduate students); any connections 
they held with local businesses and organizations, and any philanthropic or other work 
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in the local community. Putting in such effort before going out into the field provided 
not only an understanding of the HEIs’ current economic and non-economic 
geographies and relations, but also offered a solid foundation for the development of a 
nuanced interview schedule. 
 
3.3.5 In-depth, semi-structured interviews 
In order to fully explore my research questions, I undertook in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with a “purposeful sample” (Patton, 1990) of key informants selected for 
their strategic role within each university. The interviewees included Vice Chancellors 
(or equivalents), Pro-Vice Chancellors (or equivalents) and other members of the 
Strategic Board, Academic Registrars and/or Secretaries, Deans (or equivalents), key 
actors in finance, widening participation, educational outreach, admissions, marketing 
and recruitment, and Presidents of the Student’s Unions. In all cases, interviews were 
requested with the Chair of the Board of Governors, but only one responded positively. 
(Please see Table 3.3 below for a breakdown of interviews by university). In total, 
fifty-five interviews were undertaken over a three-month period in early-mid 2012. 
This allowed enough time for each HEI to have formulated a Strategic Plan and Access 
Agreement in relation to the 2011 White Paper, and to have begun implementing that 
Plan in preparation for the 2012/13 academic year, which was the first year that the 
new policy would have full impact. The vast majority of interviews lasted around an 
hour-and-a-half. Only one was a disappointing 25 minutes, and the longest was 3 
hours. A full, anonymized list of interviewees is provided in the Preface to Part II. 
 
Given the climate in English HE at the time, I was concerned that recruiting 
interviewees may prove difficult in some institutions. The Government’s White Paper 
had been met both positively, with some commentators saying it was about time that 
academia came down from its ivory tower, and negatively with many scholars, 
politicians, students and lay people alike protesting that this was a step too far along 
the neoliberal road to marketisation (e.g. Collini, 2010; Daily Mail, 2011; Guardian, 
2010a; Telegraph, 2011a; Vernon, 2010). As such, having gained permission from 
each of the Vice Chancellors to undertake my research in their institutions, we agreed 
upon a list of actors whom I could approach to request an interview. Only one 
institution proved slightly problematic in this regard, denying me potential access to 
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two actors I felt were key. However, through very polite negotiation and professional 
reasoning, I was allowed to contact their ‘seconds-in-command’. 
 
Strategic Position GE PA DTC FTL 
Vice Chancellor 1 1 1 1 
Deputy VC 1 1 1 2 
Pro-VCs, Vice 
Principals 
3 6 2 3 
Deans/Chairs of 
Faculties 
4 2 3 5 
Chair Board of 
Governors 
- - 1 - 
Registrar/Secretary 2 1 1 1 
Director of 
Marketing 
- 1 1 1 
President of Student 
Union 
1 1 1 1 
WP, Education and 
Outreach 
1 1 1 - 
Other Strategic 
Directors 
- - 2 - 
Totals: 13 14 14 14 
Table 3.3 Strategic Positions of 55 Interviewees Across Four Case Study HEIs. Source: 
Author.  
Notes: Each HEI has been given a psuedonym in order to preserve anonymity. These are: Global 
Entreprenuer (GE); Palace Aspirational (PA); Downtown Coastal (DTC) and Four-Town Local (FTL). 
A full explanation for their anonymity is detailed in Section 3.3.6 below. 
 
To make my approaches, I drew up individualized interview proposals outlining the 
purpose of my research, the themes that we would explore, and my research ethics (see 
Section 3.3.6, below). In addition, I underscored that whilst permission had been 
granted for me to undertake my research, they were absolutely free to decline my 
request. The proposals were sent via e-mail to both the potential participants and their 
secretaries where appropriate. Out of sixty requests, fifty-five came back positive, 
which was an excellent response rate and well worth the effort made. 
 
For me, the strength of the in-depth interview was that it allowed me to explore the 
experiences, feelings, perspectives and emotions of the participants at a much deeper 
and broader level than quantitative techniques such as questionnaires (Davies, 2007; 
Longhurst, 2003). Given the emphasis of my thesis on the complexity and situated 
nature of all economic practice, it was imperative that my approach enabled my 
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interviewees to explore their economic activities as “a set of lived practices” (Crang, 
2002: 648) that are relational and may be subject to diverse evaluations, 
understandings, norms, dilemmas, and beliefs (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006). As such, I 
tried to make the questions points for discussion such that interviewees could form an 
“intellectual engagement” with the research in what Schoenberger (1991) refers to as 
“collaborative dialogue”. In practice, this enabled my participants to think about their 
responses and to interject comments, opinions and asides as though in conversation. 
Thus, they were able to both provide context to their narratives and experiences, and 
explore their emotions around those experiences. Indeed, one of the most fulfilling 
aspects of my research came at the end of the interviews with many participants 
expressing how much they either enjoyed the process or found it cathartic. 
 
The interview schedules utilized open-ended questions and a set of semi-structured 
prompts that were based around five core themes: 
• The value and valuation of higher education – exploring interviewees’ 
understandings and experiences from a personal and institutional perspective. 
• The negotiation, implementation and transformation of the current higher 
education White Paper – exploring interviewees evaluations, understandings and 
strategies. 
• The meaning-making process – exploring how institutions strategized the White 
Paper and what factors were most influencing actors’ strategies for moving on in 
the world. 
• The current socio-economic geographies and identities of the institutions – 
exploring to what extent and in what ways these may or may not be shaping their 
decision-making processes and future trajectories. 
• The trajectory of higher education – exploring interviewees’ experiences of the 
push towards marketisation over time. 
 
Before taking the interview schedule into the field, the questions were piloted at 
another HEI to ensure that it reflected the aims of my research, which it did. However, 
two difficulties were highlighted. Firstly, the schedule was quite long and would take 
just over an hour to complete. I therefore decided to treat the core themes as a list of 
topics that, ideally, each participant would cover, but that could be tailored in light of 
any time constraints. This needed to be done sensibly to allow subsequent triangulation 
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between transcripts (James, 2006). Secondly, and relatedly, I would need to know the 
interview schedule inside out in order to achieve my aim of collaborative dialogue. 
The White Paper was a complex policy instrument attempting to shape a far more 
complex world, and I did not want to narrow down my interviewees’ opportunities to 
explore their experiences. 
 
3.3.6 Ethical considerations and difficulties 
As my research involved human participants, I first needed to gain approval from the 
Queen Mary, University of London Ethics Committee before contacting any of my 
selected HEIs or potential interviewees. Although the Economic and Social Research 
Council funded my research, I did not need to gain their further approval. Indeed, 
Queen Mary’s ethical standards corresponded fully with the ESRC’s (see QMUL, 
2014; ESRC, 2014). In line with QMUL’s Statement of Research Ethics Policy, I 
needed to demonstrate that my research would be carried out “with honesty, integrity 
and due care for the rights of participants and researchers” and that I would always be 
mindful of minimizing or eliminating any potential risks (QMUL, 2014). To this end, 
and since my research was with adult professionals and concerned a relatively non-
contentious subject, I completed the on-line, fast track ethics evaluation provided by 
the University. Here, I needed to state: that consent would be sought from participants; 
that they would be informed of my methods, the purpose of my research, what their 
participation would entail and any risks involved; that confidentiality and anonymity 
would be assured; that participation would be voluntary and free from coercion; that I 
would avoid harm in all instances; and that the independence of my research would be 
made explicit. Within a few days of submission, my application was passed with an 
ethics rating of 10/10. 
 
Of my four HEIs, two required full anonymity – including the name of the university. 
Given that I wanted to examine their histories, geographies and positionalities within 
the HE sector, I felt this might be difficult. However, following discussions with my 
supervisors I proposed that I would safeguard their anonymity as far as possible by 
using pseudonyms for all four institutions and not referring directly to their geographic 
location or RAE ranking. Further, any freely available statistics used would be rounded 
to the nearest 5% so as to avoid identification where possible. A brief description of 
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each case study is provided in the Preface to Part II of this thesis. The pseudonyms are 
as follows: 
Institution Position Pseudonym Abbreviation 
Typical high rank Global Entrepreneur GE 
A-Typical high rank Palace Aspirational PA 
Mid-low rank, wide-draw Downtown Coastal DTC 
Low-mid rank, local draw Four Town Local FTL 
Table 3.4 Case Study Pseudonyms. Source: Author. 
 
As detailed above, interviews were requested via invitation. At this stage, the potential 
participants were informed that: I would like to digitally record the interviews, but that 
this would be their choice; the interviews would be confidential, in that they would not 
be discussed with any other parties (other than my supervisors); any recordings would 
be transcribed and analyzed by me; and their narratives would be anonymized, 
avoiding as far as possible their individual identification. Whilst people often enjoy the 
opportunity to put across their point of view and explore their experiences and 
feelings, I was aware that some interviewees might find the digital recorder 
intimidating (Mountz, 2007). At the start of each interview I, therefore, asked if the 
participant was still happy to be recorded, and always placed the handset discretely to 
one side. 
 
To help participants feel relaxed in the interview setting, the interviews were held on 
the participants’ home turf in quiet, private offices chosen by them. To facilitate this, 
the interviews were planned well ahead and scheduled over a two-to-three week period 
for each HEI. This enabled me to plan travel, book accommodation and eat within my 
limited research budget. Before each interview, I confirmed the date, time and place 
with my interviewees. Having sat next to a terrific sales person in my previous 
incarnation as a production manager, I’d learned that ‘confirming’ appointments rather 
than ‘asking’ if the date was still OK hardly ever produced a negative response, and 
this certainly held true for my research. Throughout my time out in the field, my hotel 
rooms served as my base and provided important retreats from what was a tiring and 
emotional experience. 
 
At the start of each interview, consent forms and information sheets were provided to 
interviewees, and each was informed that they could pause or withdraw from the 
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interview at any time without penalty. They were informed that my research was 
independent for my PhD and any subsequent publications, and that any recordings and 
transcripts would be stored safely for my sole utilization. Throughout the process I was 
aware that I should avoid harm and exploitation by empathizing with the positionality 
of my interviewees, seeking to minimize any vulnerability they might feel by “co-
owning” and “co-shaping” the processes of “questioning, answering, listening and 
conversing” (Cloke et al, 2004: 129). Given that my interviewees all held quite 
powerful positions in academia, I was actually surprised that this held true for the 
majority of cases. Out of fifty-five participants, only two succumbed to the managerial, 
“puffer fish” stance described by Dunn (2007) – attempting to overwhelm me with 
their positions and avoid answering questions; whilst another displayed the puffer’s 
shy-side – hiding intently behind her bag and coat until she felt secure enough to 
unfold. Indeed, in most cases I definitely needed to consider my own positionality as a 
researcher in the very field that I was seeking to explore. I am, actually, a very small 
person: a mere 5ft tall, 43kg and totally bland when it comes to dress. But get me 
going, and my personality increases. Thus, I consistently tried to be reflective of my 
positionality and “put myself to one side” – attempting to maintain “neutrality” 
throughout the interviews (Davies, 2007). Although Rose (1997) warns that remaining 
reflexively impartial is practicably impossible in qualitative research, considering such 
issues was foundational to earning the trust of participants and helping them to feel 
like partners in the research process. It was also crucial to establishing the 
trustworthiness and credibility of my data (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). 
 
At the end of each interview, after thanking my interviewees for sharing their 
experiences with me, I immediately completed my fieldwork diary, making note of the 
intangible moments that I would likely forget over the course of time, including any 
topics or issues that had been covered particularly well. For example, I noted the 
composure of my interviewees, their hand gestures and postur(ings); how relaxed or 
tense they were; their passion or dispassion. One interviewee spent four or five 
minutes turning and pointing out of the window when I asked what it meant to the 
university to be located where they were. “That. That”, she kept saying, pointing at a 
council estate and staring at the bleak prospects it represented for the young people of 
the city. On other occasions I noted where interviewees had come particularly prepared 
or had mentioned something I had not considered that could be of import. Regarding 
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the former, I wanted to note where interviewees seemed to be “performing” in order to 
guide me towards a particular stance (see Dwyer and Davies, 2010). However, it was 
very important not to confuse preparedness with disingenuity. For example, one very 
excited interviewee told me: 
“Now watch me closely during the interview. Every time I think I’ve got something 
really interesting to say, I’ll raise my hand and you can note the time on the 
recording”. 
And he did! And it was interesting! At the end of the interview we had a really nice 
chat and he told me to “keep the recorder running just in case”. He also paid me the 
compliment of noting that I never lost attention and maintained good eye contact 
throughout. 
“You know your interview schedule very well”, he said. 
Ultimately, I found keeping a fieldwork diary invaluable, not only for helping to verify 
the context and dependability of my data (Baxter and Eyles, 1997), but for bringing my 
interviews back to life as I set about transcription, analysis and reporting. 
 
3.3.7 Analysis and reporting of interview data 
All interviews were transcribed word-for-word which, whilst incredibly time-
consuming, gave me the opportunity to get really close to the detail of my 
interviewees’ narratives. It is hardly surprising that after 55 interviews in four different 
HEIs, one’s memory becomes hazy as to who said what, where and when. But the 
process of transcription, which I always pre-empted by reading the relevant entry in 
my fieldwork diary, took me back – as far as possible – to the interview space as a fly-
on-the-wall listening to what were largely friendly, complex, and emotional 
conversations between one attentive party, who listened carefully and asked lots of 
questions, and another who dug deep into his or her experiences and shared them in a 
private – yet public – room. 
 
To deconstruct these personal time capsules seems a bizarre thing to do, for whilst the 
elements fit with themes that would help me explore my research questions, together 
they formed a whole, which illuminated, at that time and in that place, my 
interviewees’ thoughts on what was happening in HE in light of a political shift in their 
social relations of value. However, it is not the job of a researcher to publish 55 
transcripts and ask the reader to make sense of them. As such, the transcripts were 
coded using TAMS Analyzer such that they could be considered thematically. Using a 
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specifically designed programme to organize, evaluate, annotate and keep track of the 
transcripts was incredibly useful, as it enabled me to search for codes developed from 
my research questions, the theoretical framework established via the literature review, 
and, importantly, emerging themes from the narratives themselves. However, my own 
iterative reading and re-reading of the transcripts was essential for the development of 
meaningful and insightful codes that faithfully represented the narratives of my 
interviewees. Using these two techniques together was undoubtedly time consuming. 
However, allowing myself to think complexly and reflexively about the narratives 
enabled me to consider existing literature alongside new data in ways that may have 
not been done before (Cope, 2003; Flowerdew and Martin, 2005). 
 
For example, Jessop (2004) had stressed the paradox that the emergence of complex 
economies is forever based on round after round of complexity reduction, and had 
proffered that variation becomes less as economic practices become embedded into an 
actor’s life-world or, what I would call in this thesis, emerging economic geographies 
and social relations of value (following Lee, 2006, 2011). Iteratively reading my 
interviewees’ testimonies allowed me to challenge that assumption and provided the 
basis for my analysis in Chapter Six. Further, my interviewees’ understandings of the 
value of higher education forced me to think hard about the performativity of social 
relations of value and their relationships to power. As we will see in Chapter Eight, 
this enabled me to consider the concomitant strength and fragility of a neoliberal 
hegemony. 
 
Throughout the empirical Chapters Five, Six and Seven the reader will find a wide 
range of verbatim quotations, which, as Baxter and Eyles (1997), James (2006) and 
Rose (1997) recommend, allow the interviewees to speak for themselves. Where these 
have been used as ‘representative’ quotations, they have been triangulated between 
sources, reducing the risks of misinterpretation and misrepresentation (James, 2006). 
In addition, to ensure their accurate representation to the individual, ‘subject context’ 
has been confirmed via my fieldwork diary. All interviewees were offered the 
opportunity to verify transcripts but all refused. This was an extremely stressful and 
full-on period for the HE sector, and I was extremely grateful that my interviewees 
gave me their time, insights and experiences. As such, I have paid particular attention 
to ensuring that their words have remained in context, thereby reinforcing the 
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credibility and dependability of data and ensuring methodological rigour throughout 
(Baxter and Eyles, 1997). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has developed the ontological and epistemological position adopted in 
this thesis and, more particularly, has specified the methods adopted in response to the 
research questions detailed in Chapter Two. A carefully designed case study approach 
stressing the significance of context dependency and based on the quantitative analysis 
of the diverse geographies within which English universities are situated has provided 
the frame within which the four universities were identified for in-depth study. 
 
In the pages that follow, Chapter Four provides a discourse analysis of the historic 
unfolding of HE policy from the early 1900s to 2011, specifically regarding HE’s 
funding. The purpose of exploring the historic context in the first half of the chapter is 
to illuminate the subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) shifts that have taken place in 
HE’s social relations of value over time, and the cumulative effects these have had on 
HE’s framework of action. The second half of the chapter then focuses sharply on the 
intensifying marketisation of HE since the Dearing Report (1997). Chapter Four is 
followed by the Preface to Part II of this thesis, which sets out and explains the 
stylized flow of Chapters Five, Six and Seven, which together form what I am calling 
an ‘iteration’: i.e. one particular geographically, temporally, and relationally situated 
unfolding of my case studies’ life worlds, from ‘meaning making’ to ‘emergence’. By 
sticking rigidly to the discourses that arose from my interviewees’ testimonies in 
relation to their understanding, negotiation and implementation – or not – of the White 
Paper, and by using their own words and narratives – to the point that I almost want to 
apologize to the reader for my abundant use of quotation marks! – the aim of these 
chapters is to situate any knowledge gained, in the ‘real world’: in their multiple and 
complex emerging economic geographies. Finally, my empirical findings will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight: the Conclusion. 
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4 Higher Education Policy and the Market Imaginary as a 
‘Semiotic Order’ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the introduction to the University in Society, Lawrence Stone writes that: “every 
university partly reflects the social, economic and political system, but partly also it 
gives a life of its own, independent of the beliefs and interests of the community”. 
Indeed, for Stone, the university is “one of the most poorly integrated of institutions”, 
which throughout history “has been obstinately resistant to changes, which were 
clearly demanded by changing conditions around it”. “And yet”, he continues, “in the 
long run, no institution can survive indefinitely in glorious isolation, and the 
interrelation between the university’s own built-in conservativism and the pressures on 
it to adapt to new external conditions is one of the most potentially illuminating, but 
most practically obscure, aspects of the process of historical change” (1975: v). 
 
Although, as this chapter will demonstrate, universities themselves have often been 
powerful instigators of profound changes in HE, Stone’s words are no less resonant. 
No institution, indeed, no individual, can exist (indefinitely) beyond the social, 
economic and political relations that give human substance to the world in which we 
live. Of course, we each hold our own particular values – the ideals, beliefs, desires, 
morals even – that contribute enormously to whom we are and the ways in which we 
do what we do. But even these, whilst multiple and complex, do not arise in isolation. 
And there is, and always has been, the fundamental necessity of survival, which cannot 
be achieved apart from the social, economic and political relations that exist in time 
and place: the social relations of value that give form to the materiality and society of 
economy – to our economic geographies. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out how far a neoliberally informed “market 
imaginary” as a “semiotic order” (Jessop, 2004) has come to penetrate HE policy in 
England in the attempts of various Governments and interested parties to shape the 
economic geographies of HE that emerge. My discursive analysis begins in Section 
4.3, focusing on HE policy since 1997 when the Dearing Committee published its 
Report: Higher Education in the Learning Society. According to Peter Leuner, an 
academic observer of the time, the Report signified that the British university system 
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was about to change beyond all recognition. For Leuner14 (1997: 1), the “cozy 
consensual system that [once] provided a highly selective, state funded arrangement 
for a restricted group of students” had already been eroded “by both politics and 
markets” as Thatcherite policies to expand student numbers without increasing per-
capita funding had whittled down the unit of resource producing “profound changes in 
institutional culture”. The Dearing Report – or more specifically, the ‘New’ Labour 
Government’s interpretation, variation and partial retention of it – was “unlikely to run 
counter to more than a decade of identifying university students as consumers in a 
market relationship with the higher education system”. This was despite the fact that 
Labour had resisted the marketisation of public services whilst in opposition, and 
despite the fact that “linking markets with higher education would have been 
unthinkable” when Labour last held power (ibid). 
 
However, to begin my analysis in 1997 would ignore the important historical 
development of HE in England. For example, up until 1992, HE was divided along an 
important binary line, the trespassing of which brought together the two very different 
cultures of the so-called ‘public system’ and ‘autonomous system’ (detailed below) 
with profound effects. A decade before that, Keith Joseph – a dedicated admirer of 
Friedman and Hayek15 – was Secretary of State for Education and Science (SoSE) in 
Thatcher’s Conservative Government and was beginning to give real political 
substance to the longue durée pressures on HE to turn towards market principles for its 
survival. I say longue durée because fiscal pressures to curtail HE spending had been 
intensifying since the early 1960s when the Robbins Committee (1963) attempted to 
codify and move forward an expansion that had already been taking place since 1944. 
The earlier phase of expansion, from ’44, had progressed in an atmosphere of 
optimism and intense public pride in a university system and further education (FE) 
system that, together, were seen to be supporting the aspirations of the country by 
underpinning its “hopes for growth” (Carswell, 1985; Moberly, 1949; Shattock, 2012). 
However, the Robbins expansion, from the 1960s, whilst still shrouded in optimism, 
was dogged by intense financial and political tensions as a deepening economic crisis 
unfolded. 
                                                        
14
 Peter Leuner was Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs at the American International 
University in London. World Education News and Reviews. 
15
 See Nick Bosanquet’s (1981) brilliant paper “Sir Keith’s Reading List”, which sets out the theoretical 
contents of a list of papers and books on the New Right with which Sir Keith insisted his civil servants 
familiarize themselves upon his taking office at the Department of Industry. 
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Section 4.2, therefore, begins in the early 1900s with the establishment of the primary 
funding bodies that would come to shape the iterative emergence of HE’s economic 
geographies: the LEAs and the University Grants Committee (UGC). On the one hand, 
the funding structures of the LEAs, which underpinned the “public system”, were to 
provide vital purchase for various Governments from the 1970s onwards to introduce 
market principles into HE’s framework of action. On the other, the relational context 
of the UGC was to provide an important system of grant funding that helped to support 
the Liberal-based values of university autonomy and freedom for over sixty years. 
Whilst the universities had come under frequent pressure from diverse Governments to 
be more efficient and (latterly) more competitive, the UGC’s replacement by the 
University Funding Council (UFC) in 1989 signified a distinct rupture in the 
universities’ long-established social relations of value. 
 
Of course, to begin my research in 1902 is not to ignore the foundational role that the 
‘ancient’ universities of England (and Scotland) played in establishing the (still) 
broadly held understanding that the values of university autonomy and freedom 
signified an independence that was central to upholding what Newman (1852), 
classically, expressed as the Idea of a University (see Section 4.2.1 below). As this 
Chapter will highlight, England’s universities have long-struggled to avoid the 
influence of Government and the market in setting out their strategic direction(s); and 
as Moberly (1949) asserts, the (Christian) power, or ‘virtue’, of the Studium16 
embodied by Oxford, Cambridge and then, later, Durham and UCL has been central to 
that struggle: to sustaining the life, health and “high church” values of the system (see 
Newman, 1852; Rashdall, 1895; Haldane, 1910; Moberly, 1949; Stone, 1975; 
Carswell, 1985). Rather, to begin in 1902, my intention is to detail a period in which 
the economic and social value of both universities and other institutions of HE became 
intensified under a public and political gaze, and which is inextricably entangled with 
the most recent technical incursion into HE’s social relations – the Coalition 
Government’s White Paper, Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System 
(BIS, 2011a). 
                                                        
16
 Sacerdotium (priesthood: ecclesiastical authority), Imperium (empire: political authority) and Studium 
(university: intellectual authority or ‘licentia docendi’, i.e. the license to teach) are what Rashdall (1895) 
sets out as the three ‘powers’ or ‘virtues’ whose co-operation helped maintain the life and health of 
Christendom. Thus, the university – given its power and intellectual authority in the production of 
knowledge – deserved the same serious investigation as that received by the Papacy and Empire. 
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4.2 The iterative emergence of a higher education sector 
Table 4.1 UGC Recurrent Grant List, 1919-1989 (Universities Only). Source: Author’s 
compilation from various resources. 
Ten English Universities on Original UGC Recurrent Grant List 
(RGL) (1919) 
Approx. Date of 
University Status 
University of Oxford Before 1167 
University of Cambridge 1209 
University of London, comprising: St Georges, UCL, King’s College 
London, Royal Holloway, Queen Mary, Goldsmiths, LSE, Imperial, and 
SOAS. 
Later additions: Birkbeck (1920), Courtauld Institute of Art (1932), London Business 
School (1964) (see Note 6), and Heythrop (1971). 
1836 
University of Durham 1837 
University of Birmingham 1900 
University of Liverpool 1903 
University of Leeds 1904 
University of Manchester 1904 
University of Sheffield 1905 
University of Bristol 1909 
Other British Universities on Original UGC RGL (1919) 
University of St. Andrews 1410-1413 
University of Glasgow 1451 
University of Aberdeen 1495 
University of Edinburgh 1583 
The University of Wales, comprising: Aberystwyth, Cardiff and Bangor. 
Later additions: Swansea (1920) and St. David University College (1971). 
1893 
Other English Civic Universities & Institutions on UGC RGL (Pre-1963) 
University of Reading* 1926 
University of Nottingham* 1948 
University of Southampton* 1952 
University of Hull* 1954 
University of Exeter* 1955 
University of Manchester Institution of Science and Technology 1956 
University of Leicester* 1957 
University of Keele 1962 
Newcastle University 1963 
Murray’s Seven New Universities (added post-1961) 
University of Sussex 1961 
University of East Anglia 1963 
University of York 1963 
Lancaster University 1964 
University of Kent 1965 
University of Warwick 1965 
University of Essex 1965 
Robbin’s Former CATs (added post-1963) 
Loughborough University 1966 
Aston University 1966 
Brunel University 1966 
University of Surrey 1966 
University of Bath 1966 
University of Bradford 1966 
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City University, London 1966 
University of Salford 1967 
Other Institutions (added post-1963) 
Royal College of Arts 1967 
Cranfield Institute of Technology (now Cranfield University) 1969 
Manchester Business School See Note 6 
Other British Institutions (added post-1963) 
University of Strathclyde (UK’s first technological university) 1964 
Herriot-Watt University 1966 
University of Dundee 1967 
University of Stirling (a UGC/Robbins’ new university) 1967 
Notes: 1) * These universities were on the original 1919 UGC RGL as ‘University Colleges’. 2) Table 
4.1 does not account for any HEI added to the UGC RGL beyond the universities arising from the 
Robbins’ expansion. Any other HEI added before 1989 (when the UGC was replaced by the UFC) 
would not have held full university status. 3) All post-1992 universities receive their recurrent grants 
through HEFCE. 4) The University of Ulster and Queen’s University of Belfast did not receive a UGC 
Recurrent Grant (RG), although the UGC did advise on grants to both institutions. 5) Neither the Open 
University (DoE) nor the University of Buckingham (private) received a UGC RG. 6) The London 
Business School and the Manchester Business School arose (as business schools) from Robbins (1963) 
and the Franks Report (1963) and subsequently received a UGC RG. 
 
4.2.1 Propagation: the roots of two ‘systems’ 
To consider the roots of the ‘public system’ my inquiry begins in 1902 when Arthur 
Balfour was Prime Minister of a Conservative-Liberal coalition Government, and 
before which education beyond the age of 12 was understood as a costly privilege 
taken up only by the elite and the middle classes. LEAs, along with new secondary 
schools, were established under Balfour’s Education Act (1902) the discourses around 
which situated the problem of the ad hoc provision of education within a framework of 
national efficiency and economic competitiveness (Hansard, 3 December, 1902). 
Relative to its major competitors Britain was in economic decline, and if it were to 
maintain its position in world trade and compete with the industrial powers of Europe 
and the USA it would need to provide its industries with an educated workforce. 
Rather than rely on market forces to coordinate education in the collective interests of 
society, the system was to be organised through a “complete unity of administration” 
that only government could provide and which was “so necessary to efficiency and 
economy” (Fabian Society, 1903: 6). Otherwise, as the Member of Parliament for 
Cambridge University put it, the nation would be in “urgent peril” due to such “grave 
national disadvantage” (Hansard, 3 December, 1902). 
 
The general oversight of elementary and secondary education was to be undertaken by 
the Board of Education (BoE) with necessary input from the universities and other 
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knowledgeable experts on educational quality. However, Local Authorities17 (LAs) 
had local tax-raising powers, and were thus charged with designating LEAs in order to 
fund, from local taxes and rates, the growing system of state, technical, continuation, 
voluntary, and endowed grammar schools and evening classes in conjunction with 
central Government funding. Similarly, the LEAs were to pay the fees, scholarships 
and bursaries of less well-off students staying on or progressing into what were then 
all regarded as elements of ‘higher’ education: i.e. a secondary or grammar school 
education beyond the compulsory age of staying at school (which at that time was just 
11); technical institutes; teacher training colleges; university colleges; and universities. 
Furthermore, the LEAs were to “supply or aid the supply of education other than 
elementary” deemed desirable in their localities18 (Education Act, 1902). Thus, the 
LEAs became a significant provider of various higher and further educational services, 
and a significant source of funds for universities and aspiring university colleges. 
 
Importantly, the ‘universalization’ of local rates to help fund education was seen as 
engendering a crucial sense of “communal obligation” in the minds of the public, and 
was deemed only right given the widely held understanding of the public value of 
education to the nation’s economy and society (Hansard, 3 December, 1902; Education 
Act, 1902). By 1918, a national system of public education, organised through local 
interests, was ready to be consolidated through the ‘Fischer’ Education Act (1918). 
The Act espoused a central value which was to further embed an understanding of the 
public good of both elementary and higher education and shape the latter’s trajectory 
for many years to come, i.e. that such a system should be “available for all persons 
capable of profiting thereby”19 (1918, para 1). 
 
When the UGC was established in 1919, David Lloyd George was Prime Minister of a 
Liberal-Conservative coalition Government, which had come to power in the midst of 
a social and economic crisis precipitated by the massive losses of the First World War. 
Perhaps in a twist of irony, just shy of a century later, in 2008 the Governor of the 
Bank of England, Mervin King, drew parallels between the financial crisis that had 
                                                        
17
 These were, predominantly, the town councils of the county boroughs, and county councils designated 
under the 1888 Local Government Act (Fabian Society, 1903). 
18
 The LEAs could also help finance ‘higher education’ in towns and cities outside their area where they 
felt it expedient to do so. 
19
 It is worth noting that this principle is often attributed to Robbins (1963) but, as indicated, it has a 
much longer lineage. 
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been crippling global stock markets since August 2007 and the financial crisis that 
began in 1914 in anticipation of the War (Pym, 2014). In both instances, crises were to 
provide justification for the Governments of the time to consider varying their 
relationship and that of the country with the nation’s universities, although, as we will 
see, their deliberations are both similar and vastly different. 
 
Following the 1902 Education Act and a subsequent rise in local demand, five ‘civic’, 
‘red-brick’ institutions became universities under royal charter, making a total of ten 
universities in England (see Table 4.1, above). In his memoir, John Carswell20 (1985) 
suggests that by 1919 the universities did not much enter into the consciousness of the 
nation as a whole, but did engender a great sense of pride in the locales in which they 
were embedded both through the fees and scholarships furnished by the LEAs, and for 
the facilities, education and employment that the universities provided. They also held 
“an extraordinary power over the feelings and outlook of those who studied in them” 
(ibid: 2-3), many of whom progressed into the professions, the civil service, all levels 
of government and industry, and many of whom felt an enormous sense “of having 
acquired values by which to live” (ibid). Given that the universities, either jointly or 
severally, held seats in the House of Commons, their influence and connection at this 
time was significant21. 
 
Having suffered from underinvestment during WWI, the beleaguered universities were 
to be channeled public funds via the UGC, which was established under the direction 
of the Treasury rather than a Parliamentary Ministry. The UGC’s role was to listen to 
the needs of the universities and negotiate with them their quinquennial settlements, 
which were to be calculated on a ‘deficiency principle’ – that is, to make up the 
difference between the substantial income they derived from other sources (such as 
endowments, student fees and LA grants) and the amount calculated as necessary for 
each to fulfill its anticipated expenditure and to survive over the five-year cycle. 
Initially, no university derived more than 30% of its income via the UGC, and other 
than ensuring that the grant was reasonable and properly administered, in no other 
                                                        
20
 John Carswell, then a civil servant, was assigned to the Treasury in 1960 and helped prepare Treasury 
evidence for the Robbins Committee. He then became the DfES Undersecretary responsible for the 
university programme, and later Secretary of the UGC. 
21
 By 1919 Oxford, Cambridge and the University of London formed individual University 
Constituencies whilst all other English universities were represented jointly under the Combined 
English Universities. The universities of Scotland, Ireland and Wales were similarly represented (Craig, 
1972). 
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sense was the UGC “an instrument of Government policy” (ibid: 13). Indeed, the 
devolution of executive responsibility to a Treasury committee meant that, “political 
and parliamentary questions did not enter into the delicate issues involved” (ibid: 10; 
see also Shattock, 1994). As such, the relational context of the universities’ central 
public funding would adhere to the Liberal principles set out by Lord Haldane 
(following Newman, 1852) in his Royal Commissions on University Education (1910 
to 1913): that Government should be kept at arms length from universities in order to 
maintain the central values of academic freedom and autonomy such that the 
universities could maintain academic standards, produce good and cultured citizens, 
train an elite of future leaders, and pursue and advance knowledge as an end in itself 
(Haldane, Lord, 1913). 
 
4.2.2 Expansion 
Since the end of WWI, technical education had been strategically selected as central to 
the future economic success of the country given the substantial innovations in 
manufacturing and technologies emanating from Germany and the USA. Certainly, the 
LEAs had responded favorably under instruction from the BoE, providing basic 
science education and technical certification through both statutory education and non-
statutory ‘further’ education to the age of 18 and above (BoE, 1934, 1935). Similarly, 
individual universities had, very slowly, expanded their science departments as 
demand in the economy rose – although as the 1935-49 Chair of the UGC, Walter 
Moberly, noted, both the universities and the UGC strongly resisted the “Copernican 
change” in university values and culture that following such state-led demand would 
have required22 (Moberly, 1949). 
 
However, in 1943, with the shift to Keynesian demand-side regulation and welfarism 
underway, then Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and his cross-party ‘War Ministry’ 
released their White Paper, Educational Reconstruction, stating in no uncertain terms 
that: “Upon the education of the people of this country the fate of this country 
depends” (BoE, 1943: 1). For the authors, the War had underscored the necessity to 
                                                        
22
 Copernicus overturned long-embedded beliefs that the earth was at the centre of the solar system 
rather than the sun. His arguments represented a paradigm shift from the Ptolemaic model to a 
heliocentric model. By invoking this metaphor, Moberly (a Christian-Liberal) was suggesting that to 
follow the state-led demand for technical education would overturn the long-held values of university 
autonomy and freedom, forcing the universities to shift from a ‘liberal’ provision of education to a 
‘servile’ provision (1949: 31). 
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take advantage of what was being discursively constructed as the nation’s most 
valuable asset: its youth. If education was to serve the values of the individual and the 
nation then a “public system” had to be established (ibid). As such, the White Paper 
proposed to streamline general education into three progressive strands – primary, 
secondary and further education (including teacher training) – with LEAs being 
statutorily obliged to extend both part-time and full-time FE to the over-18s through a 
system of “county colleges”. Moreover, no fees were to be charged in any educational 
establishment under LEA control such that no one capable of benefitting could be 
excluded on the basis of wealth or location. This was to be a public system, publicly 
funded, for the public good (BoE, 1943). 
 
This consolidation of a localized system of statutory FE provision was given legal 
substance in the ‘Butler’ Education Act, 1944, which further concretized relations 
between central Government and the LEAs through the establishment of the Ministry 
of Education (MoE). Both Carswell (1985) and Shattock (2012) argue that, initially, 
the MoE preferred to deal with organised educational interests such as LEAs, 
voluntary bodies, trade unions, and educational associations, rather than focus on 
bureaucratic and Ministerial relations in Whitehall. However, the direct line of power 
and the funding system that the Act brought into being – from Government, to the 
Ministry, to the LEA, to the educational establishments – were to prove potent 
mechanisms of control as the public system expanded. 
 
Concomitantly, the universities were experiencing shifts in their own social relations 
of value. Throughout WWII, the quinquennial grant of 1938-39 had been maintained, 
with no university receiving more than 50% of its income from Government. However, 
under Lord Hankey’s recommendations on Further Education and Training (BoE, 
1944) the number of university places was to increase by 50% to around 75,000. This 
move was backed by the Association of University Teachers (AUT), the Committee of 
Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) and a variety of university interests who 
urged the UGC to ask the Treasury to provide 75% of the required funding on the 
grounds that “this would be less injurious to academic independence than to have to be 
dependent on local authority contributions” (Shattock, 2012: 11). The LEAs were 
answerable to their local ratepayers, and dependence on LEA contributions would only 
undermine the ‘higher values’ to which the universities aspired by allowing local 
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values to become entangled with the process of funding. Furthermore, receiving 
funding through the UGC would put the universities in control of their rate of 
expansion and allow them to protect their unit of resource rather than having to be 
responsive to, or rely upon, LEA and student demand (Carswell, 1985; Gosden, 1976). 
 
The CVCP was largely supportive of expansion, discursively linking its value to both 
the economic success of the nation and to the gains that could be made by the 
universities through increased student numbers, higher staff salaries, more time for 
research, and better research links with industry. But such advantages could not be at 
the expense of academic standards or autonomy (CVCP, 1945). Rather, the preferred 
route to achieving these values was to maintain the Treasury-UGC-University 
relations, with the UGC acting as the universities’ “collective Minister” (Carswell, 
1985: 12). Undoubtedly, these relations were sometimes strained and compromises had 
to be made. For instance, in 1943 the Treasury had reorganized the UGC’s board to 
include a majority of serving academics who, the Treasury felt, would better respond 
to national demand23 (ibid). This annoyed the CVCP, who would rather have 
maintained the board’s ex-academic and non-academic membership in the knowledge 
that their distance from the day-to-day pressures of HE had long-helped ensure the 
universities’ autonomy. Further, in 1946, in response to both the Percy Report (1945) 
and the Barlow Report on Scientific Manpower (1946), the Treasury had altered the 
UGC’s terms of reference such that they should prepare and execute plans to ensure 
that the universities were “fully adequate to national needs” (Treasury, 1946, cited in 
Carswell, 1985: 14). Yet, throughout this period the CVCP and the universities 
remained utterly committed to their funding relationship with the UGC. Shattock 
(2012: 15) puts this down to “a common ‘Oxbridge’ culture built up particularly 
through the War years which bound together senior university figures, the UGC, 
Treasury officials and (some) politicians”, whilst Dodds et al (1952: 112) suggest that 
they were “cut from the same cloth” understanding “what a university [was] and why it 
should be free from interference from amateurs”. However, whatever their motives, the 
UGC mechanism was to both protect the universities and prove a watershed in 
university-state relations – not least because the recurrent grant would now form the 
                                                        
23
 Carswell is not explicit as to why serving academics rather than ex-academic or non-academic board 
members should respond more favourably to Treasury demands. However, in the context of his writing, 
I assume that he is implying that serving academics, perhaps, have more to lose given that their 
livelihood is gained largely through state funding, and/or that they can see more readily the national 
value of HE given their ‘front-line’ relations. 
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majority of the universities’ income. The implications of this “quiet measure of 
nationalisation” (Carswell, 1985: 14) would not only open up the universities to 
eventual scrutiny and audit from the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG); this 
shift in their social relations of value would also become a powerful lever in terms of 
Government control. 
 
4.2.3 Setting the pattern 
By the time the Committee on Higher Education, chaired by Lord Robbins, was 
appointed by the Treasury in 1961 to “review the pattern of full-time higher 
education… in the light of national needs and resources” (Treasury, 196124), two quite 
distinct ‘systems’ had evolved. From before the end of the War, Governments from 
across the political spectrum25 had each problematized the value of further and higher 
education through discourses of national economic competitiveness within which 
science and technological education were underscored as central to economic success 
(BoE, 1943; Robbins, 1963). However, the expansion was equally driven by popular 
demand. Certainly, quantitatively, the increased birthrate following the War and the 
tendency for children to remain in, a now ‘free’, secondary education underpinned 
MoE and UGC calculations regarding the rate and extent of expansion. Yet, as the 
Robbins Committee (1963) argued, the demand for expansion also came from both 
schools and parents. Firstly, a lack of places meant disappointment for schools, 
teachers and students for whom HE had become a tangible measure of success. 
Secondly, more parents than ever – from across the classes – now had aspirations for 
their children to gain a higher education. As Carswell asserts, during the War years 
many parents had, for the first time, been brought into direct contact with university 
graduates who served as their superiors. As a result, HE was now more widely valued 
as “a precious asset” (1985: 26). 
 
From 1938/39 to the mid 1950s, the number of full-time students in LEA controlled 
teacher-training colleges grew by over 100% from 13,000 to 28,000. Similarly, those 
studying full-time for advanced qualification in FE institutions had doubled from 
6,000 to 12,000. In addition, LEA institutions catered for the vast majority of part-time 
students with well over 50,000 students gaining advanced qualification in the vast 
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 Treasury Minute of Appointment, 8th February1961 in The Robbins Report, 1963. 
25
 These were: Churchill’s all party ‘War Ministry’, Attlee’s Labour Government and three successive 
Conservative Governments. 
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network of technical colleges that had come into existence by 1954/55. Britain’s 
universities had also expanded markedly. By 1949, some 85,000 students were 
studying to degree level and beyond – 10,000 more than Lord Hankey had called for in 
1944 – although this had tailed off to around 82,000 by 1954/55 (Robbins, 1963: 
Tables 2 and 4). By the time Robbins was set in motion in 1961, both LEA and 
university numbers had increased even further, as had the divide between the two 
systems. 
 
The die was cast with the MoE’s White Paper on Technical Education, 1956, which 
codified debates that had raged between the universities, the LEAs, the UGC and the 
MoE since the Percy and Barlow Reports. In 1948, the National Advisory Council for 
Education in Industry and Commerce (NACEIC) had been established by the MoE to 
take the Reports’ recommendations forward, which it attempted in 1950. Accepting the 
universities’ evaluations that they were research-led and should therefore remain far 
closer to fundamental science than the technical colleges, the NACEIC adhered to the 
principle that the autonomous universities and the UGC must design their own 
expansion (Shattock, 2012: 21-22). Barlow (1946) had recommended that the UGC 
should oversee the creation of an entirely new ‘technical university’, which the CVCP 
had resisted on the basis of academic values and value for money. The NACEIC didn’t 
press the matter. Instead, they called for a National Institute of Technology to come 
under the LEAs and a higher level of teaching and qualification in the LEA colleges, 
which would award degrees through affiliation to their local universities (NACEIC, 
1950). The LEAs largely supported the former, but rejected the latter stating that it 
would weaken their level of control. They wanted degree awarding powers of their 
own (Shattock, 2012: 24). 
 
On the basis of these debates, a number of significant developments followed. Firstly, 
in 1953 the Treasury announced to Parliament that Imperial College was to greatly 
expand rather than the UGC providing a new technical university. The decision helped 
concretize CVCP and UGC values that scientific study in the universities must be set 
within a broad culture of learning (Carswell, 1985). In addition, £43million was to be 
channeled into expanding a further thirteen existing universities with work to begin in 
1957. This began to further differentiate some of the ‘civic’ universities (which were 
already considered to hold “a different mission” from the ancient institutions – see 
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Moberly, 1949) – as more technologically focused and with a broader base of student 
recruitment (Shattock, 2012). Furthermore, under the Chairmanship of Lord Murray 
(1953-63), the UGC and the universities were developing plans for seven brand new 
institutions to help accomplish a proposed expansion in university places to 170,000 
by 1970. The universities would be (largely) residential and nationally selective, 
constructed anew on green-field sites with no lineage to any other previous institutions 
(Carswell, 1985). Thus, like their ‘ancient’ predecessors, “they represented the 
ultimate realization of the concept of autonomy” (Shattock, 2012: 43): the freedom to 
govern academically without the restrictions of local values and local markets26. 
 
Secondly, in 1954, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘Rab’ Butler MP, announced to 
the Cabinet that the CVCP and UGC would not support degree-awarding powers in the 
technical colleges on the grounds of inadequate facilities and teaching standards. The 
universities would only support degrees offered in high-level institutions (ibid: 27). 
Thus, in 1956, the MoE White Paper called for massive investment in twenty-four of 
the best technical colleges with a subset being selected as Colleges of Advanced 
Technology (CATs). Drawing on the dominant understanding that the only way to 
protect academic values and standards was to shelter institutions from both political 
and ‘market’ influences, the latter were to be put under direct MoE control, thereby 
providing an “independence appropriate to the level of their work” (MoE, 1956). It 
was from these institutions that ten further universities were to arise under Robbins 
(see Table 4.1); and it was this divided pattern of HE that Robbins was asked to 
problematize and resolve. 
 
4.2.4 The last hurrah! 
“Higher education has not been planned as a whole or developed within a framework 
consciously devised to promote harmonious evolution… But higher education is so 
obviously and rightly of great public concern, and so large a proportion of its finance is 
provided in one way or another from the public purse, that it is difficult to defend the 
continued absence of coordinating principles… The needs of the present, and still more 
of the future, demand that there should be a system” (Robbins, 1963: 5). 
 
                                                        
26
 Newman (1852) also underscored the value of studying away from home that the ancient universities 
provided, arguing (as did Rashdall, 1895, in his exploration of Studium) that the segregation of students 
and scholars away from everyday social influence provides them with the freedom to think in a rich, 
focused learning environment. 
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With the above words, Robbins (1963) set out an agenda for a co-ordinated expansion 
that would uphold the interests of all the elements of HE: the universities, the colleges 
of education, and further education. But this was not a call for central planning. Rather, 
setting “great value upon the freedom of individuals and institutions” (ibid: 5), the 
Committee called for a decentralized initiative to be co-ordinated through common 
principles, supported by a new Grants Commission and the LEAs, and upheld via ex-
ante, public funding. 
 
In terms of expansion, the three elements together would need to increase full-time 
provision from 216,000 in 1962/3 to 392,000 by 1973/4 with numbers projected to 
reach 558,000 by 1980/81 – an overall growth of 160% in eighteen years (ibid: 160, 
Table 44). In the university sector, the seven new universities initiated by Murray plus 
a further six would provide growth over and above expansion in the existing 
universities. In addition, the ten CATs were to be granted university status and, 
alongside the colleges of education, these would join the ‘autonomous institutions’ to 
be administered by a single Grants Commission (see Table 4.1 for the institutions that 
finally came under UGC funding). This would be similar in structure, procedure and 
principle to the UGC, but would come under a new Ministry of Arts and Science27 
capable – as was the Treasury – of protecting the system from external influence: be it 
political, financial (in the sense of audit), ‘market’ or otherwise. The remainder of FE 
was to expand through the regional, area and local colleges, which would remain under 
LEA and MoE control28. 
 
Certainly, the Robbins Report’s principles underscored that the variety of institutions 
in Britain should be equally valued for their diverse contributions to the nation’s 
economy and society, and that “there should be no freezing of institutions into 
established hierarchies” (ibid: 9). Instead, individual colleges – particularly the best 
technical colleges – should naturally evolve into universities on the basis of excellence 
and reputation. However, both the pattern of the proposed expansion and the dual 
“machinery of government” (ibid: 238) put forward for its co-ordination were 
                                                        
27
 The proposed new Ministry of Arts and Science would also oversee “other autonomous state-
supported activities” such as the Research Councils, the Arts Council, and the Standing Commission on 
Museums and Galleries (Robbins, 1963: 250). It would also need some adaptation in the case of 
Scotland. 
28
 The terms used here refer to FE in England and Wales. The same was to occur in Scotland through 
their equivalent institutions and governance structures. 
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dominated by the two principles that had long-shaped HE in Britain: first, that HE 
should be available for all those qualified and wishing to undertake higher study (ibid: 
8); and second, that the freedom and autonomy of the university system was 
paramount to their achieving their higher values (ibid: 230). Although “the matter” 
was “of great difficulty and delicacy”, the latter would have to be balanced against the 
necessity for the universities “to serve the nation’s needs”29 (ibid: 228). 
 
Within 24 hours of the Report’s publication, the then Conservative Government 
released a statement confirming its support for the proposed expansion to 328,000 by 
1967/8. Higher and further education had grown in public esteem over the past decades 
and general opinion, including the press and the voting public, was widely supportive 
of the expansion and the values for which it stood. However, the re-composition of the 
‘autonomous system’ to include the colleges of education was rejected (Carswell, 
1985: 70). For sure, resistance had come from the LEAs and MoE, which were 
opposed to the idea on the grounds that it would sever important social and 
pedagogical links between the locally embedded schools and colleges and the teachers 
who taught in them. In addition, the LEAs had already conceded control of the CATs 
to the MoE, and now these were to leave the ‘public system’ altogether. For the LEAs 
and the MoE, the natural evolution of their best institutions into the autonomous 
university system could only undermine the value of the institutions left behind (ibid). 
 
Resistance also came from the UGC and the universities. Shattock (2012) notes that 
whilst the UGC was largely supportive in its evidence to the Robbins Committee, 
under the new Chairmanship of John Wolfenden they rejected the inclusion of the 
colleges of education fearing that it would open up the universities to the scrutiny of 
the CAG. Unlike the institutions under MoE control, the quinquennial grant had 
protected the universities from audit – despite their level of public funding – and this 
was not a protection that the universities or UGC wished to concede. However, their 
determination to hold on to this principle, and, indeed, Robbins’ lengthy defense of it 
                                                        
29
 Underscoring the complexity of their understanding of freedom, The Robbins Committee notes: “We 
believe that a system that aims at the maximum of independence compatible with the necessary degree 
of public control is good in itself, as reflecting the ultimate values of a free society. We believe that a 
multiplicity of centres of initiative safeguards spontaneity and variety, and therefore provides the surest 
guarantee of intellectual progress and moral responsibility. We do not regard such freedom as a 
privilege but rather as a necessary condition for the proper discharge of the higher academic functions as 
we conceive them” (1963: 230). 
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(Robbins, 1963: 235-238), revealed a vital lever that could be pulled on ethical 
grounds. 
 
4.2.5 He who pays the piper 
In 1965, Anthony Crosland, then SoSE under Wilson’s Labour Government, was the 
man who pulled the lever. In the final months of Government, the Conservatives had 
established the Department of Education and Science (DES)30, thereby putting paid to 
the dual ‘machinery’ proposed by Robbins. Instead, the DES had absorbed the MoE in 
its entirety and had acquired the functions of the Treasury in relation to the universities 
with the UGC still in tact. As a result, the UGC and its now enlarged list of around 50 
institutions (see Table 4.1) became “a specific group within the education system” 
(Carswell, 1985: 55). 
 
In the April, at Woolwich Polytechnic, Crosland set out the case for embedding the 
‘binary line’ that had long-shaped HE. His solutions had wide support from colleagues 
within the Department (such as Toby Weaver, his right-hand civil servant), the LEAs, 
the trade unions and the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions (Shattock, 
2012: 59). But there were to be some major differences from the past. Predominantly, 
Crosland called for a non-university sector “with a separate tradition and outlook”: one 
that could meet the “ever increasing need and demand for vocational, professional, and 
industrially based courses” (cited in Carswell, 1985: 72). However, rather than 
encourage an “unhealthy rat-race mentality” spurred by the evolutionary competition 
proposed by Robbins, the sector should be “comparable to the universities” with 
degree awarding powers of its own. Moreover, its value in being “responsible to social 
needs” meant that it “should be under social control” and not sheltered from public 
scrutiny by the values of autonomy (ibid). 
 
The primary outcome of Crosland’s intervention was the establishment of some thirty 
polytechnics under LEA control – a strategy that was given governmental purchase 
through the DES White Paper: A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges (1966). 
However, as Carswell notes, Crosland’s arguments also underscored that it was 
“perfectly possible to carry on higher education without the privileges of autonomy 
                                                        
30
 The establishment of the DES broadly followed Harold Shearman’s Note of Reservation to the 
Robbins Committee, which warned against the two-Minister model (Robbins, 1963: 293-296). 
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and freedom from public audit” (1985: 73). As a result, when the Public Accounts 
Committee and CAG, again, demanded access to the universities’ finances for audit, 
“the walls of Jericho fell” (ibid: 86). Without the protection of the Treasury31, the 
universities were opened up to the governmental tactics, strategies and management 
procedures of Whitehall. Whilst the quinquennial grant remained in place, the 
autonomy to which the UGC, universities, Robbins and many other interested parties 
attached such value would never be the same again. 
 
Undoubtedly, it would be a mistake to consider Crosland’s evaluations of HE solely in 
terms of his ideological and political opposition to removing local institutions (which, 
for him, promoted social justice and widening access) from the predominantly Labour-
controlled LEAs and aligning them with, largely, nationally selective universities 
(Crosland, 1982). By 1965, university annual expenditure had increased from just 
£3.7m in 1945 to £134.5m, 70% of which now came from the state. Furthermore, the 
Anderson Committee (1960) had recommended the introduction of a national 
entitlement scheme, which made LEAs liable for all home student fees and 
maintenance grants (subject to parental income) – effectively removing any barriers to 
students studying away from home32. Anderson’s recommendations had been given 
legal purchase in the 1962 Education Act – whilst Robbins was in progress – and were 
beginning to hit the public purse due to an expansion the scale of which Anderson had 
not considered (Hillman, 201333). More broadly, Iain Macleod, then Conservative 
Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, was warning of stagflation in a direct attack on 
Keynesian economic theory, echoing the discourses of inflation, price control and 
efficiency that had underpinned the first public expenditure survey (PES) of 1962 
(Macleod, 1965). For the first time, the PES had enabled Cabinet to set a limit on 
public spending against which the diverse departments of government would need to 
compete. HE policy simply had to be aligned with budgetary considerations and the 
Treasury’s long-term view of the economy. 
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 The PES of 1962 (see below) was to be undertaken by Treasury officials. Thus, realizing that (to some 
extent) a financial survey of university expenditure would be like the Treasury scrutinizing itself, the 
Treasury severed its relationship with the UGC (see Treasury evidence to Robbins, 1963). 
32
 A further innovation that effectively increased the number of students studying away from home (and 
their ability to do so) was the introduction of the Universities Central Council on Admissions (UCCA) 
in 1961 by Murray (Chairman of the UGC). Each of these initiatives – a national grant system, UCCA 
and the Robbins expansion – collectively altered the economic geographies of HE whilst putting 
enormous strain on the public purse. 
33
 Nicholas Hillman was David Willetts’ Chief of Staff and then special advisor on HE policy from 2007 
to 2013. At the time of writing, he was Director of the Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI). 
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By the end of the decade, Britain was on the brink of a severe economic crisis, as was 
the rest of the globe. In the November of 1967, the Labour Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson had devalued the pound warning that it was the only way that the country 
could “break out of the straitjacket of boom and bust economics” (BBC, 1967). And by 
1969 the Keynesian settlement, which, for many, had produced a “golden age” of 
global economic stability, was on the verge of total collapse (Held et al, 1999). Shirley 
Williams, then SoSE, attempted to influence HE’s framework of action, reflecting the 
fiscal pressures. Her strategies included: reducing or removing student maintenance 
grants and introducing a system of loans; worsening staff/student ratios to gain 
economies of scale; developing a system of loans for student accommodation; and the 
more intensive use of university buildings to gain efficiencies and encourage financial 
inputs via external ‘consumer’ relations. Although Williams’, almost, market-like 
solutions were not taken forward, they partially reflected measures already considered 
by the CVCP between 1966-67 under demands for greater university efficiency 
(CVCP, 1966a, 1966b). She also captured the sentiments of Treasury officials relayed 
in their evidence to Robbins in which they underscored the need to consider financing 
student fees through loans in order to, a) reflect the private as well as public benefits of 
HE, and b) avoid “imperiling” its proposed expansion through lack of solid economic 
forecasting (Robbins, 1963). Despite the optimism and valuation of HE that had 
shrouded Robbins34, the 1960s had not been a decade of coherence for HE’s emerging 
economic geographies. 
 
4.2.6 “Roll-up!” “Roll-back!” “Roll-out!” 
In 1979, a distinctly neoliberal emphasis on market principles came into the nation’s 
economic, social and political relations with the election of Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative Government. Whilst discourses of national competition, economic 
growth and efficiency were just as central as they had been at the turn of the century, 
their ideological and expert problematization produced radically different solutions. 
HE would still need to expand and serve the public good, but its projected costs to the 
public purse would need to be reduced through the incremental engendering of market 
practices, values and subjectivities. Like all good followers of Hayek, the 
Conservatives understood that any changes could be only just ahead of the political 
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 A content analysis of Robbins (1963) shows that “value” is mentioned 29 times; “valuable”, 29 times; 
“values”, 3 times; ideal(s), 6 times; and “principle(s)”, well over 100 times. 
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curve without severely risking the support of voters (Tomlinson, 1990). But they had 
inherited a social and economic landscape that was in deep crisis. If the “Misery 
Index” had swung the US elections of 1976 and 1980 towards the monetarist followers 
of Friedman, the warning from Wilson’s Energy Minister in 1975, that Britain’s 
economy faced a “wholesale domestic liquidation” following the oil crisis, inflation, 
unemployment and recession that had plagued the first half of the decade, had surely 
done the same (Cabinet Minutes, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c). The moment was ripe for 
change. 
 
In the university system, bureaucracy caused by the, now, annual public audit had 
spiraled, as had the costs of salaries, capital grant allocations and general university 
costs. The situation was similar for the polytechnics, although their monies were 
distributed via the LA ‘pooling system’, and, as such, they were not subject to public 
audit (Carswell, 1985). Inflationary pressures, the unions, and an ideological 
commitment to the public sector – particularly on the Left – were all held to be major 
causal factors behind an economic problem to which neoliberal principles must be 
applied. 
 
The first move by the new SoSE, Robert Carlisle, was to announce full cost fees for 
overseas students, thereby creating a full-blown international market35. Until Crosland 
had announced, in his “Lancaster speech” of 1967, that overseas student fees were to 
rise to £250 whilst ‘home’ student fees were to remain static, the geography of the 
public good had not been fully problematized into policy36. However, once Crosland 
implemented the strategy, amidst calls from the Treasury for greater efficiency and 
public outcry over the level of overseas subsidization, almost every SoSE that 
followed recognized the potency of this simple tactical device. Certainly, tying the 
public good of HE to the national boundary through government policy could diminish 
public expenditure. But more importantly, based on the deficiency principle (described 
above), increasing the ‘alternative’ income that the universities derived from fees – be 
they overseas or home – diminished their UGC grant. The polytechnics, which were 
funded through the LEAs, had already turned to overseas recruitment to drive up 
income as an alternative to competing with the highly rated ex-CATs for home 
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 The implementation of full cost fees for overseas students was given full political purchase in the 
1983 Education (Fees and Awards) Act. 
36
 Robbins (1963) had recommended a rise in general fees in order to increase overseas’ contributions 
and reduce their subsidy from the public purse, but this had not been translated into policy. 
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students. Now, the universities could be driven to think about projected student 
numbers in relation to income and internal economic management rather than, 
predominantly, relying on the UGC grant. University autonomy could be breached by 
the tactic of per-capita funding. 
 
The second move was to begin establishing the ‘machinery’ needed to shape HE’s 
social relations of value in line with central Government ideology. The Conservatives 
saw the LAs as their political antithesis: inefficient, controlling and a drain on public 
resources (Bosanquet, 1989; Mohan, 1999). Thus, in their first Budget, the 
Conservatives severely restricted LA spending – alongside the whole of public 
expenditure – and capped the LEA funding pool, effectively ending the open-ended 
expansion of the “public system” that had been under LA control since 190237. When 
Keith Joseph took over from Carlisle as SoSE in 1982, he finalized the establishment 
of the National Advisory Board for Public Higher Education. The NAB was set up 
specifically to rationalize the public system and take the expansion forward on the 
basis of lower per-capita spending at marginal cost – driving internal efficiency and 
self-regulation whilst helping to separate institutional interests from those of the LAs 
(Shattock, 2012: 73-75). 
 
In the ‘autonomous system’, home fees (derived via the LEAs) had risen substantially 
throughout the 1970s and now made up over 50% of university income. Thus, in an 
attempt to lower per-capita spending, the Government cut the UGC quinquennial grant 
by some 15% (Guardian, 1982). In theory, this was designed to drive efficiency 
measures across the entire autonomous sector. However, rather than move forward 
with a diminished unit of resource the UGC responded by reducing student recruitment 
in selected institutions – particularly in the new universities. As The Guardian put it, 
the move represented the “death of a dream” that the new universities would produce 
citizens “who could solve the country’s economic problems” (ibid: 13). Whilst the 
Government faced public outcry and uproar in the Commons, Keith Joseph noted that 
at least the cuts were “rational”, stating: “It [the UGC] has distinguished between the 
good and the less good, the stretched and the over-stretched, the duplicated and the 
over-duplicated” (cited in ibid). Numbers – or “human units” as Carswell (1985) puts 
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 See the 1980 White Paper on Public Expenditure. Shattock (2012: 70) states that LEAs drew on a 
‘pool’ to fund student numbers. This favored larger LEAs that could exploit their catchment areas and 
expand more rapidly than smaller LEAs. 
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it – were what controlled the system: not the “national need for places” stressed by 
Robbins (1963). 
 
In his Green Paper of 1985, Joseph struck out at the whole of HE stressing that it was 
“vital for our higher education to contribute more effectively to the improvement of 
the performance of the economy” (DES, 1985: para 1.2). He thus proposed two 
dominant strategies to shape “the development of higher education into the 1990s” 
(DES, 1985). First, a research assessment exercise (RAE) would measure the relative 
quality of research output and fund institutions accordingly. HEIs would either 
“publish or perish” (THE, 2002) as scarce resources were directed towards high-
quality, research-led institutions. Second, the year-on-year state funding of universities 
and polytechnics would be cut in order to embedded the metrics of efficiency – of 
increasing value (output) for money (cost) – into practice. If institutions, the UGC and 
the NAB did not respond accordingly then they would have to decide which HEIs were 
worth saving. As The Sun (reportedly) put it in support of Joseph’s proposals: “if, for 
example, [inferior institutions like] Essex were to fall into the North Sea, the only 
disadvantage would be to increase coastal pollution” (Hansard, 4 June 1985). For the 
polytechnics, the NAB warned that whilst they had increased student-staff ratios 
substantially between 1981 and 1985 against a 20% cut in per-capita funding, further 
cuts to the unit of resource would impact quality significantly (ibid). For the 
universities now facing bankruptcies and closures, the Jarratt Committee Report on 
University Efficiency (1985) set the foundations for NPM structures, eliminated new 
tenure, and increased student-staff ratios. The Report was commissioned by the CVCP. 
 
The marketisation of HE was slow to start. Like many other public sector services such 
as the NHS, the civil service, policing and defense it was not a matter of simply 
‘rolling back’ the state and allowing the market to become the primary mechanism of 
coordination. Rather, understandings of the social and economic value of HE signified 
that internal “quasi-market” (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993) mechanisms were better 
suited to engender market-like behaviour whilst protecting against market failures. In 
1992, Kenneth Clarke became SoSE for the reformulated Department for Education 
(DfE – no longer Science) having spent the previous four years as Health Secretary 
imposing an internal market and NPM structures on the NHS. For Clarke, engendering 
competition was key to inducing efficiency, flexibility and rational economic 
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behaviour. With the universities and polytechnics separated into two different systems 
with diverse funding structures, cultures and missions, competition was almost 
impossible. But in a unified system in which all the institutions would have to compete 
for a single pool of students, competition would be almost guaranteed (Kogan and 
Hanney, 2000). 
 
The legislative groundwork for removing the binary line was set down by Kenneth 
Baker in his White Paper, Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge (DES, 1987) and 
his subsequent Education Reform Act (1988). Part II of the Act provided for the 
establishment of two new funding bodies: the UFC and the Polytechnics and Colleges 
Funding Council (PCFC), whose members would be appointed by the SoSE. Not only 
did the maneuver replace the UGC with a funding council whose remit to ensure value 
for money in relation to public funding would be directly answerable to the SoSE. The 
Act (1988: 120.1) also made a clear distinction between what constituted “higher” and 
“further” education, removing the authority of the LEAs to provide the former in their 
locales38. 
 
By 1991, under the ‘stifling’ conditions imposed by the new funding mechanisms, the 
Committee of Directors of Polytechnics (CDP) and CVCP had reached a consensus: 
the binary system had had its day. Both the PCFC and UFC had pushed forward an 
expansion by attempting to stimulate competitive prices at marginal costs through 
market-like mechanisms. In the polytechnics, where responsiveness to local demands 
and markets had long been part of their social relations, the tactic had worked. In the 
universities, which were still fighting for the values of freedom and autonomy, it had 
not (Shattock, 2012: 80-83). However, a joint working group between the CDP and 
CVCP found that the binary system – or, rather, its (lack of) funding – simply drove 
down quality and imposed too many restrictions (CVCP/CDP, 1990). 
 
The Further and Higher Education Act (1992) abandoned the binary line, conferring 
university status on the polytechnics thereby creating a diverse, but single, HE sector. 
The PCFC and UFC were replaced by the Higher Education Funding Councils for 
England (HEFCE), Wales and Scotland. In England, HEFCE’s role was to “encourage 
institutional competition to promote the most cost effective use of resources within an 
                                                        
38
 The LEAs would still have to administer both fees and maintenance grants. 
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imperative to contain public spending” (Shattock, 2012: 83). The person to Chair the 
new Council was the man whose tactics and procedures had worked well with the 
polytechnics when he was Chair of the PCFC: Sir Ron Dearing. The marketisation of 
HE had taken a significant step forward. 
 
4.3 The incremental extension of the market imaginary: HE policy from Dearing 
to Browne (and just a little bit beyond)  
 
4.3.1 Dearing: The small issue of the fee 
“As the world becomes ever more complex and fast-changing, the role of higher 
education as a guardian or transmitter of culture and citizenship needs to be protected. 
Higher education needs to help individuals and society to understand and adapt to the 
implications of change, while maintaining the values, which make for a civilised 
society. Other countries have reached similar conclusions, and other higher education 
systems are responding. The UK cannot afford to be left behind… However, no public 
service can automatically expect increasing public expenditure to support it. Higher 
education needs to demonstrate that it represents a good investment for individuals and 
society” (Dearing, 1997, Summary Report: paras 18-22). 
 
The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education was appointed with cross-
party support in 1996 under the Chairmanship of Sir Ron Dearing. Bearing in mind the 
diversity of the system – the different types of institutions, their missions, their 
students, and their geographies – the Committee’s remit was to recommend how the 
purposes, shape, structure, size and funding of HE, including support for students, 
should develop over the following 20 years in order to meet the needs of individuals 
and the nation. Its Terms of Reference stated that, “within the constraints of the 
Government’s spending priorities and affordability”, the Committee should have 
regard for certain principles including, that: 
1. Participation rates should be increased for young and mature students in initial 
HE and for adults in lifelong learning; 
2. Students should be able to choose between a diverse range of courses, 
institutions, modes and locations of study; 
3. Qualification and teaching standards should, at minimum, be maintained and 
assured; 
 129 
4. HE should be increasingly responsive to the needs of both employers and 
employees and include the development of widely valued skills; 
5. Arrangements for student support should be fair and transparent; and 
6. Value for money and cost-effectiveness should be obtained in the use of 
resources (Dearing, 1997, Main Report). 
 
The Inquiry set out its rationale for achieving its remit within two particular 
discourses. First, echoing OECD (1996, 1997) representations of the vital role that HE 
had to play in training the world’s workforce and fueling economic growth, the Inquiry 
argued that the UK needed to respond to a growing global, knowledge-based economy 
in which economic competition was increasing from both advanced and developing 
countries. As both political and technological forces were driving national economies 
towards greater integration, ever-more nations were placing increased premium on 
knowledge and lifelong learning, making them far more committed to HE and training. 
In turn, this was making national economies more dependent on HE’s development of 
people of all ages with high-level skills. Furthermore, a global market place for HE 
had been rapidly developing since the WTO had underscored the need for the global 
North to identify itself as a high-value producer by including HE as a service sector in 
its first General Agreement on Trade in Services in 1995. If the UK were “to meet the 
international challenge” and “compete with global competition” it would need to invest 
in higher and further education (Dearing, 1997, “Wider Context”). 
 
Second, the British HE sector was facing a massive funding crisis and was no longer 
expanding. Public support for HE at 1995/96 prices had reached £7.2billion (on a 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement basis), whilst the unit of funding per student 
had been driven down by over 40% over the preceding 20 years. Moreover, as part of 
their public spending review (and prior to their defeat in the 1997 General Election), 
the Conservative Government had projected a further 6.5% reduction in the unit of 
funding over the next two-to-three years, which the Inquiry had to uphold (Dearing, 
1997, Report 12). Certainly, there were now over 1.6 million full- and part-time 
students in HE, with almost 1/3 of young people from schools and colleges 
progressing into nearly 200 HEIs across the UK. However, in 1993, then SoSE, 
Kenneth Clark, had effectively halted national expansion by placing a cap on publicly 
funded undergraduate numbers and withdrawing most of the capital grant. As a result, 
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the Inquiry, citing oral evidence from the CVCP, was concerned that the long-term 
stability of the HE system and the reputation of UK awards may be undermined by 
“short term pressures to reduce costs, in conditions of no growth” (ibid, Main Report: 
17.6). Something had to be done. 
 
If 18 years of Conservative rule had embedded quasi-market mechanisms in order to 
induce and normalise neoliberal understandings of efficiency and competition into 
HE’s framework of action, Dearing’s solutions marked a far deeper penetration of the 
‘market imaginary’ into policy. Certainly, as the opening quote to this section 
highlights, the Inquiry Committee was determined to preserve the traditional role of 
HE as the transmitter of values and culture that made for a civilized society. However, 
under international pressures to compete in a global knowledge economy and under 
austere national fiscal conditions, the principles formalized by Robbins needed to be 
“redefined and extended” (ibid, Report 1, “Key Points”). Demand for HE from people 
of all ages was expected to grow, and in order to keep up with other nations, 
participation rates for young people would need to reach 45%. Moreover, HE had 
“proved to be an excellent personal investment” with a return to graduates “averaging 
between 11 and 14 per cent” through improved earnings and their ability to give 
employers “a credible signal” of their potential. And this trend for graduates to be the 
major beneficiaries of HE was expected to continue, “even after further expansion” 
(ibid, Summary Report: 25). As such, the Inquiry concluded that students needed to be 
identified and understood more as ‘consumers’ of HE, and the universities more as its 
‘producers’ (ibid, Report 12). 
 
The central mechanism by which this could be achieved was that of exchange. Rather 
than have Government purchase (ex-ante) HE in its entirety on behalf of its consumers, 
potential students would need to evaluate for themselves the costs and benefits of HE 
through the payment of an up-front fee. Although the Inquiry recommended that the 
fee – which was calculated to cover the full cost of tuition – was to be shared with 
Government in order to reflect both its private and public value, the student 
contribution of around 25%, or £1000, was to be collected and administered by the 
universities, putting them into a direct producer-consumer relationship with the student 
(ibid, Main Report, Recommendations 72 & 79). In theory, this would make the 
universities more responsive to student demand; more competitive in trying to attract 
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students; more informative regarding their courses and standards; more proactive in 
diversifying income streams; more business-like in their internal accounting systems; 
and more cost effective and efficient. As the policy consultancy group London 
Economics put it in their Report to the Inquiry: “with more student-linked funding, one 
would expect institutions to develop the characteristics of free market agents” (ibid, 
Report 12: 2.2.1-2.2.3, emphasis added). 
 
On 23rd July 1997, within hours of the Dearing Report’s release, the New Labour 
Government made an interim statement to the House of Commons agreeing with the 
Committee that, given the severe funding problems facing HE, funding reform was the 
only way to ensure that the system could improve and expand. As David Blunkett, then 
SoSE for the Department for Education and (now) Employment (DfEE), stated: 
“Students should share both the investment and the advantages gained from higher 
education: rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. The investment of the nation 
must be balanced by the commitment of the individual: each will gain from the 
investment made” (Hansard, 23 July, 1997). 
 
By February 1998, the Government was ready to finalize their proposals for taking the 
Inquiry’s recommendations forward. They did so through the simultaneous launch of 
two publications: their Green Paper, The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998a), which detailed 
their strategy for lifelong learning, and Higher Education for the 21st Century: 
Response to the Dearing Report (DfEE, 1998b). The recommended flat rate, up-front 
fee of £1000 was to be initiated. However, it would be means-tested in order to protect 
the less well off. Students currently assessed as eligible for full maintenance support 
would pay no fee at all with the level of contribution for remaining students being 
assessed on a tapering scale pegged to parental or spousal income. As promised in 
New Labour’s pre-election statement on lifelong learning, all remaining maintenance 
grants for living costs were to be replaced by ‘interest neutral’ loans, which would be 
repaid on an income contingent basis (Labour, 1997). Again, in order to protect the 
less well off, repayment would only begin once the graduate’s income reached £10,000 
with the level of repayment being directly linked to monthly earnings. 
 
The Government’s decision to mediate the impact of the fee on low-income families 
was an attempt to uphold the long-held value that HE should be available to all those 
capable of benefiting from it, regardless of location or wealth (DfEE, 1998a, 1998b). 
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Throughout the Dearing Inquiry, “fair” or “widening” access had arisen as a strong 
competing discourse to the market imaginary, and had informed many of the 
Committee’s recommendations. Furthermore, the social, cultural and economic 
benefits of widening access had underpinned much of the criticism levied at the 
Government for agreeing that fees were to now play a central role in funding HE. For 
example, Lord Glenamara, Labour’s Education Secretary in the late 1960s, declared to 
the House of Lords that he was “ashamed of the party” for initiating the fee (BBC, 
1998). Ken Livingstone, MP, accused the Party of “whipping away a ladder of 
opportunity which they themselves had climbed” (ibid). And debates regarding the 
Teaching and Higher Education Bill (DfEE, 1998c) highlighted what Baroness Blatch 
expressed as, “the irony of all time” that it was a Labour Government that would be 
dissuading young people from low-income families to participate in HE due to the 
level of “state organised debt39” they would accrue (HoC, 1998). Although David 
Blunkett’s statement of July ’9740 argued that to not ensure the investment needed for 
the future of HE would be “to betray the next generation”, New Labour’s turn towards 
market principles – no matter how mitigated – had left many people feeling betrayed 
(see also Leuner, 1997). 
 
4.3.2 Blair: Top-up fees and a differentiated market 
Certainly, the policies that the New Labour Government put into practice in 1998 
further established the mechanisms and ‘machinery of Government’ required to embed 
market principles into HE’s framework of action. Aside from setting the legal 
foundations for student tuition fees and loans for living costs through the Teaching and 
Higher Education Act (1998), the Government used its regulation making powers to 
influence the actions and activities of HEIs and the ways in which they measured 
themselves against certain criteria. For example, to ensure that HEIs provided potential 
students with better and more-timely information regarding their courses and teaching 
standards, the Government pursued two avenues. First, the Quality Assurance Agency 
(QAA) was established with the duty of reviewing university provision of careers 
services and guidance as part of its remit, thereby ensuring that HEIs better integrated 
advice on lifelong learning into their procedures. Set within economic discourses of 
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 The Guardian, 24 September 1997 – cited in HoC, 12 March 1998. 
40
 David Blunkett omitted this phrase from his statement to the Commons. However, the statement read 
simultaneously to the House of Lords by Baroness Blackstone included the phrase. In theory, the 
statements should have been identical. See Hansard, 23 July 1997, volume 581 cc1445-58, House of 
Lords. 
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human capital and utility maximization, the aim was “to help people choose courses 
and careers which [were] right for them to maximise their opportunities” (DfEE, 
1998b: 2.3). Second, the Government set up working groups to bring together 
representatives of schools, colleges, HEIs and student unions, along with other 
interested parties, to research students’ information needs and establish where 
improvements could be made. The explicit aim was to elicit rational economic 
behaviour by ensuring “that students [had] the fullest available information on higher 
education opportunities, costs and benefits as a basis for making choices” (ibid: 2.5). 
The Government also sought to increase university efficiency through extending the 
regulatory role of the Funding Councils. In England, HEFCE was to now issue the 
block-teaching grant (BTG), and as part of their funding formula, HEIs were required 
to increase efficiency and cut costs. Moreover, where any university spending was 
found to be well above the sector median, HEFCE now had the power to examine 
whether it “represented a good use of resources” and to penalize institutions that failed 
to evidence value for money (ibid: 10.4). Far from upholding the principle of 
autonomy by keeping Government at arms length from the universities, both the QAA 
and HEFCE extended the Government’s powers to engender neoliberally informed 
market subjectivities – affecting both universities and students alike. 
 
However, it was not until 2003 with the release of their White Paper, The Future of 
Higher Education (DfES, 2003a), that the Government put into policy understandings 
of student-led demand and a differentiated market through the implementation of, so-
called, ‘top-up fees’. According to the Department for Education and (now) Skills 
(DfES) in their paper, Why Not a Fixed Fee? (DfES, 2003b) the variable fee was 
foundational to engendering certain market principles. Fundamentally, the Government 
believed that it was wrong to assume that every student wanted the same thing from 
higher education or that every university should be the same. A “one-size-fits-all 
model” was “unfair to students” and “too rigid for universities”. “Diversity” needed to 
be “celebrated not stifled” (DfES, 2003b: 4). Under variable fees, universities would 
be responsible for setting their own fees up to a Government imposed cap of £3000. As 
such, diversity, competition, efficiency, entrepreneurialism, excellence and innovation 
could all be encouraged by giving students more choice and institutions more freedom 
via the simple market process of relating supply to demand through variable prices 
(ibid). 
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On the one hand, through a discourse of consumer choice, the Government was 
attempting to differentiate student identities and match them with producer-
institutions. For example, the DfES argued that whilst every student required “high-
class teaching”, some were “looking for a specific job”; others “wanted to learn for the 
love of learning”; some “wanted to be pioneers in their fields”; and others just wanted 
“to be the first in their families to go to university”. As such, the country needed both 
local universities “working with their communities and regional economies” and 
nationally/internationally selective universities “doing leading edge research”. The 
sector needed to respond to the demands of all manner of students, not simply the most 
academically able (ibid). 
 
On the other hand, through a discourse of producer freedom, the Government was 
attempting to engender a differentiated, competitive market in which universities and 
higher/further education colleges could identify and position themselves against their 
peers. For the DfES, HEIs needed the freedom to manage their own businesses and 
determine their own fee policies. It was simply wrong for Government to set fees 
centrally and stifle competition by making decisions that were best made by those 
responsible for delivering HE. As the DfES put it: 
“It is their course and their provision; and they know best where to set a fee that offers 
good value for money to their students… An ability to compete on cost as well as 
quality will level the playing field for those universities and colleges able to offer 
excellent value for money but unable to compete on reputation alone” (ibid: 5). 
 
Implemented as a ‘technology of Government’, the DfES underscored that variable 
prices would make HEIs “think hard about what they charge[d] for their courses and 
about the attractiveness of the student ‘package’ leading to innovation and quality 
improvements right across the sector” (ibid: 6). Yet embedding such market logic into 
HE’s framework of action would need to be bolstered through further improvements in 
student information. To this end, the Government proposed a two-pronged strategy. 
First, the DfES was to introduce a new survey for all final year students through which 
they would report on the content, nature and value of their experiences. Second, the 
universities would be made to publish summaries of external examiners’ reports 
revealing information regarding the quality of courses and the peer-learning 
environment. In both cases, the results would be made readily available through a 
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comprehensive guide to HE, which potential students would be able to examine 
against the cost of prospective courses, thereby helping them to chose which institution 
and course was right for them. Together, the strategically selected tactics of variable 
prices and better information would assure producer-consumer market relations, thus 
reaping benefits for all: 
“The scope to raise more or less cash from students and the publication of better 
information about what their courses offer will incentivise universities to improve the 
quality of their offer to students and ensure that it offers good value for money… And 
because students will begin to take decisions that are informed by the personal cost and 
benefit of their courses, the sector is likely to be more responsive to the needs of 
employers, with knock on effects for the economy as a whole” (ibid: 6). 
 
Again, the Government proposed to mitigate the impact of top-up fees on low-income 
families citing the social values of fair access and widening participation as its 
rationale (DfES, 2003a, 2003b). Under a new Graduate Contribution Scheme, students 
would no longer be required to pay the fee up-front. Instead, the value of the fee could 
be covered by interest neutral loans, which could be added to any maintenance loans 
repayable through the state-sponsored Student Loans Company (SLC). In keeping with 
the 1998 Act, the loans would be income contingent with no graduate making 
repayments until their annual earnings reached £15,000. However, in a highly 
regulatory move, the Government proposed that any institution wanting to charge top-
up fees above the (then) annual fee level of £1100 would need to draw up a five-year 
Access Agreement setting out: 
• The fees the institution wished to charge; 
• The courses to which the fees would apply; 
• The outreach work they intended to undertake with schools and colleges to help 
raise the level of attainment, aspirations and applications; 
• The bursaries and other financial support the university would make available 
along with advice on financial issues; and 
• The milestones and indicators the university would decide itself and against 
which it could measure progress towards its own ambitions of widening 
participation (DfES, 2003c). 
A new Office of Fair Access (OFFA) would be established to both approve the 
universities’ Access Agreements and review their “overall efforts and progress” when 
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they came up for renewal (ibid: 4). And, supported by HEFCE, OFFA would have the 
power to impose financial penalties if the Agreements were not fulfilled. 
 
Whilst, in principle, the majority of universities and other interested parties were 
supportive of the values of fair access and widening participation, many underscored 
that those values were being undermined by the level of student debt, which had 
rapidly increased following the 1998 legislation (HOCESC, 2002-03a: 63). Further 
still, many were opposed the notion of external ‘state’ regulation, fearing that it would 
be yet another breach of university autonomy. As the Standing Conference of 
Principals stated in its evidence to the House of Commons Education and Skills 
Committee (HOCESC): 
“The access regulator… is bound to involve a layer of bureaucracy. [It] is bound to want 
to get involved in things that are not any of its business. Admissions is… one of the few 
areas of higher education that is not externally regulated closely by the funding council. 
It is now going to be [regulated]… so you are back to a state agency” (ibid: 47). 
Through specific regulation of institutional behaviour, Government was attempting to 
pin down, ex-ante, a particular understanding of the value of HE as a return on the 
state’s investment. 
 
Conversely, many of the witnesses giving evidence to the HOCESC also opposed the 
notion of ‘university freedom’ being gained through a differentiated market – albeit a 
regulated one. For example, the National Union of Students (NUS), the AUT, and the 
National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) stated 
that the vast majority of their respective members were overwhelmingly opposed to 
differential fees between institutions. For the NUS this was because it would “create a 
two-tier, elitist higher education system” (ibid: 54); for the AUT it “would impact 
[teachers]’ ability to make choices and help people on the basis of their academic 
ability rather than their ability to pay” (ibid: 55); and for NATFHE it would “destroy 
funding equality and thus genuine equality of opportunity” (ibid). Furthermore, having 
differential fees within each university was even worse. Most AUT members were 
“absolutely horrified by the idea that an internal market may well develop between 
departments and courses” (ibid: 58), while the University of East Anglia underscored 
that charging more to read English than Chemistry would “turn students into 
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consumers who inhabit rooms… in the same institution… wonder[ing] why one is 
cross-subsidizing the other” (ibid: 59). 
 
Significantly, then SoSE Charles Clarke highlighted that the New Labour 
Government’s decision to operationalize top-up fees for full-time, home undergraduate 
students denoted “a major departure” in their strategic regulation of HE (ibid: 58). In 
1998, the Government had not only rejected top-up fees on the grounds that they might 
cause home undergraduates to ‘shop around’ for courses or institutions on the basis of 
price rather than the appropriateness of the provision offered (Blackstone, 199741). 
They had made top-up fees illegal, and had conferred upon HEFCE the power to 
financially penalize any institution attempting to charge over (or under) the fee set by 
Government (THE Act, 1998: Section 26). At that time, New Labour had reasoned that 
setting fees centrally was necessary because the CVCP alongside (specifically) the 
London School of Economics and seventeen other ‘leading’ universities had been 
threatening to charge a £300 levy on admissions due to the severe funding restrictions 
imposed under 16 years of neoliberally informed Conservative rule (HoC, 1998: 47). 
Now in 2003, just five years later, the Government was responding favourably to 
pressure from the CVCP (now, Universities UK) and, in particular, the Russell Group 
institutions to reinstate their powers to levy such charges and raise additional funds 
(see BBC, 2000, 2003). 
 
Although the arguments put forward by the CVCP (UUK) included an understanding 
that having Government set university fees would undermine their autonomy and 
academic freedom, it was the universities’ ability to survive via an adequate system of 
funding that was foundational to their rationale (BBC, 2000, 2003; Guardian, 2002). 
According to UUK and a number of independent Vice-Chancellors and Principals, if 
the Government was not prepared to pay the real cost of funding the HE sector, then 
those who most benefitted from it – i.e. the students – would have to make up the 
difference (Barr, 2002; HOCESC, 2002-3b42). Moreover, the value derived from the 
students would need to be sufficient to fund the sector over the long term. As Britain’s 
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 Baroness Blackstone, Hansard, HoL Debate, 30th October 1997, column 1127. 
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 See for example, oral and/or written evidence to HOCESC (2002-2003b) from Professor R. Floud 
(Vice Chancellor, London Metropolitan University); Professor A. Lucas (Principle, Kings College 
London); Dr. G. Copeland (Vice-Chancellor, University of Westminster); and Baroness Warwick of 
Undercliffe (Chief Executive, UUK): Questions 152-159 and 160-179 (Accessed at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmeduski/425/3021201.htm). 
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leading expert and Government advisor on university funding, economist Nicholas 
Barr, put it: 
“The current cap of £3000 is probably about right. [But] if the cap is too low for too 
long, a critical bulk of universities will charge the maximum, appropriating a system of 
flat fees. The result will be, a) to reintroduce close-ended funding, and b) to restore 
central planning by the back door” (HCESC, 2002-03a: 58). 
Retaining the £3000 cap on top-up fees beyond the life of the next parliament would 
stifle the logic of market competition and banish HE to the impoverishment of a 
centrally planned economy (Barr, 2002-03). The political extension of the ‘market 
imaginary’ across HE’s social relations of value would, definitively, need to be 
revisited. 
 
4.3.3 Current policy: students at the heart of the system 
When the former CEO of BP, Lord Browne, was invited by the New Labour 
Government in November 2009 to review HE’s system of funding and student finance, 
Britain, along-side the rest of the globe, was in the grip of an economic crisis the 
effects of which had their roots in the neo-liberalized, de-regulated world of global 
finance (Harvey, 2011; Peck et al, 2010, 2012; Pani and Holman, 2013). Then 
Governor of the Bank of England, Mervin King, had likened the crisis to that of 1914 
stating that, in both cases, it was the free-market policies and practices of laissez faire 
that had caused the value of assets held by the banks to plummet and thus precipitated 
their bailout by the nation’s tax-payers (Pym, 2014). Regarding the HE sector, between 
1914 and 1919 two cross-party coalition Governments43 had reacted to the austere 
fiscal conditions by setting up the UGC to ensure university survival through local and 
national public funding. In October 2010, when the Browne Review was released, both 
it and the newly elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition reasoned that the 
only way to ensure the long-term survival of the sector was further marketisation. 
 
Similar to the Dearing Report (1998) and New Labour’s White Paper on the future of 
higher education (DfEE, 2003a), the Browne Review (2010) set out its strategies for 
representing and reforming HE’s framework of action within a logical, neoliberally 
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 From May 1915 to December 1916, Liberal leader, Herbert Asquith led a Liberal-Conservative-
Labour coalition. From 1916 to 1922, Liberal leader, David Lloyd George did the same. 
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informed, economic discourse44. In a competitive global knowledge-based economy, a 
strong HE system was vital to the national economy and Britain’s international 
economic standing. Thus, in order to sustain future economic growth, increased 
investment in HE was required; otherwise, the benefits that HE could bring to 
individuals and the nation would be lost, as would Britain’s international comparative 
advantage. However, due to the financial crisis, HE faced “significant reductions in 
public investment over the next few years”, so whatever strategies the Review selected 
would require “a long term perspective”: one that would provide “a sustainable 
funding solution for the future” (Browne, 2010: 17). To this end, the Review 
recommended: 
“…a radical departure from the existing way in which HEIs are financed. Rather than 
the Government providing a block grant for teaching to HEIs, their finance now follows 
the student who has chosen and been admitted to study. Choice is in the hands of the 
student. HEIs can charge different and higher fees provided that they can show 
improvements to the student experience and demonstrate progress in providing fair 
access and, of course, that students are prepared to entertain such charges” (ibid: 3). 
 
The mix of market reforms and arms-length regulation that had been implemented 
since 2006 under the Higher Education Act (2004) had provided English universities 
with the resources and freedom to invest in staff, infrastructure and widening access 
(Browne, 2010: 19). However, according to the logic of the Browne Review, the year-
on-year ex-ante funding of institutions through the BTG – regardless of their 
performance in relation to students – had allowed the sector to become “complacent” 
(ibid: 23). HEIs needed to behave more like market actors. They needed to be more 
competitive, more efficient, more flexible, and provide better information and an 
improved student experience. Thus, the only rational solution, according to Browne, 
was to deepen the market logic of a demand-led system by placing students at its heart. 
The state valuation and subsidization of home undergraduate tuition fees via the BTG 
had to end (except in the cases of strategically important or vulnerable subjects). The 
time had come for the student-consumer to value HE through the payment of variable, 
full-cost covering fees – thereby forcing producer-institutions to deal with the realities 
and uncertainties of consumer choice in a competitive market: 
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 See Chapter Eight for a discussion on the interplay between the incremental normalisation of such 
discourses and the HE sector’s diminishing resistance to marketisation over time. 
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“Our proposals put students at the heart of the system. Popular HEIs will be able to 
expand to meet student demand. Students will be better informed about the range of 
options available to them. Their choices will shape the landscape of higher education… 
HEIs must persuade students that they should ‘pay more’ in order to ‘get more’. The 
money will follow the student” (ibid: 4). 
 
To support this discourse, the Review presented economic evidence submitted by 
knowledgeable experts. For example, numerous witnesses45 had drawn upon OECD 
statistics, which suggested that those countries that had expanded their HE sectors 
more rapidly since 1960 had experienced faster economic growth (OECD, 2008, 
2009). Universities UK (UUK) (formerly the CVCP) had calculated that, in Britain, 
HE was larger in size by Gross Value Added than the advertising, aerospace or 
pharmaceutical industries with an estimated annual output of £59 billion. The sector 
was part of a thriving international market attracting students from across the globe, 
making Britain the second most popular destination behind the USA (OECD, 2010); 
whilst, according to the QS World University Rankings (2010), 15 of the country’s 
universities were in the global top 100. Furthermore, as the Russell Group argued, with 
45% of young British people now progressing into HE, the increase in employed 
university graduates between 2000 and 2007 accounted for some 6% of growth in the 
private sector, or £4.2 billion of extra output “as measured by the extra wages people 
earned as a result of being graduates” (Browne, 2010: 14). 
 
Clearly, then, there were both public and private benefits derived from HE. Yet, as the 
expert witness Nicholas Barr claimed, according to economic theory the balance 
between the state’s contribution and that of the home undergraduate was totally wrong 
(Barr, 2010). According to the Browne Review, OECD (2010) research clearly 
demonstrated that the individual benefits of HE in the UK were, “on average, over 
50% higher than the public benefits” (2010: 14). And yet, Research from the Institute 
of Fiscal Studies showed that, under the policies implemented since 2006, the 
additional private contributions that graduates would make over time through the 
repayment of their top-up fee loans (around £1.7 billion compared to the Dearing 
system) were almost equaled by the additional state support provided to students 
upfront to help ensure “participation and access” (£1.6 billion) (ibid: 21). The current 
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 These included the Russell Group, Million+ Group, Alliance Group, Cambridge University, the 
Council for Advancement and Support of Education, and Howard Davies – to name but a few. 
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system of funding had, therefore, failed to redress the disproportionate contribution 
that the state had been paying in order to protect, from market failures, the ‘positive 
externalities’ that HE brings to society at large (Barr, 2010). 
 
In addition, evidence from HEFCE indicated that, contrary to concerns raised during 
the 2003 debates, demand from potential home undergraduates had increased, 
suggesting that they were willing to pay a higher price for a level of education that 
they, themselves, held as valuable (Browne, 2010: 20). Thus, the Review argued that: 
“Unlike primary and secondary education, which are paid for out of general taxation, 
higher education is neither compulsory nor universal. Access to it is determined by 
aptitude… and by choice… As a consequence it is only reasonable to ask those who 
gain private benefits from higher education to help fund it rather than rely solely on 
public funds collected through taxation from people who may not have participated in 
higher education themselves” (ibid: 21). 
According to Browne’s rationale, it was simply wrong to ask individual taxpayers who 
may not be deriving the private use value of HE to subsidize, collectively, another 
individual’s freedom to choose (ibid). There was, therefore, a persuasive moral 
argument based on neoliberal principles, as well as an economic one, to support the 
instigation of full-cost covering fees in a competitive market. 
 
The discursive turn against collective policies was echoed by Liberal Democrat Vince 
Cable, the new Secretary of State for “Business, Innovation and Skills” (rather than 
“Education”), in his initial House of Commons’ response to the Browne Review 
(Hansard, 12 October 2010a). The Liberal Democrats had come to power in the June 
by negotiating with the majority Conservatives following Britain’s first hung 
Parliament since 1974. The outgoing New Labour Government under the Premiership 
of Gordon Brown had lost 91 seats in the party’s single biggest loss since 1931, 
perhaps signaling – as was claimed by their political opponents – that the voting public 
was wholly dissatisfied with a Government that had allowed the economy to run out of 
control (see Swaine, 2008). When the former New Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, 
had finally stepped aside to make way for Gordon Brown in June 2007, the ex-
Chancellor of the Exchequer had brought with him the reputation of a prudent, 
knowledgeable economist-politician dedicated to Third-Way strategies for seeking 
economic growth and stability across the fiscal cycle (Economist, 2005). Now, his 
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Keynesian-related demand-side strategies could be blamed for “Britain’s broken 
economy” (David Cameron, cited in Swaine, 2008), allowing Cable to obfuscate the 
failings of neoliberal market strategies and declare: 
“…As a strategic direction the Government believes that the Review is on the right 
lines… Browne acknowledges that, “the current funding and finance systems for higher 
education are unsustainable and need urgent reform”. The issue [now] has to be framed 
in terms of how the higher education sector contributes to the deficit reduction 
programme… My own Party consistently opposed graduate contributions, but in the 
current economic climate we accept that the policy is simply no longer feasible… We 
are in a world in which we have inherited a massive financial mess. We have to come to 
terms with reality… That is why I intend, on behalf of the coalition, to put specific 
proposals to the House to implement radical and progressive reforms of higher 
education along the lines of the Browne Report” (Hansard, 12 October 2010a). 
 
In fact, the Secretary of State alongside the Government’s new Minister for 
Universities and Science, Conservative David Willetts, spent the next seven months 
putting their message across and testing their ideas against political and public opinion. 
Between October 2010 and June 2011, which saw the release of their White Paper, 
Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System (BIS, 2011a), the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills46 (BIS) slowly set out its strategies through, often, 
“passionate and robust debates47” in the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and 
the passage of the Education Bill (137) (e.g. Hansard, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d; 
HOC, 2011); in Written Ministerial Statements and Standard Notes deposited in the 
Commons’ Library (e.g. Hansard, 2010e; LSN, 2010a, 2010b); through Impact 
Assessments, BIS and HEFCE Circular Letters, and BIS webpages (e.g. BIS, 2010a, 
2010b, 2010c; HEFCE, 2011); and through both official and leaked releases to the 
media (e.g. BBC, 2010; Guardian, 2010b; THE, 2010; Daily Mail, 2011b; 
Independent, 2011; Telegraph, 2011b). Each of these fora provided the Government 
with the opportunity to construct a particular representation of HE’s framework of 
action by identifying specific actions, activities and identities for HE’s actors. They 
also enabled the Government to communicate the logic of their rationale for doing so. 
 
                                                        
46
 The Department for Education and Skills (DfES 2001-2007) became the Department for Innovation, 
Universities and Skills in 2007, separating HE from education. The DfIUS became the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills in 2009.  
47
 David Willetts referring to the HOC Debate on Higher Education Fees, in Hansard, 9 December 2010. 
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For example, the identification of accurate, timely information and competition as 
indispensible components of an efficient market helped the Government to construct 
the consumer and producer identities and relations of value they wished to embed 
between students and HEIs. As David Willets stated to the Commons: 
“…The bulk of universities’ money will not come through the block grant, but will 
instead follow the choices of students. It will be up to each university or college to 
decide what it charges, including the amounts for different courses. All universities and 
colleges… will be expected to publish a standard set of information about their 
performance on the indicators that students and their parents value: contact hours, 
teaching patterns and employment outcomes. We also propose to open up higher 
education provision to new providers, including further education colleges. These 
proposals offer a thriving future for universities, with extra freedoms and less 
bureaucracy, and they ensure value for money and real choice for learners” (Hansard, 3 
November, 2010b). 
 
The Government’s rationale for increasing information and competition was publicly 
circulated through the media, which in turn provided a forum for opposing-discourses 
to be put forward. For instance, The Telegraph noted the Government’s intention that 
information would “be fed into new price comparison-style websites that shame the 
worst-performing universities and allow students to apply to the best institutions” 
thereby “ensuring students gain maximum value for their additional investment” 
(Paton, 2011). However, countering the proposition, Times Higher Education 
suggested that the amount of information that HEIs were being asked to provide would 
“baffle, not enlighten, students” (Partington, 2011). Regarding competition, the BBC 
explained how the cut in the teaching grant would “go a long way towards creating a 
level playing-field” between public and private universities, thereby “removing the 
barriers” that had long-stifled competition (Baker, 2011). However, The Observer 
warned that the risks posed by private sector universities were being ignored – 
underscoring that the value of Britain’s “world-class reputation” was at stake (Boffey, 
2011). 
 
By the time the White Paper (BIS, 2011a) was released, every element of it (to 
paraphrase what a Government Minister told me in private conversation) had been 
‘cogitated, argued over, and pulled to pieces’, both in public and in private, allowing 
the Government to refine its strategies before putting them into policy and practice. 
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That is not to say that public and professional opinion necessarily changed the 
Government’s fundamental position. Indeed, the many public protests involving tens 
of thousands of students, families and teachers that took place across the country 
between November and December 2010 did nothing to alter the Government’s 
rationale for replacing public funding with private funding, which, as Vince Cable 
stated, was “in some sense, ideological” (Hansard, 9 December 2010d). 
 
However, considered as a ‘technology of government’, it was predominantly the White 
Paper (BIS, 2011a), alongside the Government’s official Response to Lord Browne 
(BIS, 2011b), BIS’s Impact Assessment (BIS, 2011c) and the minor amendments that 
arose from the White Paper Consultation (BIS, 2012), of which HEIs would have to 
make sense and meaning in relation to their existing socio-economic geographies. 
 
The White Paper spans some 78 pages and sets out the coalition’s “radical” yet 
“progressive” policies for regulating the HE sector from academic year 2012/13. On 
the radical side, following Browne (2010), the goal was to create a demand-led system, 
which would be “freed to respond in new ways to the needs of students” (BIS, 2011a: 
3). To achieve this, the White Paper suggested rebalancing power and influence 
through strategically selected policies that would “do more than ever to put students in 
the driving seat” (ibid: 2). Up until now, Government funding of HE had taken power 
and influence out of the hands of students and weakened the incentives on institutions 
to improve their performance – including the quality of teaching and range of choice. 
Similarly, because undergraduates had not yet faced the full cost of undertaking HE, 
the incentive for them to put pressure on institutions to provide a better service, and at 
a better cost, had been lessened (see also, BIS, 2011c). As such, an economic discourse 
of ‘government failure’ coupled with the logic of free-market principles framed the 
metrics and criteria by which HE had to change. 
 
On the progressive side, the goal was to widen participation further and to increase 
social mobility through certain Government interventions. Fundamentally, the 
coalition suggested that HE could be: 
“…a powerful engine of social mobility, enabling able young people from low-income 
backgrounds to earn more than their parents and provid[e] a route into the professions 
for people from non-professional backgrounds” (BIS, 2011a: 54). 
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However, in accessing HE, there were often:  
“…significant barriers in the way of bright young people from the most disadvantaged 
backgrounds” (ibid). 
For example, simply opening up HE to the uncertainties of the market might result in 
significant market failures whereby the public value of HE might suffer due to 
inadequate investment either by HEIs or individuals (BIS, 2011c: 21). Furthermore, 
although the system of student finance and Access Agreements implemented since 
2006 had helped maintain participation levels of low-income students, “applicants with 
real potential” were still “not making it into the most selective institutions” (BIS, 
2011a: 6). Thus, the White Paper argued that although, in principle, the Government 
supported the values of university freedom and autonomy they, concomitantly, 
endorsed the principle of access enunciated by Robbins. As a result, all individuals 
“with the highest academic potential” had to be provided a route into HE –“and to the 
most selective institutions in particular” (ibid: 7). 
 
To meet these goals, the primary element that Government had to address was 
university funding and student finance. From September 2011, HEIs across England 
would see substantial cuts to their BTGs to make way for a new fees regime for full-
time undergraduates. HEIs would be able to charge a basic amount of £6000 per year – 
which HEFCE had calculated would fully cover their basic costs – and then decide 
how much extra they wished to charge up to a maximum cap of £9000. The differential 
fees mechanism would make the sector more responsive to student demand and enable 
the diversity of provision by compelling HEIs to identify themselves in relation to their 
students and competitors. The cap would protect the public purse by driving further 
efficiencies, which would be bolstered by the fact that cost-covering fees would not 
come into operation until September 2012. HEIs would, therefore, face a direct cut to 
funding for the academic year 2011/12 – immediately stimulating the efficiency 
measures recommended by the Diamond Review48, which UUK had, themselves, 
commissioned (ibid: 19-20). 
 
Thus, the funding – the “life-sustaining” value (Lee, 2006: 415) – previously allocated 
via HEFCE on the basis of teaching and learning would now need to be raised via 
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 Professor Ian Diamond of the University of Aberdeen was leading a review of efficiency in the HE 
sector. 
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recruitment, thereby opening up HEIs to the risks and uncertainties of an 
undergraduate market. For the Government this was central to their market rationale: 
“[The introduction of full cost-covering fees will] put more power into the hands of 
students. Institutions that can attract students by showing them that they offer good 
quality and good value for money, should grow and prosper, and may well increase their 
overall income. Institutions that cannot attract students will have to change” (BIS, 
2011a: 15). 
 
A re-vamped graduate contribution scheme would underpin the Government’s 
‘progressive’ understanding of student finance. No first-time undergraduate would 
have to pay the fee upfront, although they could if they wished. Instead, interest-
bearing loans would be provided via the SLC to be repaid on a “pay as you earn” basis 
through the tax system. Graduate borrowers would start to repay the loans only once 
they earned above £21,000 annual salary, and repayments would be deducted at 9% of 
income above this threshold. Interest would be charged at a tapered rate, again based 
on earnings, and capped at Retail Price Index +3%. After 30 years from graduation, 
any outstanding debt would be written off (ibid: 17). 
 
Importantly, throughout the text BIS underscored the progressive nature of the scheme. 
As Nicholas Barr argued in his evidence to the Browne Review, it was imperative that 
the key message relayed to readers emphasized that it was graduates who repaid the 
loans, not students (Barr, 2010). This discursive splitting of identity between the 
consumer of HE and its purchaser enabled BIS to construct a ‘win-win’ discourse 
regarding the process of exchange. Since the repayments would be linked to actual 
earnings, the graduate contribution would reflect the quantum of personal gain, thus 
ensuring that the repayments would be based “on the ability to repay, rather than the 
size of their debt” (BIS, 2011a: 17). According to Government estimates, around 70% 
of total costs to the exchequer would be recovered over a 30-year period. The 
remaining 30% of costs would be borne by Government “to maintain the progressive 
elements of the scheme” (ibid: 15). High-earning graduates, not students, would be the 
major beneficiaries of and contributors to HE, leaving Government to finance the 
(remaining) value of the public good. 
 
In order to further embed both a ‘market imaginary’ and the Government’s 
understanding of the public value of HE into HE’s framework of action, the White 
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Paper detailed three particular strategies. First, teaching had to be put back at the heart 
of the student experience in order to ensure the quality of the system. The key to 
achieving this was by better regulating the availability and type of information that 
student-consumers could access. From 2012/13 all publicly funded HEIs would have 
to provide a Key Information Set (KIS) for each of their full-time and part-time 
undergraduate courses covered by the QAA, who would now “make formal 
judgements” on the quality of information provided (ibid: 36). This would make it 
easier for student-consumers to locate and compare information across diverse 
institutions. Included in KIS would be statistics regarding: student satisfaction and 
NSS results; graduate outcomes such as employment and earnings; time spent in 
learning and teaching activities; methods of assessment and feedback; course tuition 
fees; student finance including bursaries, scholarships and other student support; entry 
tariff requirements; accommodation; and various metrics of teaching excellence. In 
case the student-consumer, institution-producer or any other interested party should 
misunderstand what role they should play or the purpose of KIS, the White Paper 
spelled out its market logic: 
 “[The] wider availability and better use of information for potential students is 
fundamental to the new system… It will be… harder for institutions to trade on their 
past reputations while offering a poor teaching experience in the present. Better-
informed students will take their custom to the places offering good value for money. In 
this way, excellent teaching will be placed back at the heart of every student’s university 
experience” (ibid: 32). 
The power to influence the quality of HE would be put into the hands of its consumers 
(ibid: 2). 
 
Second, diversity and responsiveness had to be increased. Certainly, cost-covering 
fees, differential prices and better information would heighten competition somewhat. 
But these mechanisms, alone, were not enough to provide a system in which students 
could “choose freely between a wide range of providers” (ibid: 47). Popular HEIs and 
courses had to be able to expand, and new providers – including private providers and 
FE colleges – had to be able to “enter the market” (ibid: 46). Initially, the White Paper 
had wanted to create a “level playing field” by giving private providers similar access 
to public funding (via SLC loans) to that received by public HEIs (ibid: 47), but these 
plans were ‘temporarily postponed’ following the White Paper Consultation (BIS, 
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2012). Thus, the Government’s primary strategy was to “liberate” Student Number 
Controls (SNCs). 
 
Due to recruitment beyond HEFCE set targets by some institutions in recent years, 
strict SNCs covering home, full-time undergraduates were introduced in 2009/10 with 
“penalties” for institutions that “over recruited” (BIS, 2011a: 48). Whilst the fiscal 
reasons for SNCs remained valid, the controls were limiting student choice and 
restricting expansion, thereby stifling competition and diversity through an imbalance 
between supply and demand. Thus, within the confines of decreasing public spending 
and ensuring that overall costs were managed, SNCs had to be “set free” (ibid). To this 
end, the White Paper proposed: 
“…a package of reforms to free up around 85,000 student numbers in 2012/13. We will 
do this by introducing a flexible “core and margin” model to be administered by 
HEFCE. From year to year, every institution will have to compete for the student 
numbers outside its core allocation and the core will reduce every year” (ibid: 50). 
 
There would be two elements to their approach. First, the new regulations would allow 
“unrestrained recruitment of high-achieving students scoring the equivalent of AAB or 
above at A-Level” (ibid). Core allocations for all universities and FE colleges (with 
degree-awarding powers) would be adjusted by HEFCE to remove these places from 
the 2011/12 SNCs leaving HEIs with a ‘reduced core’. Institutions would then be free 
to recruit as many AAB+ students “as wish to come” (ibid). Overall, the Government 
estimated that some 65,000 AAB+ places would be “liberated” in 2012/13, with the 
competition being extended year-on-year across the life of the Parliament, continuing 
with ABB students in 2013/14. This would allow “greater competition for places on 
the more selective courses and create the opportunity for more students to go to their 
first choice institution if that university wishe[d] to take them” (ibid). 
 
The second element involved the creation of a “flexible margin” of around 20,000 
places, which would be removed from each institution’s ‘reduced core’ on a pro-rata 
basis. In order to “support expansion by providers” who combined “good quality with 
value for money” (ibid), HEIs and FE colleges would then be allowed to “bid” for this 
margin, provided their fees were no more than £7500, including any fee waivers. For 
institutions that won students, these would be added back to their core, producing a 
final student allocation for 2012/13. Unlike the AAB+ competition, the flexible margin 
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would not allow for expansion in overall numbers. However, by steadily increasing the 
flexible margin in future years a “greater dynamism in the allocation of places” could 
be achieved (ibid). Together, the AAB+ and “flexible margin” competitions would 
enable a diverse range of institutions (and students) to identify the actions and 
activities that fit with their self-perceived subjectivities and which they would need to 
undertake in a more competitive and dynamic market. 
 
The final strategy that the White Paper detailed would compel HEIs to improve their 
Access Agreements in order to increase social mobility. Certainly, the state would play 
its part to uphold what the Government was now, very narrowly, constructing as the 
public value of HE. HEFCE would continue to recognize the additional costs 
associated with recruiting students from disadvantaged backgrounds by funding 
widening access activity through its recurrent targeted allocations to HEIs. HEFCE 
would also remain responsible for allocating the remaining teaching grant for specific 
subjects that were deemed too expensive (such as medicine), or were of national 
importance (e.g. the STEM subjects – Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics – and strategically important vulnerable subjects (SIVs) like modern 
foreign languages). Students from families with incomes of £25,000 or less would be 
eligible for a non-repayable maintenance grant of £3,250 per year, as well as a loan of 
£3,875 for those living away from home. And the least well off young people and 
adults would have access to the Government’s new National Scholarship Programme 
(NSP) – although the number would be limited. Finally, for the first time, part-time 
undergraduates (many of whom came from non-traditional backgrounds) would be 
extended tuition fee loans for courses starting in 2012/13 (ibid: 61). 
 
However, as the Government’s ‘partner’ in their ‘public-private’ relationship (ibid: 2), 
HEIs would, also, have to play their part. Although the White Paper continued to 
underscored that the Government did not want to undermine academic excellence or 
institutional autonomy, every HEI in receipt of HEFCE funding would be legally 
compelled to spend more on their outreach activities, retention strategies, bursaries and 
fee waivers for widening participation students, whilst strengthening the rationality 
and metrics of their Access Agreements to be regulated by OFFA. Importantly, the 
additional funding required to achieve these aims would come from the undergraduate 
student fee. Any institution charging above the £6000 basic threshold would have to 
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demonstrate that a minimum proportion was being spent on its Access activities. They 
would also be expected to implement and match Government funding for the NSP 
(ibid: 60). What Government understood as the primary public value of HE – i.e. 
social mobility – had to be protected. 
 
The White Paper, however, clearly articulated one proviso to this strategy. The 
progressive policies that the Government wished to put in place had to be subject to 
expenditure constraints and adhere to their overall rationale for putting HE funding on 
a sustainable footing. As the White Paper put it: 
“Ultimately, the best way to widen participation is to ensure there are sufficient higher 
education places available for those qualified… However, each undergraduate place has 
a substantial cost for taxpayers and we need a more cost-effective sector if we are to 
spread opportunity more widely. We will be looking for real efficiencies… [and] 
increased value for money… The more efficiently that higher education can be 
provided, the less it will cost the graduates of the future, the more people will be able to 
benefit and the greater the national economic gain” (ibid: 7-8). 
The public value of HE had to be supported, but that could not be to the detriment of 
realizing the value(s) of the neoliberal market imaginary. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
As demonstrated in this chapter, HE has long been held as a central asset in the 
production of Britain’s economy and society. Indeed, since 1902 where my analysis 
began, the public value of HE has been consistently discursively constructed as 
indispensible to the economic competitiveness and comparative advantage of the 
nation; to the enrichment of society through the production of knowledge and well-
educated citizens; and to the general betterment of society – from the production of 
elite leaders to the enabling of social mobility amongst the less well off. Yet over time, 
the political emphasis on who should pay for HE and the ‘machinery’ and/or 
‘relations’ through which it should be funded have definitively shifted – both 
discursively and practically. 
 
It is quite tempting to view this shift, quite simply, in terms of a political re-orientation 
towards neoliberalism: as a shift from the Left to the Right; from Keynesian demand-
side economics to neo-classical supply-side principles; from an emphasis on the public 
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value of HE to an emphasis on individual gain; or from a belief in the efficiency of 
central co-ordination to a conviction that the efficient organization of economy and 
society is best achieved through the practices and values of the ‘free’ market. 
Certainly, as demonstrated, since neoliberalism became a potent political force in the 
late 1970s, and particularly since the turn of the 21st Century, there has been a far 
deeper penetration of the market imaginary into HE policy – a point to which I shall 
return in a moment. 
 
However, as detailed in my analysis, the development and application of HE policy up 
to the present day seems to have been far more complicated than that. For example, in 
the first decades of the 20th Century as Britain faced severe economic crisis, a wide 
range of interested parties including Governments formed of the three main political 
Parties, the universities, Lord Haldane, and the Fabian Society were, collectively, 
arguing that, given the importance of HE to the nation, a truly ‘public system’ should 
be established: one which should be publicly funded and centrally co-ordinated for the 
public good – as those interested parties understood it. Yet, it was the social relations 
of value of this ‘public system’ – the proximity of the LEA controlled institutions to 
DoE and central Government funding and to local ratepayer demands – that provided 
vital purchase for successive Governments from the 1970s onwards (variously formed 
of the same three Parties) to successfully introduce certain market principles into HE’s 
framework of action. At the same time, the universities, whose ‘liberal-based values’ 
(Moberly, 1949) of freedom and autonomy were held as so central to their public 
contribution, were being protected from both Government and market influences via 
their UGC-Treasury relations. Yet, it was their level of public funding and Crosland’s 
ideological resistance to their ‘elite’ or ‘favoured’ position that opened them up to 
public financial scrutiny – thereby breaching their autonomy and setting the 
foundations for eventual marketisation, which, under a neoliberal rationale, is meant to 
offer the universities greater autonomy and freedom! (See Chapter Two, Section 2.2 
for a working definition of neoliberalism). 
 
The concomitant iterative emergence of the pattern, size and make up of the HE sector 
has been no less complex. By the time Kenneth Clarke brought the two systems 
together in 1992 in order to engender market competition amongst a single, unified HE 
sector, a diverse array of institutions had emerged. The ancient universities, the (ex-) 
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‘civic’ institutions, Lord Murray’s new universities, Lord Robbins’ transformed CATs, 
Crosland’s polytechnics (many of which had absorbed the ex-teacher training 
colleges), and myriad FE colleges that provided ‘higher level’ qualifications: each had 
their own histories, cultures, identities, missions and relational geographies – from 
locally embedded institutions serving local populations to nationally and 
internationally selective HEIs. Each of these institutions had been part of a massive 
expansion over the course of a century, which, on the one hand, was guided by the 
common principle that HE was good for the nation and, thus, should be available to all 
those qualified and wishing to participate, whilst, on the other, was guided by a 
multiplicity and complexity of values, beliefs and motivations. 
 
It is such diversity and complexity that HE policy must intervene and act upon in order 
to shape, further, HE’s framework of action. But here, too, the deeper penetration of 
the market imaginary into HE policy has been incremental and complex, having 
emerged – not necessarily uniformly or lineally – from previous iterations of political 
economy. For instance, the instigation of variable fees in 2006 by the second Blair 
Government signified a far deeper commitment on the part of New Labour to engender 
market competition in the HE sector than did their prior implementation of the up-
front, flat-rate fee recommended by Dearing (1997). Yet, Blair’s simultaneous removal 
of the up-front process of exchange also represented an opportunity for HE’s actors to 
resist the sort of consumer-producer relations that New Labour was attempting to 
provoke, as was the Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government under David 
Cameron’s leadership. 
 
That said, as my discursive analysis of the 2011 White Paper (BIS, 2011a) indicates, 
the coalition Government’s intensions to shape the evaluations, identities, actions and 
activities of HE’s actors via a neoliberally informed market imaginary are clearly 
manifest in the White Paper’s texts. The metrics or ‘tactics’ designed to engender 
market subjectivities and values are, by-and-large, “radical” (BIS, 2011a) and plain to 
see. Variable, full-cost-covering fees to stimulate consumer-producer relations in a 
demand-led system; KIS to allow student-consumers to shop around, thereby driving 
up quality and making HEIs provide a better service; the partial liberation of student 
numbers to drive competition, diversity and institutional responsiveness; and the 
willingness of Government to allow those HEIs that do not respond favourably to fail 
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in a competitive market. And even where policies have been put in place to uphold the 
Government’s rather narrow understanding of the public value of HE, the detrimental 
effects that these policies might have on market efficiency and competition have been 
both tactically and discursively dissuaded. As the White Paper spells out for the clarity 
of the reader, the cap on student numbers remains in place just in case the 
Government’s progressive funding regime induces institutional inefficiencies. But 
provided HEIs react well and maintain efficiencies the cap will be further lifted, in part 
to provide wider access, certainly; but, moreover, to drive forward market competition. 
 
In Part II of this thesis, I explore how four, very different, HEIs negotiated their way 
through the coalition Government’s White Paper, Higher Education: Students at the 
Heart of the System (BIS, 2011a). Together, Chapters Five, Six and Seven form what I 
am stylistically calling an ‘iterative emergence’, the details for which are set out in the 
Preface to Part II. The purpose of these chapters is to understand: 
• To what extent the coalition’s policies of marketisation have been successful in 
shaping the subjectivities of HE’s institutional leaders – their values, 
evaluations, actions and activities; 
• How, in light of the White Paper, individual HEIs made meaning of and 
negotiated their positions within the multiple and complex social relations of 
value that made up their economic geographies; 
• What impact the existing economic geographies and identities of individual 
HEIs had on their future trajectories – particularly given the inherent temporal 
and spatial path-dependency of economic geographies; and 
• How understandings of the value of HE, alongside the subjectivities of the 
HEIs, may or may not have emerged as more multiple and complex under 
processes of neoliberalization. 
 
In exploring these research questions, my aim is to shed light on how processes of 
neoliberalization must necessarily work in and through the multiple and complex 
social relations of value that help shape the economic geographies of the Ordinary 
Economy. In so doing, I will suggest that neoliberal hegemony is best understood as a 
critical mass of moderate compliance with the values and rationalities of the market: a 
critical mass which is always part of more diffuse and complex social relations of 
value that are always emerging and always open to negotiation, valuation, resistance 
 154 
and transformation. As a result, emerging economic geographies have the potential for 
being the socio-political sites of hope in political economy – but only where there is 
enough of a collective will to conjoin around a particular set of values through 
practice. These suggestions along side the results of my empirical investigations will 
be discussed fully in Chapter Eight. 
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Preface 
 
The purpose of this preface is to: 
a) Set out the rationale for adopting a stylized analytic for my empirical chapters; 
and, 
b)  Provide brief descriptions of the four case study HEIs. 
 
Firstly, Chapters Five, Six and Seven follow the pattern of what I am calling an 
‘iterative emergence’: that is, an on-going, unfolding progression through time (and 
space) between the immediate past, present and future (and the here and there), which 
suggests a path-dependent, yet contingent (meaning open) sense of evolution. The idea 
for the analytic arose from the testimonies of my interviewees as they shared with me 
their experiences regarding their implementation of the 2011 HE White Paper. In this 
regard, what struck me most about their testimonies was how they each described a 
similar pattern of semiotically, reflexive evaluations and processes as they moved 
iteratively between the policy discourses, metrics and values with which they were 
confronted, their immediate past and existing socio-economic spatial relations, and 
projections of what potential relations might be useful and/or valuable to them in the 
future. 
 
Based on my empirical findings, and by relating these back to my theoretical 
arguments set out in Chapter Two, I want to suggest that the iterative emergence of the 
HEIs’ economic geographies progresses through three stages: 
1) Meaning making (complexity reduction); 
2) Putting strategies into action (complexity re-introduction); and 
3) Emergence (demonstrating the on-going, multiple and complex nature of 
economic geographies). 
The theoretical underpinnings and arguments relating to each of these stages set the 
foundations for the empirical investigations of each chapter, which follow and 
illuminate the pattern of these three stages. Importantly, as my research will 
demonstrate, it is in the transition from imagination to practice that the concomitant 
embedding and transformation of the White Paper’s policy metrics and values literally 
begin to take place. 
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Secondly, whilst in-depth descriptions of the four case study universities are provided 
in the text of Chapter Five, these descriptions form part of my analysis. I therefore 
think it is useful to provide the reader with very brief profiles in this Preface followed 
by a full, anonymized list of interviewees. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
Methodology, I was asked to maintain the anonymity of the HEIs as far as possible. It 
is therefore not possible to state the universities’ actual locations, or give any precise 
details regarding their histories or attributes that might unwittingly disclose their 
identities. The same is true for the interviewees. 
 
As detailed in my methodology, four very different HEIs were carefully selected to 
represent the diversity of the HE sector in England and/or to provide interesting cases 
for empirical investigation. Table P1, below, details the universities’ positions in the 
system, their mission groups, the pseudonyms used in order to provide anonymity and 
their corresponding abbreviations. 
Table P-1 Case Study Pseudonyms. Source: Author 
 
Global Entrepreneur 
In the 2008 RAE, GE was ranked amongst the top ten universities in the country and 
recruited fewer than 6% of its home undergraduates from the local area, making it 
highly typical for a research-led institution. In 2009/10 they were teaching well over 
28,000 students compared to an average of 20,758 amongst England’s top twenty 
universities, making it one of the largest selective universities in the country, as well as 
one of the largest institutions overall. Of these students, around 65% were 
undergraduates and 35% postgraduates. And of the latter, some 3,000 were non-EU 
overseas students, giving GE a reasonably typical student profile for a research-led 
HEI. However, compared to other selective institutions GE recruited strongly from 
state schools and quite well from low socio-economic groups both nationally and 
Institution Position Mission Group Pseudonym Abbreviation 
Typical high rank, 
nationally selective 
Russell Group Global Entrepreneur GE 
a-Typical high rank, 
locally recruiting, less 
selective 
1994 Group Palace Aspirational PA 
Mid-low rank, wide 
recruitment 
Universities Alliance Downtown Coastal DTC 
Low-mid rank, local 
recruitment 
Million+ Group Four Town Local FTL 
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locally, with between 20% and 25% of home undergraduates coming from NS-SEC 
groups 4 to 7. In part, this reflected the university’s stated commitment to widening 
participation through local outreach programmes, and a strong emphasis on reaching 
schools in low-participation neighbourhoods. Indeed, teaching and learning were 
strongly stated in GE’s strategic vision as ‘core values’. However, as will be seen in 
Chapter Five, one of GE’s most defining features was its aim to increase its standing as 
a world-renowned research institution and to embed its global presence “into every 
aspect of the university’s mission”. 
 
Palace Aspirational 
For a university ranked in the 2008 RAE’s top twenty, the geographies of PA’s student 
body were quite unusual. For example, in 2009/10 the university recruited almost 60% 
of its young, full-time, first-degree undergraduates from its local base, well above the 
top-twenty average of 5.7% (excluding London) and 14.27% (including London). Of 
these students, almost 40% came from NS-SEC 4 to 7 compared to an average of 
30.1% for all English universities, underscoring PA’s long-standing commitment to 
widening participation, especially in the local community. Furthermore, in terms of the 
ratio between undergraduate and post-graduate students, PA’s profile of approximately 
3 to 1 was more akin to a teaching-led HEI (on average 79% to 21%) than one driven 
by research (69% to 31%). However, by 2012 the university was striving to raise its 
reputational standing amongst the country’s elite by: increasing its intake of post-
graduate students (including those from overseas); seeking to join the Russell Group 
by emphasizing the importance of research; and raising its tariff entry points 
requirements for its undergraduates. Of the four case studies, PA was the university 
undergoing the most significant degree of internal change at the time of my research. 
 
Four Town Local 
As discussed in Chapter Three, establishing a ‘typical’ low/mid-ranked institution was 
quite problematic due to the diversity of institutions in the lower half of the sector. I 
therefore decided to choose an institution whose level of local embeddedness was 
somewhat higher than other institutions of similar rank. As a teaching-led institution 
positioned in the bottom third of the 2008 RAE rankings, the geographies of FTL’s 
student body are very interesting. For example, whilst most Million+ HEIs recruit a 
high percentage of their fulltime, first degree, home undergraduates from state schools, 
FTL’s 2009/10 level of recruitment of around 99% was well above the national 
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average. Of their home undergraduates, some 70+% were recruited from the local area, 
demonstrating a very high degree of local and regional embeddedness. And over 50% 
of their undergraduates came from NS-SEC groups 4-7. At the same time, FTL’s 
student body included just over 15% post-graduates – quite a long way below the 
national average of 25%. And around 1/3 of these students were from overseas. Such 
figures, no-doubt, reflected FTL’s commitment to widening participation through local 
outreach programmes and its emphasis on reaching schools in low-participation 
neighbourhoods. Indeed, judging by its mission statement, the university placed a 
strong emphasis on social inclusion and social change that was driven by a strong 
ethical commitment to teaching and learning. In addition, the university saw itself as 
an educational hub that supported the local economy through encouraging knowledge, 
innovation and enterprise. As will be seen in Chapter Five, these aspects of FTL’s 
mission largely articulated what the university understood as the public good of higher 
education: a public good whose definition the Government was attempting to narrow 
through the metrics of the 2011 HE White Paper. 
 
Downtown Coastal 
Finally, DTC was a teaching-led institution ranked in the third quartile of the 2008 
RAE. For such an institution the geographies of its student body were quite ‘a-typical’, 
despite the diversity of institutions in the lower half of the RAE rankings. For 
example, the university had a broad spatial reach in terms of its home undergraduate 
students recruiting just over 11% from the local area in 2009/10 compared to a national 
average of 41.6% for other teaching-led HEIs. In addition it recruited quite a high 
number of non-EU students – both undergraduate and postgraduate – particularly from 
South East Asia and China. Moreover, quite a high percentage of its home 
undergraduates came from NS-SEC groups 1-3 (70%). Thus, DTC seemed more akin 
to a research-led institution, particularly in terms of its spatial reach, and I wondered if 
the university had to work hard at recruiting from far a-field – especially since it was 
located in a city with significant areas of deprivation and low achievement at GCSE O-
level. Yet, according to its strategic plan, the university was ardently committed to 
widening access in local low-participation neighbourhoods and raising aspirations in 
the local community. I therefore felt that understanding how DTC made sense of its 
geographies in relation to the White Paper and, indeed, how they might impact the 
university’s trajectory, would make a fascinating case study.
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Global Entrepreneur Palace Aspirational 
101, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 201, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
102, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 202, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
103, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 203, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
104, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 204, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
105, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 205, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
106, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic 206, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
107, Senior Management, Steering, Long-time Academic 207, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
108, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic 208, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic, Public Service 
109, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic, Public Service 209, Senior Management, Steering, WP, Project Management 
110, Senior Management, Steering, Long-time LLL/WP, Long-time Academic 210, Non-Steering, EO/WP, Marketing, Careers-Education 
111, Management, Steering, Long-time Administrator, Industry 211, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
112, Management, Steering, Long-time Administrator, Public Service 212, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic 
113, President Student Union 213, Management Support, Steering, Long-time Administrator 
 214, President Student Union 
Four Town Local Down Town Coastal 
301, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 401, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
302, Senior Management VCO, Medium-time Manager, Education 402, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 
303, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic 403, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic, Industry, Public Services 
304, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Strategist 404, Senior Management VCO, Long-time University Finance, Industry 
305, Senior Management VCO, Long/medium-time Academic, Industry 405, Management, Steering, Long-time Strategist, Public Services 
306, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Strategist, Public Service 406, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic, Public Services 
307, Senior Management, Steering, Long-time Academic, Industry 407, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic, Industry 
308, Management, Non-Steering, Long-time Academic 408, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic 
309, Management, Steering, Long-time Student Representation 409, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic 
310, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic, Education 410, Senior Management, Steering, Long-time Strategist, Marketing 
311, Management, Steering, Long-time Strategist, Marketing 411, Non-Steering, Student Finance, Industry 
312, Management, Non-Steering, Long-time Academic 412, Non-Steering, EO/WP, Careers Support, Marketing 
313, Management Support, Non-Steering, Long-time Administrator 413, Non-Steering, Administrative Support 
314, President Student Union 414, President Student Union 
 415, Non-Steering, University Governance, Finance Industry 
Table P-2. List of Interviewees and Positionalities. Source: Author. KEY: VCO – Key Strategist in Vice Chancellor’s Office; Steering – Key Strategist but 
outside VCO; Non-Steering – Not involved in steering or strategy; LLL – Life Long Learning; WP – Widening Participation; EO – Educational Outreach. 
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5 Meaning Making: Complexity Reduction 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This first empirical chapter explores how each of the four case study universities made 
meaning of the discourses and metrics set out in the HE White Paper (BIS: 2011a) in 
relation to their existing economic geographies and, thus, decided upon initial 
strategies for “going on in the world” (Jessop, 2009: 336). 
 
Stemming from the need to resolve the complex interplay between, 1) relations of 
neoliberalization, which are themselves geographically diverse (Brenner et al, 2010); 
and 2) the diversity of ‘ordinary’ contexts into which those relations are inserted or 
imposed, in Chapter Two of this Thesis I proposed that through the conceptual lens of 
‘Emerging Economic Geographies and the Ordinary Economy’ the political-economic 
process of neoliberalization could be understood to connote: the (attempted) 
transformation of existing socio-economic spatial relations into emerging economic 
geographies, more-or-less governed by the metrics and values of the market. This 
proposition had two foundational, interrelated moments that subtend the process of 
emergence. 
 
First, drawing on Jessop (2004, 2009) and Lee (2006, 2012), I underscored the 
centrality of economic imaginaries in the processes of complexity reduction and 
semiosis – i.e. the intra-subjective production of meaning – and the importance of 
these processes in enabling actors to move forward. For both authors, policy 
instruments such as the HE White Paper (2011a) and the economic imaginaries they 
put forward aim to direct or structure the evaluations, values, actions, activities and 
(thus) subjectivities of actors and organizations in line with a reduced understanding of 
the economy, which those who seek to govern hold as important and/or valuable. In 
essence, the ‘real economy’ is too complex to be comprehended in its entirety and, so, 
cannot be managed or governed as a singular object. Instead, subsets of economic 
relations are discursively fixed as objects of intervention that can be semiotically 
understood (Jessop, 2004, 2009). Thus, the reduced imaginaries and metrics set out in 
policy act as an important and often powerful set of simplified, semiotic referents that 
actors should reflect on as they negotiate their way through policy in order to progress 
forward. 
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Second, however, drawing on Lee (2006, 2012), I also argued that, in their negotiation, 
reductive political-economic imaginaries such as that of the market are immediately 
confronted by the multiplicity and complexity of semiotically- and materially- 
constituted social relations of value that make up the Ordinary Economy. Although all 
actors necessarily reduce complexity as a condition for moving on in the world, they 
still bring with them multiple logics, values and understandings of Value that may 
guide their evaluations, as well as multiple social and material relations that offer both 
opportunities and constraints. As such, it is my argument that whilst social relations of 
value are filled with relationships of power, economic policy initiatives such as the HE 
White Paper will inevitably become varied because the practice of economic 
geographies is always already multiple and complex. Between the values and logics by 
which complexity is reduced by policy makers and the values and logics by which 
complexity is reduced by actors who must make meaning of policy, a plethora of 
“socio-spatial disjunctures” (Pani and Holman, 2013) exist between discourse, 
construal and construction. 
 
This first empirical chapter of three seeks to illuminate these ideas through an 
exploration of initial strategy formation. As detailed in Chapter Three, my research 
took place in early-mid 2012 just after the four case study universities had formulated 
an initial set of strategies in relation to the White Paper, and, indeed, were testing some 
of those strategies in practice (see Chapter Six below). The thesis is, thus, ideally 
placed to explore how each HEI made meaning of policy in light of their emerging 
economic geographies and, so, illuminate the disjunctures between policy discourses 
and ‘real world’ construal and construction. The chapter does this through an 
examination of how the HEIs set their undergraduate fee, and how and why they 
decided to participate in, or not participate in, either of the primary policy initiatives 
devised by Government to bring further competition into the sector: i.e. the AAB+ 
competition and the ‘flexible margin’ (see Chapter Four above). In so doing, the 
chapter illuminates the concomitant power of political-economic imaginaries (as 
discursively constructed in policy initiatives such as the Coalition’s White Paper) to 
shape social relations of value and the immediate variation of such imaginaries as they 
are interpreted and made meaningful in relation to the diversity of concrete economic 
geographies that exist. Even in the initial stages of meaning making and strategy 
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formation, the empirical evidence presented herein bears witness to political-economic 
power relations in which opportunities for normalisation and variation necessarily co-
exist in the struggle over what is and is not value. 
 
5.2 Meaning making and strategy formation: the concomitant potential for 
normalisation and variation 
In the initial stages of strategy formation, each case study university made meaning of 
the White Paper in relation to their existing and potential relational economic 
geographies, moving iteratively between the reductive imaginaries, discourses and 
metrics that confronted them (or more specifically, what the HEIs understood them to 
imply) and a reduced notion of what they perceived as important. Here, through the 
inter-related processes of complexity reduction and meaning making, each HEI 
semiotically selected and reflected on some fundamental core features of their existing, 
complex socio-economic relations and practices, identifying what was important, 
useful and/or valuable to them. The point for each university was to develop an initial 
set of core strategies for moving forward as an institution: that is, to negotiate their 
way through the “new context” (Interviewees 103, 206, 302, 408) that the White Paper 
was attempting to bring into being and, most centrally, to survive this renewed and 
profound push towards marketization. 
 
Importantly, as Sections 5.2.3 to 5.2.6 will demonstrate, the core features that the case 
studies reflected upon were by no means chaotic or accidental. Policies of 
marketization involve a reshaping of the social relations of value that give form to the 
materiality and sociality of emerging economic geographies. Thus, the HEIs chose to 
ask themselves fundamental questions that related to their economic practices and 
relations such as: What are our existing economic geographies and social relations of 
value? How might these change in light of our understanding of policy? What is our 
potential for moving forward? What must we do in order to survive? At a finer level of 
detail this involved asking themselves questions such as: Who are we? What is our 
purpose? Who are our students? Why do we do what we do? What are our values? 
Where do we fit within the system? How much value do we need in order to survive 
and continue doing what we do? In so doing, the HEIs understood more about what 
they were willing to accept from policy (be that eagerly, pragmatically, under duress or 
a combination thereof) and what they wished to reject (either in part or in full). In the 
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process, the tactics, technologies and techniques of the White Paper immediately 
began to affect the on-going trajectories of the HEIs’ economic geographies, at the 
same time as the policy discourses of the White Paper immediately became varied in 
their negotiation in and through diverse economic geographies and the social relations 
of value that shape them. 
 
5.2.1 Setting the home-undergraduate fee: where policy meets the Ordinary Economy 
Examining how the HEIs decided on the level – or, “price” – at which they should set 
their home-undergraduate fee provides an excellent example for exploring the above 
processes. As detailed in Chapter Four, since New Labour’s White Paper of 2003 
variable fees had been discursively constructed as an essential element for instigating 
producer-consumer relations in a differentiated market. According to a variety of 
knowledgeable experts, the neoliberally-inspired market values of competition, 
efficiency, entrepreneurialism, excellence and innovation could all be encouraged by 
removing the block teaching grant and giving the universities the freedom to determine 
their own fee policies (within the parameters set by Government) and manage 
themselves as businesses, thereby forcing HEIs to identify, measure and position 
themselves against their peers (e.g. Barr, 2002-03, 2010; BIS, 2011a; Browne, 2010; 
DfES 2003a, 2003b; HOCESC 2002-03a; HOC 2011). Certainly, in 2006 when mere 
‘top-up fees’ were introduced this ‘technology of Government’ had largely failed to 
produce a variation in fees across universities. However, in 2011 with the 
implementation of the full, cost-covering undergraduate fee, the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition believed that such a “radical departure” in the way that HEIs were 
funded would force producer-institutions to deal with the realities and uncertainties of 
consumer choice in a demand-led system (BIS, 2011a; HOC 2011). All HEIs, from FE 
Colleges to universities, would now have to raise their “life-sustaining value” (Lee, 
2006) via the student-consumer who could now shop around in a more competitive 
market. As a result, those institutions that failed to offer good value for money, quite 
simply, would not survive. 
 
Given that the White Paper proposed that HEIs should calculate an appropriate cost-
covering fee by costing out what they do, measuring themselves against the 
competition and thinking about their typical student-consumers and their demands, 
setting the cost-covering fee immediately involved each HEI reflecting on their 
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existing and potential social and material economic relations in time and place: the 
past, present and potential future trajectories of their emerging economic geographies. 
In order to derive life-sustaining value from their student-consumers rather than the 
block-teaching grant, my research indicates that each HEI chose to ask themselves the 
questions that I set out in Section 5.2 above, reducing the complexity of their life 
worlds to some core understandings. In the process, the discourses, metrics and 
neoliberal values of competition, consumerization, and market-demand all had the 
opportunity to become embedded into HE’s framework of action at the same time as 
the policy discourses and metrics had the potential for becoming varied or, indeed, 
entirely resisted – provided the will to do so was present and collectively adequate. 
 
5.2.2 The discursive context: the stories that we tell ourselves 
Broadly speaking, the majority of interviewees from across all four case studies held 
severe reservations regarding the implementation of the full cost-covering fee for 
home undergraduates. Although the White Paper and accompanying policy 
instruments spelled out clearly the new system of funding and the socio-economic 
rationale for its implementation, the interviewees variously described the policy as a 
“chaotic mess”: a “complete disaster”, “done on the hoof with no proper consultation” 
(Interviewees 402; see also 112, 203, 403). The removal of the block teaching grant 
and its replacement with funding that would follow the student, only to be repaid by 
graduates once they had reached a certain level of income, was seen as “a huge social 
experiment” (Interviewee, 203) the value of which was “hard to understand” 
(Interviewee, 409). In its current form, the new funding system was “massively, 
financially unstable” costing the Government “£6 billion a year more than they were 
paying before”; and that meant that at some time there would “have to be cuts” 
(Interviewee, 101). So while there was “immediate pressure” on HEIs to alter their 
behaviour quickly (Interviewee, 213), a long-term perspective was hard to imagine – 
unless, as one strategic director explained, the universities reflected on the things they 
knew best and/or held dear: 
“What we’re going through at the moment is shocking! It is absolutely radical! There’s 
nothing organic about what’s happening now…. People making policy don’t understand 
the direct impacts on the universities. They don’t understand how students get to 
universities or why. They’re basing their knowledge, often, on limited personal 
experience of particular kinds of universities. So it’s incredibly difficult to have a long-
term perspective, except that you can hold on to certain truths, values, which you think 
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your staff can sign up to about the purpose of what you’re doing and why you’re doing 
it. But policy is making that rather difficult.” 
(402, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Two dominant discourses framed interviewee testimonies regarding the effects of this 
radical shift in their social relations of value. The first involved the production of 
producer-consumer relations in a differentiated HE market – a subject that I will return 
to in great detail in Chapter Six. For each of the interviewees, the production of 
producer-consumer relations had been on the political agenda since, at least, the 
introduction of the upfront fee in 1997. However, with the introduction of variable 
fees, the concept that HEIs should understand both students as consumers and 
themselves as producers in a market relationship had been “stepped up” (Interviewee, 
205) with the current White Paper signifying a profound “acceleration” in the notion 
that institutions should respond to student-consumer demand (e.g. Interviewees 103, 
205, 305, 408). Many individual HEIs had known for some while that they were in a 
competitive market for recruitment. However, now there was a sense throughout the 
sector that once students were paying up to £9000 a year for their education, they 
would be “far more demanding”, and as a result the universities would need to be “far 
more responsive” than they had in the past (Interviewee, 112). The league tables, 
Twitter, Facebook and other forms of social networking and information that enabled 
students to “shop around for their education” (Interviewee, 412) would put an even 
greater onus on the universities “to demonstrate, very openly and overtly” that they 
really were “good at what they do” (Interviewee, 205). In short, students were 
beginning to see HE as “a product” of which they had “higher expectations”; and it 
was all because they’d now be “looking for value for money” (Interviewee, 412). This 
was “the sort of language” and the “sorts of stories” that were coming into the sector 
(Interviewees 412, 103). And for the interviewees they represented a variety of 
‘threats’, ‘constraints’ and/or ‘opportunities’ that the HEIs would need to reflect on 
when they considered their students in relation to setting their fees. 
 
A second, related discourse involved the uncertainty that this consumerization and 
shift in funding mechanism were bringing into the sector. For one strategic manager (-
205), HE could be described by: 
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“…lots of words beginning with ‘F’, not all of them rude: Fraught. Febrile. In 
flux.” 
The removal of the block grant had taken away any “cushion” or “degree of certainty” 
(Interviewee, 401), making the universities more reliant on student numbers for their 
survival and, importantly, “leaving the fee to drive the way they think about 
recruitment and the uncertainty of demand” (Interviewee, 205). HEIs would need to 
consider their students’ attitudes, demands and behaviours in terms of expectations; 
and consider the competition – “upping their game” in order to secure those students 
who were “willing to pay the full-cost fee” (ibid). The universities could not afford to 
“stand still” or “become complacent”: they would need to “adapt” and “flex” and 
“secure new markets” in order to replicate their income streams and survive against 
their competitors (Interviewees 203, 205, 302). Indeed, as one senior manager and 
long-time academic stated with absolute conviction: 
“No institution is immune from the uncertainty brought about by the neoliberal order. 
The whole sector has had its position in society deeply questioned, leaving institutions 
and certain disciplines feeling particularly vulnerable.” 
(103, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Thus, whilst no institution was alone in this “guessing game” (Interviewees 311, 401), 
no one could envisage what it all might lead to four or five years down the line 
(Interviewee 105). The only thing that was “predictable” was “the direction of travel” 
(Interviewee, 102). Higher Education had become “very, very, politicized” with “the 
Minister… handing out money according to what Government [felt] was important” 
(Interviewee, 207). And due to a lack of collective resistance, that was “not about to be 
reversed” (Interviewee, 102). As one senior administrator underscored: 
“…The ground rules have all gone! The rule book’s been ripped up; and no one knows 
from month to month what will be thrown at us next. And you can either cope with that 
or resist. We’re trying to cope with it [because] we don’t think resistance is going to 
succeed in this policy era.” 
(313, Management Support, Non-Steering, Long-time Administrator) 
 
Indeed, despite the severe reservations that the interviewees held regarding the attempt 
to further marketise undergraduate HE through the White Paper, the vast majority saw 
the absence of collective resistance as a profound failure on behalf of the sector “to 
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speak well enough with a strong voice, as one” (Interviewee, 402). For some, this was 
due to the diversity of the sector. With so many different institutions pursuing different 
missions and values how could the sector speak with one voice? Even the University 
and College Union had failed to represent the diversity of institutions because their 
needs were often “diametrically opposed” (Interviewee, 111). For others, unequal 
power relations within the sector itself meant that while some institutions, like those of 
the Russell Group, held the ear of Government, other institutions outside of the Top 
Twenty remained unheard – thereby weakening the sector as a whole (e.g. 
Interviewees 104, 212, 302, 311, 412). Moreover, for many of the interviewees the 
most obvious reason that the vice-chancellors had “remained supine” over the fees 
increase was that they’d be “getting more money!” (Interviewees 402, 403). If you 
looked at this shift in their social relations of value “in purely instrumental ways”, as 
one senior manager phrased it, then the universities would be “doing quite well out of 
it!” (Interviewee, 101). With the fees coming through over the next few years, most 
universities would have an increase in income, and more resources would be available 
for improving their offers. As such, although the financial benefits also came with a 
cost – the “price tag of quasi-marketisation” as Interviewee -101 put it – resistance to 
the increase in student fees had to be weighed against the universities’ own self-
interest. As one strategic leader explained: 
“I was at a meeting about three weeks ago where HEFCE’s research and innovation 
chap was saying to universities, ‘You’ve never had it so good’. And he’s probably right. 
If it wasn’t for the chaos of the policy he would be right. We are getting more money! So 
you do have to think about that.” 
(403, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic, Industry, Public Service) 
 
It was amidst this context of consumerization, heightened competition, uncertainty and 
absence of collective resistance that the four HEIs had to reflect on their material and 
social economic relations in order to set their fees and formulate a set of core strategies 
for moving on in the world. Certainly, many of the interviewees, as individuals, felt 
that asking the student to almost wholeheartedly finance their higher education was 
“disgraceful” and something that the universities “should all be out there fighting 
against” (Interviewee, 209) – regardless of the progressive nature of the graduate 
repayment scheme. However, the failure of the sector to pin down and articulate what 
they could collectively agree was of value had opened the door more widely than ever 
for a differentiated market to be “engineered: socially engineered” (Interviewee, 402). 
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As a result, the fees were here and each university would need “to weigh up their own 
situation”, which, according to Interviewee -209 was: 
“…all very complicated: really complex”. 
As one senior manager underscored, the direction that each university would decide 
upon depended very much on the values, culture and relations of the institution. As 
he/she summarized in words far more eloquent than I could devise: 
“It’s the stories that we tell ourselves about who we are and how we pass that on from 
generation to generation.” 
(103, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
5.2.3 Global Entrepreneur: escaping Government regulation 
For Global Entrepreneur, setting their headline fee was “hardly worth debating. It was 
absolutely clear that it had to be £9000” (Interviewee, 105). Although, as one very 
senior manager pointed out to me while chuckling profusely that he/she could provide 
me with “all sorts of fancy stuff” to explain their rationale for doing so, the bottom line 
was, “Why wouldn’t [GE] charge the top rate? Frankly, anything else would look 
bizarre!” (Interviewee, 101). If GE had charged less for their headline fee, then they 
would have been seen as “a cheaper university” in some way (Interviewee, 105). And 
given the university’s core identity, class of student, and both national and 
international standing and reputation, that simply wasn’t an option (ibid). Rather, in 
order “to be seen” to be making a premium offering that students could associate with 
“the quality” of the institution, the “price signal” that GE sent out had to underscore 
“the value” that students would derive from their “investment” (Interviewee, 104). As 
such, given the Government’s fee-cap of £9000 – which surely would be what their 
competitors would be charging – GE had to price themselves at the level of a lead 
institution, because that’s where they wanted to be (Interviewee, 112). 
 
In reality, in order to feel relatively secure in their evaluations and gain the backing of 
staff and, importantly, the validation of potential future students through the process of 
exchange, the university had, indeed, engaged in numerous debates, reducing down all 
the “fancy stuff” to some core understandings of why they needed to set their headline 
fee at the top rate of £9000 alongside devising a core set of strategies that would 
enable the institution to consolidate a sustainable economic trajectory moving forward 
(Interviewee, 101). 
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The university had undertaken a thorough costing exercise to ensure that whatever fee 
they charged, the value derived would be sufficient to ensure their on-going survival. 
However, this was not to be survival merely in the material sense of the word – 
although this was, of course, important (e.g. Interviewees 102, 103, 105, 107). Rather, 
for each interviewee the most fundamental factor influencing GE’s direction was “its 
perception of itself” (Interviewee, 105), which, according to Interviewee -103, had 
“come up a lot” in its strategizing “because, actually,” it was “core”. Determining its 
direction and determining its strategies in light of the new policy context was all about 
who they were, because it was this “collective identity” (ibid) that helped establish 
their institutional values and the existing and potential material and social relations that 
the university held as central to their on-going survival. 
 
First and foremost, GE had “an overwhelming desire to be academically excellent and 
outstanding” in “every aspect” of the institution; and everything else came second to 
that concern (Interviewee, 102). Indeed, for all of the interviewees, being research-led 
was seen as “incredibly important” both financially and ideally, and there was a 
general sense that the institution should “make no apologies for that” (Interviewee, 
107). In practice this meant that their “research identity” had to be embedded across 
every Department because, unlike some more “highbrow institutions”, research and 
teaching were not seen as separate at GE (ibid): 
“Quality research”, stressed Interviewee -103, “has to be infused with teaching”. 
In that sense, the university felt a “relentless drive for quality” (Interviewee, 111) – 
continuously wanting to “be better” and “push harder”, from undergraduate teaching to 
postgraduate research to the REF (Interviewee, 102). Thus, as one senior manager 
underscored: 
“Understanding that research quality in both a national and international dimension is 
absolutely central to who we are. That is our identity.” 
(103, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Although GE was still “relatively young” compared to other top UK institutions, its 
self-knowledge regarding its core identity and values, which it had carried with it since 
its formation, had lent the university a certain “gravitas” (Interviewee, 107) and “level 
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of maturity” which had given the university a certain degree of confidence 
(Interviewee, 105): 
“It never has to feel that anyone is looking at it as anything less than a research-
intensive, very high quality university in the UK”, explained Interviewee -107. 
“We think we are good”, stressed Interviewee -110. 
And if you just looked at what GE had achieved in forty-five years, it was “pretty 
impressive” (Interviewee, 102). As a result, GE had maintained the same trajectory 
rather than try something new simply for the sake of it – “just to see if it worked or if it 
failed” (ibid). In that sense, the “academic community” was “remarkably cohesive”, 
displaying a great deal of “acceptance” regarding the type of university they were in, 
and the fact that they had to keep that identity going (ibid). 
 
According to interviewee testimonies, the self-confidence that this generated 
underpinned GE’s “can do” attitude (Interviewee, 108). The institution was “dynamic, 
active – those sorts of terms” (Interviewee, 103). It was “very energetic”, “very 
ambitious” and “quite entrepreneurial… Very entrepreneurial, actually – drop the 
quite” (Interviewee, 105). Indeed, GE was “good at being ‘fleet of foot’ and 
responding to new opportunities” (Interviewee, 112). So, if the university wanted to 
“explore new avenues or new ways of doing things” it was “willing to take the risks” 
(Interviewee, 107). Provided it was a good idea – which GE had the experience and 
internal machinery to analyze quickly (Interviewee, 102) – and provided it fit with 
their “higher level aims” – “What sort of university are we? What sort of university do 
we want to be?” – then they’d “do it!” (Interviewee, 112). 
 
Again, this sense of identity had come from their founders, because “they realized that 
[GE] had to be different if it was going to succeed” (Interviewee, 104). However, 
whilst combining entrepreneurialism with academic excellence provided staff “a sense 
of being a bit special” (Interviewee, 102), it was more about “gaining competitive 
advantage” in their various HE markets, and being “hungry: hungry for more” 
(Interviewee, 103). As a result, one senior manager described having: 
“…a real sense that [GE] is in motion, from something new and ‘greenfield’ to 
something where we could credibly be seen to be in the ‘Big Five’ and then, in another 
few years, as being a major international and global institution.” 
(103, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
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Geographically, the institution was located in a bit of a ‘no-man’s land’; and although 
its location was “important” in the sense that they had a very strong economic regional 
engagement and extremely profitable ties with local industry, there was a general 
feeling that GE could be “located anywhere” and “still have the idea of being 
distinctive” (Interviewee, 104). In a “global world” where “everything [was] mobile – 
students, staff, research etc.” – one way of “enhancing” their reputation was to 
“leverage [their] connections with other institutions around the world” (ibid). That is: 
to “become a global hub of academic excellence; globally perceived; globally 
connected” (Interviewee, 106). Thus, as one senior manager and long-time academic 
expounded, GE’s “perception of itself as an internationally or globally excellent 
university” was “a very important feature in determining its direction and its 
strategies” (Interviewee, 105). 
 
GE’s sense of identity was also reflected in its students. In terms of home 
undergraduates, its students were “very, very high quality” with “more applicants in 
the AAB category than any other institution in the UK other than Oxbridge” 
(Interviewee, 104). Although this had often been interpreted as being “very elitist”, 
there was an underlying socio-economic logic to the relationship: 
“If [GE] is genuinely trying to be one of the top national and international 
institutions, then we have to be very ambitious in terms of the type of students we let 
in”, said Interviewee -103. 
Most typically, their home undergraduates came from “quite well-resourced 
backgrounds” (ibid) and were “largely middle-class” (Interviewee, 105), and this too 
would influence GE’s strategies. First, given their socio-economic backgrounds and 
the quality of education they would receive at GE, their typical students would most 
likely progress into high-paying careers and, thus, pay back the full value of their fees 
and loans through the graduate repayment scheme. Second, given the high standard of 
their entry-level qualifications, their students would have a variety of choices in terms 
of selecting a university with an excellent reputation. Couple this with the fact that the 
majority of GE’s Departments recruited heavily in terms of overseas students and 
PGTs where “marketisation” was “at its most arrogant and aggressive” and fees were 
“perversely high” (Interviewee, 108)…  
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“…the perversity being that the higher the fee the more people… seem to think that 
[the degree] is of value!” iterated Interviewee -108…  
… and there was a deep sense across the university that GE was “more primed to think 
in terms of markets” for their survival because they would “always be in competition” 
with other high-ranking institutions (Interviewee, 112). As such, in setting their 
undergraduate fee in light of the new policy context, GE simply had to emphasize the 
quality of the institution to their potential consumers. They had to demonstrate the 
value of their degrees: 
“People really want to come here because they get a really good experience and it’s got 
a great reputation. So to demonstrate that, and as a sort of rationing tool, basically, we 
have to keep raising the [qualification and price] bar to try to eliminate numbers, 
otherwise you spend all your time trying to select students. So there’s always been a 
kind of market approach. The University’s always been trying to get to the top, and 
that’s just the [‘GE Way’]: to be one of the best universities. So people are used to the 
competition: it’s you against someone else and you’ve got to be seen to be better if you 
want to achieve success.” 
(112, Management, Steering, Long-time Administrator, Public Service) 
 
Setting their headline fee anywhere below the £9000 threshold set by Government 
was, therefore, not an option. When GE made meaning of the White Paper in relation 
to a semiotically reduced understanding of their complex economic geographies – their 
core identity and values; their national and international competitive and reputational 
standing; their typical class of student and the use value of their degrees; the fees that 
they charged in other markets; and their potential social and material relations for 
moving forward – the academic community “universally” upheld what Interviewee -
112 called, their “value proposition”: “If we think about it strategically… it’s got to be 
£9000! What are we even debating?” 
 
On one level, then, it seemed quite evident that GE identified very strongly with the 
market imaginary set out by Government – selecting (privileging) and retaining 
(embedding/embodying) certain discourses, identities, actions and activities that fit 
well with both market and institutional values. However, in devising a set of core 
strategies to sit along side their headline fee, GE’s variation of Government policies 
and values was significant. For example, in terms of the AAB+ competition, although 
the university could, theoretically, have expanded their AAB+ intake, there was “no 
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thirst or enthusiasm” to significantly grow the university in terms of home 
undergraduate numbers (Interviewee, 112). Certainly, AAB+ was seen as GE’s 
“natural territory” (Interviewee, 102) and home student-consumer demand was high. 
Yet GE had no desire to expand at the cost of other English institutions by competing 
for what, ultimately, was a relatively finite pot of students (Interviewee, 104). For sure, 
given the increased competition and uncertainty that the AAB+ competition would 
engender, GE would have to make certain that they consistently recruited the numbers 
they needed to keep them in the Top 10 of national league tables (Interviewees 101, 
103, 105, 106, 108). And the fee that the students would now be bringing with them 
would add “a huge additional dividend to the bottom line” (Interviewee, 103). 
However, even in the initial stages of strategy formation, the Vice-Chancellor and 
strategic directors were guided by multiple values and logics. 
 
First, whilst in theory there was now more freedom and more of a financial incentive 
to expand their undergraduate body, some interviewees expressed doubt that their local 
material relations could cope. The additional land, teaching space, student 
accommodation and staff that the university would have to provide represented 
significant “constraints” and disincentives rather than “opportunities” for GE 
(Interviewees 101, 102, 104, 112). Second, the university was far more interested in 
exploiting its international socio-economic relations rather than simply focusing on the 
domestic market. Here, the interviewees expressed two dominant logics to explain 
their rationale. 
 
The first wholeheartedly embraced the market value of competitive advantage. In the 
UK, a relatively small group of elite institutions consistently dominated the league 
tables, attracting the best students and winning the most research funding. 
Internationally, these universities could easily “go it alone and be big players” in the 
Top 30 to 40 globally renowned institutions (Interviewee, 112). In terms of domestic 
competition, GE was never going to surpass the “Big Five”; and internationally, at 
least for the moment, it was unlikely that they’d reach that “elite top-tier” 
(Interviewees 102, 104, 107, 112). But they were, now, at a point of being consistently 
recognized in the second-tier of globally excellent universities (Interviewee, 107) – 
and it was here that the Vice Chancellor and strategic directors envisaged GE’s most 
successful future social and material relations of value (Interviewee, 111). Already, 
 175 
‘International’ was embedded across all of the PVC’s portfolios, and the institution 
was “utterly committed to the notion of the ‘Global University’” (Interviewee, 103). 
Moving forward, by forming alliances with other international universities in a similar 
position, GE could “share resources, share identities and share academic visions”; and 
in so doing they could establish “a critical presence” (Interviewee, 102) and “enough 
clout” (Interviewee, 112) that would allow them to become “world research intensive 
institutions”: the “global power houses” of the second-tier (ibid). As Interviewee -111 
explained, only so much of the university’s future would be shaped or determined by 
the UK domestic market. It was through their international economic geographies that 
GE could “gain most impact” and “be seen to be successful”, both of which were 
central to securing a sustainable economic trajectory for GE. 
 
The second dominant logic underscored the multiplicity and complexity of values that 
underpinned GE’s strategic evaluations. For sure, GE was very keen to “play to its 
strengths” in the national domestic market (ibid). However, its on-going success had to 
involve all of its geographic relations of value – local, national, and international. And 
in major part that meant breaking away from the restrictions placed upon it by 
Government regulation tied to public funding. The university had always recognized 
that if it was reliant on one slug of money from one resource, then it would always be 
susceptible to change – and that held true for Government funding as much as it did for 
relying on a single market customer (Interviewee, 104). Because GE was relatively 
young compared to Oxford and Cambridge, it didn’t have a strong alumni base so it 
didn’t have any rich endowments. Thus, in order to build its facilities and sustain its 
broad-church offer, it had always sought out “other funding streams that [would] allow 
more flexibility in the way [GE] allocated resources” (ibid). In most other English 
universities it was “money in and money out… with very little flexibility”, and that 
had left them open to a constant ‘financial hammering’ since the late 1970s 
(Interviewee, 112). As a result, one senior strategist told me passionately:  
“We don’t care about Government funding – just to stop all the bloody interference, 
basically! The University has always been interested in insulating itself against the 
Government because they can be incredibly destructive for universities. This 
Government's policy changes will have massive impacts as happened under Thatcher 
whose cuts really clobbered places like Salford. For a long time, hammering higher 
education has been [Government] policy.” 
(112, Management, Steering, Long-time Administrator, Public Service) 
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Thus, GE’s history, identity and values had always made the university seek out 
diverse sources of income, and their on-going global strategy was no different. 
Certainly, the strategy did reflect willingness – eagerness, even – on the part of the 
institution to think in terms of markets. However, their decision not to expand 
domestically through the AAB+ competition was underpinned by a far more complex 
set of logics and values than simply feeling that “material success” (Sheppard and 
Barnes, 1990) could be achieved through more distant economic geographies. It was 
also about who held power in their social relations of value. As one senior manager 
confirmed:  
“Our job is to locate current policy in the direction the university is going in, not the 
other way around… We’ll look at the White Paper in the context of the institution. 
We’re not going to wait for Government to determine the future of the institution. We 
know that [policy] has an impact on us, and we need to engage with it positively and 
deal with it in a constructive way. But it’s not going to set the strategies and ideals of 
the institution.” 
(111, Management, Steering, Long-time Administrator, Industry) 
 
5.2.4 Down Town Coastal: The unexpected shelter of the ‘squeezed middle’ 
Down Town Coastal arrived at the value of their headline fee by reflecting on similar 
factors to Global Entrepreneur. However, the multiple logics and values guiding their 
evaluations were very different. Given their particular positionality – or, at least, their 
understanding of their particular positionality – DTC felt somewhat protected from the 
competition and uncertainty that they felt the White Paper was attempting to induce 
throughout the sector. As such, in setting their headline fee, DTC’s primary strategy 
was to “hold a steady course” in what they largely perceived to be the “shelter”, rather 
than the Government induced “constraints”, of the “squeezed middle” (Interviewee, 
401). 
 
In terms of their core identity, the narrative that most dominated interviewee-
testimonies was that, “actually”, DTC was “hard to characterize… or compare to other 
institutions” because they didn’t “really have an identity, particularly” (Interviewee, 
405). At best, the institution could describe itself as “a ‘middling’ university that 
historically [had] been very comfortable in being buffered from both ends” 
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(Interviewee, 406). They were neither top of the league tables, nor were they bottom. 
And whilst, on one level, they had often “struggled” with this “bland… contentment to 
be a mixture of things and sit in the middle ground” (Interviewee, 409), there was also 
“a great deal of comfort” that could be drawn from it because they were “never going 
to be exposed” to the sorts of pressures felt by other institutions that sat at either end 
(Interviewee, 406). 
 
Although DTC was primarily a teaching-led university – what Interviewee -408 
described as “a teaching factory” whose primary goal was “undergraduate bums on 
seats” – they also excelled at research; at least, they did “in some areas, but not 
necessarily all areas” of the university’s massive breadth of courses (Interviewees 402, 
412). With well over 21,000 students, they could definitely describe themselves as 
“large”, which had to be “a good thing given the current climate” because, surely, 
there was “some strength in being large” (Interviewee, 412). Furthermore, financially 
they were strong, deriving some 85% of their income from teaching and the remaining 
15% from research-type activity (Interviewee, 401). And, with over 3000 international 
students contributing some £20million in fee income that year alone, that was “a very, 
very significant contribution” to an already “healthy turnover of about £160-
180million” (Interviewee, 405). Certainly, the university hit their Widening Access 
targets set by Government, but they didn’t exceed them. And their students came, 
largely, from the middle range of A-Levels – although the university did have to lower 
its tariff entry points when it came to ‘Clearing’, which did involve “an awful lot of 
people” because DTC was often considered by potential students as their “insurance 
choice” (Interviewee, 409). And whilst it was “nice” to think that potential students 
felt the university was “a solid, mid-range institution” that would make “a very good, 
safe, second choice” – especially when their first choice was “a Russell Group 
institution!” – it did make it difficult to control numbers (ibid); and that, of course, had 
financial implications (Interviewees 403, 404, 405). But there were “all sorts of things” 
that DTC could do that were “in the middle range of the sector” (Interviewee, 401). 
And whilst that made them “pretty indistinguishable” from their competitor 
institutions (Interviewee, 404) – “a bit ‘average’ really, although that is a horrible 
word” (ibid) – the university was “easy to sell” – although as their second in command 
of marketing iterated: “I would hate for you to think that we ‘sell’ it, because we don’t 
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‘sell’ it: it is quite an easy institution to ‘promote’” (Interviewee, 412, emphasis 
original). 
 
Thus, as one strategic director underscored regarding DTC’s identity and what that 
meant in terms of setting their fee and strategy formation: 
“I think it’s all about how [DTC] sees itself as a university...” 
Then realizing just how unclear DTC actually was regarding its identity, he/she 
paused; then added: 
“…It’s complicated, isn’t it?” 
(408, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic) 
 
Indeed. DTC’s situation was very complicated; and given the significant shifts that the 
White Paper was currently bringing into being – particularly in terms of their social 
relations of value – there was talk amongst the university’s leaders that occupying that 
middle ground may no longer be the safest strategy. Politically, there seemed to be “a 
clear agenda to polarize the system into a group of low-cost, high throughput 
providers” at one end, and “a group of more research intensive, internationally 
competitive institutions” at the other (Interviewee, 409). And there were “suspicions” 
that the “middle raft of institutions” may be “extremely vulnerable” (Interviewees 402, 
405, 404, 409, 415). 
 
For DTC, the primary problem was that they were due to lose a significant number of 
students from their ‘core’ due to the tactical arrangements that Government had set in 
motion to induce competition throughout the sector. And, of course, that could 
severely affect the university’s financial future. At the “top end”, according to HESA 
and HEFCE data, they were due to lose between four to five hundred AAB+ students – 
although DTC had hardly been aware that they’d had this number because they hadn’t 
been keeping proper records (Interviewees 401, 405, 415). At the “lower end” they 
were due to lose between six to seven hundred through the ‘flexible margin’, unless 
they were willing to risk bidding back for them by lowering the cost of their fee. But, 
of course, there was no guarantee that their bid would win Government approval. 
Moreover, “if the Government continue[d] to move money through the core-margin 
redistribution” next year, “by increasing the numbers to bid on, or extending the 
AAB+ policy to BBB”, then “that would be hugely destabilizing”: there was “huge 
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uncertainty looking forward” (Interviewee, 405, emphasis original). Thus, as one, quite 
distressed49, strategic leader told me: 
“We still don’t know how many students we will recruit in September! Policy decisions 
are being made which have, absolutely, detrimental impacts on the middle of the sector, 
which is where we sit… All of these things make it very difficult to realize the 
aspirations that we have, and it makes long-term development quite difficult because we 
just don't know what will happen. The squeezed middle really does exist at the 
moment… You can’t win in these circumstances!” 
(402, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Yet like every other HEI affected by the values, metrics, tactics and techniques of the 
White Paper, DTC had to win in order to survive in this “new, unchartered territory” 
(Interviewee, 403). They had to make meaning of the White Paper in relation to their 
existing and potential socio-economic spatial relations and devise a relevant and 
workable set of strategies for moving on in the world. 
 
According to the interviewees, first and foremost DTC had to articulate a “clear 
identity” (Interviewee, 403) and a “clear set of principles” (Interviewee, 402) in order 
to differentiate themselves from their competitors and make themselves attractive to 
their newly positioned student-consumers. As Interviewee -401 explained, now that the 
full-cost fee was attached to the home undergraduate student, the discourse that had 
been circulating most throughout the HE sector was that students would be seeking out 
the “best opportunities” and “best value for money”, so DTC had to respond. 
 
If you looked at DTC’s position in terms of geography and the sector, there were two 
similar institutions about 40 miles East and 50 miles West, with one Russell Group and 
one 1994 Group institution nestled in between. In some respects these institutions 
could be classed as competitors, but they were largely beyond DTC’s ‘Travel to Study 
Area’, so in DTC’s reckoning they were of little concern (Interviewee, 410). In 
addition, two “much smaller” universities sat to the North and East, but DTC 
considered these to be “more vulnerable” than they were to further marketisation. So, 
again, they didn’t pose any direct threat (Interviewee, 401). Rather, it was the more 
local Further Education Colleges with their increased degree-awarding powers that 
                                                        
49
 Evidenced from my field-work diaries. 
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most concerned DTC. These were primarily teaching-led institutions offering a wide 
range of vocational courses to predominantly local, medium-quality students, and this 
overlapped considerably with DTC’s traditional mission, offer and potential student-
consumer. What DTC had to do was differentiate themselves from these local 
competitors. 
 
Reflecting back on their complex identity, the university’s strategists selected three 
“core activities” that would reflect the dominant values of the institution – values they 
felt would be most attractive to, and valued by, their potential student-consumers. 
Certainly teaching had to remain their primary focus given its importance to their 
students, staff and the financial health of the institution. But ‘real’ business 
engagement and, moreover, research were activities through which DTC could 
articulate a clear identity – thereby differentiating themselves from the FE Colleges. It 
was here that they could provide “real value for money” in the face of “increased 
competition” – “and win!” (Interviewee, 408). 
 
Similar to GE, then, it seemed that through the processes of meaning making and 
complexity reduction DTC were strategically aligning themselves with the values and 
metrics of the market as set out in the discourses of the White Paper. Indeed, given 
their strong identification with being a safe, second-choice institution, content with 
sitting in the middle ground, the impact that the White Paper was having on DTC was, 
in many respects, more profound than it had been for GE who considered themselves 
historically inclined to think in terms of markets (see Section 5.2.3 above). By shifting 
the dynamics in DTC’s social relations of value, the metrics of the White Paper were – 
at minimum – asking the university to take stock of their “market position” and, in 
‘governmentality’ terms, measure where they were in relation to where they should be 
(Miller and Rose, 1991). 
 
And yet, when it came to setting their headline fee, DTC veered strongly away from 
the Government imaginary of a competitive market differentiated by price relative to 
current institutional standing. For DTC £8,500 was the value at which they decided to 
pitch themselves in the home undergraduate market. That was just £500 less than GE! 
This was an institution that had come some 60-odd places lower than GE in the RAE 
2008 Rankings, and which, according to its strategic directors, knew that “with every 
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kind of league table that comes out” DTC were “in the middle” (Interviewee, 406) – 
presumably about to be squeezed by either end! Given that Government experts 
expected the diversity of institutions to differentiate and position themselves within a 
£3000 pricing zone calculated into the fee (from £6000 to £9000), I was intrigued to 
discover what factors had influenced DTC’s calculations. 
 
Although a handful of interviewees suggested that the university had no clear strategy 
in setting their fee… 
…“There was no rationale!” laughed Interviewee -406, “It was about as rational 
as this Government’s policies! Everyone was just plucking a number out of the sky!”… 
…DTC had, in fact, undertaken a rigorous cost analysis to establish their bottom line. 
Depending on how generous they wanted to be in terms of bursaries and fee waivers, 
the university could have pitched themselves at well below £8000 and still derived a 
sustainable income moving forward. However, according to a majority of interviewees 
this would have been a strategic and financial error. 
 
Rationally speaking, there were multiple and, oft-times, conflicting logics for this 
being the case, three of which I want to detail here. The first did conform to a market 
imaginary based on price. However, in DTC’s strategic imagination this was about 
identifying themselves with a ‘prestige market’ based on quality rather than a 
competitive, ‘price-lowering market’ based on volume, which was the opposite of 
what DTC felt the Government was trying to instigate through its metrics. In order to 
differentiate themselves clearly from the local FE Colleges, which in DTC’s 
calculations could probably deliver “quite a decent, high volume education for around 
£7000” (Interviewee, 405), the price signal that DTC relayed had to indicate the 
“quality and values” of the university (Interviewee, 411). Everyone across the HE 
market – potential students, schools, staff and competing institutions – all understood 
that the “best” HEIs, “the research-led HEIs”, would charge the highest prices, so 
DTC couldn’t afford to “look too cheap” (Interviewee, 412). Although the university 
recognized that they “couldn’t quite” position themselves alongside the Russell Group 
and 1994 Group, they didn’t want to price themselves too far below those institutions, 
because ultimately they needed to provide the type of research informed experience 
that the students would expect in return for their money, and that came “at a price” 
(Interviewee, 409). As such, the only way to communicate that value to their potential 
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consumers – “and to finance it, of course!” (Interviewee, 402) – was to charge a 
higher fee. 
 
A second logic involved the identity and geography of their ‘typical’ home-
undergraduate student and indicated that it simply wasn’t necessary for DTC to charge 
a lower fee. As noted above, DTC’s typical students came from mid-to-low income 
families and held qualifications in the mid-to-low range, so according to some of the 
interviewees they could be identified with “the increasing number of students who for 
good reasons [were] looking at a local market” (Interviewee, 410, emphasis original). 
Most fascinatingly, the majority of DTC’s strategic leaders believed that a large 
percentage of their students came from a catchment area of around 35 mile radius, 
within which sat DTC’s main “feeder institutions” (Interviewee, 405) – although this 
wasn’t actually the case50. In turn the latter took many of their 6th-formers from the 
city in which the university was located – a location that had long influenced the 
university’s mission: 
“That! That… (Long pause). That is what it means to be located in this city”, said 
Interviewee -404 emphatically as he/she stared out of his/her office onto the 
neighbouring social housing estate. “People don’t realize that there is so much social 
deprivation here, but there is; and you can look at it from this window every day. 
[Down-Town] is a very poor city and I think our role here – providing jobs, social 
projects, raising aspirations and with widening participation – is certainly one of the 
reasons I’ve stayed... I think we are characterized by what we do in those areas”. 
By the same token, the university could benefit from the “sort of collective, cultural 
identity” that had developed amongst those same local populations (ibid). According to 
a number of the interviewees, anecdotally at least, many local people were hardly 
willing to leave the city boundaries: 
“If you look at the typical [Down Town] stock – they are not going anywhere!” 
confirmed Interviewee -410. 
                                                        
50 One of the reasons I approached DTC as a case study was that HESA data indicated that only about 
12% of their students came from within a 12 mile radius of the institution. When I informed DTC that 
this was the case, they were quite incredulous, so much so that I offered to map out their most recent 
data for them using GIS – just to make sure I hadn’t made an error. Sure enough, my collague Dr. 
Daniel Lewis and I found that most of their students came from 50-60 miles away and not from the local 
feeder institutions with whom DTC had established deep social relations. 
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“When I first moved here people kept telling me about the ‘Island Culture’ and 
‘Island Mentality’… and unless you’ve lived here, in this city, you wouldn’t 
understand”. 
Strategically speaking, when the role of the university and this “Island Mentality” were 
examined together there seemed to be “a deep sense of loyalty to the city that spill[ed] 
over onto the university” (ibid) which in terms of “a quality institution” was “the only 
show in town” (Interviewee, 406). As a result, the idea that DTC was suddenly going 
to “lose out to a swathe of low-cost competitors” or that their AAB+ students were 
going to “migrate to the Russell Group” was simply “not proven” (Interviewee, 410). 
Provided DTC took care of its low-income students through bursaries and fee waivers, 
and provided their potential student-consumers understood the implications of the 
graduate repayment scheme… 
…“The money is not a major issue for a lot of our students… they’re not paying, 
that’s the key thing”, iterated Interviewee -403… 
…then DTC could invest in a quality student experience by charging what they felt 
their market could stand (Interviewee, 402). And that was far closer to £9000 than it 
was to the £7000 that the local FE colleges were likely to charge. 
 
The third logic involved another set of competing values contained within the White 
Paper itself and underpinned a firm belief amongst the university’s strategic leaders 
that, quite simply, DTC could not be “competed away” (Interviewee, 401). Whilst 
embedding competition into HE’s framework of action was a primary aim of 
marketisation, in order to ensure that costs to the public purse did not spiral through 
uncontrolled demand the Conservative-Liberal Coalition, like their Labour 
predecessors, had kept in place a cap on student numbers (apart from AAB+ students). 
As a result, DTC’s strategists understood the HE system to be “frozen”, meaning that 
the universities and FE Colleges were “not in a real market, anyway” (Interviewee, 
401, emphasis original). Each institution knew they had the opportunity to recruit their 
‘core’ student numbers but, in general, they couldn’t expand beyond them. And 
although some institutions at both the upper and lower end of the league tables would 
definitely “feel the draught” of marketisation, those institutions that sat “in the middle” 
were relatively “well protected” (ibid). Thus, as one strategic director in marketing 
underscored: 
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“People get too wound up about, “Oh we are all competing with each other”. No! The 
market is far more complicated than that... Competition is very dependent upon where 
in the country you sit. The economic models simply don’t play out in real places. You 
have to take real people and places into account.” 
(410, Senior Management, Steering, Long-time Strategist, Marketing) 
 
Taken together, the multiple logics that DTC applied to make meaning of the White 
Paper in relation to a reduced understanding of their existing and potential relational 
economic geographies signified that DTC could charge a higher fee and “hold a steady 
course” (Interviewee, 401) in the relative shelter of the squeezed middle: 
…“Subject only, of course”, as one senior director (-401) told me with some irony, 
“to the difficulties of actually recruiting our target numbers” 
 
5.2.5 Four Town Local: Clawing back the ‘ante’ for survival under ‘winner v loser’ 
politics 
In theory, having removed students from each institution’s core numbers through the 
AAB+ and Flexible Margin competitions, HEIs should have been compelled by the 
metrics of the White Paper to compete with one another for those valuable students. 
Having replaced the relative security of funding HE, ex-ante, through the BTG with 
the in-security and uncertainty of attaching ex-post funding to the student-consumer, 
the primary method for HEIs to secure their life sustaining value was to attract and 
recruit potential students from across the HE market – as well as to diversify their 
income streams, of course. Yet as we have witnessed from the experiences of GE and 
DTC, the multiple and complex nature of social relations of value in the Ordinary 
Economy is not so straightforward. Even in the initial stages of meaning making and 
complexity reduction, we see the concomitant embedding, transformation and 
variation of Governmental values as embodied by the White Paper. 
 
Four Town Local’s experiences provide yet another compelling account of the 
complex interplay between normalisation and diversity in the Ordinary Economy. 
However, as I will demonstrate below, their story also underscores the extensive and, 
largely, unforeseen damage that can be instigated by Governmental programmes that, 
in FTL’s words, are designed to create “winners and losers” (Interviewee, 307). For 
FTL, the intended redistribution of students through the AAB+ and Flexible Margin 
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competitions alongside the downward pressure that both would have on university 
finance signified only one thing: that Government was out to favour the high-ranked 
universities at the expense of the institutions that sat at the lower end of the league 
tables: that Government was out to “shaft” the institutions that were supposedly 
upholding the remaining value of the public good (Interviewee, 301). 
 
Located in a region I want to call ‘Perpetual Twilight’, Four Town’s rootedness in time 
and place – in its extraordinarily local economic geographies – heavily affected how 
the university made sense of the White Paper. Established some 160 years earlier as a 
sort of Technical Institute that provided vocational training and general education to 
working men, FTL was “in and of its community” (Interviewee, 307), meaning that its 
connection to Perpetual Twilight’s history and identity signified that the present-day 
university “could not be preserved somewhere else” (ibid). In its heyday, Perpetual 
Twilight was one of the most industrialized areas of Britain made “black by day and 
red by night”, as Elihu Burritt (1862) put it, by the intensity of activity that echoed 
24/7 through its “foul and melancholy air”. However, following the decline of its 
major industries throughout the 20th Century, and particularly since the neoliberally 
inspired economic restructuring of the 1980s, the region had suffered severe economic 
deterioration. 
 
Today, a certain darkness still lingered over the area in the form of a “lack of 
aspiration amongst those born and bred in [Perpetual Twilight]”: 
“There is almost a pride, here, in self-deprecation”, said Interviewee -310. “People 
actually say, ‘It’s not pretty, is it? It’s a dump!’ Those are the sorts of words that are 
used”. 
Likewise, the only red that remained was Twilight’s standing as an “unemployment 
red-spot”, devoid of the economy that had once made it prosper: 
“When you look at the spots on the unemployment map we are right there as one 
big red dot!” affirmed Interviewee -309. 
Put these factors together with the high levels of crime and social deprivation that had 
“indexed” the four towns of Twilight as some of the worst positioned in the country 
(Interviewee, 304), and there was “a very real [Twilight] issue” that FTL “as the 
unofficial university of the region” needed to consider (Interviewee, 309): 
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“Don’t get me wrong”, said Interviewee -310, “but there’s a huge pride in that lack 
of aspiration. And that does reflect across, if you like, the level of aspiration here: 
‘Yeah, but we’re not Cambridge, we’re [Four Town Local] aren’t we?’” 
 
The fact was that the general lack of aspiration found in Perpetual Twilight seemed 
ingrained in the university’s primary student body – its home undergraduate 
population – and this had long-affected the university in terms of establishing and 
embedding its traditional mission. To begin with, some 70%+ of the university’s 
undergraduate population came from within a 15-mile radius of the institution, making 
it one of the most locally-recruiting HEIs outside London: 
“Part of that is about the ‘[Twilight] Mentality’”, reasoned Interviewee -309, 
associating the lack of aspiration in the region with their students’ lack of imaginative 
and physical mobility. “Some of our students have never been to London before 
because it is so far away – and that is a real [Twilight] thing. If some of our students 
go to [nearby, ‘x-Big City’], that is a day out!” 
 
Moreover, over 50% of their undergraduates came from disadvantaged or low-income 
households indicating that both the region and the university were dealing with socio-
economic difficulties well above the national average (Interviewee, 305). Thus, whilst 
on one level FTL’s “focus” on being “a community university” could be seen as “a 
conscious decision” motivated by wholly rational reasons (Interviewees 309, 306), 
what the interviewees underscored as the fundamental value of the institution arose 
from a far deeper plane: 
“When it comes to writing our new Widening Participation strategy, we don’t really 
need one”, said Interviewee -309, “It is in our DNA”. 
Indeed, as one very senior director iterated, echoing the “deep sense of purpose to 
make a difference to local students” (ibid) that many of the interviewees discussed: 
“Widening Participation… gives us our identity. There’s no doubt about that. It’s in the 
warp and the weft; it permeates through. It’s about mission, it’s about purpose, it’s 
about what we stand for, it’s about every interaction – it’s fundamental. So, it’s not 
‘somebody’s job’! And I feel quite passionately about that. It cuts across and influences 
what we do on a daily basis”. 
(302, Senior Management VCO, Medium-time Manager, Education) 
 
 187 
Enmeshed as they were in this socio-spatial relational context, FTL had, for many 
years, ‘reached out’ beyond its boundaries to local schools and colleges in order to 
understand what the needs of their potential students might be in terms of the 
university’s provision. On the one hand, this meant thinking about the support 
mechanisms that might be required in order to provide their, largely, WP students 
whose tariff entry points were low with the best possible learning environment while 
they were at university. On the other, it meant thinking about what their students might 
want and require in terms of their future lives (Interviewees 302, 303, 308, 312). 
 
Again, their students’ identification with the general lack of aspiration in the region 
informed a “key part of [FTL’s] mission” (Interviewee, 305): 
“Our students want to live local… study local… and remain local”, said one very 
senior director (-301), “so they’ll be less likely to travel for jobs.” 
Thus, to be successful in achieving their ‘purpose’ the university had to possess “a real 
bearing and weight within the local business economy” (Interviewee, 309). The 
majority of Twilight’s employers were small to medium-sized enterprises that were 
looking for graduates to add something to their businesses, and it was part of the 
mission of the university to gear the employment outcomes of their students to those 
local enterprises – thereby helping their students to gain the local jobs they desired 
while simultaneously impacting the economic recovery of the region. “That [was] an 
important value of the institution”, and it was one of their “unique strengths” (ibid, 
emphasis original). As one university strategist elaborated: 
“For this university, Widening Participation is about giving an opportunity to those who 
have got the capacity from the locality or the region… to improve their lot in life. That 
means raising their aspirations, improving their education, improving their life chances, 
their employment outcomes and, therefore, the position of the locality. The important 
thing, here, is that they won’t all get degrees and then migrate to another part of the 
country. Indeed, we want them to stay in [Twilight] and help [Twilight] to thrive.” 
(304, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Strategist) 
 
Thus, as far as Four Town’s strategic leaders understood it, even according to the 
neoliberally informed discourses and metrics of the White Paper, FTL was the epitome 
of a university that served the public good (Interviewees 301-to-313). Given the 
identity of their typical student, without Government funding the mass provision of HE 
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in Perpetual Twilight would be subject to market failures. Further still, given the lack 
of inward market investment to the region, the positive spill over effects that the 
university was having would be subject to the same. As such, when I asked one senior 
strategic leader what had long-driven the university’s mission, he/she responded: 
“… As a sacrament to the area. I think we had that obligation as a publicly funded 
body. [FLT] had, and still does have, a sense of duty and obligation to do what we were 
set here to do, which was to help the economic, social and political development of 
[Twilight].” 
(301, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
However, in the words of one strategist involved in marketing, given the university’s 
understanding of their social value, when the White Paper was released it felt like “an 
economic Tsunami”, with FTL “standing on the edge of an ocean while something 
huge [was] being dropped in the middle” (Interviewee, 311). Indeed, when viewed in 
the context of the “wave upon wave” of Government tactics that had swept across the 
HE sector since, at least, the 2010 Spending Review, the impact that the White Paper 
would surely have on their social relations of value could severely undermine all that 
the university stood for. More than that, it posed an imminent threat to their very 
survival (ibid). As Interviewee -311 underscored: 
“The changes under this political Coalition… are a wake up call! …We won’t have 
any money in the next five years!” 
 
For all of the interviewees, the metrics set out under the Coalition acted as a powerful 
set of simplified, semiotic referents that made them reflect upon their local, relational 
economic geographies. First, in the broad context of the region, the 2010 Spending 
Review was already driving the university towards certain “economic imperatives” 
(Interviewee, 302). For one, in recent years, where the local authority had been less 
able to afford provision, FTL had been helping to raise aspirations and educational 
standards by selling their expertise to local schools and public services – albeit on a 
not-for-profit basis. Now, with Aim Higher being dismantled and school budgets cut, 
any diminution in this financially and socially valuable market could signify a sizeable 
reduction in university turnover (ibid). Moreover, the Regional Development Agencies 
were being abolished and public services cut, so there would be less inward public 
investment and fewer jobs in Twilight. Traditionally, a lot of Four Town’s students 
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graduated into the public sector, so given their desire to work locally that meant the 
university was facing a declining rate of onward employment for their graduates 
(Interviewee, 301). As such, given “the logic of supply and demand”, a “self-
perpetuating spiral” could easily become “the downside” of the “double-edged sword” 
that being such a locally embedded institution denoted (Interviewee, 302). Thus, as 
Interviewee -301 stated definitively in summarizing FTL’s understanding of their 
regional position: 
“Whilst there is economic decline in this area, we will always be in decline”. 
 
Second, in the direct context of FTL, the AAB+ and Flexible Margin competitions 
alongside the uncertain funding of HE through the student fee could undermine the 
financial sustainability of the university even more profoundly. Perpetual Twilight had 
a high number of universities and FE Colleges that “technically” were within easy 
reach for FTL’s potential students (Interviewee, 313). As such, although the university 
liked to think of themselves as “the local link” (ibid), they were in fact “in an area of 
high competition” within which the White Paper seemed resolute on creating “winners 
and losers” (Interviewee, 307). 
 
With two Russell Group institutions not too far away, FTL was concerned that they 
would “cherry pick” around 250 of their better-qualified WP students by offering them 
substantial bursaries the value of which FTL could not afford to match. Thus, the 
quality of FTL’s peer learning environment would be diminished simply in order for 
those high-ranked universities to meet their Government-set targets for increasing 
social mobility – the definition of which seemed to conform far more to the values of 
the Russell Group than it did to the values of institutions like Four Town: 
“It is about plucking out bright kids and putting them into good universities!” 
declared Interviewee -304 angrily, “whereas for us [it’s] all about… what gets added 
by the time the student comes out the other end… The value added, here, is enormous 
in comparison!” 
 
Furthermore, the local University Colleges and FE Colleges numbered in the tens, and 
were very similar to FTL in terms of typical student profile. In order to create a 
bidding stock for the Flexible Margin, HEFCE had reduced FTL’s ‘core’ by some 750 
places, and the percentage reduction was not dissimilar for the local Colleges. As a 
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result, there was an expectation that once “the total sum of places taken away” was 
computed against “the total given back” through the bidding process, overall Perpetual 
Twilight would be “a net loser” (Interviewee, 313). Considering the institution’s 
identity and regional embeddedness, FTL felt “completely hobbled” by the inevitable 
rise in local competition (Interviewee, 307). Moreover, although the university’s 
strategic leaders had “outright rejected the concept of students as consumers” 
(Interviewee, 301), they none-the-less recognized that “in the new world order that 
[was] emerging” (Interviewee, 311) their on-going survival would depend on 
responding to local demand. As Interviewee -313 explained: 
“Because we are regarded by people as their local university… and because people stay 
in the area, we survive or fall on that! …If we don’t provide a good student experience 
and job opportunities at the end of it, word of mouth can go badly wrong for us as well 
as good (sic).” 
(313, Management Support, Non-Steering, Long-time Administrator) 
 
It was through this iterative process of meaning making that FTL reduced the 
complexity of their socio-economic relations down to a handful of salient points that 
would enable them to devise a new fee strategy for moving forward. On the one hand, 
it seemed clear that they would need to compete with the local Russell Group 
institutions for their AAB+ students. On the other, they would need to compete with 
the local Colleges for the students that made up their ‘core’. And all this was set 
against a backdrop of Government-induced marketisation that FTL felt was contrary to 
the value of the sort of higher education they provided (Interviewees 301-to-314). 
 
But, compete they would! 
 
In order to maintain their AAB+ numbers their strategy was two-fold. First, despite the 
fact that the university was regularly close to the bottom of most league tables – “It’s 
like [wearing] an annual hair shirt”, said Interviewee -304 – they would need to 
maintain a relatively high headline fee of £8,500 such that they could align the quality 
of the university with their prestige opposition (Interviewees 301, 302, 303, 304). In 
the past the university had “been content with ‘Asda Packaging’” because being 
understood as “a caring university” had felt more important than projecting “a quality 
image” given their local socio-economic spatial relations (Interviewee, 311). Now, in 
light of the Government-induced shifts in their social relations of value, those values 
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had to change. Second, they would need to focus more on research. Given the 
understanding across the HE sector that there existed “an inextricable link between 
good quality teaching and research” (Interviewee, 301), the current policy framework 
was providing a significant impetus for those “more reluctant” institutions and 
individuals “to dip their toe into a more diversified future” (Interviewee, 307). 
Although research-led teaching was held by plenty of Four Town’s academic staff to 
be of value, there were also those who had long-been content with “making life cosy 
for themselves, and easy” by shirking their research responsibilities (ibid). As such, the 
university could, now, utilize the power and discourses of the White Paper to push 
forward a research agenda, the value of which was, now, far more evident and 
compelling: 
“If colleagues won’t go willingly, there is something actually, now, pushing as 
well”, confirmed Interviewee -307. 
 
In order to retain a percentage of their ‘core’ student number, FTL would have to risk 
bidding back for those potential students through the Flexible Margin process. 
Certainly, demonstrating the quality of the institution through both their high, headline 
fee and research agenda would help to differentiate the university from their local, 
lower-end opponents. However, FTL could simply not afford to lose the value of the 
fees attached to those 750 students (Interviewee, 301). As such, the university’s 
leaders devised two further strategies. Firstly, by disbanding all of their bursaries the 
university could offer a fee-waiver of £1000 to all their undergraduates51. This would 
enable the institution to enter into the bidding process by conforming to the 
Government-set regulation of reducing the maximum cost to the Treasury to £7,500 
per-student per-year. Yes, there would be downsides to the strategy. For one, 
disbanding individual bursaries would leave their very-low-income students a lot 
worse off – but the university could simply not afford to maintain the more 
‘progressive’ distribution of its widening access funds given this new policy regime. 
For another, reducing the diversity of their bursaries down to a single understanding of 
Value would be far less attractive to their potential future students (ibid). Considering 
their typical student profile, fee-waivers had:  
                                                        
51 The only individualized bursaries that FTL would now provide were the funds they set aside to match 
the Government’s National Scholarship Programme, which, by tying funding to the achievement of A-
Level grades AAB or above, they intended to utilize to try to attract local AAB+ students (Interviewee, 
309). 
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“…no value and no benefit to the student! It’s cash in the pocket that matters to the 
student!” argued Interviewee -301, smacking his/her clenched fist on the table: 
‘Bang!’ 
However, fee-waivers were clearly of value to the Government. On the upside they, 
also, were an effective mechanism by which FTL could maintain a high headline fee at 
the same time as competing in the Flexible Margin! As a consequence, the university’s 
strategic leaders recognized that they would have to shift their values somewhat: 
“We’ve had to go with fee-waivers”, ceded Interviewee -301 pragmatically. 
 
Secondly, in order to make up for any remaining shortfall in their ‘core’, FTL was: 
…“Going to grow!” proffered Interviewee -301. “At a time when full-time student 
numbers will be reduced, we will seek to grow – which is an interesting challenge”, 
he/she qualified. 
In the context of the removal of the BTG and the subsequent need to make “year-on-
year surpluses” – such that they could “re-invest in the quality of the student 
experience and ensure [the university’s] survival” – FTL had to, somehow, recuperate 
the financial value that these Government-devised competitions were intent on taking 
from them (ibid). As Interviewee -301 elaborated: 
“We are moving into a situation whereby the funding environment… means that we will 
have to be more entrepreneurial… fleet of foot… more creative. The University was 
operating very much as though it were funded on a block grant bases: a sort of ‘we’ll be 
all right for money’, mentality, ‘funding will come’. Well that goes! The new political 
environment says: ‘that goes!’… We need our schools to be developing new markets as 
quickly as possible and exploiting those markets!” 
(301, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Looking at their past and current economic geographies, and projecting what might 
sustain growth moving forward, the strategists’ approach was two-pronged. On the one 
hand, the university would need to be even more “business facing” than ever before 
(ibid). Faced with the cuts to local public services alongside their graduates’ demands 
for local jobs, Four Town’s academic community would need to develop new markets 
with private industry in order to increase both university income and the attractiveness 
of their offer. For instance, where the School of Health had long-worked with – and 
been paid by – the local NHS in terms of student training and work-experience it 
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would now need to market itself to the local private health sector in order to 
compensate for the shift in their social relations of value – regardless of what their 
individual values might be: 
“Just because the NHS can’t give us any places doesn’t mean that we can’t place 
students in the private sector, said Interviewee -301. “The local private healthcare 
sector is enormous, and hardly does any training of its own. So we’ve said, ‘let’s do 
things differently!’ Our systems and traditions are very much about a centralized, 
planned institution. It’s a bit like an old Soviet Union state… I mean… I’m opposed to 
private healthcare myself… But this is a very different way of thinking. This is very 
much more market orientated. That is the sort of thing we want to see our Schools 
doing.” 
 
On the other hand, FTL would need to increase its student numbers. Looking forward, 
one particular market offered significant financial potential: 
“We’ve always been committed to our post-graduate, overseas and part-time 
markets”, explained Interviewee -303. “They don’t sit in our student number control, 
so there is room for growth. But now that we know that part-time students have access 
to loans, it seems logical to look again at our part-time market”. 
Thanks to the successful lobbying of institutions like Birkbeck and the OU which 
specialized in part-time students, under the more ‘progressive’ metrics of the White 
Paper both young and mature people wishing to study part-time were now eligible for 
tuition fee loans, the value of which was to be calculated on a pro-rata basis of 
intensity as compared to full-time study (Interviewees 303, 309, 312). As a result, Four 
Town’s strategists believed that increasing their part-time intake could provide a 
lucrative source of income: provided they could recruit those additional students, of 
course! 
 
Bearing in mind the employment issues that Perpetual Twilight faced, the university 
had access to a substantial part-time market. However, in recent years those potential 
students had become increasingly risk averse. Thus, maintaining part-time numbers 
had become increasingly difficult – as had maintaining full-time undergraduate 
recruitment (Interviewee, 303). 
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“There is a lot of debt aversion in the low socio-economic families from which our 
students are likely to come to us”, highlighted Interviewee -309. 
As such, the university would need to be more aggressive in its recruitment strategies. 
Already, they had stepped up their marketing activities in local schools and colleges 
trying to dispel the negative messages being circulated in the media regarding student 
fees and debt. But they were, also, recruiting large numbers of their most recent 
graduates to contact both potential part-time and full-time students to spread the 
message that, actually, they wouldn’t have to pay the fee up front. Nor was it likely 
that they would graduate with high levels of debt that would need to be repaid – 
although the university did have to temper that message in order to still underscore the 
quality of their offer: 
“The work-a-day degrees we are offering are quality degrees”, explained 
Interviewee -309. “…So we’ve avoided saying in quite the stark terms that ‘you will 
probably never earn enough to repay it all back’… We didn’t want to dampen 
aspirations in quite that way. But we do say… quietly… about the amount they are 
going to repay: ‘If you are earning this much, then you are only going to repay this 
much’. And we’ve stayed at the lower end of that.” 
 
When I asked one very senior leader of Four Town to reflect on the impact these shifts 
in their social relations of value might have on the HE sector, I was struck by the 
strength of his/her reply. He/she said: 
“I think the big issue comes in about 2016/17 when the government finally accepts that 
it can’t afford the scheme that it has introduced, and then it will be: wow! We can’t 
afford higher education! …Sure, we have difficulties over policy initiatives made with 
no evidence base and no real framework. But once you’ve accepted the idea that 
undergraduate students will be paying back from income, and there is no upfront fee, 
then to some extent you have to ask, ‘does it matter what the fee is?’” 
(301, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
For FTL, any detrimental effects of their a) turning to the private sector to increase 
their income, and b) clawing back whatever ex-ante public funding they could access 
through the vagaries of the graduate repayment mechanism, could not be seen as 
problems of their making. Nor were they ethical issues that the university had to deal 
with. In the opinions of the interviewees, FTL was still by-and-large a public 
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institution, still publicly funded, and still serving the public good (Interviewees, 301-
313). Rather, what mattered most to the university was that in the marketisation game 
of ‘winners and losers’ that this Conservative-led Coalition had devised, FTL could 
ensure their long-term survival: 
“We’ve taken the view that we are ignoring Government”, said Interviewee -301. 
“We are assuming that we are going to get shafted by every Government policy that 
comes along and we are just going to grab control of our own destiny. And anything 
that we can get from Government: Great! Bonus! So we have gone for that hard 
view!” he/she said, slapping the table with an open palm. “I’ve said to people, you’re 
not going to get any more funding in future, you’ve got to generate it all yourself… 
This is about making sure that we are here in 10 years time”. 
 
5.2.6 Palace Aspirational: Calling time on timeless values – where aspirations meet 
the market meter 
If FTL’s story demonstrates the unforeseen and complex consequences of a 
university’s determination to remain embedded in, and/or committed to, the perceived 
opportunities offered by its local economic geographies, Palace Aspirational’s story 
demonstrates the multiple and unforeseen consequences of a university’s attempts to 
unravel itself from the perceived constraints of its local socio-economic spatial 
relations. Similar to FTL, PA had long-identified itself as an institution that, certainly 
according to the narrow discourses and metrics set out in the White Paper, 
predominantly upheld prevailing Government understandings of the value of the public 
good. However, unlike FTL, PA was an institution seeking to create a new 
“immaculate picture” (Interviewee, 213) by which it could structure its forward-
moving strategies. Such a ‘purified image’ might include the university’s traditional 
local social relations of value, certainly. But these could no longer be the institution’s 
dominant set of semiotic referents. Rather, they – and therefore the “timeless values” 
that they represented (Interviewee, 201) – would need to be subordinated to a new set 
of metrics and values: one which better represented the aspirations of the university in 
its struggle to define what is and is not value: 
“The strategy… is a formal statement of who we think we are, where we want to be, and 
what we want to achieve. It is this ‘immaculate picture’… that’s quite useful because it 
gives everybody something to hang on to and to point to. …In terms of the headline 
strategic plan, I don’t think anybody in the organisation would really disagree with the 
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aim: We want to be in the Top Ten. But in terms of how we achieve it and what’s 
holding us back, then you get disagreements… and that’s interesting because it becomes 
about metrics rather than metric.” 
(213, Management Support, Steering, Long-time Administrator) 
 
Located in an area of ‘a-Big City’ that I’m going to call ‘Selling Point’ (the reasons for 
which will become clear in a moment), Palace Aspirational had established an “almost 
unique” identity and reputation for combining “a very high achievement in research” 
with “an almost unequalled record of embedding itself within the local community 
through its recruitment of local students”, a very large proportion of whom came from 
low socio-economic backgrounds (Interviewee, 201). For sure, other, more prestigious 
universities either “matched or exceeded” PA’s research achievements, while still 
others – “definitively lower-ranked” – either matched or exceeded their record on 
widening participation (ibid). However, if you took a good look at any other university 
across the UK, “nowhere [came] close to putting the two together” (ibid). 
 
Similar to FTL, Palace’s record in WP was rooted in its history, geography and local 
socio-economic relations, each of which registered an enormous sense of pride and 
value amongst the interviewees: 
“There are a lot of people within this university who are very proud of what it 
does”, said Interviewee -210. “The roots of this university were established to educate 
the population in [Selling Point], and if you look at the make up of our student body, 
you can still see that happening”. 
“One thing that is wonderful about this place… is the fact that we have a history of 
doing widening participation!” echoed Interviewee -212. “We grew up doing it as a 
Technical College… And we shouldn’t loose sight of that history: of the great good 
that we have done for a whole host of people over many years”. 
“It’s a genuinely diverse university: and long may that last!” added Interviewee -
209 referring to the “very colourful” mix of cultures, ethnicities, religions, and socio-
economic groups that made up the university’s student body. 
The fact that historically, the university had started as “part of a genuine will and 
desire to benefit local people”, and the fact that PA was so “rooted” in a “both 
ethnically and socially diverse area – quite a poor one actually”, was “genuinely 
valued by both staff and students” (ibid): 
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“We make a lot of it”, underscored interviewee -209. “Our geography, clearly, has 
a big impact”. 
 
In contrast, in terms of its research, the university had had to work hard on increasing 
its overall quality and consistency; an activity it had chosen to undertake over the past 
decade or so under the leadership of its two most recent Principals, both of whom were 
variously described by colleagues as “ambitious” and “value-driven” (Interviewees 
202, 203, 204, 207, 209, 212). For each of these leaders, high-quality research offered 
the university two extremely valuable assets: i.e. ‘income’ – derived from both the 
Research Councils and HEFCE’s Recurrent Research Grant; and ‘standing’ – derived 
from the ‘prestige-value’ that had been placed upon research activity throughout the 
history of the sector52. 
 
Until around 2009/10, the fact that PA had managed to maintain this “unique” 
combination had brought the university “a great deal of respect… both locally and 
nationally” (Interviewee, 209), which for all of the interviewees was something to be 
“celebrated” and “valued”. Furthermore – but “putting all the motherhood and apple 
pie to one side”, as Interviewee -213 put it – in the face of ever-increasing competition 
it had offered the university “a definite edge” (Interviewee, 209), which many 
interviewees were loathe to relinquish: 
“We are a world-leading, research university with very deep roots in the local 
community”, iterated Interviewee -207. “Our immediate competitors are [various 
Russell Group and 1994 Universities], and we could just become a clone of those. But 
we would lose the distinctiveness of that rootedness. I see that as a real ‘selling 
point’”, he/she underscored. “And I use those words deliberately! The fact that we 
work with the local community to improve their lives is a story that is very different 
from the Oxbridge or Redbrick Universities. If we lose that story, we lose something 
that is quite powerful and very attractive… We would be idiots to get rid of that 
identity”. 
 
To varying degrees and based on their own individual logics and values, each 
interviewee put forward reasons for not wanting to let go of PA’s unique 
“characteristics”, “attributes”, or “selling points” (e.g. Interviewees 201, 203, 205, 206, 
                                                        
52 Interviewee references fully anonymized to avoid identification with other quotes. 
 198 
207, 212). However, in spite of the perceived opportunities that their local socio-
economic relations offered, being an international, research-led university with a local 
commitment to WP was increasingly becoming an identity that PA was finding “hard 
to maintain” (Interviewee, 201). 
 
As the “rising star” of the league tables since the 2008 RAE, PA had been striving to 
reposition itself amidst the sector’s top institutions, such that in the not-too-distant 
future it could be considered for entry into the highly selective ranks of the Russell 
Group. As such, according to a majority of PA’s strategic directors, there were 
“obvious constraints” to being in Selling Point, which “everyone” apparently 
recognized (Interviewees 201, 203, 204, 205): 
“Being here makes us need to try harder”, explained Interviewee -213. “There’s a 
real downside that’s around ‘getting noticed’… and people’s assumptions of what it’s 
like here... So there’s a sense that we need to prove something because we’ve always 
been seen as ‘them down in [Selling Point]’ and not so much as a big-hitting 
organisation… We can’t, and don’t, perceive ourselves as a local university. Yes, our 
location… gives a richness to the organisation… but that can’t be the sole purpose of 
our mission”. 
 
From around 2009/10, the primary mechanism by which PA had been attempting to 
reposition itself was by demonstrating, via a variety of highly regarded league tables, 
that PA “fit” the identity of an elite institution. This meant iteratively reflecting on 
their current identity, activities and social-relations and comparing various aspects of 
them with the metrics that the league tables utilized to measure, sift and sort both 
national and international HEIs into their easy-to-identify, ranked positions: from “one 
to ten” on page one of the leagues, to a level that “the best students” wouldn’t even 
consider “beyond page two” (Interviewee, 203). 
 
In recent years PA had started to get better feedback in the National Student Survey, 
which provided an important indicator of the quality of the sorts of student-oriented 
processes and activities that applicants would be most interested in when selecting an 
institution for study. However, the university still needed to “raise its game” in terms 
of its peer-learning environment and the “quality” of its graduate output (Interviewee, 
205). Due to its historic focus on widening access to students from local schools, many 
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of which performed poorly in terms of A-Levels, the quality of PA’s intake was “too 
low” according to the league table metrics, as was the number of First Class degrees 
that the university awarded (Interviewee, 201). As such, PA’s strategic leaders felt that 
their best option was to raise their UCAS tariff entry requirements, thereby altering the 
make-up of their student body and, importantly, conforming to the evaluation of 
‘quality’ as metricized by the various leagues: 
“People like selling points!” stated Interviewee -206. “People like to look down a 
simple league table and say, ‘right, X is there and… that’s better because it’s three 
places above Y’. Sure people should be asking questions. But these days they seem 
very happy to take things completely at face value”. 
 
Initially, the strategy worked reasonably well – particularly in ‘technical terms’ since 
the university felt relatively protected by both the ‘financial security’ of the BTG and 
the ‘recruitment security’ of SNC. Although, as Interviewee -201 told me, PA had 
long-been used to competing for students in a “quality market”, the university sector 
had never truly been exposed to the uncertainties and risks associated with operating in 
a “free market” wherein the value of HE would not be up-held by ex-ante Government 
funding, and students could choose where they wanted to go – without the restriction 
of number controls. In addition, the strategy had suffered little resistance, being 
generally understood as “one of those virtuous circles that would, eventually, start to 
reinforce itself” (Interviewee, 213). A key feature of being in Selling Point had been 
that Palace was “not pretentious” – they didn’t have “an institutional poker up [their] 
backside!” as Interviewee -213 put it. PA was a high-achieving university that still 
managed to do WP: there was absolutely no reason that they would have to become 
“an exclusive preserve” for “middle-class people” who were “predominantly white!” 
(ibid). Provided the strategy was handled “subtly… incrementally, even”, then both 
staff and local schools would have time “to adapt” (Interviewee, 203). Just because PA 
wanted to take “best advantage” of its successes did not have to alter the long-term 
values and relations of the institution (ibid; see also 201, 202, 204, 207). 
 
Yet, when the 2011 White Paper was released both the financial feasibility and ethical 
legitimacy of the strategy were called into question by numerous staff, students, local 
schools and other interested parties. Even local Councillors demanded meetings with 
the Principal to clarify PA’s entry tariff intensions (Interviewee, 201). On the one 
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hand, replacing the BTG with a cost-covering fee that was attached to the student 
while setting numbers free through the AAB+ competition would surely bring the risks 
and uncertainties of virtually “free market” competition into a set of socio-economic 
relations that PA had, specifically, been attempting to engender. The onward economic 
coherence and trajectory of the university could be severely weakened (Interviewee, 
206). On the other, continuing to pursue its “elitist aspirations” at a time of hitherto 
unequalled marketisation would surely be at the cost of PA’s WP students 
(Interviewees 201-to-214). Would, for example, the university still be accessible to 
local students if it decided to charge the full £9000 fee in order to be seen as a top-
flight institution? Moreover, would the university reduce its WP activities if it 
continued raising its tariff entry points in order to compete for those elite AAB+ 
students? Surely, “as the standing and reputation of PA increase[d]”, so they would 
“become a more attractive destination to more able students”, and that meant “further 
increases in their entry requirements and fewer students from [Selling Point]” 
(Interviewee, 201). That was the “overriding perception” amongst those against the 
strategy, and… 
 “…statistically”, said one senior leader, “they were right!” (ibid). 
The very foundations of PA’s local social relations of value could be severely 
undermined. 
 
Faced with the choice of moving forward with its AAB+ aspirations or turning back 
towards its WP roots, PA chose the former. According to the most dominant set of 
logics that the interviewees expressed, the problem predominantly boiled down to two 
interrelated components: value and survival. Judging from the metrics of the White 
Paper53, PA was looking at a substantial reduction in its core numbers. First, through 
the flexible margin competition they would lose between 500 and 1000 students. 
Although a percentage of these could be won back should PA take part in the bidding 
process, the university would never win back the full number. In addition, the fee 
attached to the student would have to be substantially lower than the £9000 maximum 
allowed by the new fee-policy, indicating a significant negative impact on PA’s 
bottom line (Interviewees 201, 206, 211). Second, through the AAB+ competition 
PA’s core would be reduced by around a further 1000 undergraduates, and these would 
be set free to the supply and demand vagaries of England’s “prestige market” 
                                                        
53 For full details see: HEFCE (2012) Recurrent Grants and Student Number Controls 2013-14. 
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(Interviewee, 201). Elite universities across the country would be “fighting over those 
supposedly ‘brilliant’ students” (Interviewee, 210). Thus, if PA were to turn its back 
on its AAB+ aspirations in favour of its WP roots, there was no way that it would ever 
attract those ‘freed up’ AAB+ students. Taken together, the reduction in core numbers 
represented a potential onward financial deficit of millions of pounds, which, without 
ex-ante Government funding, PA simply could not afford: 
“Ultimately, and this is pure pragmatism”, said Interviewee -206, “it all boils down 
to money, because without money there are things you simply cannot do.” 
 
According to a second, dominant set of logics, PA’s most senior strategists simply 
were not prepared to give up their elitist aspirations. The university had spent the last 
three years constructing a new “immaculate picture” by which it could steer the 
evaluations, values, actions and activities of its staff towards the higher echelons of the 
Russell Group (Interviewees 213). They were not going to turn back now – particularly 
given this Government’s push towards marketisation. As one strategic leader explained 
in the context of setting their fee: 
“There was a lot of discussion about what the fee level should be: What sort of 
institution are we? What would be the consequences if we didn’t charge what our 
competition would charge? Would it tarnish our image? And we came to the conclusion 
that we really needed to charge £9000 because the Principal’s immediate reaction to 
everything is, ‘how does that compare to the Russell Group?’ That is [his/her] 
benchmark. ‘Is anyone in the Russell Group not going to charge £9000?’ So it was clear 
from the outset that it had to be £9000. There was no option.” 
(212, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic) 
 
Given PA’s history of WP and the concerns that had been raised regarding its potential 
devaluation and demise, the university wanted to be careful not to ignore the groups 
that they had been working with over a long period of time (Interviewee, 210). 
However, a better balance had to be struck between its WP activities and raising tariff 
entry points, such that PA could still be “representative of timeless values” but 
“without becoming irrelevant”, as Interviewee -201 put it. 
 
For example, a potential solution to maintaining its WP relations might have been the 
strategic selection of contextual data to allow certain local students access to the 
university with lower tariff entry points than the ‘new PA norm’. These local students 
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would have been identified as ‘underprivileged’ by specific indicators: e.g. socio-
economic background, residence in a low-participation neighbourhood, status of 
school, etc. In essence, this would have enabled PA to uphold understandings of the 
public value of HE as expressed by the White Paper – i.e. social mobility – thereby, 
enabling the institution to hit its Government set WP targets as well as maintain its 
local WP relations. However, in making meaning of the use of contextual data in 
relation to PA’s headline strategic aim, the potential solution was rejected. Maintaining 
their low-tariff WP numbers would have affected PA’s position in the leagues: 
“It’s unfortunate that people from disadvantaged backgrounds aren’t adequately 
supported”, said Interviewee -203. “But we don’t think it’s right for a quality 
university like [PA] to keep low entry tariffs just to keep the WP students coming in. 
That doesn’t do them any favours, or us – not in the long-term”. 
 
A second potential solution might have been to work with local schools to help raise 
their students’ aspirations and achievements (Interviewees 201, 203, 204, 209, 210). In 
theory, this could have provided a resolution to the problem whereby every party in the 
relationship could “win” (Interviewee, 201). Going forward, local schools could 
improve their Ofsted ratings, the students could achieved higher A-Level grades, and, 
importantly, the university could maintain the multiple and complex value of its WP 
mission and identity without compromising its aspirations of being in the Top Ten 
(ibid). And yet, in making meaning of the strategy in relation to the White Paper there 
were, again, significant problems – specifically in terms of PA’s geographically 
grounded social relations of value. Being in ‘a-Big City’ was not like being in other 
large conurbations. PA was “surrounded” by “predator institutions” whose elite 
reputations had always made it hard for the university to compete (Interviewee, 212). 
Now, with the “new world of fees” emerging, PA was even more concerned that they 
would lose the more concretely defined “student-consumer” of the AAB+ policy to 
those “big-hitting organizations” (ibid). PA had no idea what their competitors’ 
potentials were for expanding their capacities, but there were plenty of rumours flying 
around that they – like PA – would somehow need to make up the numerical and 
financial shortfalls precipitated by the Government’s reductions to their core student 
numbers. Furthermore, those elite institutions really needed more WP students in order 
to hit their Government set targets (Interviewee, 210). As a result, if PA invested lots 
of time and resources into helping local students achieve AAB+, there was “no 
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guarantee” that they could “expect a payback in terms of recruitment”, as Interviewee -
203 underscored: 
“If a local WP student does get AAB+, the likelihood that they will choose [PA] is slim. 
We know what will happen: [Our immediate competitors] will whip them away! They’ll 
offer a [generous] scholarship because they’re desperate to have some WP students! So 
if we nurture them to [meet] our entry standards, I bet you anything they’d get attracted 
to one of the Top Five!” 
(203, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Thus, whilst all PA interviewees – without exception – expressed grave reservations 
and sadness that their elite aspirations would dint their local WP relations, the value in 
maintaining those, once, “bread-and-butter” relations at their historic levels quite 
simply was no longer there (Interviewee, 210). For sure, the university had struggled 
not to lose sight of their mission and to ensure that their strategy had been guided by 
first principles: 
“That was our number one priority”, stated Interviewee 201: “To necessarily 
accommodate Government policy but to ensure that we were not directed by it”. 
But, over the preceding years, that mission had already begun to change significantly. 
As a result, as more than one senior strategist told me, PA would certainly continue 
onwards with its WP activities; but in light of the White Paper’s pronounced push 
towards marketisation, the “incremental” shifts that PA had planned for their local WP 
social- and material- relations of value would have to be “accelerated” (Interviewees 
203, 204, 206, 211, 212). 
 
Given the Government’s emphasis on ‘setting value free’ to the market at the expense 
of upholding its collective value through ex-ante public funding, each interviewee felt 
that the struggle was, in many ways, futile. The Government’s valuation of HE as a 
public good was in direct contradiction to its valuation of market processes – as were 
the metrics of the leagues. As one senior strategist summarized: 
“The problem is that Government is on a path that they are determined to see through… 
Whilst they’re saying that they would like universities to widen participation, it’s 
impossible to do that alongside the AAB+ competition. The two things are completely 
working in opposition to one another. Unless Government says they will hold some 
AAB+ places back and give them, solely, to universities that are allowing for 
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contextualized admissions, it will be impossible for us to admit a student with BBB 
based on their specific context because that place just won’t be available with the AAB+ 
competition. Surely, that tells us something about the ideology behind this. I have been 
around higher education for a long time; and in terms of policy, this is the worst model 
that I have ever seen. It’s frightening – really frightening!” 
(209, Senior Management, Steering, WP, Project Management) 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
As the above research has demonstrated, in the initial stages of strategy formation the 
economic imaginary of the market as discursively set out in the HE White Paper 
played a central role in the Government’s attempts to structure the evaluations, values, 
actions, activities and subjectivities of HE’s strategic leaders and their universities. 
Indeed, as a vital element in the process of meaning making and complexity reduction, 
the reduced understandings that White Paper put forward in its discourses, values and 
metrics regarding what the Government reasoned was HE’s appropriate social and 
economic form acted as an important and powerful set of simplified, semiotic referents 
that each of the strategic leaders from each HEI reflected on as they negotiated their 
way through this ‘accelerated’ push towards marketisation. Importantly, these semiotic 
referents were in no way accidental. In the Government’s attempt to reshape HE’s 
social relations of value, they arose from the Coalition’s understanding of the basis of 
Value creation, which, in this case, was predominantly a neoliberally informed 
relational process of market-driven production, consumption and exchange. 
 
In setting their cost-covering fees, for example, each HEI understood that given the 
almost wholesale removal of the BTG and the uncertainty this would bring into the 
sector, the universities would have to attract sufficient numbers of home undergraduate 
students in order to generate enough ‘life-sustaining value’ to ensure the HEIs’ on-
going survival. As my research has illuminated, not only did this involve each HEI 
having to calculate their cost basis and make financial projections over the short to 
medium term. It meant each university understanding who their typical students were, 
where they came from, and their typical demands; the ‘products’ that the universities’ 
were offering and their potential for generating income; who and where were their 
competitors; and on what basis they would need to compete for those value-generating 
students. In the process, each HEI began to think of themselves – and act – more as 
producers of a product that would need to be attractive to HE’s more forcefully 
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identified student-consumers: sending out the right ‘price signals’ regarding the 
university’s quality and making sure that their consumers would understand that they 
were getting ‘good value-for-money’. 
 
Similarly, in strategically selecting their positions regarding the AAB+ and the flexible 
margin competitions, my research illustrates how each HEI reflected on their existing 
and potential economic geographies, moving iteratively between the reductive 
discourses and metrics of the White Paper and certain core features of their existing 
socio-economic geographies, relations and practices that the universities had identified 
as important, useful and/or valuable to them. What number of students were they likely 
to lose from their core and what were the financial implications of those losses? Which 
of the competitions more suited the identities of the universities and their home 
undergraduate bodies? Which competition held most potential for income generation 
and enabling the universities to survive under the increased pressures, risks and 
uncertainties of quasi-market competition (for the flexible margin) and almost free-
market competition (for the AAB+)? 
 
When understood from the perspective of the universities’ shifting social relations of 
value, the ways in which the universities made meaning of the semiotic referents 
contained in the White Paper in relation to their own reduced understandings of their 
emerging economic geographies underscores just how easily policies can become 
embedded into strategy – unless those policies are resisted, of course. 
 
However, this research has also demonstrated that, in their negotiation, the reductive 
metrics and values of the market imaginary were immediately confronted by a 
multiplicity of semiotically- and materially- constituted social relations of value that 
helped make up the HEIs’ economic geographies. In the process of complexity 
reduction the HEIs brought with them multiple logics, values and understandings of 
Value that guided their evaluations. Furthermore, multiple social and material relations 
offered each university both opportunities and constraints in terms of strategy 
formation. 
 
Whilst GE, for example, set their headline fee at £9000 in order to attract the elite 
AAB+ students that traditionally made up their home undergraduate body, the 
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university was in no way interested in competing for more of these students than they 
needed for their on-going survival. In their evaluation, the additional income that they 
would have received from those undergraduates would have been at the expense of the 
viability of the HE sector overall. Rather, given their high-ranking position in both 
national and international league tables, GE felt that pursuing their overseas markets 
and relationships would offer them greater value. Furthermore, it offered them a way 
to escape government regulation, which the university felt had become increasingly 
oppressive. 
 
Not dis-similarly – but in relation to their own existing socio-economic geographies 
and relations – FTL set their headline fee at £8500, reducing it to £7500 through fee-
waivers such that they could take part in the flexible margin. For this university, 
embedded as they were in their local region, it was the local FE colleges with whom 
they would need to compete for the local and, predominantly, low-income students that 
traditionally had made up their core. However, although, similar to GE, FTL also felt 
that Government regulation was oppressive, the university was more concerned that 
the White Paper was undervaluing the crucial role that the university played in the 
region: increasing social mobility and creating economic opportunity for the benefit of 
the public good. As a result, the university planned on underpinning its survival by 
gaining as much income from Government as possible. If Government was out to 
‘shaft’ universities that upheld the public value of the system, then in return, 
Government was going to get ‘shafted’ too! 
 
Indeed, at the very same time as each institution selected strategies that upheld the 
neoliberally inspired market values of the White Paper by increasing their 
competitiveness, being more entrepreneurial, and considering the quality of their 
products in relation to student-consumer demand, they equally selected strategies that 
undermined those market values. Both DTC and FTL sat at the mid- to lower- end of 
the league tables, and yet both universities set their headline fees at £8500 – just £500 
lower than both GE and PA who were ranked in England’s top tier. From the 
Government’s understandings of market behaviours, this was not the price-
differentiated market that they had expected would emerge. 
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And yet, most interestingly, the two universities’ fee strategies actually typify what 
Caliskan and Callon (2009a, 2009b) call “economizing behaviours”. Both DTC and 
FTL had calculated that with the overall cap on student numbers and the fact that a 
majority of their typical students would not have to pay back their fees and loans, 
neither university (to repeat the words of one of DTC’s directors who was him/herself 
an economist) was in immediate danger of being “competed away” (Interviewee, 401). 
 
Similarly, as my research highlights, the fact that the majority of universities in the 
English system felt that they would be getting more money following the 
implementation of the White Paper, in part, underpinned their lack of collective 
resistance to the further marketization of the sector. In the universities’ ‘economizing’ 
calculations, it didn’t matter what the source of that Value was: the taxpayer, the 
student, or a combination thereof. What mattered, was their ability to invest in the 
provision of a higher education that they felt was valuable and, most fundamentally, to 
survive. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that it was not simply the market-oriented policies of the 
White Paper that became varied in the process of strategy formation. The same was 
true for the Government’s progressive policy for increasing social mobility through 
widening participation. PA, for example, chose to focus on increasing its competitive 
and reputational standing by raising its tariff entry points to the detriment of its local 
WP recruitment. And FTL chose to cut all of its bursaries for low-income students in 
favour of meeting the Government’s requirements for the flexible margin competition. 
 
Between the values and logics by which complexity was reduced by the governmental 
technology of the White Paper and the values and logics by which complexity was 
reduced by HE’s actors as they made meaning of those policies, a plethora of “socio-
spatial disjunctures” (Pani and Holman, 2013) existed between discourse, construal 
and strategy formation. 
 
Thus, the chapter has illuminated the concomitant power of the market imaginary as 
discursively produced in the White Paper to shape HE’s social relations of value and 
the immediate variation of that imaginary as it was interpreted and made meaningful in 
relation to the diversity of the universities’ concrete economic geographies. Even in 
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the initial stages of meaning making and strategy formation, the empirical evidence 
presented here bears witness to political-economic power relations in which 
opportunities for normalisation and variation necessarily co-existed in the struggle 
over what is and is not value. 
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6 Putting Strategies into Practice: Complexity Re-introduction 
and the Fallacy of Dualities 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Through their in-depth development of cultural political economy (CPE), Bob Jessop, 
Ngai-Ling Sum and colleagues of the Lancaster School have made a substantial 
contribution to extending academic knowledge regarding how political-economic 
programmes and imaginaries become anchored at the level of everyday practice 
(Fairclough et al, 2004; Jessop, 2004, 2009; Jessop et al, 2008; Jessop and 
Oosterlynck, 2008; Jessop and Sum, 2001, 2003, 2013; Sum, 2004, 2009). Indeed, 
their various integrations of Gramscian state theory with the general evolutionary 
mechanisms of variation, selection and retention, semiotic analysis, and 
governmentality have explicitly sought to provide insights into the “path-shaping 
potential” of the economic imaginaries that “actually come to be selected and 
institutionalized” and thereby “come to constitute economic subjectivities, interests, 
activities, organizations… and the dynamics of economic performance” (Jessop and 
Oosterlynck, 2008: 1155-1156). However, as-much-as this body of work attempts to 
steer an ontological course between overly structuralist accounts of political economy 
and the rather loose constructivist accounts of material and subject formation, CPE is 
still left with something of a dilemma regarding the necessary co-existence and co-
evolution of normalisation and diversity in the Ordinary Economy (Lee, 2006). In 
particular, Jessop and Oosterlynck claim that “while massive scope for variation 
typically exists at an individual transactional level” the medium- to long-term 
application of policy programmes, somehow, narrows the scope for variation 
“considerably” (ibid: 1158). 
 
The research that I present in this chapter demonstrates that the struggle over everyday 
economic practice is far more complicated than that. Hence the dilemma that Jessop, 
himself, presents: that is, how can the world be always complex at the same time as 
new political paradigms and values become hegemonic? (2009: 338). From the 
evidence accumulated via fifty-five interviews conducted across four diverse HEIs, I 
suggest that as policy metrics get put into practice, so people need to make evaluations 
about what stays, what goes, what gets altered, and what new actions, activities and 
values become introduced. As such, policy has the potential to displace, diffuse and 
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possibly, even, ‘crowd out’ other practices and values due to, a) the power relations 
involved, b) a lack of immediate (and total) resistance, and c) the establishment of a 
critical mass of engagement with the ‘new’ metrics. However – and of utmost 
importance – there will always be variation of policy metrics as multiple and diverse 
values and understandings of Value shape economic practice. 
 
When strategies are put into practice, they encounter a diverse range of actors who 
must make sense of them in relation to their social and economic relations. Strategies, 
therefore, inevitably become varied as they are put into practice. Although individuals 
go through the semiotic process of complexity reduction in order to make sense of the 
world (see Chapter Five, above), they immediately re-introduce complexity into 
economic policy initiatives. This is because economic geographies are multiple and 
complex, involving multiple logics, social relations, values and understandings of 
Value. It is simply not possible for policies to impose some pure or utopian imaginary: 
the utopian cannot exist in social relations; hence the original Greek etymology of 
utopia: no place54 (Baudrillard, 2001; Clarke, 2011). However, at the same time, as 
strategies are put into practice, so policy metrics have the opportunity to become 
embedded into our social relations – at least, in part – and hence imaginaries such as 
the neoliberal market have the opportunity to become hegemonic – provided, that is, as 
I will conclude in Chapter Eight below, a critical mass of moderate compliance is 
achieved. 
 
This chapter aims to illuminate these ideas through an exploration of how various core 
strategies of the four case study HEIs were put into practice. The chapter provides 
empirical evidence that supports the challenges made in Chapter Two to overly 
simplistic, dualistic understandings of resistance-compliance and embedding-
transformation as either/or processes. Unless the values contained within policy 
discourses and metrics are rejected (that is, thrown out), the implementation of policy 
(that is, putting policy into practice) means that there will be on-going opportunities 
for its values to become embedded into social practice. At the same time, policy will 
                                                        
54 The word Utopia, thought to be initially used by Plato and later Sir Thomas More (1516), comes 
from a combination of two Greek words: oú (meaning “not”) and τóπος (topos, meaning “place”). 
However, the English pronunciation of ‘U’ as ‘Eu’ means “good”. Hence, the combination of the two 
meanings, “no-place” and “good-place” underscores a vital question: can a wholly good place ever be a 
social reality? Baudrillard (2001) argues that only nothing is perfect, since, in oposition to itself it 
reflects back nothing. Thus, Utopias will always be imaginaries destined to be ‘placeless’ illusions 
against which the real can be merely measured and compared. 
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always be confronted by multiple and complex social relations and will inevitably 
become varied in and through diverse emerging economic geographies. Furthermore, 
policies themselves do not arise in a vacuum, somehow detached from social relations. 
They are themselves informed and influenced by the sociality and materiality of the 
always-emerging economy and diverse power relations, as well as reflecting (various) 
ideological perspectives. 
 
The chapter will shed light on the above processes through an examination of ‘the 
Student as Consumer’. After setting out the context, the chapter will explore how the 
HEIs implemented strategies regarding: first, the Student Experience; second, Key 
Information Sets; and third, the Student Charter. Each of these strategies was 
discursively constructed in the White Paper as essential elements for driving the 
quality of HE forward by putting a clearly identified student-consumer and his/her 
demands at the heart of the system. Yet, for a variety of reasons, understanding the 
student as ‘a consumer’ of HE was often met with considerable resistance from the 
HEIs. Moreover, each HEI, to varying degrees and, again, for a variety and 
combination of reasons, found it impossible to disentangle the subjectivities of their 
home undergraduates into tidy ‘identity silos’ labelled either ‘consumer’ or ‘non-
consumer’. In so doing, the chapter will conclude that there could be no clear 
identification or practice of a singular student-consumer subjectivity under the 
increased pressures of neoliberal marketization and its constant variation. 
 
It is through these explorations that the chapter demonstrates the complexity of 
emerging economic geographies in the Ordinary Economy. As the policies of 
Government and the strategies of the university are put into practice, so complexity is 
necessarily re-introduced in and through emerging economic geographies as the 
multiplicity of actors involved move from construal to construction. 
 
6.2 The student as consumer: driving quality in a demand-led system 
Since the Dearing Report of 1997, re-identifying students as consumers and HEIs as 
producers of HE has been a dominant discourse deployed by various Governments to 
help embed the market imaginary into HE’s framework of action. In the White Paper, 
Higher Education: Putting Students at the Heart of the System, (BIS, 2011a), a variety 
of policies and strategies were deployed and suggested to help structure HEIs towards 
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undertaking their perceived roles as producers, and understanding and repositioning 
student subjectivities as consumers in a demand-led system. However, as this chapter 
will demonstrate, as the various tactics set out in the White Paper became translated 
into initial strategies, which were then put into practice, they were confronted by the 
complex social relations of value that help make up concrete, relational economic 
geographies. Multiple actors – whilst still needing to make meaning of these tactics 
and strategies, and therefore reduce complexity in the semiotic process of construal – 
held multiple values, logics and relations that ensured a diversity of evaluations and 
practices that would help to shape their onward trajectories as they moved from 
construal to construction. 
 
Predominantly, but not entirely, and for many reasons, each interviewee in each 
institution was highly resistant to understanding the student as a ‘consumer’ of HE: 
especially a consumer whose demands might steer the HEIs’ actions and activities and 
undermine what the interviewees variously understood as the value of HE (the latter is 
discussed extensively in Chapter Seven, below). They were also very resistant to 
understanding themselves as producers of some sort of ‘product’ that could be bought 
and sold. In the main, universities were understood as places of study and learning 
while the academics that worked in them were understood as educators who, at most, 
were now providing their students with a service. Importantly, for each HEI their 
students needed to position themselves as partners in this relationship, not the 
purchasers of a definitive commodity like “a washing machine”, “a frozen chicken 
from Sainsbury’s” or “a mobile phone” (Interviewees, 105, 403, 410). HE was a 
shared responsibility, and students – “like members of a gym” – had to do their part if 
they were to realize its value to themselves as individuals (Interviewees 106, 201, 309, 
402, 408). 
 
One dominant narrative underpinning such reasoning was the desire to maintain 
university autonomy – a desire that had long underpinned university resistance to 
Government and/or market interventions (see Robins, 1963). However, this desire was 
not simply an “elitist” attitude as many a politician has argued as reason for breaking 
university autonomy down (Carswell, 1985; Shattock, 2012). Rather, keeping 
Government and students – or any purchaser of HE, for that matter – at ‘arms length’ 
in their social relations of value had enabled HEIs to maintain certain values, actions 
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and activities that might otherwise have been altered through a closer relationship of 
exchange (Robins, 1963). For many of the interviewees, allowing overly simplistic 
understandings of students as consumers and HEIs as producers in a close market 
relationship to become embedded in their social relations of value was, simply, not an 
option, as it would undermine certain values, practices and relations that the 
institutions held dear. The only way to defend these was through the maintenance of 
autonomy: through the defence and maintenance of space between the values of the 
HEIs and the values of their various ‘interested consumers’: 
“In theory, we are autonomous institutions, which conceptually is not a trivial point. 
Seeing “the student as a consumer” (pauses)… It’s a ghastly phrase because it says, 
“you must provide a better product for the consumer, the ‘customer’”, basically… 
Common wisdom tells us that seeing the student as a consumer will shift the relationship 
between the student and the institution: that it will drive the way in which universities 
deliver programmes through student demand. But that may not be to the best advantage 
for students or institutions. Students as consumers are deeply affected by insecurity 
because they don’t know what they are buying, nor the value of what they are buying. If 
I go into Sainsbury’s I look at what I want and I buy it. The student comes here, and 
once they’ve signed on… they can’t just pick and choose because there are core courses 
they have to take. And they can’t say, “I’ll pay you a little bit more and get a first-class 
mark for that”: that would totally undermine what we do as universities. So that 
relationship – that demand relationship – has to be managed, even with the fees 
regime”. 
(103, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
This resistance to understanding their students as consumers was often apparent as the 
universities’ strategies were put into practice across the institutions. And yet, in 
deploying their strategies, it was almost impossible for the HEIs not to think of their 
students as consumers, or to speak about either the students or the institutions as being 
involved in, or forming, various markets. For sure, many interviewees saw the 
imaginary of the student consumer as abhorrent, with some hankering back to a 
bygone age when “the economic purposes of HE were immaterial” (Interviewee, 102), 
“the social benefits” outweighed “personal gain” (Interviewees 201, 301), the 
relationship between the academic and student was perceived to be “simpler” 
(Interviewees 205, 213, 307) and HE was “a good thing in and of itself” (Interviewee, 
412). However, the issue of the fee, the heightened competition and the uncertainty 
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that further marketization was bringing into the sector had fundamentally altered those 
values and relations. 
 
For all interviewees, multiple logics shaped their understandings of their relationship 
to the student-consumer: what one interviewee described as an “inside/outside”, 
“student/consumer” understanding (Interviewee, 105). On the one hand, as potential 
recruits on the “outside”, the universities were far more inclined to think of their future 
students as consumers of an “offer” that the universities needed to market. Whilst 
many were still concerned about the detrimental effects that consumerization might 
have on HE – even at the recruitment stage – they still understood that the cost-
covering fee was “a game-changer” (Interviewee, 112). Students would “want to know 
that they [were] getting value for money” (Interviewee, 401), and the universities had 
to respond. This was what the “new context” of HE was telling them (e.g. 
Interviewees, 103, 206, 302, 408). On the other hand, once students had been recruited 
to “the inside”, their relationship with the HEI would have to be managed such that 
their demands would not get out of control (e.g. Interviewees 103, 112, 204, 212, 309, 
403, 405). Whilst the universities still had to deliver on the offer promised (otherwise, 
as one senior manager and long-time academic put it, “the word will spread” and 
“what they Tweet is highly influential!” (Interviewee, 203)), and whilst some 
interviewees truly saw real value in treating the student as ‘a consumer’ – even at the 
student stage – the relationship that the university and its staff would have with the 
student could not be understood in simple producer-consumer terms. Student 
expectations and demands could not dominate the universities’ social relations of 
value. If they did, at best, it could “lead along the road to litigation” (Interviewee, 
405); at worst it could “undermine the value of what higher education is really all 
about” (Interviewee, 201). 
 
Thus, each interviewee provided a variety of logics for both deploying and varying the 
tactics of government and strategies of the university. This was a complex negotiation 
of value and values as the market imaginary (as discursively produced by policy) was 
confronted by complex economic geographies and the social relations of value that 
shape them. 
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6.2.1 Enhancing the student experience: the defence of space in the struggle over value 
Examining how the HEIs put into practice their various strategies for enhancing ‘the 
student experience’ provides an excellent starting point for exploring such complexity. 
Getting universities to reposition students as consumers and HEIs as producers in a 
close market relationship was a goal that the White Paper hoped to achieve, in part, by 
asking HEIs to reflect upon the nature, quality and value of ‘the student experience’ on 
offer. Since fees had been introduced in 1997, and particularly since 2006 with the 
introduction of differential/top-up fees and the heightened competition that they were 
designed to engender, the student experience had become part and parcel of 
mainstream HE discourse (WHEF, 2011). However, as the Browne Review 
underscored, according to National Student Survey statistics, students themselves were 
“no more satisfied” with HE than they had been ten years before (2010: 23). 
Employers were reporting that many graduates lacked the skills needed to improve 
productivity. Institutions lacked the funding needed to invest in improvements to the 
education they provided. And, in any case, “the incentives for them to improve the 
student experience” were “limited” due to Government ex-ante funding (ibid). Indeed, 
evidence from UUK suggested that both institutional autonomy and student choice 
were heavily constrained by the current funding system, with those best placed to 
judge the value of undertaking a higher education – that is, the student-consumers – 
having limited sight of, input into, or control over the experience they were buying due 
to their financial distance from it (ibid: 23-25). 
 
The White Paper was clear that putting students in the driving seat and identifying 
them as the consumers of HE would help drive up the quality of the system – 
particularly the quality of teaching. And, of course, this was due to the closer 
proximity of student demand to the university providers through the process of 
exchange. The student-consumer, who would now be more deeply embedded into the 
universities social relations of value through the payment of the full-cost fee, would 
seek out the best quality experience that the universities could offer. Thus, their 
demands would increase the quality of the taught experience throughout the English 
HE sector (BIS: 2011a). 
 
The market rationale underpinning the discourses of the White Paper was not lost on 
the HEIs – a point to which we shall return in a moment. Indeed, each institution 
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displayed a very clear understanding that attaching HE funding to the student would 
“fundamentally change the relationship between the student and the institution” 
because students would “inevitably want to know what extra value they were getting 
for the money that they [would] now be paying in fees” (Interviewee, 401). However, 
as indicated above, the vast majority of interviewees sought to reject the notion that the 
student could be understood as a consumer whose demands should shape the nature 
and value of the experience that the universities felt they should provide. As one senior 
manager involved with student recruitment put it: 
“Seeing the student as a consumer is both academically and educationally faulty 
because what education is about is seeing a person through a progression, and that is 
not something that they can buy. There will be assessment at university, and not 
everybody is going to make it – albeit that it is our responsibility to help as many 
students to succeed as possible. In addition, it just puts the student in the wrong place in 
terms of demanding a particular experience. Even our student union is very ‘anti’ 
seeing a student as a consumer because they think that students will lose out from that 
view: they won’t appreciate the wider benefits of higher education if they simply view it 
as a commodity”. 
(304, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Strategist) 
 
Such an understanding that HE was so much more than a simple commodity that 
could, and should, be influenced by consumer demand was echoed throughout each 
institution, with the vast majority of interviewees underscoring the pastoral nature of 
the university-student relationship and/or the, almost, transcendental nature of the 
value of the student experience. For some, being an educator was “more of a 
mentoring role”: “a kind of advisory figure for the students’ troubles”, whereas “if 
you’re a customer and you run into personal difficulties, it’s going to be tough for you” 
because in a market relationship “we could end up charging more for that sort of 
service” (Interviewee, 206). For others, it simply wasn’t possible for the student to 
“grasp” or “test” the value of the student experience even in the three or four years that 
an undergraduate would spend with the university. Rather, the student wouldn’t “know 
for years to come” whether their experience would be “useful or valuable to them” 
because they couldn’t “put an absolute value on the broad skills that the educational 
experience [would] bring either educationally, socially, emotionally or so on” 
(Interviewee, 108). As such, it simply wasn’t possible for potential students to “put a 
price on [their university experience]”. The universities had “an enormous 
 217 
responsibility to educate [their] students”, and “part of that education” was that they 
were “not consumers” (ibid). 
 
At the same time, it was almost impossible for the interviewees to talk about 
enhancing the student experience without considering the student as a consumer – at 
least in part. Now that home undergraduates were entering more deeply into the 
universities’ social relations of value through the cost-covering fee, many felt that it 
was ‘only right’ to consider offering the sort of student experience that the student-
consumer demanded. Indeed, each HEI took the problem of enhancing the student 
experience very seriously. Given the progressive expansion of HE, the increased 
competition and the concomital shifts in the universities’ social relations of value, the 
experience that the universities had traditionally, and recently, offered students needed 
to be re-examined: 
“Having removed the safety net of the block grant, the student experience really starts 
to take on a requirement to be cherished, nurtured, grown, improved and reflected on in 
a way that it never was in the past. Students used to be very happy to go to university, 
see the occasional learned professor… and then just get on with it themselves. The 
educational part was more about osmosis through being in a learned environment. And 
that was fine when you had very small numbers of universities and students. Now that 
we’ve got larger numbers of students going to more universities, it becomes important 
for competing institutions and academics looking for promotion to be thinking more 
about teaching because, clearly, that’s where the money is coming from. The money’s a 
very clear indication that we need to think about that”. 
(206, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Of course, the actual strategies for enhancing the student experience that each HEI 
formulated were deeply influenced by their core understandings of their relational 
economic geographies. Since each university served a different “client group” 
(Interviewee, 302) and held differing material and social possibilities for moving on in 
the world, the strategies they selected varied substantially across each institution. But 
the possibilities for the inevitable variation of policy metrics did not end there. As each 
of their strategies was put into practice, various understandings of the value of the 
student experience and various logics for employing the strategy guided and shaped 
the actions and activities of those involved – from the strategic directors, to academics, 
to, in some cases, the students themselves. On the one hand, the closer proximity of the 
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producer-consumer relationship was impossible for the HEIs to completely distance. 
On the other, a plethora of values underpinned the evaluations, actions and activities 
for enhancing the student experience that the universities felt they wanted, or needed, 
to offer. 
 
The case of GE provides an excellent, in-depth example for exploring these processes. 
As with each institution, GE by-and-large did not want to position the home 
undergraduate student as a consumer with whom they were in a close market 
relationship. Whilst there had been a lot of talk within the sector in recent years about 
students starting to behave more like consumers, the university’s strategic leaders and 
academics with whom I spoke didn’t always see it that way. Rather, HE was very 
much about “operating in partnership with students” with everyone involved “trying to 
achieve the same thing” (Interviewee, 102). Certainly, GE had a duty to provide their, 
largely, middle-class students with a service for which they would now be paying a 
substantial fee. But their students were not consumers of a product. Such a model, if 
accepted by the sector, would not only be “disastrous for the institutions”, it would be 
“disastrous for the students” (Interviewee, 111). According to Interviewee -111, a 
long-time administrator who had come into HE from industry, for the institutions it 
implied that the autonomous universities and the academics that worked in them were 
simply incapable of taking the students’ interests seriously without being driven by 
consumer demand. For the students, it implied that they knew everything that they 
needed to about the value of a higher education before they arrived – and they, simply, 
didn’t. Yes, the students were “making an investment: conceptually, physically, 
mentally, emotionally and financially” and they would surely “want a return on that 
investment”. But they also had to recognize that they “had to put something in, in 
order to get something out” (ibid). As such, GE had to be “confident enough” to “not 
allow consumerism to define the model of the student experience”: to define what is 
and is not value in the field of HE (ibid; Interviewee, 106). 
 
However, despite such reticence, enhancing the student experience had now become 
“decidedly more explicit” for GE (Interviewee, 109). Indeed, interviewee testimonies 
variously highlighted three dominant factors that, since the release of the White Paper, 
were engendering “a far greater sense of urgency across the institution” (ibid). First, 
the entire sector was being “explicitly held accountable for the student experience” by 
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an “enforced burden of external regulation” headed by HEFCE as the new student-
consumer champion (ibid). GE had their QAA review coming up, the REF, and like 
every other institution they were facing a barrage of regulatory consultations that were 
“coming out like no tomorrow” (ibid). Just how many of those would “genuinely 
impact the day-to-day experience” that the university was giving their students was 
“unproven”. However, unlike the preceding year when the regulatory impetus simply 
“wasn’t there”, now, GE would “have to think tangibly” about what they were 
investing for the students who were coming in 2012 (ibid). 
 
A second factor that was “really focusing” GE’s attention was “the competition 
brewing across the sector” (Interviewee, 102). Although the university was 
“comfortable” with the value of their undergraduate offer, given their position as a 
highly ranked university whose students were predominantly AAB+, GE had a sense 
that each of their competitors would be “looking very hard at what their students 
receive, and… investing in all kinds of projects” (ibid). For sure, such investment was 
designed to attract the elite home undergraduate who was now far freer to choose their 
ultimate destination. But it was also designed to attract the elite overseas students 
whose fees in a highly competitive world market would, in many departments, now 
need to rise in order to keep apace with home fees (Interviewee, 112). As such, GE’s 
Vice Chancellor had highlighted to colleagues that the whole university had “to wake 
up and think about the students’ expectations” in relation to “the experience on offer” 
(ibid). Perhaps, “in the short term” they would “have to go through the valley of doom, 
just like everyone else” (Interviewee, 102). But given that the long-term survival of the 
institution was “critically dependent” on attracting “those really elite students” 
(Interviewee, 112), GE “certainly [didn’t] want to be left behind” (Interviewee, 102). 
 
Without doubt, each of these narratives found considerable weight with GE. However, 
for all of the interviewees a third factor – the undergraduate fee – was by far the most 
dominant social and material relation shaping the institution’s focus on the student 
experience. For a number of years, the university had successfully competed in a 
variety of markets – in particular overseas students, PGTs and MBAs. They’d invested 
in “new buildings, better facilities, more courses, more trips, special programmes and 
training activities – all the sorts of things, which [didn’t] exist at undergraduate level” 
(Interviewee, 103). Now that they were asking home undergraduates to pay £9000 per 
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year, provided the institution could “demonstrate a comparable level of excellence” in 
“the product” they were “selling” – “I mean, the degrees… not selling… you know 
what I mean” (Interviewee, 104) – then they could “justify having quite an 
entrepreneurial, business-like model in terms of a strategy” that would “make the 
undergraduate experience even more attractive: make those degrees, really, the very 
best” (ibid). As one strategic director “confessed” to me in the privacy of our interview 
space: 
“…And you can put me in the ‘bad guys’ category for this. I think this is something to 
celebrate! These are markets. We’ve been told to play in these markets. We’ve won in 
these markets. This is good news! If you go across to the business school: that beautiful 
building, those wonderful rooms: it is only for postgraduates… It is the best show in the 
shining example of the way in which the student experience has been enhanced in 
particular areas. Where those markets have been developed, resources have followed to 
develop those markets, but it hasn’t been spread more generally. The difference now is 
that it is everywhere: that is what the new context to that says. The new fees regime says 
every department at its core is now engaged in market activity”. 
(103, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Indeed, this is what the “new context” was telling GE. Just as they had needed to think 
about providing their postgraduate students with the “very best” experience in order to 
“win” in those markets, now, with the advent of the cost-covering undergraduate fee, 
GE had to be more responsive to the demands of this newly ‘subjectified’ student-
consumer (Interviewee, 112). Whereas previously, the public, ex-ante subsidization of 
the home undergraduate had enabled GE to distance their demands and focus, instead, 
on their own sets of values55, now, given the private, ex-post investment that the 
undergraduate would be making, the university was being told to “really think about… 
the currency of the student experience” (Interviewee, 107, emphasis original). “What 
value [would] their degree offer them for the on-going job market?” “What attributes 
[could GE] give to their home undergraduates that [would] allow them to talk about, in 
the most convincing way, what they [could] take into any stage of their life?” (ibid). 
                                                        
55 The spatiality of these relations of value is quite fascinating. Having the Government purchase HE on 
behalf of the consumer (at least in the major part) enabled the HEIs to provide their undergraduates 
with, in their own opinions, a far lesser quality experience. This was despite the fact that their 
undergraduates frequented, but didn’t quite ‘share’, the same spaces with their fee-paying, overseas and 
postgraduate neighbours. The work that must have gone into maintaining this ‘consumer-non-consumer’ 
dual identity amongst the undergraduate population must have been substantial, given the proximity of a 
different set of social relations of value. 
 221 
 
And yet, as one of the Deans of Faculty underscored, in putting their strategy into 
practice, GE needed to establish “a very clear vision” regarding the level at which the 
undergraduates’ demands would become “unreasonable” (Interviewee, 106). There 
was “an obvious downside to seeing students as consumers” (Interviewee, 101). It 
would mean that the university would have to comply with the students’ and 
Government’s emphasis on the value of teaching, and GE just had to “be honest about 
that” (ibid). Not every academic in the research-led institution was equally committed 
to teaching. Indeed, it would be “ludicrous to make out anything else” (ibid). 
Moreover, now that individuals were “being encouraged to measure their own value 
for money”, how could GE “explain to the student that, actually, their fees [didn’t] 
cover the full cost of the research academic, but [were] contributing towards the 
collective costs of the university… and the social value of higher education by paying 
into some sort of collective pot?” (Interviewee, 111) Those values had been “lost in the 
debate because it [was] all formulated around ‘I pay – I get’”. The model was “too 
much like a personal account where the student would just like [GE] to tick off the 
pounds as [they] spent them”. It was all “very worrying” (ibid). 
 
While for some interviewees undertaking the student experience felt like “the right 
thing to do in the market sense” (Interviewee, 103), for others, it was also “right” in 
terms of “building a, kind of, collective responsibility” (Interviewee, 105). As one 
strategic leader involved with the student experience explained: consumerism was 
suggestive of a “passive model” of consumption, whereas GE’s students were “also 
part of operating and participating in the whole undertaking of which they [were] 
consumers” (ibid). As such, in attempting to establish their “very clear vision” of what 
GE was naming “the GE Community”, it was important that the student experience 
was something that the institution did “with students not to students” (Interviewee, 
103, emphasis original). 
 
In fact, over the passage of three days, the entire university was involved in “a 
massive, massive audit” of every course across 35 departments (Interviewee, 104). 
Academics, the Student’s Union, postgraduates and undergraduates alike sat across 
from one another trying to establish not only the students’ multiple desires in terms of 
facilities, experiences, and the whole of teaching and learning but, also, to provide 
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them with an insight into the workings of the university: to provide them a better 
understanding of the “collective value” of what a university could be (Interviewee, 
105). As one senior Manager put it: 
“It’s not that consumerism is necessarily a bad thing, but it comes at a price. Students 
start to see university as a kind of product, but it isn’t really meant to be about that. It’s 
about your capacity to be inventive and creative, and your ability to get on with your 
peers, work in a learning community, and to be a global citizen. Those imperatives start 
to get drowned out if you are not very careful”. 
(101, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
From the above testimonies, it was evident that ensuring that the collective values of 
the university had not been drowned by the values of the market was widely held as “a 
rather positive outcome from this awful situation” (Interviewee, 103). So too had been 
the opportunity to “really engage” with the diverse expectations, experiences and 
values of both students and staff. And, rather unexpectedly, it had been the fee that had 
produced those “positive outcomes”: i.e. the shift in their social relations of value  
(Interviewees 103, 105, 108, 111). As one strategic manager and long-time academic 
noted, GE would have undertaken their reviews anyway as part of the QAA 
(Interviewee, 108). But they never would have come together as a community, “were it 
not for the increase in the fee” (ibid). Nor would they have recognized, collectively, 
just how ‘utterly committed’ to teaching the vast majority of the academics, actually, 
were (Interviewees 103, 106, 108, 111, 113). The “serious driver of all the excellent 
work” they had done had been “the external environment” and the “higher 
expectations” that they knew would come from students (Interviewee, 108). None-the-
less, it was imperative that “the students should not engage in a relationship with their 
educators as if it were a market transaction”. And for many of the interviewees, the 
university had “a big responsibility to articulate those values” (ibid). 
 
GE’s story underscores just how impossible it is to think about socio-economic 
processes such as marketization as being either resisted or not resisted; as becoming 
either embedded or transformed. In exploring how GE put their strategies for the 
student experience into practice and, thus, re-introduced complexity as they moved on 
in the world, the research bears witness to the concomitant resistance of, compliance 
with – and valuation of – the market values that the governmental technology of the 
White Paper sought to engender, at the same time as it bears witness to their 
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concomitant embedding and transformation. Multiple logics, evaluations and social 
relations of value shaped the way in which GE’s strategy for enhancing the student 
experience unfolded in practice. And this was the same for all of the HEIs. 
 
In the following section I explore the Coalition Government’s attempt to induce neo-
liberally informed producer-consumer relations into HE’s framework of action through 
the embedding of a central element of a free market: i.e. information. In so doing, it 
becomes clear that the HEIs were not averse to implementing and valuing certain 
market relations, per se. Far from it. Rather, they were resistant, most particularly, to 
Government interference but, also, to any other ‘interested party’ directly dominating 
their social relations of value. 
 
6.2.2 Information? Absolutely! Key Information Sets? Only because we have to! 
“Whether consumers are sovereign depends, among other things, on their access to 
information – information, which it may or may not be in suppliers interests to provide. 
Real markets, embedded, regulated and characterized by imperfect and unevenly 
distributed information, are effectively actual or potential fields of struggle. Hence, as 
Elson (1988) emphasizes, markets don’t have to be simply accepted on existing terms or 
rejected; they can be further socialized and politicized, and behaviour within them 
changed.” 
(Sayer, 1995: 122) 
 
Sayer’s (1995) emphasis that real markets, characterized by imperfect and unevenly 
distributed information, are “fields of struggle”, is at the heart of my investigations. 
Yet, as this section on the implementation of Key Information Sets (KIS) will 
demonstrate, Elson’s (1988) view that markets can be “further socialized and 
politicized, and behaviour within them changed” is, perhaps, rather too straightforward 
a statement, which belies the complexity and multiplicity of what may be meant by 
‘socialization’, ‘politicization’ and, indeed, ‘behaviour’. As argued in Chapter Two of 
this thesis, political-economic programmes such as neoliberalization are “constantly 
confronted by social diversity” (Lee, 2006: 421). Thus, any imagined economy is 
“only ever partially constituted” (Jessop, 2004: 163) due to the enormous effort it 
would take to fully normalise and embed any single political-imagination of what 
economic practice – or, what value – should or should not be. 
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That said, as detailed in Chapter Four, the sense that the ‘market imaginary’ could be 
further embedded into HE’s framework of action via a struggle over what constitutes 
the socio-economic practices and value of HE, is precisely what the White Paper set 
out to achieve. Central to the coalition Government’s rationale was the notion that the 
better regulation of information that the ‘sovereign’ student-consumer could access 
would assure the quality of the HE sector by unleashing student demand. From 
September 2012, all publicly funded HEIs would have to provide KIS for each and 
every full- and part-time undergraduate course that came under the regulation of the 
QAA. This would make it easier for student-consumers to locate and compare 
information across diverse institutions, enabling them to take their custom to the 
institutions they felt were offering good value for their, now, cost-covering fees. As 
such, it would be much harder for institutions to avoid providing timely, accurate and 
salient information, which (according to the White Paper) both potential students and 
Government felt was valuable: the sort of information that would put the power to 
influence the shape, trajectory and value of HE directly into the hands of its consumers 
(BIS, 2011a: 2). 
 
In general terms, the interviewees saw KIS as just another, classic, “bright idea” 
emanating from Government and Whitehall, which the vast majority doubted would 
ever be of use to potential students in making their decisions about which university to 
attend and why. KIS smacked of “the Government believing its own rhetoric” that HE 
was “now a market” (Interviewee, 410) or, at minimum, “a much more student-
focused system” in which information mattered – “so let’s have KIS on everybody’s 
website so that people [could] compare and contrast” (Interviewee, 111). The task of 
gathering and compiling the data would be a “massive, massive validation and 
technical task” that would be “hugely expensive” because no-one collected the data 
required by Government – at least not all together, nor in the KIS format (Interviewee, 
402). As such, KIS was seen as a largely ‘bureaucratic exercise’ that the universities 
would undertake, certainly: it was a requirement of the White Paper which none of the 
interviewees spoke about either completely or forcefully resisting. But the ‘level of 
interference’ that it represented was deeply resented, and most HEIs would try to 
circumvent or add detail to its metrics in some way, depending on what they felt was 
of value or had the potential to help them survive and thrive amidst the emerging 
uncertainty and increased competition brought about by further marketization. 
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The dominant narrative that framed the HEIs’ desires to augment and/or re-articulate 
the provision of information was that KIS would be incomplete and distorted, 
reflecting only those values held as relevant by Government and, possibly, students. 
For many, the metrics that the White Paper required for KIS reflected a very narrow 
understanding of the value of HE: one that subjectified students as value-maximizing 
consumers, guided only by what Caliskan and Callon (2009a, 2009b) refer to as 
“economizing behaviours”, which the Government believed could be enhanced both 
by the information provided to them through KIS and their university experience. As 
one senior strategic leader elaborated: 
“If the context is where students are being told that you go to university to get a better 
job and better pay then it is perfectly reasonable to ask universities to provide the 
information that will justify those two, but only those two, values. What is your 
employment rate for graduates? What is the salary that they get? Can you justify, in 
very narrow metric terms, how you treat your students while they are with you with a 
view to maximizing their perceptions of gaining value for money?” 
(201, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
As such, for each HEI, the “sort of information” that universities were being asked to 
provide was “incomplete to the point of being grossly misleading” (ibid; see also 
Interviewees 101, 301, 401). 
 
For sure, some of the metrics required for KIS were seen as ‘perfectly reasonable’, 
providing the sort of information that the universities themselves already felt they 
could and should provide in order to both inform and attract potential students. 
However, other metrics required by KIS elicited considerable resistance from many of 
the participants regarding the shift this would represent in their social relations of 
value. This was not simply, or wholly, a resentment of bureaucracy or Government 
interference that the interviewees were expressing. Whilst the HEIs seemed 
‘reasonably comfortable’ with understanding potential students as ‘consumers’ of HE 
before their recruitment – while they were still “on the outside” as one strategic 
director put it (Interviewee, 105) – they did not want to see their consumerization 
based on certain understandings of Value with which the universities most 
fundamentally disagreed: 
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“It’s perfectly reasonable that we should say what our fee is, how much our 
accommodation is. We do all that now. We make available NSS and employment 
destination survey information, which probably if you’re a family is quite difficult to 
know where to find. But exactly how much examination and coursework students will 
get is incredibly complex because it’s different on every unit. And the idea that more 
contact-hours means better learning, disgusts me! You can be in contact 12 hours a day 
and not have the kind of experience that a potential graduate should have about 
developing research skills, developing autonomy, setting your own targets, etc. I’m all 
for good information, but if you’re using it for the “moneysupermarket.com approach” 
– I’ve got £8,000, I want somewhere in the South East and I want to do history, what 
can I get? – I think it's dangerous, really dangerous!” 
(402, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Elaborating the logics behind this narrative, two primary discourses dominated 
interviewee testimonies. Similar to one of the narratives that framed the Student 
Experience (see section 6.2.1, above), the first, less dominant, of the two discourses 
concerned a pastoral relationship between the universities and their students, the value 
of which many felt would be undermined if the narrow values expressed through KIS 
were allowed to dominate the flows of information throughout the sector. As 
Interviewee -402, above, explained, the “fear” was that KIS would “become a 
substitute for real support to potential students, and that [would] be a great pity”. This 
loss was not simply an effect of KIS, however. The erosion of “real support” was 
something that had been occurring for many years under the pressure of marketization, 
and the “real support” – the “good information” and services – that was needed to 
uphold a pastoral relationship held as valuable, was something that the universities, 
somehow, had to regain: 
“What we really need is to reinvent our connections and services and make sure that 
colleges and schools have got really good, up to date information to give the very best 
advice to quite vulnerable young people”. 
(Ibid) 
 
The second, more dominant discourse underscored a “fundamental disagreement”, not 
that potential recruits could be understood as consumers, per se: rather, that they could 
be understood as rational consumers. Without doubt, all of the universities recognized 
the importance of “good information” in both helping potential students to make their 
evaluations and in providing HEIs with the opportunity to market themselves to 
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potential “client groups” (Interviewee, 302). However, given the knowledge that the 
interviewees had of their students and the people they tended to recruit, they simply 
couldn’t imagine those individuals fitting the identity of the rational, calculating, 
economic actor that the neoliberally informed metrics of the White Paper were 
attempting to produce. 
 
For some of the participants – predominantly from the medium-low ranked institutions 
– this was a reflection on the capacity and/or desire of the “average 18-year old or their 
parents” not to become “confused” by the vast swathe of comparisons that KIS was 
asking them to make (e.g. Interviewee, 412). They, the universities, could understand 
the legislation, but with regards to their students and their families, it smacked of 
“confused.com” (ibid). In part, this was because the universities’ own marketing 
departments would inevitably “go round trying to market alternative views” to 
potential students, trying to highlight what the institution thought was valuable about 
HE as well as what may be attractive to recruits (Interviewee, 304). Moreover, KIS 
was seen to favour potential students from middle-class backgrounds rather than help a 
different, lower class of students whose families and schools often had limited 
experience of HE (Interviewee, 405). In putting their information strategies into 
practice, each institution would need to consider the subjectivities of their typical 
students and put forward their message accordingly. 
 
For other interviewees – more evenly spread across all four cases – the simplistic 
imaginary of the rational, economizing consumer who was largely focused on price 
missed out the complexity of human subjectivity and the “strange mix of intervening 
variables” (Interviewee, 101) – the multiple values and logics – that were important 
and rational to the students. For sure, the narrow set of values set out in KIS was never 
going to turn students into the “discerning consumers” signified in “Government 
rhetoric” (e.g. Interviewees 111, 212, 304, 401). As one university strategist and 
governor of a local secondary school explained: 
“Although there is that idea of shopping around within a marketplace, the student body, 
those 18-year-olds who by and large make up the majority of our students, don’t 
necessarily make their choices in the way the rational consumer of Government rhetoric 
would. So although marketisation and this idea of creating a market are around, the 
target audience is alien to this. These ideas should only be put in place when the market 
demands it, when the customer demands it; and in this case that would be the students. 
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The students don’t choose their university based on KIS data or even, I don’t think, 
economic price: they make their choices based on a variety of things that are important 
to them”. 
(406, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic, Public Service) 
 
Importantly, when speaking about the need for HEIs to produce information in order to 
attract potential students and differentiate themselves from competing institutions, it 
was not that the interviewees were outright rejecting the idea of the student-consumer. 
Nor were they outright rejecting the understanding that HE had become more of a 
market in which the universities needed to compete and survive. Rather, they were 
resisting the notion that Government should be involved in shaping the subjectivities 
and evaluations of, most particularly, potential students, but also the HEIs themselves, 
through policy metrics that directly involved their social relations of value. As a result, 
if the universities wanted to keep both Government and student demand ‘at arms 
length’ and maintain their autonomy, they would need to reverse their failings of the 
past and close down the space for Government intervention by putting forward a 
narrative about the university that they held as valuable. 
 
For one interviewee at GE, there had been “a failure on the part of institutions to be 
clear what the nature of their particular experience” was and “a failure on the part of 
the individual to understand the system” (Interviewee, 111). If the universities were, 
indeed, “autonomous institutions”, they “should be confident enough” to “use 
autonomous language” to “make it clear” what they valued and what they did not. Yet, 
“so many institutions” clung to “blanket terms like ‘research-led’ and ‘teaching-led’ 
because if they let go, suddenly they [would not be] part of that mission group” (ibid). 
If the sector was “full of competing institutions”, then they “should be confident to 
describe themselves and let people choose” them “for what they were and what they 
were trying to do”. The autonomous universities had to “be brave enough to be clear” 
(ibid). 
 
Of course, as detailed in Chapter Five, in developing a “clear narrative” in the 
immediacy of strategy formation, the complexity of social relations and meanings that 
make up economic geographies is reduced, even though the values set out in 
Government policy are immediately varied by the diversity of economic geographies 
that exist. However, when the HEIs came to put their strategies into practice, they were 
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immediately confronted by the multiplicity of logics, values and evaluations that make 
up the Ordinary Economy. 
 
FTL, for example, had a very clear message regarding the student fee that they wanted 
to market to potential recruits as part of their overall information strategy. For this 
university, given what they knew about their ‘typical’ students and the stories that had 
been circulating in the media regarding the spiralling costs of HE, it was important that 
potential recruits understood the ‘progressive nature’ of the loans system set out by 
Government. Indeed, their ‘outreach team’ spent a lot of time and effort imagining the 
fears that their typical students and their families might have about getting into debt 
and the sort of questions they might therefore raise at the university’s open days. Yet, 
when the open days arrived, FTL was confronted by a completely different, and 
unexpected, scenario: 
“What we do with KIS and how we interpret it in terms of our client groups is the 
critical issue… You’ve got to stick really close to the needs and interests of that market 
and respond to it. Part of that response has to be the clarity that you give in terms of the 
information that you present; and if you don’t do that people will quickly tell you. For 
instance, the first open day that we had here after all the media hype came out around 
fees, we thought that we would have to answer lots of questions about how much it 
would cost and the levels of debt. But we got hardly any – hardly any! We’d set up all 
sorts of ways in which people could ask the question, and we got all sorts of literature to 
help them, but they didn’t ask the question! So the “right” information is what people 
want, need and desire, not necessarily the information that we want to give them, and 
that can be a real challenge”. 
(302, Senior Management VCO, Medium-time Manager, Education) 
 
Palace Aspirational faced similar complexity, only this time in asking their staff to 
comply with their strategy. As with FTL and the other HEIs, the presentation of 
information to potential students represented a complex entanglement of logics, 
opportunities and constraints in shaping the university’s emerging social relations of 
value. For PA, the fact that students would be presented with a publicly available set of 
information about what universities do was “definitely focusing [their] minds” on 
making certain that the distinctiveness and value of their offer would be visible and 
comprehensible amidst the metrics set out in KIS (Interviewee, 204). 
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As discussed in Chapter Five above, following the 2008 RAE, PA had “needed a major 
rebrand” (Interviewee, 203) because they felt that their identity had changed. They had 
climbed significantly in the league tables and, having failed to grasp the opportunity 
earlier, they now wanted to describe themselves in such a way that potential students 
would understand the quality of the student experience they could expect. As one 
strategic director involved with teaching and learning expounded: 
“Since the last RAE we have changed; but nobody really knows… So we’re now trying 
to work out through committees how to make sure that the better quality students have a 
very easy ‘click’ that gets them to the next level of information that fleshes out the KIS 
numbers – employability particularly. Not only are they using material that will be quite 
old, it’s about students who probably came in five years ago. So for an organisation like 
ours, which has changed a lot in ten years and is on the up attracting higher quality 
students, KIS won’t do us justice.” 
(203, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Although some of those committee members supported the university’s information 
strategy – particularly since KIS was generally understood as “onerous Government 
micromanaging” (Interviewee, 212) – the strategy also met with considerable 
resistance. For some interviewees, the very existence of KIS signified that Palace 
should respond using the same metrics and language as KIS because: 
“…the league tables will come out and students will look at the contact hours and 
at how much they are paying and think, is this value for money?” explained 
Interviewee -212. 
For others, resistance arose from the fact that PA would be moving away from certain 
values that stemmed from the institution’s rootedness in the local area if, suddenly, 
they started recruiting ‘better quality students’ from around the country on higher 
tariffs (e.g. Interviewees 209, 210, 212). Although high-ranking HEIs tended to be 
more selective, PA had risen up the league tables serving a particularly local 
population in an area of high deprivation and their ethic of widening access was well 
known throughout the sector. As such, a number of the interviewees didn’t see why the 
institution now wanted to adopt an information strategy that would undermine those 
social relations and values (ibid). Furthermore, the information required for KIS was 
often information that was of import to their, traditionally, ‘typical’ potential students. 
For those staff working “at the front face” who were regularly confronted by student 
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demands, it was unethical for the university to try to avoid the values of the student-
consumer as discursively constructed by KIS in favour of a narrative that the 
university wanted to construct. The value of HE to students should not be undermined 
by the values of university autonomy: 
“KIS will make it a lot easier for students to compare information across different 
universities, and it will allow them to make more informed decisions. So if universities 
have nothing to hide they should have nothing to fear. I think it is good because it will 
make us tidy up the information that we give to students and present it in a more 
coherent way, but it needs to be information that the students need not just what we 
want to tell them. Sometimes we, as an office, find it difficult to get that sort of 
information out of departments. But we are at the front face meeting students on a 
regular basis, and KIS will be useful. If students are borrowing money and having to 
pay fees, they want to know how much contact time they are going to get… Our students 
are becoming more savvy: particularly about relating where we are in league tables to 
what they are getting for their money.” 
(209, Senior Management, Steering, WP, Project Management) 
 
Perhaps, what is of interest about the Government’s determination to engender 
consumer-producer relations through regulating the availability of more timely, 
accurate and salient information regarding the value of HE is that each HEI, in one 
way or another, had already undertaken what all of the interviewees openly described 
as ‘market activity’. And this was without the impetus of direct Government 
intervention. By attempting to ‘pin down’ the practices and value of HE through a 
reduced understanding of students’ demands and desires, the Government was actually 
getting in the way of the plurality of values, which according to neoliberal thinkers 
such as Hayek (1973, 1979) and Friedman (1980) could be satisfied only though free 
market relations: that is, validated through the process of exchange. 
 
However, and perhaps most importantly, my exploration of how the HEIs variously 
put their information strategies into practice has underscored the concomital 
normalisation and variation of ‘governmental’ technologies, tactics and techniques 
(and that is ‘governmental’ in the ‘small g’ sense as elaborated by Foucault (2000), 
Rose and Miller (1992) and Dean (1999)). For both the strategies of the HEIs and the 
Government’s technology of KIS were confronted by a diversity of logics, evaluations 
and values, which ensured that no single, reduced political, economic or social 
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imagination could come to fully constitute or define the universities’ social relations of 
value. As the HEIs moved from construal to construction, so complexity was 
necessarily re-introduced in and through their concrete, relational economic 
geographies. And multiple logics, values and evaluations underpinned their socio-
economic practices. 
 
6.2.3 Traversing the identity threshold: The Student Charter and the inside-outside 
student-consumer 
The final example that I want to explore in this section is the deployment of the, so-
called, ‘Student Charter’ by HEIs. In early-mid 2010, the Minister of State for 
Universities and Science, David Willetts MP, had asked the NUS, UUK and GuildHE 
to form a small “task and finish” working group to bring together representatives from 
HEIs and students to “explore best practice in the use of Student Charters and other 
student agreements” (SCG, 2011: 3). Since top-up fees had been introduced in 2006, 
Charters and similar documents, which formed a variety of loose agreements between 
HEIs and their students, had proliferated unevenly across the HE sector setting out a 
diversity of ‘rights and responsibilities’ for both parties. Now, given that the Browne 
Review into university funding was well under way, the Government wanted to 
rationalize their production. Thus, the Student Charter Group (SCG) was 
commissioned to produce “a toolkit for HEIs and Students Unions” who, working 
together, should, at minimum, reach “a new basic standard” by incorporating certain 
“key principles” for the Charters’ development, design and use (ibid: 3-12). 
 
In setting out their Final Report, the SCG was “very aware that major changes to the 
higher education funding system and its regulatory framework” would “greatly 
influence the nature of the relationship between HEIs and students” (ibid: 4-6). Given 
the expected increase in competition across the sector, there would be “increased 
pressure for HEIs to be clear about what they provide[d] and how the experience at 
their particular institution differ[ed] from other universities” (ibid: 4). In addition, the 
Coalition Government had made “specific commitments” to help improve the 
availability of information to both prospective students (so that they could “make well-
informed choices when applying to higher education”) and actual students – so that 
they could “know” what to expect from HEIs and what HEIs could expect of them 
(ibid: 3). Whilst KIS was designed, primarily, to focus on prospective students, the 
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SCG’s remit was to focus on the latter: on the provision of information to students 
once they had crossed over to – or purchased into – the inside of higher education. 
 
Importantly, in principle, the Charters were not to be seen as ‘legal style, personal 
contracts’ between the HEIs and their students. Rather, the SCG recommended that 
they should act as “a front page”, with “clear links” and “signposting” to more detailed 
information in course handbooks (including assessment criteria and contact hours, etc.) 
and university regulations (such as complaints procedures and appeals) (ibid: 7-8). 
They should also “communicate the ethos of the institution” while emphasizing the 
“importance of belonging to a learning community” and the need for staff and students 
to “work in partnership” with one another (ibid: 7-8). Indeed, from their e-mail survey 
of all English UUK and GuildHE member institutions56, the SCG had found that 
Charters would work only if there were “real partnership working” between the 
institutions, the students and their representatives. By establishing clear mutual 
expectations and helping to monitor the student experience, the student would 
understand the need to develop clear working relationships. Thus, each HEI had to 
have “a clear communication and dissemination strategy… to ensure that the whole 
student body and all HEI staff [would be] informed and engaged” (ibid: 7). 
 
Given the SCG’s emphasis on ‘partnership working’ and ‘learning communities’, it is, 
perhaps, surprising that the Student Charter was seen by many of my interviewees as 
an additional element of the Government’s strategy to engender neoliberal market 
relations through the metrics of the White Paper. Indeed, in the opening lines to 
Section 3.3: “Student Charter”, the White Paper echoed the SCG’s sentiments stating 
that the student experience would be “most enriching” where such principles were 
fulfilled (BIS, 2011a: 33). However, as the White Paper, itself, stated with absolute 
clarity in its Executive Summary, the Government’s intention was that the Charters, 
“like student feedback”, would “take on a new importance to empower students whilst 
at university” (ibid: 6, emphasis added). For BIS, the Charters should: detail what 
students could expect from their institutions, particularly in terms of teaching and 
learning; include clear information for students on what to do if expected standards 
were not met; and help provide consistency of practice across subject areas (ibid: 33). 
                                                        
56 In total, the SCG surveyed 105 UUK and 31 GuildHE English institutions with an 88% and 61% 
response rate respectively. Of those institutions, 62 had Charters or similar agreements in place, and 
approximately 20 institutions were either in the process of, or considering, developing a Charter. 
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In other words, the White Paper left out the responsibilities that the universities could 
expect from their students57, but left in the responsibilities that the newly ‘empowered’ 
student-consumers could demand from their HEIs. Thus, with their overall sights set 
on creating a sector that was “freed to respond in new ways to the needs of students” 
(ibid: 3), the governmental technology of the Student Charter would fit very well with 
the values of the market as imagined by the Coalition. 
 
Of course, in examining how the HEIs put their strategies for implementing the 
Student Charter into practice, again, my research bears witness to a complex 
negotiation of value and values as first, the semiotically reduced understandings of the 
market imaginary, and second, the semiotically reduced strategies of the HEIs, were 
met by a multiplicity of logics and social relations that give form to concrete economic 
geographies. For, on the one hand, although each HEI was determined to recapture the 
ethos of ‘partnership working’ set out by the SCG (which, of course, was informed by 
a diversity of experiences and values from across the HE sector) their reasons and 
strategies for doing so were each influenced by their particular socio-economic 
relations. On the other hand, although each HEI had a very clear strategy they wished 
to implement, a complexity of values and evaluations underpinned their eventual 
practice. As all of the actors moved from construal to construction, so complexity was 
re-introduced in and through their emerging economic geographies and the social 
relations of value that shape them. 
 
As with the implementation of the student experience and KIS, the four case studies 
were, by-and-large, resistant to understanding the student as a consumer of HE in 
relation to the Student Charter. As one strategic director, whose own teenager was 
currently applying to a variety of universities, put it: 
“We have a contract with the student, but it is that we deliver an education and they 
show up and work with us to help us deliver on it; and that seems the right contract. 
Seeing the student as a consumer, I feel, is a lose-lose situation”. 
(207, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
For this interviewee, the student would lose because the majority were already quite 
economically “tactical” in their approach to their education, enquiring about specific 
personal ‘costs’ or ‘inputs’ that would be required in exchange for their degree: 
                                                        
57 Indeed, the only mention of students’ responsibilities in the White Paper was that they should 
“actively draw on all the resources that a good university or college [could] offer” (BIS, 2011a: 33). 
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“’What do I need to do to get a 2:1?’ ‘What time do I really need to spend on 
independent study?’ ‘How well do I need to do on this exam?’” (ibid). If the 
Government and students then added a monetary value into the exchange process then 
universities – indeed, the whole of society – would also lose out: 
“If Government and the student consumer then add in a kind of, ‘if I add a little bit more 
in terms of payment, will I get more for it?’ Or, ‘how do I buy extras on top?’ then we 
are on a very slippery slope. This sort of thinking devalues their degrees, and it devalues 
universities”. 
(Ibid) 
 
Underpinning this interviewee’s narrative were two discourses that most dominated all 
four HEIs’ reasoning for attempting to recapture the ethos of ‘partnership working’ in 
their strategic implementation of the Student Charter. The first probed the nature of the 
‘product’ or ‘experience’ that the student was now buying and their resultant 
expectations that might affect the newly rationalized ‘contracts’. Since the introduction 
of top-up fees in 2006, student expectations around what they were purchasing had 
gone up. They now expected “a brilliant three years” with the universities expected to 
“get them a job at the end of it”; and if the universities failed to deliver, then the 
students would ask “why not?” (Interviewee, 210). Students were “more savvy” about 
contact hours and league tables; they “shopped around” for the best bursaries and 
scholarships; they were “more interested” about work experience and vocational 
elements of courses; and they were “more discerning” regarding if higher education 
was right for them (see Interviewees 109, 110, 207, 210, 305, 307, 406, 408). As one 
interviewee explained, the students would now “look at anything” that would indicate 
that they were “getting value for money” (Interviewee, 210).  
 
For many of the interviewees, most disturbing regarding this shift in the universities’ 
social relations of value was that, once potential students had traversed the ‘outside-
inside’ subjectivity threshold to become actual students, they now perceived that they 
had certain rights: “I am paying for this, I have a right to your time. I am paying for 
this, I have a right to talk in your lecture” (Interviewee, 212). This was “the sort of 
demand culture” that was “attached to this idea of the consumer” (Interviewee, 405). 
There was a “mentality of entitlement brought about by consumerization”; and it was 
“only going to get worse” (Interviewee, 212). Indeed, a “mind set of consumerization” 
was “coming into higher education” – “really scaring” a variety of staff because, as 
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one long-time academic put it, “the students are in cloud cuckoo land! They think that 
as they are paying more money they have a right to all these things, and patently, that 
is not the case!” (ibid). Consumerization was “undermining the value of higher 
education”, and something tangible had to be done (Interviewee, 304). 
 
The second discourse related to who was responsible for providing students with, or 
getting students through, their degree. In certain respects, students could be seen as 
consumers. Some chose to take rooms that were provided through the university; they 
ate in the universities’ cafes; they shopped in the universities’ shops; they paid for 
certain facilities that the universities provided. So there was “an element” wherein the 
students were using the universities’ “commercial services” such that “they might 
reasonably think of themselves as consumers” (Interviewee, 204). But in relation to 
education and learning, the majority of the interviewees did not accept the ‘student as 
consumer’ as “a helpful metaphor” (Interviewee, 204). Rather, the most appropriate 
relationship that described the shared nature of higher education was that of the 
partnership: 
“I don’t think that education is possible on the basis of consumption because the 
consumer doesn’t have responsibility for the quality of the product in that model, 
whereas the student does have responsibility for the quality of their learning. So it is not 
an image that I find helpful. Students are partners rather than consumers, and that 
allows people to take responsibility for their lives in a quite significant way. That is why 
the partnership in learning is so key because you have to decide, as a student: ‘this is 
what I want to be’; ‘this is what I want to do’.” 
(204, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
In attempting to describe an appropriate context for their preferred relationship, over a 
third of the interviewees from across each institution turned to the metaphor of ‘the 
gym’ in order to elaborate the distribution of rights and responsibilities that they felt 
the educational relationship entailed. Whilst many felt a “deep concern” for students 
who, as one interviewee put it, were “still finding themselves in this new role” 
(Interviewee, 105), the educational exchange relationship was “rather different” from 
that of the “conventional consumer” (ibid). Students couldn’t simply “come in” and 
“give the universities money” in exchange for their degrees (Interviewee, 412). Once 
the student was “at university” they were “also part of operating and participating in 
the whole undertaking of which they [were] consumers” (Interviewee, 105). As such, 
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once they had taken on the mantle of “student” by traversing the identity threshold, 
they were “inside its production as well as outside” (ibid). And that’s why the Student 
Charter was “so important to the universities” (Interviewee, 412). They had to “get that 
relationship across to the student” (ibid). As one senior strategic leader expounded: 
“I will never use the term consumer in relation to a student. Students engage in a 
partnership with universities in which they are, absolutely, entitled to an education in 
which the institution fulfils their side of the bargain. But the university is also entitled to 
expect students to fulfil their half of the bargain, and if they do not, then the outcome is 
that they don’t receive a degree. The model that people use sometimes is that it is like a 
gym. Yes, you should expect all of the equipment to work and the gym instructors to 
know what they are talking about, but, actually, if you want to get fit you have to do that 
yourself; and just paying an expensive membership fee is not enough… It is not part of 
the bargain that the university will guarantee that the student gets a degree. The student 
fee is buying an opportunity: it’s for an education and it’s for a service; but it is not for 
buying a degree”. 
(201, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
Given the ever-expanding number and diversity of institutions across the English HE 
sector, there would be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategic selection and application of the 
Student Charter (SCG, 2011). As one interviewee who had regular contact with the 
sector’s Registrars underscored: HE was “too often presented as this homogenous 
thing”, but in reality it was both “confusing” and “confused”; and the move to “a more 
marketised system” had probably “exacerbated the confusion” (Interviewee, 111). 
Indeed, both “the consumerization of higher education and the Charter model” were 
“presenting really important tests for universities” at that moment, and each institution 
had “to be clear” about what their obligations were, and what their students’ 
obligations were: what their rights were, and what their students’ rights were. But the 
diversity of these would be reflective of “the colour and texture of the system” (ibid). 
 
For sure, the four HEIs reflected such diversity, with each making meaning of the 
Student Charter in relation to their own emerging economic geographies. Down Town 
Coastal, for example, was putting together their strategy for the Student Charter at the 
time they allowed me access for my research, and it was highly apparent that their 
strategy was distinctly their own. For DTC, it was important to reflect the ‘dual 
identities’ of the student-consumer, which an important cadre of the institution’s 
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strategic leaders did not feel were wholly incompatible with one another given the 
history, identity and core ethos of the institution, and who they felt their typical 
students were. Undoubtedly, the Charter had to reflect that the degree was a 
partnership: “the university will do this, if the student will do that: it isn’t like walking 
into a shop to buy a can of beans” (Interviewee, 401). The students had to put some 
work in order to fulfil their side of the bargain – so there was a bargain (ibid). But it 
was “better to express it in that big way rather than saying, ‘well you're buying this 
package so you have to pay X because you're getting that bit extra’” (interviewee, 
405). That way laid “student complaints” and “the road to litigation” (ibid). 
 
However, as detailed in Chapter Five, DTC was located in an area of high deprivation 
and it seemed very clear to each of its strategic leaders (a number of whom were 
trained economists) that HE and the onward job market were intrinsically intertwined 
in terms of student consumption. It was not as though the university could simply 
ignore the demands of their students. And although DTC felt like a “local university”, 
for many years they had, in fact, been marketing themselves to far more “distant” 
populations of home undergraduates compared to other mid-low ranked competitors in 
their region (Interviewees 402, 405, 410, 412). So DTC had long-understood – and 
practised – the need to balance the ‘high church’ values of HE with the ‘low church’ 
values of their various markets upon whom their survival now increasingly depended 
(Interviewees 401, 409, 415). 
 
Thus, in putting together their Charter, a core feature of which they were naming “the 
Student Voice”, DTC certainly wanted to reflect that there was a bargain to be struck 
between the institution and their students. None-the-less, the students still had “quite 
significant rights” as individuals exchanging “good money” for something they desired 
and valued (Interviewee, 401). As one of the strategic directors involved with 
developing the Student Voice iterated: 
“Look. If responding to student demand is being seen to be doing something 
appropriate then I am happy with that. But I am also happy to talk about partnerships: 
it’s just a different sort of language. You want to work together, and you want the 
students to take some responsibility in terms of their own experiences and the learning 
environment… But perhaps, earlier, too much of higher education was produced around 
the needs of the producers and their view of the world: not enough around the needs of 
the consumers. But these things have to exist together, and I strongly believe in that. So 
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these languages of demand and partnership aren’t incompatible. That’s why the 
university needs to put such an emphasis on the Student Voice in developing our 
Charter”. 
(408, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic) 
Thus, for DTC it was imperative that the Charter should help communicate to both 
students and staff that they each needed to take ownership of the shared and individual 
values on both sides of the higher education bargain. The university-producer and the 
student-consumer had to exist together – on the inside of a rather fuzzy identity 
threshold. 
 
In contrast to DTC, the Student Charter at FTL had just been completed and was ready 
for widespread dissemination amongst students and staff. Unlike DTC, for FTL 
rejecting the student as a consumer in relation to the Charter had, seemingly, not 
proved a ‘fuzzy concept’ – at least, not in the imaginations of the university’s leaders 
in the process of strategy formation. As one senior leader confirmed definitively:  
“We’ve rejected the concept of students as consumers. We talk about students being 
partners because this is an educational process it is not buying and selling goods. 
Clearly there is a contractual process, but the student as consumer creates a provider 
and taker type relationship… and we expect that our staff learn from our students and 
that our students learn from each other. They are part of the university community. So 
we are very clear: they are partners. They are part of the process”. 
(301, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
However, when it came to testing the Charter in practice, the apparent clarity with 
which the university’s leaders had rejected consumer and producer identities was 
confronted by the multiplicity of evaluations, logics and values that underpin the 
complexity of ordinary economic relations. Once students were on the inside of HE in 
a relationship with the university and staff, it was impossible for a variety of actors 
from strategic directors, to staff, to students themselves, to separate undergraduate 
identities into clearly labelled ‘subjectivity silos’ marked either ‘market-consumer’ or 
‘non-market-student’. 
 
As “part of the process” in their working partnership, FTL had repositioned their 
students in terms of decision-making, engagement and consultation, and had invited 
the Student Union to prepare the first draft of the Charter. Bearing in mind that the 
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Charter needed to detail a set of “shared expectations” between both students and staff, 
the Union had set out “a sort of matching road map” of relations, standards and values 
to help guide both parties throughout the students’ HE journey (Interviewee, 309), 
from just before their crossing the threshold of becoming actual students to their exit 
again – only this time into the world of the graduate and the onward use value of their 
degrees. 
 
For the Student Union, creating the first draft of the Charter provided them the 
opportunity to embed some of the students’ demands and expectations regarding their 
university experience and what they felt HE was actually for into a tangible document. 
Over the preceding years, in numerous surveys, the quality of teaching and learning at 
Four Town and the potential for the predominantly local student population to progress 
into well-paid jobs had been highlighted as areas that the university needed to improve 
on in order to deliver better value for money. As the President of the Student Union 
expanded: 
“I know that there is an argument that higher education shouldn’t just be about a job, 
that there is a social value as well. And that may be true to some people in certain 
areas. But for the typical student at university in [Four Town], it is about improving 
your knowledge in order to get a better job… They are here getting a certain career”. 
(314, President Student Union) 
 
Although, as the President continued, delivering on such values shouldn’t have had 
“anything to do with the student paying a fee”, now, with the three-fold increase in 
tuition costs, it was imperative that the university “deliver on student expectations in 
the same way as when they purchase goods from a shop” (Interviewee, 314). For sure, 
students couldn’t be understood as consumers in the sense that they couldn’t “return a 
dodgy education like a dodgy DVD, and get a refund” (ibid). But they were consumers 
in the sense that they were “consuming a service”. Students were now “buying their 
education and buying their tuition in the hope that it [would] give them enough skills 
to get a good job at the end of it” (ibid). As such, despite their “lack of control” in the 
university-student exchange relationship, the students of Four Town expected their 
education to be “high quality, fit for purpose, and last a good length of time” (ibid). 
They wanted the material and social relations that would deliver the onward use value 
of their education to be enshrined in the Charter. 
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Although the strategic directors seemed clear that a consumer identity for students was 
to be rejected in relation to the Charter, embedding an understanding that the 
university had a responsibility to provide their students with a high quality experience 
was not seen as problematic. Indeed, just after the implementation of top-up fees in 
2006 a small cadre of directors had been specifically hired, at least in part, to improve 
on the student experience at Four Town. Back then, the media hype and academic 
rumour around the increased competition and marketization that top-up fees would 
surely initiate had driven the university to consider the quality of their offer, which up 
until then had not been doing their local reputation many favours (Interviewees 302, 
304, 307, 309, 311, 312). As one director involved with the student experience 
explained: 
“When tuition fees changed from £1000 to £3000, the dialogue in the sector was really 
starting to change and we were talking about students in a different way. When I was 
first here – and I’m sure we weren’t unusual about this – we would treat students like 
cattle! They would come, we would do something to them, and we would herd them from 
one space into the next. We don’t talk about them like that any more, and people that do 
are stoned and nailed against things!” 
(309, Management, Steering, Long-time Student Representation) 
 
Certainly, in part, FTL had wanted to improve the quality of teaching and facilities 
because, given the lack of life chances that their students had in relation to other, more 
middle-class, institutions, their students deserved it (Interviewee, 301). As all of the 
interviewees underscored, the university should invest in the student experience for the 
social good, both of their students and the local region in which they lived. However, 
even for those directors who vociferously rejected the notion that students could be 
understood as consumers, the relational effects of the current shift in the university’s 
social relations of value were inescapably real. Given the uncertainty and competition 
that the new funding structure was bringing into the sector, FTL could not afford to 
ignore a local reputation upon which it now depended in order to survive. As such, as 
the above director underscored, the implementation of the Charter was: 
“... all about the student experience, which of course is now connected to the fee: to 
“the price” they are going to pay”. 
(309, Management, Steering, Long-time Student Representation) 
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As the Charter was tested amongst staff and a variety of committees, staff resistance to 
embedding the effects of this shift into their social and economic relations became 
readily apparent. If the university was clear that they rejected consumer-producer 
relations, why were the strategic directors now reacting so overtly to student demands? 
If the student experience were to be enshrined in the Charter, then staff – as producers 
in this relationship – would also have to react to this shift in their social relations of 
value, and that would be to the detriment of the broader social contribution that FTL 
currently provided: 
“As soon as you start to embed terms like consumer through some contract, you quickly 
start to pigeonhole people, and when you do that you, understandably, get a reaction 
from staff who say, “well, if that is what they are, then this is what I am, and therefore I 
have to start acting in a different way”… If we start to pin a consumer label on whoever 
the student is, we then start to develop a far more narrow focus about how they should 
be treated within the university, and that would be an awful shame because you lose a 
lot of the goodwill that comes out of a staff-student relationship. That is a huge waste, in 
my opinion”. 
(305, Senior Management VCO, Long/medium-time Academic, Industry) 
 
What was important, then, was for FTL to attempt to ‘pin down’ the value of 
partnership relations by setting out clearly what the students could expect from the 
university against what the university could expect in return – just as the SCG had 
suggested in their Final Report (2010). In no way was the Charter to be understood as 
a contract, even with the three-fold increase in the student fee. Higher education was a 
“learning journey” that FTL would guide and support, but the students’ achievements 
would be based on their own efforts (Interviewees 301, 303, 309). At least, that’s what 
FTL hoped. As the director involved with the student experience elaborated: 
“…Certainly, part of the compromise was driven by a sort of legal desire not to set the 
Charter out as a contract. But part of it was also based on our values, and what we 
would consider to be appropriate to higher education. Higher education is not a 
commodity, and I think that is the language that we must use with the students. But 
whether they are going to take any notice of that when they receive a notional bill for 
£8500 per year is a different matter altogether”. 
(309, Management, Steering, Long-time Student Representation) 
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Only time would tell if the strategy could ensure the student-staff relations that the 
university held as valuable. There could be no absolute clarity for the student-
consumer identity under the increased pressures of neoliberal marketization and its 
constant variation. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
As the research presented in this chapter demonstrates, as the four case study 
universities put their strategies into practice they encountered a diverse range of actors 
who had to make sense of those strategies in relation to their social and economic 
relations and geographies. As can be seen from the examples of the student experience, 
KIS and the Student Charter, although each interviewee necessarily went through the 
semiotic process of complexity reduction in order to make sense of the world, they 
none-the-less made evaluations about what elements of the university’s strategies were 
acceptable to them, deciding what could or had to stay, what could go, what could be 
altered, and what other actions, activities and values could be introduced as those 
strategies were put into practice. As a result, the values and metrics of the market 
imaginary – not as it was discursively produced in the HE White Paper but, rather, as it 
had already been varied in the process of strategy formation – were given the 
opportunity to displace, diffuse and ‘crowd out’ other practices and values that my 
interviewees had formerly held as useful and/or valuable to them. However, at the very 
same time, the values and metrics both of the Government’s policies and the 
universities’ strategies were (again) immediately varied as multiple and diverse values, 
notions of value, and understandings of Value shaped the universities’ actual economic 
practices. 
 
Thus, the chapter has underscored just how impossible it is to think about socio-
economic processes such as marketization as being either resisted or not resisted; as 
becoming either embedded or transformed. For instance, as illustrated through each of 
my examples, it was impossible for my interviewees to disentangle the subjectivities of 
their home undergraduates into tidy ‘identity silos’ labelled either ‘consumer’ or ‘non-
consumer’. Likewise, it was impossible for them to separate out their own identities 
and practices into corresponding categories marked either ‘producer’ or ‘non-
producer’. Through their strategically selected and varied implementations of the 
student experience, KIS and the Student Charter – which the Government had 
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discursively positioned as essential elements for driving up the quality of the sector by 
placing consumer demand at its heart – each HEI displayed the concomitant resistance 
of and compliance with the market values that the White Paper sought to engender, at 
the same time as they demonstrated their concomitant embedding and transformation. 
Multiple logics, evaluations and social relations of value shaped the ways in which 
each university’s strategies unfolded in practice – in the situated, relational contexts of 
their emerging economic geographies. 
 
Of course, it is important to recognize, here, the power relations involved once actors 
and organizations have accepted the status quo of policy implementation. For as my 
research has demonstrated, the universities’ lack of immediate and total resistance to 
the HE White Paper enabled its political-regulatory power – at least in part – to 
penetrate and reshape HE’s social relations of value by establishing a critical mass of 
engagement with its ‘new’ metrics and values. And in turn, the power relations 
between the university and its staff did the same, only this time in respect of the values 
of the university in terms of its actual strategies. However, that is absolutely not to say 
that neoliberalization can be understood as a top-down process. Again, as my research 
has demonstrated, the universities’ strategic leaders held multiple logics and values for 
implementing, excluding and altering the neoliberally inspired metrics of the White 
Paper, as did the multiplicity of actors who put the universities’ strategies into practice. 
Thus far then, through the research presented both here and in Chapter Five, 
neoliberalization can be seen to be as much a bottom-up process as it is top-down. 
 
Reflecting back on Jessop’s dilemma regarding how the economy can be always-
already complex at the same time as new political paradigms and values become 
hegemonic (2009: 338), the necessary co-existence and co-evolution of normalisation 
and diversity in the Ordinary Economy demonstrated herein suggests that this is a 
dilemma that all modern forms of Government may necessarily have to face; and in 
particular, those who seek to govern through the metrics and values of a neoliberally 
informed market where scope and intensity cannot be elided (Barnett, 2005). As the 
four case study universities put their already varied strategies into practice, so the 
actors who had to make sense of them necessarily re-introduced complexity into the 
reductive metrics of the White Paper. At the same time, the policy metrics had the 
opportunity to become embedded into HE’s social relations of value – if only in part. 
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The implications of this necessary co-existence and co-evolution of normalisation and 
diversity in terms of the achievement of neoliberal hegemony will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight alongside the conclusions drawn from the rest of my empirical findings. 
In the next, and final, chapter of this empirical triptych, I explore the process of 
emergence. 
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7 Emergence: The Multiple and Complex Economic Geographies 
of Higher Education 
 
7.1 Introduction 
“…[E]conomic geographies are always becoming, always a product of interior and 
exterior influences, always fragile and always perpetually interrupted and reconfigured 
by the diverse relations, ethics and subjectivities of daily life in and around which value 
flows or is unable to flow. At the same time, social and material imperatives interrupt, 
reconfigure and constrain daily lives, which must come to terms with [those 
imperatives]… 
…It is the political and often violent negotiation of this space between variability and 
constraint in circuits of value that defines ‘what is and is not value’ and so shapes the 
trajectories of economic geographies” (Lee, 2006: 416-418). 
 
This final empirical chapter explores the third stage of what I am calling an “iteration”: 
i.e. emergence. Following Lee’s thesis on the Ordinary Economy, and as indicated in 
his prose above, in Chapter Two of this PhD I argued that economic geographies are 
always in a state of emergence experiencing the constant tensions between: the various 
material imperatives of societal reproduction; the potentially infinite, day-to-day 
variability of economic practices, social relations and understandings of value; and the 
regulatory and calculable frame of ‘the economy’ (Lee, 2006: 413). 
 
To be in a perpetual state of emergence signifies that reality is a constantly moving 
feast, in part shaped by the insistent unfolding of past trajectories, and projected into 
future possibilities that are in part based on previous and present material and social 
relations; but constantly moving – and movable – none-the-less. The implications, 
therefore, for those who seek to govern the economy are profound, for this consistently 
shifting landscape of material and social economic relations requires enormous and 
persistent work if any sort of coherent political-economic objective regarding what 
does or does not constitute value is to be maintained across time and space. And even 
then, any apparent coherence that is achieved will always be temporary, permeated as 
it is by inconsistencies and variation. In an ontology where normalisation and diversity 
necessarily co-exist with one another, this is an inescapable truth. 
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This chapter seeks to illuminate this ontological assertion through an exploration of 
how understandings of the value of HE in England began or, rather, continued to 
emerge as multiple and complex following the implementation of the policies and 
tactics contained in the coalition Government’s White Paper, “Higher Education: 
Students at the Heart of the System” (BIS, 2011a). Since value emerges through the 
practice and performance of economic geographies, the empirical evidence presented 
here bears witness to a profusion of multiple and complex values and relationships – 
often involving considerable relationships of power – that helped shape the 
evaluations, values, actions and activities of the four case-study institutions as well as 
the individual actors that helped make up those institutions. 
 
Similar to the evidence presented in Chapters Five (on complexity reduction) and Six 
(on complexity re-introduction) of this thesis, this chapter on emergence will 
underscore the concomitant processes of embedding and transformation: of the co-
evolution and co-existence of normalisation and diversity in the Ordinary Economy. 
For on the one hand, as the neoliberally informed policies of marketisation were 
strategically selected by the Government, made meaning of by the universities’ 
strategic leaders and put into practice in and through the complexity of their ordinary, 
day-to-day socio-economic relations, so the discourses, metrics and values of the 
market had the potential to ‘crowd out’ previously held values and understandings of 
Value and become embedded – dominate even – as the economic geographies of HE 
emerged. On the other hand, as the reduced and reductive signs and signifiers of the 
market imaginary were confronted by the plethora of values and understandings of 
Value that help shape the economic practices and geographies of the HEIs, so the 
Government’s desired coherence regarding the value of HE, as set out in the White 
Paper, inevitably became varied in and through those emerging economic geographies. 
As Lee underscores, in the Ordinary Economy it is the shared and/or imposed 
understandings regarding the nature of value, Value and values – that is, the social 
relations of value – that establish the criteria through which the performance of 
economic geographies may be evaluated (2006: 419). 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: having, first, set out the discourses that dominated 
my interviewees’ testimonies regarding both the universities’ and Government’s 
understandings of the emerging value of HE, Section 7.3 will illuminate the 
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multiplicity and complexity of emergence through an exploration of what some of my 
interviewees termed “market-like” or “business-like” subjectivities and behaviours. As 
the value of HE emerged as a ‘fuzzier’ and/or more multiple concept, so it became 
harder for my interviewees to disentangle their evaluations, actions and activities as 
either ‘market’ or ‘non-market’ having, apparently, valued one set of selected 
strategies over, and/or alongside, another. The overwhelming result for each HEI was 
that they now thought of themselves as more “market-like” and more “business-like” 
than they had been before the implementation of the White Paper rather than a 
simplistic either/or understanding of being market/business actors or non-market/non-
business actors. 
 
Section 7.4 pursues this notion through the lens of one particular market metric that 
every Government of Britain since 1979 had sought to implement with the aim of 
embedding some form of neoliberal market rationale throughout the HE sector: that is, 
efficiency. And it was through this metric of efficiency that the coalition Government 
was, now, attempting to impose its own, ostensibly, market-orientated definition and 
understanding of what the value of HE was and where its Value came from. However, 
as my research will demonstrate, as each HEI selected two, apparently contradictory 
strategies as essential to their on-going survival – i.e. the ‘market efficient’ 
rationalization of subjects and courses along side their, supposedly, ‘collectively 
inefficient’ cross-subsidization – there could be no clear separation of the universities’ 
market activities and valuations from their non-market activities and valuations. In the 
emerging economic geographies of higher education and the social relations of value 
that shape them, this was, indeed, a complex negotiation of value and values in the 
face of a, largely, politically imposed marketisation. 
 
7.2 Signified emergence: the co-existent struggle between (confused) constraint 
and (complex) variation 
In transcribing, reading, analysing and re-reading the testimonies of each of my 
interviewees, what struck me the most was the strength of a narrative put forward by 
fifty-five individual participants across four diverse institutions. That is: that in trying 
to understand the emerging value of HE, the reductive valuations of HE as articulated 
by Government in its policies and tactics bore little resemblance to the expansive 
valuations of HE as understood and experienced by those actors and universities in-and 
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through their real-world, concrete economic geographies. And yet, the values of the 
market imaginary as set out by Government were, at that very moment, ‘crowding out’ 
a vast array of the previously held ideals and beliefs of those HEIs – at least, in part. 
 
In the broadest of terms, my interviewees felt that, whilst reductive in its articulation, 
the Government’s understanding of the value of HE was “confused” (Interviewees 
206, 307), concocted on the back of “a lot of false starts” (Interviewee, 410) and 
riddled with “conflicting messages” (Interviewee, 105), which seemed to suggest that 
they “had[n’t], necessarily, thought it through very well” (Interviewee, 203). 
“I have never in my life been as confused as I am now over the lack of clarity and 
direction from Government in terms of the value of higher education”, said 
Interviewee -406. “I mean, they’ve stopped the White Paper, and we don’t know what 
is happening. What does that mean?” he/she questioned, almost screaming. “They 
can’t just stop it! ...I don’t think they have a clue!” 
Depending on which Government Minister was speaking on any given day, the 
message regarding HE’s value was “very mixed” (Interviewees, 105, 306), stemming, 
in part, from a dominant political ideology that was intent on introducing initiatives 
that made it “incredibly difficult to plan”, whilst also reflecting the “compromises” and 
“sell-outs” of “coalition politics” (Interviewee, 301). As a result, the universities 
would, surely, end up planning on the basis of one understanding of the value of HE, 
only to, then, have the Government “change their mind” and “pull the rug out from 
under” them (Interviewee, 206). 
 
Quite unlike the Government’s confusion, the narratives that dominated my 
interviewees’ testimonies were clear. In recent years, the supposed value of HE as 
articulated by Government had shifted – just as it had every time there had been an 
economic depression (Interviewee, 106). Set within a discourse of necessary 
“austerity”, HE had become “a political football, which the Government [felt] it could 
kick because, in the end” HE was “still a minority activity”: “a luxury” that was 
costing the taxpayer money – and that was something the Government felt it could and 
should change (ibid). Indeed, aside from the confusion, and regardless of the fact that 
“with the fees coming in”, the Government was instigating a system that would “cost 
the individual more, reduce the income to universities, and certainly cost the taxpayer 
more” (Interviewee, 307), the “one clear message” put forward by Government was 
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that it was “all about money and cost: the cost of higher education” (Interviewee, 410). 
The “value of higher education [was] now so tied up with the fact that it cost so 
much”, that it had “lost that broader message” (Interviewee, 304). It was “no longer 
about the public benefit of higher education” nor its “transformational nature” 
(Interviewee, 410). It was “only being represented as a cost to the nation” and “never 
as an investment at the level of society” (Interviewee, 304). 
 
While many in the sector were “still trying to work out where all the pound notes [had] 
fallen out of the Government’s equation” (Interviewee, 307), the “role” of the 
universities was, “largely being articulated through the added value [that HEIs were] 
giving to individuals in the market place” (Interviewee, 103): 
“Oh, it’s all about the individual!” said Interviewee -405. “It’s very much about the 
individual paying for their education to get the economic benefits later, and there’s 
very little recognition of the benefits to the country of having a skilled and thinking 
population, which is quite shocking!” 
“You’re getting all the utilitarian arguments that the value of higher education is 
because, somehow, magically, it gives you some added value on the job market”, 
underscored Interviewee – 207. “The lip service they pay to the other parts of [HE] is 
complete lip service. They haven’t a clue about the humanitarian benefit or 
civilization, or any of that sort of stuff – I really don’t think they get that”. 
Indeed, in the context of the Government’s emphasis on lowering the public cost of 
HE, there was a growing belief that the sector needed to demonstrate “value for 
money” – even if there was “plenty of evidence” to demonstrate that, actually, HE’s 
financial burden on the public purse was about to soar (Interviewee, 412): 
“And ‘employability’… is a simplistic measure of that value”, pointed out 
Interviewee -412. “That agenda has just grown and grown; and Government seems to 
constantly have that rhetoric that we need to ‘make up’ young people who are 
employable… as though that is the ‘worth’ of higher education”. 
 
Although a handful of interviewees did point out that Messrs Cameron, Cable and 
Willetts had each tried to qualify that HE was “important in its own right” 
(Interviewees 102, 202, 404), “they’d said it too late: they’d said too much before” 
(Interviewee, 404). In fact, the message regarding the private gain of HE had been 
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increasing over the past ten to fifteen years: 
“You go to university to get a good job, and if the outcomes don’t match up then, 
clearly, the university isn’t any good!” stressed Interviewee -101. 
As a result, “the underlying message [was] very much that higher education for its own 
sake [was] no longer valid” (Interviewee, 102): 
“For our current… and prospective intake of students”, explained one senior 
director (-201), “they have been told since age ten or eleven that the reason for going 
to university is twofold: First, you are more likely to get a good job, and second, you 
are more likely to earn more money. That is the sole reason that they have been told 
for over a decade, at least in terms of the predominant narrative.” 
 
Private gain rather than public good was the “bottom line” emanating from 
Government (Interviewee, 404). And it was a bottom line that had been changing 
people’s beliefs and perceptions regarding the value of HE for quite some time – the 
students, their parents, members of the public, even many of the actors who made up 
the universities. And for many in the sector, that was “a shame” (as Interviewee -412 
put it) because it was “now, overtaking a general feeling of education being a good 
thing in and of itself” (ibid). As one of GE’s strategic leaders elaborated: 
“The first time I heard anyone say such a thing was Charles Clarke around 2000, and I 
was absolutely shocked that a Minister… would make that sort of statement. It was 
absurd to associate higher education with such economic values. That kind of thinking 
became more and more embedded with the previous Government’s approach to higher 
education, and the current Government hasn’t radically changed that, but there’s more 
of a sense that higher education is there to serve the economic benefit of the individual 
and economic development of the country. That assumption is clear”. 
(102, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
That said, there was, of course, the WP agenda and the Graduate Repayment Scheme 
that would, through a confusing amalgamation of ex-ante and ex-post social relations 
of value, provide the public financial investment to underpin that particular element of 
the public good – the societal value of HE – which the White Paper articulated as 
being ‘worthy’ of public investment. At least, that was the Government’s theory (BIS, 
2011a). The Government had, by-and-large, put its money where its mouth was in 
terms of the public good of university research. Now, with the cost-covering student-
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fee coming in, it needed to ensure that the same was true regarding its valuation of 
social mobility. 
 
And yet, for many interviewees, this was where the Government’s policies had become 
most confusing. As one of FTL’s strategic directors explained; on the one hand, there 
was “a leaning towards Russell Group ideals, values, and standards – both explicit and 
implicit within Government documentation and statements”, which one could identify 
as “being propped up with elements of the fee proposals” (Interviewee, 302). WP, on 
the whole, involved the lower-ranked universities, which, according to Government 
tactics like the FMC, should compete for their students based on ‘price’. Whereas, the 
higher-ranked institutions should be focused on ‘making up’ the best-of-the-best: on 
raising the aspirations and adding value to those brightest AAB+ students coming from 
poorer social backgrounds and state schooling (Interviewee, 304). 
 
On the other hand, there was “a counter view”, which was also being expressed by 
Government that did “talk about the need to, sort of, ‘reach out’ to the disaffected 
youth” of the country and “to offer them appropriate opportunities” (Interviewee, 302). 
Most promisingly, some of that discourse had “transcended the fairly trite vocational 
debate” (ibid) and had started to talk about, what a number of my interviewees referred 
to – often with reference to Newman’s and Robbins’ principles – as, “the ‘true’ value” 
of HE”, which might arise from “offering some of those people the opportunity to go 
to university” (Interviewee, 302). 
 
However, as one of PA’s senior leaders told me, a particular concern expressed by 
many in the sector was that “the Government’s statements about what higher education 
is for [had] been rather mischievously tied in with the Widening Participation 
objective” (Interviewee, 201). “If you were [a potential student] coming from a low-
income background” then “the way to solve that problem” (i.e. the problem of being 
poor and lacking social mobility) was “to go to university” (ibid). As a result, the 
universities were finding themselves struggling to occupy the spaces between a 
(confusingly) constrained understanding of the value of HE emanating from 
Government and a more (complexly) varied understanding emanating from the 
universities. As he/she elaborated: 
“It would be very hard to convince a member of society who is used to severe financial 
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pressures that they should follow the rather lofty ideals that have nothing to do with 
finance. So in some ways it’s understandable that in the initiation of Widening 
Participation, ideas should be based, somewhat, on financial issues: ‘It’s a way to get 
yourself out of a financial trough’. What I feel has been lost sight of is that no attention 
is paid to the societal benefits or to the non-monetarial [sic] benefits of gaining a higher 
education. If I’m honest, I find it hard to quibble with the initiation of the argument on 
economic terms, because those are the grounds that are ‘understandable’ to those who 
should benefit from Widening Participation. But you need a very quick follow-up with 
reference to more fundamental values. 
(201, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
A most basic question, then, for many of my interviewees was whether or not ‘the 
market’ could provide the best mechanism – the best form for HE’s social relations of 
value – through which to organize HE’s framework of action: its evaluations, values, 
actions and activities. Based on the Government’s reductive evaluation of what HE 
was “all about” – of “fitting people into work… the skills level of the nation… the 
competitiveness of national systems, etc.” (Interviewee, 108) – the Government was 
clearly willing to “let the market decide” – at least, to an increased degree compared to 
HE’s form before the White Paper (Interviewee, 307). And that fit well with a broader, 
more, historic Conservative agenda of “moving power away from the Local 
Authorities” – “which [hadn’t] always been the same shade as national 
Governments!” – “to the individual and the family” (Interviewee, 310). That was “the 
ideology behind it: …about moving power to the market”. And it was making HE “a 
very powerful political tool” (ibid): 
“The ‘how’ is the discussion that needs to be had”, said Interviewee -108. “The 
‘how’ is about ‘how’ you achieve that. And for this Government, the ‘how’ is about the 
different ways in which the market is used to deliver [HE]… through competitiveness, 
efficiency and so on… So, the impact of fees, I think, probably affects the direct 
relationship between [universities] and students potentially more… than ‘thinking 
about’ what the point of higher education is”. 
 
According to the majority of interviewees, the message coming from Government 
certainly seemed to be somewhat “schizophrenic” (Interviewee -101): 
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…“‘British universities are world-class!’ The Government says that all the time. 
‘But their teaching is wrong!’ ‘But if we have a market it won’t be! Then they will be 
even more world-class and it’ll all be all right’”, said Interviewee -101… 
And, for sure, the Government “clearly [didn’t] accept that HE [could] be left to its 
own devices and be what it wants to be without having that secondary level of 
oversight” (Interviewee, 102): 
…“They’re constantly sticking their finger in! The Government is neither protecting 
institutions nor are they letting them go to the wall!” argued Interviewee -307… 
But the “direction of travel” was clear (Interviewee, 102), as one senior academic and 
strategist from PA underscored: 
“I think we’re in transition. You might think that this Government in particular 
would only too happily go to an entirely ‘pay your fees up front’ system, but they knew 
they couldn’t do it in one step!” reasoned Interviewee -205. 
As a result, no one in the sector could be sure of the Government’s continued 
commitment to the public good of HE – no matter how narrowly defined. Nor could 
they be sure of the Government’s continued commitment to undergraduate funding 
(ibid): 
“It’s always easy to look back to a golden age”, said Interviewee -307. “When the 
£1000 fee was first introduced we were all up in arms, and the same with the £3000 
fee… So every era has its own trauma. But, I think, the collective trauma of this one is 
far greater because, forgetting whether it’s a true market or not – well it absolutely 
isn’t, but – if they’re saying ‘let the market decide’, then it’ll decide!” 
 
Looking back on what many of my interviewees spoke about being a ‘golden age’ or 
‘era’, “at least the notion of the block-grant [had] felt like a state investment in the 
public good” (Interviewee, 111). And, as a result of that valuation and investment, 
“state priorities for higher education could very easily be sold into the system” (ibid). 
But now, with the Government’s focus on markets, it was not going to be as easy to 
“take a Government line and sell it back into an academic community when as far as 
they [were] concerned, it [was] the students who [would be] bringing in the income” 
(ibid). The social relations of value of higher education and the power relations that 
those carried with them were fundamentally ‘in transition’ from one era to another: 
from one material and social form to another. 
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Thus, it was within this period of seeing the value of HE emerging as, potentially, 
something quite different from its previously held valuation – both in terms of its 
‘what’ and its ‘how’ – that many of my interviewees expressed a “real fear” for what 
the sector might look like as it emerged following this latest “treatment” by 
Government (Interviewee, 206). On the one hand, Government was attempting to 
embed “one very narrow version of social inclusion”, which was meant to represent 
the entire nation’s fiscal and ideal valuation of the public good (Interviewee, 301). On 
the other, Government was promulgating a discourse that the nation “couldn’t really 
afford any of this” (ibid). Thus, they were trying to promote “certain types of 
universities” and corresponding socio-economic relations through the mechanism and 
values of the market (ibid). With the sector emerging into “a position where all the 
funding settlements and all the policy changes tend[ed] to favour a small group of 
universities over the others” (ibid), then: 
“…that [was] a value perception about what universities are: about what higher 
education is for”, underscored Interviewee -301. 
 
As a result, “the meaning” of HE had “been shrunk to a descriptive level where it was 
all about taking a resource and changing it so it fit with something later”: some later 
understanding and utilization of HE’s value (Interviewee, 111). And “that miss[ed] the 
whole dimension of what happens to the person and the person’s own motivation” 
(ibid). Thus, as Interviewee -111 underscored, Government was attempting to 
discursively, materially and relationally re-construct HE as: 
…“An input/output model”… 
In which: 
…“The whole journey has been missed!” 
And as a result, the Government had:  
…“Just redefined [what is and is not] higher education!” 
 
And yet, for each and every one of my interviewees, there could be no clear separation 
between the complex benefits of HE to society and its equally complex benefits to the 
individual. And as one of PA’s strategists (-213) told me: 
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“I think most people would think that’s normal”. 
And that’s why he/she valued working in a university. “I think my career’s very 
relevant”, he/she said: 
“Working in a university is all about the future, and even if you think about it 
historically, that’s about informing the future through an understanding of the past. It’s 
about individuals’ futures and about the future of the nation, or other nations... So that’s 
why I think my job is so relevant and why this issue is so important”. 
(213, Management Support, Steering, Long-time Administrator) 
 
In the continuous, iterative emergence of HE’s economic geographies and the social 
relations of value that shape them, the co-existence of normalisation and diversity for 
each HEI was an inescapable and unrelenting truth. 
 
7.3 The fallacy of duality in ‘emergence’: the constitution of market-like and/or 
business-like behaviours 
One particular discourse that permeated my interviewees’ testimonies helps to 
illuminate the multiple and complex nature of emergence in the Ordinary Economy: 
i.e. that HEIs were emerging from this latest Governmental policy intervention as more 
business or market ‘-like’ in their actions, activities and understandings of the value of 
HE. Rather than understanding themselves as fully fledged businesses acting, solely, in 
relation to the values and metrics of the market, and rather than understanding 
themselves as, absolutely, not market actors, my four case-study universities found it 
quite impossible to dis-entangle their behaviours, values and evaluations and place 
them into overly simplistic categories marked either ‘market’ or ‘non-market’. And 
this bore a direct relationship to the emergence of a ‘fuzzier’ or ‘more complex’ 
understanding of the value of HE emanating from their shifting social relations of 
value. 
 
As previously indicated, there was a strong tendency amongst my interviewees to 
reflect back on a ‘golden era’ during which ex-ante public funding had offered them 
more security and certainty moving forward. However, there was also wide 
recognition and discussion that, for at least the past 25-30 years, the longue durée of 
politically imposed marketisation had increasingly instigated a discourse that HEIs 
“should run [them]selves as businesses” (Interviewee, 304). HE was a big employer 
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both nationally and locally, and, taken together, the variety of public grants to and 
public purchases from HEIs added up to a significant public investment in the public 
good of HE. Furthermore, even when the HEIs had received “very large block grants 
from HEFCE and, before that, the UGC”, that public investment “would, typically, 
have only made up about 45% of a university’s income” (ibid). As such, under the 
direction of myriad Governmental “drivers” (ibid), many of which were framed by a 
discourse of efficient and financially prudent “managerialism” (Interviewee, 405), 
there had long-been the expectation that HE would “wash its face financially” 
(Interviewee, 304): ensuring that their cost-base was efficient; exploring and 
competing for multiple sources of income; and carefully managing their structure and 
offering to ensure their long-term survival. As one strategic director of planning 
explained: 
“I think people know that, yes, we’re a university with different values and a different 
culture from, say, IBM, but at the same time what they value is clear and careful 
financial management. You have to carefully plan your staffing and what you’re going 
to deliver in order to make sure you’re still here in ten years time”. 
(405, Management, Steering, Long-time Strategist, Public Services) 
 
Importantly, the distinction that Interviewee -405 was trying to draw between the 
different values and culture of a university as compared to a business such as IBM was 
widely echoed throughout my interviewees’ testimonies. Certainly from one 
perspective, and similar to Interviewee -405, many of my participants could not help 
but consider their university to be a business acting in relation to a HE market – even 
if, up until the 2011 White Paper, and perhaps even including it, what HEIs were 
facing could at most be described as “quasi-market” relations (Interviewee, 101). 
 
For example, as Interviewee –207 told me in relation to PA’s projected investment in 
infrastructure following the Government’s massive cuts to the capital grant: 
“So like any business you are trying to work out what the business climate is like. 
Can we afford it? Can we get another stream of income so that we can repay the 
loan?” 
Or, as Interviewee -305 elaborated in relation to FTL’s generation of roughly 
£23million annually from its ‘knowledge transfer’ work with local industry: 
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“One of the strengths of this university has been in how it exploits its intellectual 
capital for the benefit of its business… My role is to continue to see how we can 
develop and further increase those sums of money”. 
Still further, as Interviewee -408 said in relation to DTC’s students having to “commit 
so much money” in order to gain a higher education: 
“Seeing people take on such a financial burden… is a crying shame, I think. But if 
you have been in a business for as long as I have, and it is a business after all… we 
have to wrestle with that.” 
And by way of a final example, as Interviewee -106 proffered nostalgically, harkening 
back to when GE was considered “a bunch of gifted amateurs” rather than the 
“corporate enterprise” it was now considered to be: 
“There’s no way you can operate like that anymore…” 
 
From another perspective, however, every one of my interviewees was adamant that 
universities were not businesses; as the above Interviewee, -106, underscored with 
some agitation when he/she recognized what he/she was actually saying: 
“…No business... Oh no!” he/she cried, almost shrieking. “You see! I’m using the 
term ‘business’! We’re not businesses! But…” he/she continued, struggling for words. 
“No ‘business’ operates like that anymore. I mean: we could go bust! You don’t have 
protection against that in this country, not like universities in Europe.” 
Another strategic director (-203), this time from PA, emphasized the point with the 
greatest of clarity: 
“We’re not a business. We’re clear that we’re not a business. We’re not here to 
make a profit. Yes, we’re here to run things in a way that allows us to invest in 
whatever. And, yes, we’ve got to have good management and the finances must be 
done properly, etc. But we’re not a business with a load of shareholders”. 
 
Indeed, for each of the interviewees, England’s public universities were by no means 
businesses acting in a market for home undergraduates – at least, “not in any sense of 
the word ‘market’ that the vast majority understand” (Interviewee, 101). They were 
still largely publicly funded, even though their social relations of value in terms of the 
undergraduate fee was now incredibly complicated (see Chapter Four above). They 
were registered charities, not private companies, and operated on a not-for-profit basis 
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rather than answering to shareholder value. And whilst each of the HEIs had responded 
to the distinct acceleration in marketization brought about by the HE White Paper by 
adopting “common business practices” (Interviewee, 201) – such as increasing their 
competitiveness, increasing internal efficiencies, and spreading the risks of market 
uncertainty through the diversification of income streams – that didn’t mean that they 
were “suddenly going to privatize or become for-profit institutions” (ibid). 
 
The dominant reason that each HEI put forward for taking this position was, as one 
strategic director put it, that “they [had] this underlying commitment to the value of the 
public good” (ibid). As such, by far the best description that seemed to fit the emerging 
identity of the HEIs was that they were “business-like” rather than businesses (e.g. 
Interviewees 108, 201, 304, 405). Although the universities were now acting under 
conditions that were increasingly expanding the market relations that they did have – 
such as overseas and PGT students – into hitherto decidedly non-market relations – i.e. 
their home/EU undergraduates – it was “absolutely not the case” that they were 
businesses operating under the “market rationale” of the profit motive (Interviewee, 
201). 
 
There was, however, one very large qualification to this position that a number of 
interviewees elaborated – and it was a qualification that would impact the emerging 
value of HE to a significant degree. With the Government’s continued undermining of 
university autonomy through the metrics and values of the White Paper, and with the 
uncertainty surrounding the Government’s continued commitment to funding HE into 
the future, the universities in general wanted to distance themselves as-far-as possible 
from the public purse in order to mitigate those risks. And the most readily accessible 
alternative was to expand their market relations. As Interviewee -201 expounded: 
“A business would respond to this shifting policy environment by saying that we must 
not put all our eggs into one basket. If there is uncertainty over Government funding – 
over funding from the UK public purse – we must reduce our reliance on that… You 
don’t just say, ‘let’s backpedal… and only do what is completely safe’. There’s nothing 
left that is completely safe! …So you mitigate the overall risk by becoming more 
expansive. Now that, of course, is a lesson learned directly from the market… in a way 
that any good business would. Which reminds me to point out that we are absolutely not 
a business. But that doesn’t mean that we can’t be ‘business-like’ in our approach”. 
(201, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
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7.4 Efficient plurality or inefficient collectivity? Course rationalization v cross-
subsidization 
The example I want to explore, which helps to illuminate the complexity of the 
emerging value of HE alongside the emerging ‘business-like’ or ‘market-like’ 
character of the HEIs and their social relations of value, involves the market metric 
and valuation of efficiency. 
 
In neoclassical economic theory, which underpins the neoliberal political-economic 
rationale, efficiency can be broadly understood as producing the maximum value of 
outputs for the optimum value of inputs58. Thus, aside from the internal efficiencies 
that help a producer to minimise costs, in relation to the market system it is the ratio 
between the cost of all the producer’s inputs against the value that the consumer places 
upon the producer’s outputs that matters (Lindblom, 2001). Indeed, it is through the 
efficiency of the supply-demand relationship in markets that the ‘Wealth of Nations’ is 
to be found (Adam Smith, 1776). Thus, market efficiency that is driven by the supply-
demand relationship is an important source of Value. 
 
In terms of the HE White Paper, one of the most dominant efficiencies that the 
Government was trying to ‘drive’ HEIs to achieve was the efficient allocation of 
resources towards courses that the newly, more forcefully, identified consumers of HE 
– i.e. its cost-covering fee-paying undergraduates – would value for their use and 
economic utility in their on-going lives. As discussed in Section 7.2 above, since a 
great deal of Governmental effort had been made over the past decade or so at 
embedding a discourse of “employability” as the “worth” of gaining a higher education 
(Interviewee, 412), the HEIs would, thus, be compelled to examine the courses they 
offered in relation to their student-consumers’ demands – particularly in relation to the 
on-going job-market. 
                                                        
58
 Lindbolm (2001) notes that whilst there are a variety of understandings around efficiency, the most 
relevant in terms of the market relationship between supply and demand is that of the ratio of valued 
inputs to valued outputs. Put another way, in neo-classical economics, a market is efficient if a given 
level of resources is producing the maximum possible amount of goods and services, where no 
additional output can be achieved without the input of additional resources. Thus, the opitmum use of 
resourses is ensured in efficient markets by allowing prices to motivate independent producers and 
consumers in the economy. If both parties are free to choose how to allocate their resources, prices will 
direct those resources towards the independent actors who value them the most and can utilize them 
most effectively. 
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In essence, this meant that, regardless of the source of Value that the universities 
understood as the basis for their educational provision, each HEI should examine the 
cost-basis of each of their courses and measure the inputs required to furnish them 
against the level of student demand for them. If the ratio was found wanting, and there 
seemed to be inadequate potential for future, more profitable growth, then the HEIs 
should consider culling those courses in favour of allocating their scarce and, now, 
hard-won resources to more profitable enterprises: enterprises for which the market 
consumer was willing to exchange that valuable and (potentially) life-sustaining 
commodity – money. 
“There are always matters where you’re steering a philosophical course for the 
university based on what type of institution you want to be”, said Interviewee -402. 
“The trouble is, what you want to deliver is now so integrated with money, because 
student numbers mean money, money means viability, and you can’t do without it”. 
 
For each HEI, the notion of efficiency had become almost “second-nature”: a 
“financial understanding” that had become “internalized into every activity” following 
years of incessant Government regulation (Interviewee, 103). As detailed in Chapter 
Four above, but beyond the professional experiences of most of my interviewees, the 
Governmental ‘drive’ for university efficiency had been taken up by the CVCP as 
early as 1966 following pressure from the UGC and the Treasury. What my 
interviewees had experienced for decades, however, was being “audited to death”, 
wherein every year the Government’s auditors had added “yet more checking 
processes” to an already cumbersome list of efficiency measures (Interviewee, 404). 
Furthermore, what they had come to understand through “innumerable efficiency 
metrics built into the HEFCE grant” (Interviewee, 204); through Government 
efficiency “reward schemes” such as HEFCE’s University Modernization Fund 
(Interviewee, 405); and through the unceasing “drip, drip” of the efficiency system 
know as “Track” – which basically checked that university staff were not engaged in 
“doing bugger all!” (Interviewee, 403) – what they had come to understand was that 
the universities were “not to be trusted” by Government regarding the efficient 
allocation of resources (Interviewee, 410). Given the tactics and techniques employed 
by Government, the universities clearly needed to be “regulated and bureaucratized” to 
the point that gaining efficiency was no longer about “dealing with people”; it was “all 
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about ticking boxes” (ibid). Central Government had long-been attempting to remove 
any social complexity around the production of Value through efficiency and instead 
reduce its understanding and practice to a narrow set of technical indicators. 
 
Thus, the notion of efficiency was by “no means unique to this particular policy 
period” (Interviewee, 205). However, as one strategic director and dean pointed out, 
although previous efficiency measures could definitively be seen as a Government 
breach of university autonomy, when coupled with this most recent push towards 
marketization, university autonomy was being even further undermined by the social 
relations of the market (ibid). The fact was that during the ‘golden era’ of the BTG, the 
“financial wellbeing” which that had provided had at least offered the universities the 
opportunity to “sacrifice some efficiency” in favour of “giving some autonomy to 
departments” to “innovate” and provide courses that they felt were of value (ibid). 
Now that “times [were] about to get a lot harder”, the universities simply couldn’t 
“afford that luxury” (ibid). They’d need to “re-centralize” their own evaluations and 
relate them to student-consumer demand. They’d need to “eliminate waste” in favour 
of Value creation (ibid). 
 
7.4.1 Efficient plurality: course rationalization 
Keeping, very much, in line with the market logic of supply and demand as articulated 
by the HE White Paper, my interviewees set the discursive context for the efficient 
rationalization of their undergraduate courses. If the Governmental implementation of 
the cost-covering fee indicated “the conversion of students into something much more 
like a customer” (Interviewee, 112), then it was clear that the students would be “far 
more demanding” now that “most of them” would be “paying for their degrees” 
(Interviewee, 106). And unlike during the “golden years” of largely ex-ante public 
funding – which had obfuscated the student-consumer aspect of the demand-supply 
relationship embodied in the process of validation through exchange – now, the 
universities would have to respond to their undergraduate consumers “far more than 
they had in the past” (Interviewee, 112). What people “had to remember” was that 
“universities [were] massively financially marginal institutions” – thus, there was 
“always going to be that imperative” for them “to chase money” (Interviewee, 101). As 
a result, now that HE’s actors were “more ‘literate’ about metrics like efficiency”, 
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there was “far more willingness to accept the ideals of marketization” (Interviewee, 
112). As one strategic director contextualized: 
“In other words, people understand that, ultimately, we’re all on the payroll at this 
organisation and if it doesn’t manage to get enough resources to keep going then the 
natural result is: it shrinks. So there’s a realism that we have to pay our way as an 
outfit, and people, therefore, understand that we need to be efficient in what we supply 
and do”. 
(112, Management, Steering, Long-time Administrator, Public Service) 
 
Each of the case-study universities had long-since centralized some of their processes 
for examining the input-output ratios of their courses in order to establish their cost-
basis in relation to demand. In fact, just as “any good business” acting in a market 
would consider taking action to increase the production of a financial surplus, the HEIs 
had long-been ‘willing’ to consider culling certain courses where the cost-to-demand 
ratio was found to be too high (Interviewee, 301). The difference, now, following the 
removal of the BTG in favour of the cost-covering fee was that the uncertainty of 
student demand was being placed at the heart of the universities’ social relations of 
value. If the universities failed to respond, the financial consequences could be 
catastrophic: 
“We’re going to lose something like £50million of HEFCE teaching grant over the 
next three years”, explained one of DTC’s directors of planning (-405). “It is just 
going to vanish! Well, it’s just huge isn’t it? And what happens if people aren’t willing 
to pay? How many of our courses, how many of our universities, will be sacrificed in 
this kind of experiment?” 
 
Indeed, for many faculties across the country – in particular the Humanities – the 
removal of the BTG meant that they would be getting “virtually no funding from 
HEFCE” (Interviewee, 408). Thus, whether or not a department could “survive 
financially” now depended “predominantly on student approval” (ibid). And heads of 
departments across the country would “now be confronting such issues all the time” 
(Interviewee, 108): 
“So, they’ll have their eye on the bottom line of their finances”, underscored 
Interviewee -108. “They will be thinking, ‘can I get more students in? How can I get 
more income? What do their courses look like? How attractive will they be to 
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students? And how can they demonstrate that it leads to a job, etc.?’ So all of these 
external factors impact the bottom line of departments, and they’ll be trying to make 
the most of their positions”. 
 
Although my research indicates both qualitative and quantitative differences between 
the two higher-ranked case-studies and their two lower-ranked counterparts, each 
university had recently been doing just that: “think[ing] about the centrality of 
recruitment to [the institution’s] survival”; and “think[ing] about the demands of the 
markets” from which their various students came (Interviewee, 103). Indeed, for each 
university there was no doubt amongst their strategic directors that particular 
disciplines within their institutions would be feeling “particularly vulnerable” due to, 
what one of GE’s strategic leaders described as, “the in-securitization” brought about 
by “marketisation as a function of the neoliberal order” (Interviewee, 103, emphasis 
added). 
 
GE, the highest-ranked case study, had needed to cull very few of its courses following 
the release of the White Paper. Importantly, the university explained its position by 
underscoring the fact that they had long-since implemented extremely stringent 
efficiency processes which, according to one senior director (-101), stemmed from the 
“business-like mentality” they had adopted following the financial pressures they’d 
suffered under Thatcher. That is not to say that the White Paper didn’t make GE reflect 
on the courses and programmes that they offered. It did. Rather, the university was by-
and-large satisfied through its introspections that it was already furnishing its products 
efficiently because they had long-since considered their offer in relation to a variety of 
markets. Through its ‘rigorous internal monitoring’, GE “really [couldn’t] waste 
money” (Interviewee, 104): 
“The fact is we were already used to thinking in economic terms about our activities, 
and that has enabled us to adapt pretty quickly. We operate an accounting system that 
allows us to know exactly how much our different activities cost… So if we suddenly see 
a shift in our income from HEFCE towards a fee-based, student-driven system, we can 
quickly calculate what it would mean for our sustainability and how we would have to 
adapt our activities in order to cope… We operate in a very market aware way”. 
(102, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
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PA, however, the second highest-ranked institution, was undergoing significant 
internal struggles as its leaders sought to gain control of any perceived inefficiencies 
that the values and metrics of this ‘technology of Government’ had brought to light. To 
begin with, the university was looking to amalgamate some of its undergraduate 
courses where low consumer demand coupled with the inefficient duplication of 
modules both within and across departments was impacting their capacity to generate a 
surplus. And this efficiency evaluation was occurring across the whole institution: 
“Sometimes the faculties are providing things in triplicate to a finite bunch of 
students, and its bonkers!” explained Interviewee -212. 
Moreover, one particular department was facing major cutbacks and restructuring due, 
in part, to an already-known lack of demand for its primary subject: chemistry. 
According to the interviewees, the university had calculated that, given the “practical” 
nature of the degree, some modules required around sixty hours of contact time to 
deliver; and according to a number of PA’s strategic leaders, that was simply “too 
costly” (Interviewee, 212). The department was small, and was not paying its way in 
other income-generating areas such as the REF (Interviewee, 203) – so both modules 
and staff were “very vulnerable” to rationalization (Interviewee, 212). Prior to the 
removal of the BTG, “every bum on every seat” in chemistry “was worth about 
£10,500 to the university”, which included “the student top-up fee, the HEFCE STEM 
Grant, and their strategic investment in vulnerable subjects”. And yet, “every single 
chemistry degree in the country [was] making a loss on its teaching” (ibid). Now, PA 
was moving to a situation where the student would need to be ‘willing’ to pay a £9000 
fee; and who knew “how much the Government [was] going to support vulnerable 
subjects?” (ibid). Already, the department relied on ‘clearing’ to make up its student 
numbers, so demand was low. And, already, they were “losing money!” So, now, what 
with the university asking for a return of £1700 per student to invest in their 
Government enforced WP programme, the department was looking at “a £3000 drop in 
funding per student!” (ibid): 
“…And that is not a good place to be”, cautioned Interviewee -212. “It can be very 
stressful. And it’s certainly not a good way to run a business, which in effect is what 
we are.” 
 
The testimonies provided by DTC and FTL were not dis-similar from those of the 
high-ranked case studies. However, the cull in courses that they described 
 266 
demonstrated a more profound shift in their understandings of the value of their 
‘products’ in relation to an emerging demand-driven market. 
 
According to one of DTC’s strategic leaders – who apart from overseeing the 
university’s marketing strategy had recently been involved in a Government-instigated 
exercise for the “market assurance” of new courses – “one-in-two courses, nationally, 
[did] not recruit enough students” (Interviewee, 410). As such, many of England’s 
universities were now looking to cull what he/she referred to as “vanity courses”, 
which had often been “developed to suit the desires of the academic involved rather 
than the students” (ibid). For example, up until the HE White Paper, DTC had itself 
“still been developing courses that had no market” (ibid) because too many academics 
had “a bee in their bonnet about what would make a good course!” (Interviewee, 406). 
“Why can’t we go on teaching ‘nuclear needlework’?” declared Interviewee -410, 
mimicking an imagined reaction from his/her colleagues as they were told that such 
‘vanity courses’ needed to be cut. “There is a very strong resentment from some 
people. There is still that element that doesn’t realize that you actually need students 
in order to run a course!” 
 
The costs of such inefficiency had been extraordinarily high to the university, not just 
in financial terms but also in terms of academic time and processes (ibid). As a result, 
DTC’s strategic leaders were, also, considering culling the sorts of courses and 
programmes that the Government had been discursively constructing – particularly 
through the media – as “Mickey Mouse degrees”, which wouldn’t be valued by 
potential student-consumers for their use in the on-going job-market (Interviewee, 
409). As such, there was widespread feeling amongst DTC’s leaders that “if 
marketisation” could “get rid of some of that sort of waste” then, overall, “it wouldn’t 
be such bad thing!” (Interviewee, 410). 
 
Sports Science, for instance, had seen a recent drop in its applications, so “clearly the 
Government’s message” was “quickly getting across” to potential students that the 
degree did not provide “good value for money” (Interviewee, 409). Certainly, the 
university didn’t want to “disrupt its funding models” until they had “the evidence” to 
suggest that the “huge fall” in demand represented an “onward trend” (ibid). However, 
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Sports Science would have to consider “reducing the size of [their] undergraduate 
programme”, which would “clearly have an impact going forward” (ibid). 
 
Furthermore, was it really efficient for the university to have “three departments all 
teaching basic biochemistry? Couldn’t [they] bring those all together?” And did they 
really need “innumerable courses” that each taught statistics? “Couldn’t those be 
brought together too?” (ibid). At the end of the day, the students would “probably get a 
better experience” if those courses were rationalized because “the teaching would be 
fresh”. Moreover, with the efficiency savings made, the university could provide 
“extra demonstrators” and more “personal attention” (ibid). Whilst it was imperative 
for the university to have “an overall vision”, which did “say something about what 
they believed in” (ibid), they were currently in a position where the decision-making 
factors were inextricably entangled with their students’ valuation of the use of DTC’s 
products. And that had implications for the university’s on-going survival:  
“The fact is that the money is important,” stressed Interviewee -409. “Some of the 
cuts to do with efficiency savings… some of the big decisions; I just can’t make as 
Dean… I have bigger people over me, and they control part of our expenditure. So the 
money side is right there. Money drives a lot of things”. 
 
Similarly, FTL had just undertaken a substantial cull of courses just prior to my 
research with them. 
“We’ve just had to reduce our undergraduate portfolio by over sixty courses for our 
‘Learning Works’ exercise”, explained one senior director involved in marketing (-
311). “I had to stand up and be booed by the School of Applied Sciences!” 
However, as the above Interviewee explained to his/her academic colleagues, FTL’s 
internal audit of courses had revealed that there were no-less-than “seventy-eight 
courses with less than five students on them”; and in terms of their efficiency 
measures, that simply wasn’t “economically viable” (ibid). There was “a business 
reality” that the university “had to face up to” because, ultimately, “the market [didn’t] 
care if [FTL] provided a BA in Military History. The market only care[d] if they had ‘a 
use’ for their degrees!” (ibid): 
“It is all about the market”, stressed my interviewee. “And this university has to be 
market orientated. Sure, I want the university to have 300 undergraduate products; but 
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in five years time if it only has 250 because it is serving the market that has developed, 
then that is what it needs to have.” 
Of course, “the academics involved [wouldn’t] like it”, because it was “their subject 
area”, and they wanted to decide what subjects were of value. But the university’s 
leaders “just [had] to break down those barriers” (ibid): 
“All of this is based on the premise that the university needs to have a sustainable 
balance sheet”, reasoned Interviewee -311. “Income versus expenditure has to 
balance, and marketers like myself have to continue playing that game until someone 
realizes that the [alternative] is unsustainable… These courses have to be 
economically viable!” 
 
Very clearly, the interviewees’ testimonies demonstrate that the emerging social 
relations of value into which the HE sector was, politically, being immersed were 
directly impacting the HEIs’ understandings of where the Value of their provision lay. 
Put another way, the shift in their social relations of value towards a regulatory frame 
for the economy which emphasized the values, metrics and relations of the market, 
was having a direct impact on the HEIs evaluations, values, actions and activities – and 
indeed, their subjectivities as they became far more “business-like” in their behaviours. 
 
And yet, at the very same time as the four universities were efficiently rationalizing 
their undergraduate offerings in line with the Government’s highly reduced 
understanding of the value of HE – which, in turn, could be seen as undermining the 
plurality of values that a neoliberally informed market is meant to satisfy! (see Chapter 
2 above) – they were, concomitantly, involved in ‘pinning down’ their own ‘collective 
valuations’ of their undergraduate offers through the internal process of ‘cross-
subsidization’. 
 
7.4.2 Inefficient collectivity: cross-subsidization 
According to my interviewees, the ideal of cross-subsidization between, what one 
strategic director described as, “surplus departments” and “deficit departments” was 
nothing new to the universities (Interviewee, 108). In the ‘golden years’ of the BTG, 
the internal distribution of public funds between courses, programmes, and faculties 
was understood by the HEIs as a core function of their status – their identification – as 
not-for-profit, public service organizations, whose value to society was largely 
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articulated in terms of their public good contribution. Indeed, the HEIs were used to 
following and adapting HEFCE’s funding distribution model, which, in keeping with 
the Government’s valuation of the universities, enabled two things: a) the Government 
to “sell in” to the system its public good priorities, and b) the universities’ to uphold 
the fundamental principle of their “broad church offer” (e.g. Interviewees 111, 201, 
301, 404). The difference now, of course, was that the Government had redefined its 
valuation of the public good of HE – idealistically, monetarily and relationally. Thus, 
in line with the neoliberal economic rationale that underpinned this political push 
towards marketisation, in theory, the HEIs’ valuations should have been largely 
governed by the demands of its newly marketised undergraduate student-consumers. 
 
The Government was still intending on offering some public financial support for 
particular subjects: the STEMs and the SIVS. However, as far as the universities knew, 
this was to be a vastly reduced per-capita subsidy, which, as a result, would be 
allocated in line with demand. As such, as both the Browne Review and the HE White 
Paper had so clearly articulated, those courses, programmes, faculties and, indeed, 
universities that were popular – and, thus, financially sustainable – should be 
encouraged to flourish. Those for which demand was consistently low – and were, 
therefore, economically untenable – should be allowed to fail (see Chapter Four 
above). 
 
This breach of the universities’ autonomy to embed into their provision a more 
multiple and complex valuation of HE as they understood it, was not something that 
any of the HEIs was completely willing to bear. To a greater-or-lesser degree, each had 
been willing to examine their offers in accordance with some neoliberal, economic 
understanding of efficiency, but they were not willing to allow either Government or 
the market to alter the value of what the universities believed HE was for. As one of 
PA’s senior directors explained in terms that were typical for each HEI: 
“There is a genuine feeling that we – collectively – want to be part of a broad-based 
institution both academically and intellectually speaking. And the correlation to that is 
that you cross-subsidize… We cross-subsidize courses all the time, and we cross 
subsidize between departments; and the rationale is very clear and fundamental: this is 
an institution that celebrates its academic breadth and the benefits that this breadth 
brings to the university and society”. 
(201, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
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As a result, both Government and the market needed to be kept ‘at arms length’ in 
terms of the universities’ internal valuation of their broad provision of courses. 
 
Indeed, each of the case studies provided specific examples of cross-subsidization, 
elaborating their internal processes, flows of monies, multiple logics, and the 
complexity of values upon which it was based. In so doing, their testimonies 
underscored the inescapable co-existence of normalisation and diversity in their 
emerging economic geographies and the social relations of value that shape them. 
 
For example, although PA had undertaken the efficient rationalization of its Chemistry 
provision – in part due to its high cost-to-demand ratio, and in part due to broader 
efficiencies required for the REF – the university’s strategic leaders were 
concomitantly prepared to continue its cross-subsidization due to the value PA placed 
on the subject’s provision. At the time of interview, the faculty of Humanities and 
Social Sciences was “taking a huge hit in order to prop up Chemical Sciences” whose 
faculty of Science and Engineering had “just gone from being £600,000 in surplus to 
being £300,000 in deficit” – the latter having surfaced through the faculty’s failure to 
recruit enough international students whose high fees invariably helped to cross-
subsidize their home-undergraduate provision (Interviewee, 212). Although Chemistry 
was clearly “not paying for itself”, PA wanted to continue its cross-subsidization 
because of the subject’s “contribution to the university as a whole” (Interviewee, 203). 
Just because Government had “set an arbitrary fee and there [were] people who didn’t 
have the resources to pay for it”, didn’t mean that PA should “stop offering 
programmes… that help[ed] to maintain a breadth of subject areas” (ibid). And the 
reasons for this were all to do with the university’s understanding of the value of HE. 
As one long-time academic elaborated: 
“So we justify cross-subsidy on the grounds that money isn’t actually the way of valuing 
things… We do it because we think that it’s in the public good to have universities that 
have a broad range of subjects… Each time we relook at the big issues like ‘do we want 
to have a broad based university?’ the answer is ‘yes’. So we’re not going to suddenly 
home in just on the profitable areas. We are very clear about maintaining certain 
subjects despite the fact that they are not self-funding. If you never cross-subsidized 
things you’d close things down!” 
(203, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
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In fact, each interviewee’s testimony across each of the HEIs demonstrated a similar 
set of discourses and values to those which underpinned PA’s cross-subsidization of 
Chemistry. For a start, each institution had long-since begun to diversify their income 
streams in order to relieve the financial and regulatory pressures, risks and 
uncertainties they’d suffered under the incremental ‘drip, drip’ of politically imposed 
marketisation: 
“We’ve had no choice but to manage the risks that have arisen from policy”, 
explained one senior strategist from FTL (-306), “And we are! In this university it is 
very live! It can’t be one of those things where we develop a response like diversifying 
income streams and then put it on the shelf… We’ve had to go for the market, whatever 
that market that might be and whatever that market looks like”. 
And it was the profits from these markets that were now helping the universities to 
financially uphold their understandings and valuations of what did and did not 
constitute the value of HE. 
 
Profits from specific subject areas such as Business that were highly saleable in a 
variety of markets, and profits from specific groups of students such as international 
and PGT – who by-and-large constituted the ‘paying customers’ in those subject 
markets – were utilized internally by the universities to cross-subsidize both deficit-
producing-subjects and deficit-producing-students. 
 
For example, in terms of deficit producing subjects, as with each HEI, GE underscored 
the importance of both their international and PGT students to maintaining the 
financial sustainability of the institution and its autonomy to uphold its broad base 
offering: 
“If we’re honest, our PGT and overseas students are important, largely, from the 
point of view of the fees”, explained one strategic director (-106). “Like many 
universities, the difference between a department breaking even and going bust is that 
fee component. It’s one of the few elements of money that comes in that is completely 
free for the university to do what it likes with. Everybody knows that’s the case in 
higher education”. 
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Although, as evidenced throughout my research, GE had long-thought of itself as a, 
somewhat, ‘footloose’, ‘commercial enterprise’ that was used to acting competitively 
in relation to a variety of markets, the cross-subsidization of departments was 
considered a core feature of its value as a university. As Interviewee -106 continued: 
“There is very much a sense in the university that higher education is really 
valuable for its own sake. I mean, we support loss-making departments!” he/she 
exclaimed with, almost, disbelief. “Subjects that have no immediate economic value! 
And we are very happy to do that because they are just fantastically interesting and 
valuable subjects”. 
 
For sure, some interviewees expressed discomfort that the universities were charging 
overseas and PGT students whatever the institutions thought they “could get away 
with” – “just to balance the books” (Interviewee, 309): 
“…But that is the reason we are doing it”, reasoned one of FTL’s strategists (-309). 
“We are creating a surplus in one area to subsidize other areas”. 
And for sure, the universities had to establish some sort of criteria for continuing to 
support a subject – or not as the case may be: 
“Clearly if demand dropped radically, you’d have see whether it is worthwhile 
keeping”, emphasized another of GE’s directors (-104). “But you don’t make a 
snapshot decision. You look at each subject strategically and ask: ‘what is the 
importance of the subject to the university and society? What is the prognosis in the 
long-term? Are we doing something wrong that can be altered, or could it be a 
national or international trend?’ There are lots of factors you would look at.” 
 
However, provided the universities could put the profits to some ‘higher purpose’ – 
“to the good of the Academy”, as another of GE’s strategic directors (-112) put it – 
then “ethically” the universities could “think about the value of keeping a particular 
subject as set against the huge surplus made in another department” or by “another set 
of students” (Interviewee, 108). The universities were “not in it to make a profit” 
(Interviewee, 112). The “generation of resources” was “not a good in its own right!” 
(ibid). 
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Indeed, as one of DTC’s leaders told me, almost every university was having to cross-
subsidize at least one of its STEM or SIV subjects: “collecting the money in, then re-
distributing it internally in a way that match[ed] cost to delivery” (Interviewee, 402). 
So even here, where the Government was, supposedly, valuing the provision of 
subjects it deemed strategically important to the economic good of the nation, the 
universities were having to step in to prevent market failure by ‘propping up’ that 
valuation: 
“If you’re going to a demand-led system, then you’ll never produce enough STEM 
or Language graduates unless there’s some form of incentive for the student”, said 
Interviewee -402. “The market doesn’t work like that. We’re not selling soap powder, 
you know. We’re not selling food. People have to eat, but people don’t have to sell you 
French or Mathematics. So the Government hasn’t really got it right.” 
 
Furthermore, in terms of deficit producing students, the surpluses from profitable 
students and profitable subjects were being internally re-distributed by the universities 
to ‘prop up’ the Government’s under-valuation of its WP agenda. Thus, what with the 
White Paper’s most recent push towards marketization, any emerging understanding of 
the value of HE was only going to become more complex, as one of PA’s senior 
strategists explained: 
“We are trying to expand our PGT and international student bodies because that’s 
where we make the money. They will help finance the bursaries that we can give to our 
local WP students. So there is a close relationship between these student bodies. Rather 
than see those markets as contradictory to the public good, you can actually marketise 
some bits of the university product whilst utilizing those profits internally. So you can 
argue whether or not some degrees, like Business, are a public or private good; but 
done the right way, they are both. Getting a Business degree, which gets you a very high 
paying job, actually helps pay for our ability to look after students at the other end”. 
(207, Senior Management VCO, Long-time Academic) 
 
The enormous complexity of the emerging value of HE really hit home when another 
of PA’s senior directors (-201) explained that the university’s home undergraduates 
were also enmeshed as ‘creditors’ in these complex circuits of value. And to a greater-
or-lesser degree, this would be true for every university across the land. Because of the 
Government’s push towards marketisation, its under-valuation of HE as a public good, 
and the complexity of the Graduate Repayment Scheme – which removed a previously 
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‘known value’ of public investment from HE’s ex-ante relations, and displaced it to the 
‘unknown valuations’ and vagaries of the ex-post job market – the universities had 
been obliged by Government to build the upfront costs of their WP programmes (such 
as their bursaries and various outreach programmes) into their undergraduate fee. As a 
result, some home undergraduate students would be “cross-subsidizing someone else’s 
education”, and depending on the individual’s private gain through the on-going job 
market, any one of them could be “cross-subsidizing WP in general!” (ibid). 
 
According to Interviewee -201, pragmatically speaking, in order to function, the 
country needed doctors, geographers, lawyers and artists; and ethically, all young 
people from all social backgrounds should be offered the opportunity to gain a higher 
education and “contribute to social life in all these different ways” – provided they 
were qualified to do so, of course. And that was “a societal value that [went] beyond 
personal benefits.” 
 
However, when the multiple and complex social relations of cross-subsidization were 
taken into account, there was no way for the universities, the Government or the 
students to know exactly which student, from what social background, or from what 
country would end up cross-subsidizing the English public purse for that ‘societal 
value’ – be that of subjects or students. As a result, according to a number of 
interviewees from each HEI, if the universities wanted to uphold what they considered 
to be the public good of their “broad-base provision”, then the only “economically 
efficient” way of doing so was to “consider its value collectively” (Interviewee, 304). 
As one strategic leader from DTC underscored: 
“So I prefer to think of universities as a single entity: a single community. And our PGT, 
PGR, overseas and undergraduates are all component parts of that community and our 
broad base offer. In some ways to differentiate between them seems to destroy that 
notion. I think it would entirely change the nature of the way in which universities 
operate and the values that the university stands for. So although I recognize that we 
operate differently in different markets because we have to generate the stable financial 
base that we need to survive, we clearly need to differentiate between that need to 
generate income to maintain the institution and the sort of collective community that we 
would wish the institution to be”. 
(409, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic) 
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When I asked one strategic director from GE as the ‘most market-oriented’ of the case 
studies, what enabled them to not, simply, act like market actors in the face of an 
increasingly neoliberalized policy framework, he/she replied laughing: 
“Because we are not businesses! That’s what makes you act not like a business in a 
market! We are an educational institution; you know? We aren’t businesses. That’s not 
to say that you’re not mindful of all those economies and the financial implications of 
things. But we are not a business.” 
(108, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic) 
 
In the emerging economic geographies of higher education, this was, indeed, a 
complex negotiation of value and values in the face of an attempted normalisation of a 
particularly neoliberal understanding of value. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by reflecting on Lee’s (2006, 2011) assertion that economic 
geographies are always emerging, always a product of both interior and exterior 
influences, and always already fragile and variable at the same time as they are 
constrained, both socially and materially. I, thus, argued that the implications of this 
constantly moving landscape are profound, for not only does it underscore the 
enormous and persistent work that is required to maintain any sort of coherent 
political-economic objective regarding what does or does not constitute value, it 
concomitantly emphasizes that even when any apparent coherence is achieved it will 
always be temporary due to the inconsistencies and variation of actual, situated 
economic practices. Importantly, this was not to suggest that the power relations 
involved in the practice and performance of economic geographies are not relevant or 
constraining. They are. Rather, it was to underscore the inherent impossibility of 
exerting an all-pervading neoliberal market rationale from the ‘top-down’ onto social-
economic practice. 
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, given the ontological complexity and diversity of the 
Ordinary Economy, it was simply not possible for the governmental technology of the 
HE White Paper to wholly control the evaluations, values, actions, activities and 
subjectivities of the HEIs directly in line with the metrics and values of the market as 
put forward in its discourses and policies. Nor was it possible for Government to 
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wholly control the emerging value of HE. Indeed, and as demonstrated, since value 
emerges through the practice and performance of economic geographies – which are 
themselves shaped by multiple and complex social relations of value – these ‘objects of 
government’ were inextricably intertwined. 
 
Certainly the aims of the Government seemed reasonably clear to the universities – 
even if its overall message was somewhat confused. By emphasizing the private value 
of HE in terms of its eventual utility in gaining graduates a well-paying job, and by 
identifying and placing those graduates more forcefully as fee-paying student-
consumers who sat at the heart of the system, their value-maximizing demands would 
drive HE’s universities to think and behave as businesses in a competitive market, 
thereby optimizing their fiscal inputs by becoming more efficient. ‘Adding value’ to 
the student in the form of ‘employability’ alongside ‘maximizing value’ in the form of 
market-efficient resource allocation were the dominant discourses of HE’s ‘worth’ 
emanating from Government. 
 
However, as my research has illuminated, these governmental aims and discourses 
were only partially achieved and successful. Each HEI definitely set about 
streamlining and culling certain courses where inefficiencies were high and/or demand 
was low: their overlapping provisions, their poorest recruiting subjects, their ‘vanity 
courses’ and their so-called ‘Mickey Mouse’ degrees. And ‘cost’ – that most forcefully 
emphasized Government mantra – alongside ‘survival’ – that more imminently 
uncertain material imperative – underpinned each HEI’s calculations of its bottom line. 
And yet, each university concomitantly continued their long-established practices of 
cross-subsidization both between surplus-producing subjects and deficit-producing 
subjects and surplus-producing students and deficit-producing students. Indeed, even 
where Government was purportedly investing in HE for the value of what it 
understood as HE’s public good, the universities were independently reallocating 
resources internally to shore up the Government’s under-(e)valuations and 
investments. And this cross-subsidization was inextricably tied to both the HEIs’ own 
understandings of the public value of HE – its broad base offer and its multifaceted 
contribution to society, the economy and civilization – and, indeed, to their self-
identification as absolutely not businesses acting in a market. Yet, at the very same 
time, the majority of the surpluses that the universities felt ‘free’ to reallocate as self-
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identified collectives came from their actions and activities in a variety of full fee-
paying and, often, very long-standing markets, leading a number of my interviewees to 
declare that they were businesses after all! 
 
As complex as my research has demonstrated HE’s social relations of value to be, 
there is, however, one inescapable truth that each of my interviewees’ testimonies 
underscored in one-way or another. Whilst their evaluations, values, actions, activities 
and subjectivities most definitively displayed or embodied market-like and/or 
business-like attributes and values before the implementation of the HE White Paper, 
each HEI emerged as more market-like and/or more business-like following its 
application. And whilst each HEI continued to display a deep commitment to investing 
in a collective ethos of the university following the White Paper, the material 
imperatives of making a living were becoming more imminent due to the uncertainty 
of their shifting economic social and material relations. 
 
Thus, in the context of an attempted normalisation of a particular understanding of 
value in the face of a diversity of values, the metrics and values of the market 
imaginary as set out by Government were succeeding in ‘crowding out’ a vast array of 
the previously held ideals and beliefs of those HEIs – at least, in part. 
 
In the next, and final, chapter of this PhD, I will pull together the arguments set out in 
this thesis in order to draw conclusions. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to resolve the complex interplay between 
neoliberally informed policy programmes of marketisation, which are themselves 
geographically diverse, and the diversity of ordinary socio-economic contexts into 
which those policy programmes are inserted or imposed. In order to achieve this aim, I 
argued that rather than attempting to bolster the explanatory capacity of political 
economy and/or governmentality approaches by combining them with additional 
lenses, theories and concepts, an approach that took the multifarious interactions 
between socio-spatially constructed political-economic relations and the diversity of 
the Ordinary Economy as its starting point might provide deeper insights into 
neoliberalization’s processual nature. That is, how neoliberal processes of 
marketisation emerge in time and place. 
 
Without doubt, scholars of both political economy and governmentality who have 
emphasized the centrality of context as an inescapable concrete necessity in 
neoliberalization’s progress have made an enormous contribution to academic and 
scholarly knowledge (e.g. Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner et al, 2010; Harvey, 
2007; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Jessop, 2004, 2009; Jessop and Sum, 2001, 2003; 
Larner, 1997, 2000a, 2000b; Ong, 2007, 2008; Peck, 2010; Peck and Tickel, 2002; 
Peck et al, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2005; Watts, 2003). Not only have such scholars 
underscored the need to culturally- and/or geographically- ground the analytical 
rudiments and theories of these widely implemented approaches. They have also 
underscored that, if the actually existing manifestations of political-economic projects 
like neoliberalization are to be revealed, then the articulation between the economic 
and political – and, importantly, their embedding in broader sets of social relations – 
must be considered. 
 
However, as the arguments that I set out in Chapter Two demonstrated, some such 
studies have been criticized for still presenting neoliberalization as an inescapably 
“hegemonic” project by which a clearly defined neoliberal logic of capital has been 
perfectly capable of dominating social relations by subordinating public values to 
those of the market. As a result, the complex social contexts in and through which 
political programmes must necessarily operate have all too often been treated as a 
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“residual effect” of such programmes (Barnett, 2005). Thus, a broad range of political 
economy- and governmentality- inspired theories of hegemony have failed to provide 
adequate insights into the complex interplay between society and polity in the seeming 
re-production of neoliberal domination (e.g. Brenner et al, 2010; Dean, 1999; Jessop 
and Sum, 2003; Peck, 2013; Peck et al, 2012; Sum, 2004, 2009). 
 
As my arguments have demonstrated, neoliberalization most centrally seeks to change 
the way that the economy is normally practised in time and place; and other scholars 
have undoubtedly sought to overcome the perceived weaknesses of both political 
economy and governmentality through a variety of approaches that have taken normal 
everyday economic practices and relations seriously (e.g. Boudreau et al, 2009; Clarke, 
2004; Keil, 2002; Smith and Rochovska, 2007; Tilly, 1999, 2000, 2002; Wilshusen, 
2010). In this thesis, however, I adapted and re-posed the work of Roger Lee (2006, 
2011) arguing that it is in and through the emerging economic geographies of the 
Ordinary Economy that any political attempt at restructuring the economy must 
necessarily unfold. Importantly, central to this attempted political economic 
restructuring would be the semiotic and material re-shaping and re-forming of what 
Lee calls, social relations of value, involving both understandings and practices of 
value, Value and values. I, therefore, suggested that through this novel conceptual lens, 
the political process of neoliberalization would be understood to connote the 
(attempted) transformation of socio-economic spatial relations into emerging 
economic geographies, more-or-less governed by the metrics and values of the market. 
 
Of central importance in applying this analytical proposition, was the recognition and 
articulation of the ontological necessity for normalisation and diversity to co-exist with 
one another in the Ordinary Economy. The circuits of value that make up economic 
geographies are foundational to the sustenance of social life and are comprised of 
certain necessary processes involving the establishment of socio-economic relations 
and the material practices of production, consumption and exchange. At the same time, 
the specific circumstances in and through which these processes necessarily take place 
are not only geographically, temporally and socially variable, they are deeply 
influential and the consequence of political and social struggles. As such, I argued that 
economic practice is at once structured/constrained and variable. For, on the one hand, 
it is comprised of relations of power, institutions, norms, and certain material and 
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social imperatives, dynamics and tendencies, whilst on the other it is subject to 
multiple and complex interpretations, evaluations, values, logics, beliefs, dilemmas, 
and relations. And all of these factors – just like the economic geographies to which 
they are intrinsic – emerge relationally in time and place in the struggle to define what 
is and is not value. 
 
Certainly, the marketisation of HE in England has provided an interesting, timely and 
valuable case study through which to pursue the overarching aim of this thesis as well 
as its precise research questions. Firstly, the historic discourse analysis presented in 
Chapter Four has underscored the extent to which a neoliberally informed market 
imaginary has come to penetrate HE policy in England, particularly since the late 
1970s onwards with the political ascendance of the ‘New’ or ‘centre-’ right. Yet, 
having analysed the development of English HE funding policy from the turn of the 
20th Century, my research has highlighted that its emergence alongside the pattern, size 
and makeup of the sector has been far from straightforward. For instance, the political 
emphasis on who should pay for HE and the ‘machinery’ and/or ‘relations’ through 
which it should be funded and coordinated has definitively shifted. However, it simply 
isn’t possible to understand the complex political and social struggles, negotiations and 
compromises that have made up HE funding policy’s actual existences over the course 
of a century as simply a political movement from Left to Right; from Keynesian 
demand-side economics to neo-classical supply-side principles; from an emphasis on 
the public value of HE to an emphasis on individual gain; or from a belief in the 
efficiency of central co-ordination to a conviction that the efficient organization of 
economy and society is best achieved through the practices and values of the ‘free’ 
market. As my discursive analysis of the 2011 HE White Paper and a variety of 
supporting documents has indicated, the coalition Government’s intentions to shape 
the evaluations, actions and activities of HE’s actors via a neoliberally informed 
market imaginary were clearly manifest in the White Paper’s texts. And the metrics or 
‘tactics’ designed to engender market subjectivities and values were, as the White 
Paper itself suggested, “radical” and very plain to see (BIS, 2011a: 74). Yet, this 
cannot belie the just-as-apparent metrics or ‘tactics’ that continued to support, what the 
White Paper discursively constructed as, the public value of HE – most specifically its 
contribution to social mobility and employment. As Chapter Four demonstrated, the 
deeper penetration of the market imaginary into HE policy has been incremental and 
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complex, having emerged – not necessarily uniformly or lineally – from previous 
iterations of inescapably contextual political economy. 
 
Secondly, the careful selection of four very different universities through which to 
pursue my empirical investigations has provided an invaluable representation of the 
diversity and complexity of the HE sector in and on which the White Paper was 
attempting to intervene in order to shape HE’s framework of action. As my research 
has demonstrated, the varying histories, identities, geographies and, hence, path-
dependencies of the four case study HEIs decisively shaped their evaluations and 
negotiations of the metrics and values that the White Paper was discursively and 
politically attempting to reinforce. Thus, the situated socialities and materialities of the 
universities were central in helping to shape the economic geographies of HE that 
continued to emerge following the White Paper’s implementation. And importantly, at 
a more generalized level of political economy, this would be true across the diversity 
of ordinary socio-economic contexts into which relations of neoliberalization are 
inserted or imposed. 
 
Analytically, my emphasis throughout this PhD on both the situated nature of 
economic geographies and their continuous emergence has been vital. These 
characteristics reveal both the concomitant power of the policies put forward in the 
White Paper – be they ‘market’ or ‘non market’ (Peck, 2013a, 2013b following 
Polanyi) – to shape HE’s socio-economic relations, values and practices and the 
immediate variation of its metrics and values as they were interpreted, made 
meaningful and put into practice in and through the diversity of concrete economic 
geographies of the HEIs. As evidenced throughout my empirical investigations, the 
circuits and networks of value of which economic geographies are comprised are 
constantly subject to evaluation and contestation through the social relations of value 
that shape them, which are themselves foundational to, and inseparable from, the 
everyday practices and performances of the Ordinary Economy. Hence, in this light, 
my articulation of the ontological necessity for normalisation and diversity to co-exist 
with one another in the Ordinary Economy is less about illuminating this crucial 
academic argument. Rather, it is more that without its foundational incorporation into 
research, the complexities of neoliberalization’s processual nature – its actual, situated 
and constantly emerging existences – may be lost. 
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What I hope the reader has found helpful, here, has been my illumination of the 
complex interplay between geographically diverse relations of neoliberalization and 
the diverse contexts of the universities through the three stages of what I have called 
an ‘iterative emergence’. Although, as an analytic, the stages are somewhat stylized, 
they none-the-less arose from – and thus represent in a grounded form – the iterative 
and reflexive evaluations and processes that my interviewees described in terms of 
their movement from ‘construal to construction’. From the initial stages of meaning 
making and complexity reduction as each HEI selected a preliminary set of strategies 
for moving on in the world; through the apparent re-introduction of complexity as the 
universities put those strategies into action; to the emergence of a partially modified, 
re-formed and re-defined HE sector – and its value – my research has demonstrated 
that it was in the transition from imagination to practice that the concomitant 
embedding and transformation of the White Paper’s policy metrics and values literally 
began to take place. And central to this temporal and spatial concretization of 
neoliberalization was the practice and performance of the HEIs’ diverse emerging 
economic geographies and the inescapable social relations of value that shape them. 
 
Indeed, throughout each stage of the HEIs’ iterative emergence, the semiotically 
reductive understandings and metrics of the White Paper played a vital and powerful 
role in the Government’s attempts to structure the evaluations, values, actions, 
activities and subjectivities of HE’s strategic leaders and their universities. As each of 
my interviewees underscored, the replacement of ex-ante public funding with a cost-
covering fee that followed the student, alongside the instigation of both the AAB+ and 
flexible margin competitions, introduced a great deal of uncertainty into the 
universities’ social relations of value, thereby forcing them to consider how they 
would need to adapt in order to survive. As a result of their evaluations, and without 
their immediate and total collective resistance to the ‘new policy context’ (a point to 
which I shall return in a moment), each university emerged as more competitive, more 
efficient, more entrepreneurial and more market-like and/or business-like than they had 
been before the implementation of the White Paper. 
 
However, at the very same time, as each HEI reflected on their own identities (their 
histories, missions, wealth, statuses and reputations), their geographies (both in terms 
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of their locations and national and international spatial reach), their competitors (who 
and where were they and what threat might they pose to their on-going survival), and 
the socio-economic makeup and geographies of their student bodies (most specifically, 
their home undergraduates), they each chose to vary those same policy metrics in 
accordance with factors that they held as being valuable and/or useful to them. For 
instance, whilst each HEI rationally calculated how much life-sustaining value they 
would need to derive from the undergraduate fee, both DTC and FTL (the two 
low/mid-ranked institutions) pitched their headline fees at just £500 lower than the 
highest-ranking institutions in the sector. This was despite Government efforts to 
induce a price-differentiated market, which – in theory – should have related 
reputation and ranking to cost. However, in DTC’s and FTL’s evaluations, given their 
situated relational socio-economic contexts and the fact that the quasi-market metrics 
of the White Paper did not, actually, introduce the (potentially) structuring forces of 
‘full-blown’ market competition, the HEIs simply couldn’t be ‘competed out of 
existence’ by their local, lower-cost competitors. 
 
Further, whilst each HEI calculated the costs of not competing in either the AAB+ or 
flexible margin competitions, they each based their actual strategies on multiple logics 
and values. GE, for instance, would go after its ‘natural market’, but decided not to 
compete with other nationally selective universities for those valuable AAB+ students. 
Instead, it would focus on reaping the potential of their well-established international 
economic geographies, thereby avoiding competing with their English rivals (which 
GE felt would be to the detriment of the sector) while simultaneously escaping what 
GE saw as the increasing constraints of Government regulation. Similarly, although 
FTL decided that it would compete in the flexible margin competition given the local 
rootedness of their undergraduate students and the makeup of their local competitors, 
they decided that they would also seek to gain as much public funding as they could – 
primarily through the recruitment of part-time students, the market for which was not 
capped. In FTL’s evaluations, their typical students would end up re-paying very little 
of their loans as graduates. As such, given that Government was clearly out to “shaft” 
(Interviewee, 301) the local, lower-ranked institutions – which, in FTL’s opinion, were 
now the primary providers of HE as a public good – there was no reason that they 
shouldn’t get the most out of the British public purse in return. 
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Such variation of policy was also readily apparent as the universities put other 
governmentally induced strategies into practice. As demonstrated, although each 
university recognized the complex discourses underpinning both the White Paper’s 
articulation and the universities’ understandings of the student experience, KIS and the 
Student Charter, they ardently emphasised that the policies were becoming 
increasingly significant components of an emerging home undergraduate market, 
particularly in terms of the universities’ heightened needs to: a) demonstrate ‘value for 
money’; b) compete for their, now, more demanding, fee-paying students, and c) most 
fundamentally, to survive. Yet, both in formulating their strategies and in putting them 
into practice, the universities and the individual actors who made up those institutions 
all, variously, refused to see themselves simply as producers, or their students as 
consumers, of a product that could be bought and sold in a demand-supply market 
relationship. Instead, other values and logics – such as university autonomy, the 
pastoral nature of the teaching relationship, the importance of research in some 
institutions, and the fact that HE was a shared responsibility with students having to 
work hard in order to realize its value to themselves as individuals – variously guided 
their evaluations and practices. Thus, as the semiotically reduced metrics and values of 
both Government policy and the universities’ strategies were confronted by a diversity 
of values, complexity was re-introduced as the HEIs moved from construal to 
construction. 
 
Indeed, as my elucidation of the HEIs emerging economic geographies has 
underscored, it simply was not possible for the metrics and values of the HE White 
Paper to control wholly the evaluations, behaviours, values, and subjectivities of the 
HEIs directly in line with the reduced understandings of the market imaginary as put 
forward in its discourses and policies. Nor was it possible for Government to control 
wholly the emerging value of HE, which was, of course, inextricably intertwined with 
the universities’ material and social economic practices, values and relations – as well 
as their non-economic practices, values and relations. 
 
While each HEI took on the Government mantle of market-based efficiency by 
rationally choosing to cull some of their low-demand and financially, under-productive 
courses – thereby helping to normalise the basis of one particular market-based 
understanding of Value – they concomitantly chose to eschew such an understanding 
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by financially shoring up other loss-making subjects and students. As a result, the 
HEIs stressed that their practices and subjectivities reflected both business and non-
business attributes and values, making them at most market-like in their overall 
situated socio-economic performances. 
 
Further, although each HEI was willing to recognize the private value of HE to the 
individual – particularly where the home (under)-graduate would end up re-paying a 
substantial fee – they concomitantly rejected the notion that ‘adding value’ to the 
student through some metric of ‘employability’ was the basis of HE’s ‘worth’. By the 
same token, whilst each HEI was willing to recognize the public value of HE to the 
country, they concomitantly rejected the idea that social mobility and/or the economic 
development of the nation were the only public goods that were ‘worthy’ of public 
funding. Instead, in addition to these narrow Government articulations of HE’s value, 
each university stressed the much broader benefits of HE both to the individual and the 
country: its transformative nature to the individual; its general betterment of society 
through having a generally skilled and thinking population; its humanitarian and 
civilizing aspects; and the importance of learning and gaining knowledge as an end in 
itself. 
 
Undoubtedly, the particular situated contexts of the HEIs variously shaped their 
understandings of HE’s private and public value. However, every one of the 
interviewees – without exception – underscored that the value of HE to the individual 
and society was so much more than the Government’s articulation of either its ‘private 
utility’ in gaining the graduate a well-paying job or its ‘public utility’ in promoting 
social mobility and/or strengthening the economy. As such, just like their economic 
geographies and the social relations of value that shape them, both the subjectivities of 
the HEIs – the performance of which reflected their multiple ways of being human – 
and the value of HE – the multiplicity and practice of which defied its prescription by 
some iron Law of Value – emerged as more multiple and complex than either the 
neoliberally-informed discourses, metrics and values embodied in the Government’s 
HE White Paper or its understandings of the social value of HE. And yet, as each of 
the examples presented in this thesis has demonstrated, the values of the market 
imaginary as set out by Government were definitively succeeding – at least, in part – 
in ‘crowding out’ a vast array of the previously held ideals and beliefs of the HEIs. 
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Thus, in light of the evidence presented, the argument of this thesis is that 
neoliberalization – with the emphasis on its processual nature – is a bottom-up as well 
as top-down process, which is constructed in practice in the context of an attempted 
normalisation of a particular understanding of value in the face of a diversity of values. 
For, in answer to Barnett’s (2005) question regarding how so-called hegemonic 
political economic projects become anchored at the level of everyday: it is through the 
practice and performance of emerging economic geographies and the social relations 
of value which shape them. 
 
As analytically trivial as this assertion may seem, it really isn’t; for it literally places 
the social practice of economy right at the heart of political economy. The resolution 
of the relationship between politics and economy is not to residualise socio-economic 
practice because of its multiplicity and complexity. Rather, it is to accept its centrality 
in the production of political-economic relations, which are – therefore – always 
already geographically diverse. In the ontology of the Ordinary Economy in which 
normalisation and diversity necessarily co-exist with one another, this is an 
inescapable truth. And in this light, the interpretive openness of, so-called, ‘weak 
theory’ (Gibson-Graham, 2008; Lee, 2006; Larner, 2012) can be understood as a 
substantial methodological strength. 
 
So what does this research contribute to understandings of neoliberal hegemony, and 
why is this important? Far from being, as some approaches to political economy have 
implied, a ‘directive ideology’ which is perfectly capable of dominating social 
relations by subordinating public values to those of the market; and far from being, as 
some governmentality studies have suggested, a comprehensive ‘rule regime’ through 
which their desired subject effects are either ‘automatically realized’ or ‘more or less 
successfully contested and resisted’, the research detailed in this PhD suggests a 
different perspective. That is: given the processual nature of neoliberalization that I 
have demonstrated, neoliberal hegemony is best understood as a critical mass of 
moderate compliance59 with the prevailing values and metrics of the market. But this 
                                                        
59
 My use of the word “compliance”, here, is in its fullest sense: i.e. agreement, amenability, obedience, 
submission, fulfilment, observance, accordance etc. And each of these meanings may be multiply 
present at once. 
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critical mass is part of a much broader spectrum of evaluations, values, 
understandings of Value, and practices of value that is more diffuse. 
 
Again, this may seem like an analytically trivial point, but again it isn’t; for it 
underscores the inherently relational nature of neoliberal hegemony, as well as its 
evident contingency upon socio-economic practice for its actual, situated constitution. 
If, as evidenced in this PhD, economic geographies are always emerging and always 
open to perpetual interruptions and re-configuration by the diverse social and material 
relations, values and subjectivities of ordinary socio-economic practice, then so too is 
the constitution of neoliberal hegemony. As I have illustrated, the multiple and 
complex emergence of value requires enormous and persistent work if neoliberally 
informed market objectives regarding its constitution are to be maintained across time 
and space. As such, the practice and performance of value in the Ordinary Economy is 
not only inherently diverse; it is full of political possibilities. 
 
Returning, then, to my arguments regarding the HEIs’ failure to reject the further 
marketization of HE through the implementation of the 2011 White Paper. When I 
asked the interviewees to account for the lack of a collective and coherent voice, their 
dominant reasons were two-fold. Firstly, the diversity of institutions within the HE 
sector made some of my interviewees question the possibility of the universities 
finding adequate common ground for consensus. With so many different histories, 
identities, geographies and, hence, path dependencies, the universities were choosing 
to react to policy in their own self interests and/or those of their mission groups rather 
than examine their common understandings and values as a basis for acting in the 
interests of the sector as a whole. Secondly, the incremental imposition of policies of 
marketisation over the course of some thirty-five years or so meant that the HEIs were 
less likely to resist wholeheartedly the metrics and values of the 2011 White Paper. 
Certainly, my interviewees all spoke about the damage caused to HE through the 
increased competition, the need to seek-out diverse income streams, the adoption of 
other ‘market-like’ subjectivities and practices, and, most recently, the implementation 
of the undergraduate cost-covering fee. However, they also underscored that the HEIs 
and the actors that made up those institutions had variously come to value those very 
attributes and practices. 
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As my research has demonstrated, successive Governments from the late 1970s had 
implemented a variety of neoliberally informed tactics and techniques in order to 
regulate the sector towards a market-based framework of activity from which there had 
been definitive payoffs to the HEIs in adopting a whole host of, apparently, market-
based practices and values. And for a multitude of reasons, these were payoffs that the 
HEIs were, now, loath to relinquish. Palace Aspirational, for example, had been raising 
its tariff entry points since 2009/10 in order to increase the university’s ranking in the 
league tables and its reputation as an elite institution. Now, even though the university 
recognised that to continue the strategy at a time of increased competition and 
substantially higher undergraduate fees could severely impact its recruitment of WP 
students, they decided, not merely, to press on with the strategy as it stood, but to 
extend it. The value of competing in a, now, much freer reputational/prestige market 
far outweighed the value of upholding their local WP relations. Similarly, even though 
all four case studies recognised that their various outreach programmes were not, in 
essence, opportunities to market the universities to a WP audience, since the 
instigation of the ‘top-up fee’ in 2006, each HEI had steadily been increasing the 
crossover between its marketing and outreach activities. Now, given that the full value 
of the cost-covering fee was attached to the student, each HEI was not merely 
continuing this strategy: they were actually amalgamating some of their marketing and 
WP activities and staff. The value of marketing the university to a, now, more 
forcefully identified group of consumers was increasingly outweighing the value of 
outreach as an end in itself. 
 
Importantly, this is not to suggest that attributes such as competitiveness, the desire to 
do well, and a whole host of other behaviours and activities – such as the drive for 
efficiency examined in Chapter Seven – are in any way ‘essentially’ market-based or 
driven. As Clark (2008: 135) underscores, an “impressive list” of multiple and 
complex practices, processes, sites and institutions have too often been narrowly 
“identified” as neoliberal, thereby leaving the critical and reflexive researcher to 
question “what is and is not neoliberal?” Rather, the point is to highlight that given the 
perceived lack of a common ground for consensus, the perceived utility and value of 
certain attributes and practices, and, most fundamentally, the constraints imposed by 
Government in terms of the available sources of life-sustaining value, the HEIs 
questioned what choice they had but to by-and-large implement the new policy regime 
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in their own ways given the sustained political push towards marketization together 
with the on-going imperative to, as the Browne Review (2010) so succinctly put it, 
secure a sustainable future. 
 
And yet, as my research has clearly highlighted, the HEIs’ practice of this one very 
narrow understanding of value, whilst critical in terms of its mass and the re-
production of a neoliberal hegemony, was subject to a much broader spectrum of 
evaluations, values, practices and subjectivities. As a result, there were in fact 
innumerable commonalities in the HEIs framework of action around which they could 
have come together in order to achieve a collective consensus. Not least of which was 
their conviction that the material and social form by which HE should be funded and 
co-ordinated ought to both reflect and protect the multiple and complex value of HE as 
both a private and public good. As one strategic director and long-time academic from 
GE expounded when I asked what he/she might change regarding the direction of HE 
if given the opportunity: 
“I would steer it to be more robustly and unapologetically value centred. Instead of 
apologizing for being what it is, we should say what it is… because we know! …At the 
same time, I would try and translate that message into something that the other sectors 
can understand, and address their concerns. We have to have an identity – a core 
identity – that we feel proud of. And the core should be the bit… when all else fails, that 
you cannot chip away at; you cannot change. But one of the things you get with 
competition and running around trying to win the game and beat the other institutions 
all the time is the feeling that the core can be so easily dismantled through divide and 
rule. So, I would like us to stop, so nakedly, trying to win every single game that comes 
along. Whatever the rules, we should have some values that we hold onto…. That's what 
I would change”. 
(106, Management, Steering, Long-time Academic) 
 
In order to understand more about how quasi-public sectors like HE and their 
composite organizations can come together on the basis of their shared interests, a 
notion of the common good of the sector, and its relationship to the wider society, 
further research into their marketization still remains to be undertaken using the 
Emerging Economic Geographies and the Ordinary Economy approach. However, 
given the evidence presented in this PhD, it seems apparent that the necessarily partial 
constitution of neoliberal socio-economic relations in the Ordinary Economy, and the 
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fact that neoliberalization is constructed in practice from the bottom-up as much as the 
top-down, implies that any such political and social possibilities for neoliberalization’s 
successful re-negotiation will be similarly embedded in the practice and performance 
of emerging economic geographies and their social and material relations of value. 
 
This is an important insight, for it reveals with absolute clarity the formative 
significance of geography and the ways in which the Ordinary Economy is played out 
through that geography. Geography introduces not merely spatiality into the economy 
but in so doing, points to the inherency of the social, the cultural and the political 
within what is too often seen as a separate and autonomous field of economy (Lee, 
2006; Mitchell, 1998). Thus, the outcomes of these geographically embedded 
processes of change – which, necessarily, must take place – can never be pre-given: 
they can never be predicted or pre-formed in advance of actual, situated socio-
economic practice. 
 
It is precisely because the market is neither functionally autonomous – there can be no 
such thing as a ‘free’ market – nor pure – economy is always a complex mix of 
material and immaterial processes and relations – that state intervention and 
regulation are necessary both to discipline and constrain economic interpretations and 
practices (via their attempted normalisation) and to achieve certain goals – whether 
ideologically driven or driven by limited understandings of economy. Neither a 
neoliberally informed capitalism nor any other kind of social relations of value are 
‘natural’. They are always socially constructed and so need constant work, re-
enforcement and promotion in order to achieve the particular objectives and states of 
political-economic existence, which are seen as desirable by those who hold power. 
 
When seen in this light, an approach that focuses on the Ordinary Economy to examine 
these issues can contribute significantly to wider debates taking place in economic 
geography regarding the necessity to move beyond (simply) studies of 
neoliberalization or critiques of neoliberalism per se (e.g. Barnett, 2005, 2008; Castree, 
2006; Clark, 2008; Collier, 2005; Ferguson, 2010; Larner, 2003, 2012; Peck, 2008, 
2010, 2013c; Peck et al, 2010; Pollard et al, 2015; Storper, 2015; Venugopal, 2015). 
By ontologically and epistemologically placing value and its inescapable social 
relations at the heart of political-economic activity the approach set out in this PhD 
provides a theoretically grounded method for exploring, what Pollard et al refer to as, 
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“the development of a positive conception of what should come next” (2015: 1). If, as 
Ferguson (2010) suggests, understanding what a more sustainable, balanced and 
progressive economy might look like beyond neoliberalism’s “antis” – anti-
privatisation, anti-deregulation, anti-marketization etc. – involves asking the difficult 
question, “what do we want?” Then, exploring the complex ideals, beliefs, norms and 
values that underpin our actual, situated socio-economic practices and performances 
must surely be central to illuminating the presence and progressive potential of the 
diverse actors, organisations and strategies around which a new critical mass of 
moderate compliance can be formed. 
 
In its necessity to take place, government policy is inescapably meditated by local, 
social relations of value that are always, already multiple and complex and full of 
political possibilities. And the emerging economic geographies of HE in England that 
this PhD has illuminated provide a very clear explication of this. The practice and 
performance of emerging economic geographies in light of new policy metrics offers 
both opportunities and constraints for actors to move on in the world. And it is the 
practice and performance of socio-spatial economic relations that determines what is 
and is not value. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
PhD Interview Schedule: Sample. Spring 2012. 
Introduction 
First of all, thank you again for agreeing to take part in my research. I really appreciate 
that your time is valuable and I am very grateful to you for meeting with me today. 
 
I understand that you know a little bit about my research already, but if I could give 
you a brief overview whilst we are setting up, that might be helpful.  
 
So, I am really interested in how different universities are negotiating their way 
through the current changes that are taking place in higher education with a specific 
focus on current policy – primarily the Higher Education White Paper and its 
supporting documents/policies coming from HEFCE and BIS. 
 
We seem to have heard quite a lot about higher education increasingly becoming 
marketised – particularly in the press, but also from students and perhaps, even, 
colleagues – but perhaps we have also heard quite a lot about the need to maintain the 
‘public good’ of higher education and its benefits to wider society… I don’t know. The 
important thing is that my aim here, today, is to explore your views and experiences 
regarding what is happening in the HE sector and how the university is negotiating its 
way through that. 
 
So the interview will be structured around three core topics. The first involves the 
notion that HE is becoming increasingly marketised. So, we’ll be exploring various 
aspects of the White Paper – some that, purportedly, are introducing market or quasi-
market relations into the HE sector, and others that seem to be more focused on 
widening participation. Again, what is important to me, here, is exploring YOUR 
views and experiences. 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, we’ll be discussing the value of higher education and how that 
value arises. So, for example, that may involve exploring what you feel HE is for and 
where you feel your views come from; it may involve exploring what you feel 
Government believes about the value of HE and why you think that is; or it may 
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involve considering any other interested parties that you feel are important in terms of 
the value of HE. 
 
Finally, as a geographer, I’m really interested in how the existing socio-economic 
geographies and identity of the university help to shape your emerging strategies. So, 
for example, we’ll be exploring the socio-economic makeup and geographies of your 
different student bodies and how they may influence the ways in which current policy 
is being understood and implemented by the university. 
 
So those are the primary topics that we’ll be exploring together. 
 
*Please remember that I am not trying to arrive at any pre-conceived ideas or answers 
to any of this. It is your views and experiences that we are exploring, so please do say 
exactly what you want from your own perspective. And, perhaps, in some ways you 
may even enjoy it. Hopefully it’ll feel more like a conversation than an interrogation. 
 
*If you feel uncomfortable or want a break at any time, please just say, and we’ll either 
pause or stop – it’ll be entirely up to you. 
 
*And, of course, if you need me to re-phrase a question, please do say. 
 
*So, here is your information sheet, which re-states the intentions of my research 
which we discussed by e-mail. It also has my contact details and those of my 
supervisors should you have any questions or concerns. 
 
*With your permission, I’d like to record the interview; but as an alternative I can take 
notes if you prefer. 
 
*So, if you feel happy to proceed, you just need to sign off on the consent form and we 
can press on. (Go through form if needed).  
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Opening Questions 
If we open with a nice easy question to get us started… 
Can you tell me a little bit about your position at the university and the sort of 
role you play in helping to steer the university forward? 
 How long at this institution? 
 How long in this position? 
 What did you do before this? 
 How long in academia in total? 
 Life just before academia? 
 
What made you interested in taking on your current (steering) role? What drew 
you to it? 
 
So, just thinking about (name of university), how would you characterize the 
university? 
 Listen/prompt for – History, Geographies, Student identities… 
 
What factors do you feel are most influencing the university’s direction, 
currently? 
 Listen/prompt for – History, Students, VC, Government Policy, Academic 
values (teaching/research/autonomy). 
 
Value of HE 
So, just starting to think about the value of HE: what do you feel that HE is for? 
 Listen/prompt for – Public good/social, economic… Private good/individual 
gain 
 
Where do you feel you get that sense of value from? For example, is it personal 
experience; being here at this university; wider debates regarding HE’s value? 
 Is your understanding broadly in line with that of the institution? Tell me about 
that. 
What messages do you feel are coming from Government at the moment 
regarding the value of HE? 
 And what prompts you to say that? In what ways do those Government 
discourses show themselves? 
 Possible prompt – Have those message shifted over the years? Tell me about 
that. 
 
Optional Question – So, how would you describe (the realm of HE/the HE sector) 
currently? 
 And has HE always been like this? If not, in what ways is it different from the 
past? And what factors have influenced the changes (if any)? 
 So how would you describe HE before these changes? Why do you feel it was 
different 
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Current Policy – Marketisation (?) 
OK, so I’d like to start thinking about current policy – particularly the HE White 
Paper and its supporting documents – and this idea that HE may or may not be 
becoming more marketised, depending on your perspective. 
 
What elements of current policy are most influencing/impacting the direction of 
the university at the moment and in what ways? 
 Listen/prompt for – Changes to funding (removal of the BTG) (Increase in the 
student fee), Emphasis on student demand, AAB+ and/or FMC, Income 
diversification, WP/WA agenda 
 
On a very practical level, I imagine that the university has had to look at its 
funding and financial status and how this might shift going forward. Can you tell 
me about this? 
 Listen/prompt for – Internal processes, Calculations, Removal of the BTG, 
Strategies (see below) 
 
There are some really interesting policies in the White Paper that I’d like to 
explore with you. 
 
The first involves the introduction of the cost-covering fee for home/EU 
undergraduates. I’d like to start quite broadly, here. 
 What are the implications of the full-cost fee for the institution? 
 Do you feel that it will impact the relationship between the institution and the 
student? If so, in what ways and why? 
 What about academic staff? Will the new fee regime impact the student teacher 
relationship? If so, in what ways and why? 
 
OK, so being a bit more specific about your fees. I see that the university has 
implemented (state the fee structure). Can you tell me what your rationale was 
for doing this? 
 Listen/prompt for – Basic function of cost, How courses and subjects are 
valued, Student identity (socio-economic status), What other universities are 
doing 
 
I see that you have/have not differentiated the fee across different subjects. Can 
you tell me about your rationale for this? 
 
Have you thought about what you might need to do with your fee structure in the 
future should demand for certain subjects fall or rise? Tell me about this? 
 Listen/prompt for – Differentiation of income streams, Price rationales, 
Competition. 
 
At the moment, does the university cross-subsidise from one course to another? 
Either way, what is your rationale for this? 
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Would you consider dropping any courses or subjects if demand was particularly 
low? Can you explain your rationale here? 
 
OK. So the second policy I’d like to explore involves the implementation of the 
AAB+ Competition. 
 What do you think about the competition? 
 Can you tell me how it may impact the university? 
 What strategies have you put in place in terms of the AAB+ Competition? 
 What impact do you feel it will have on the HE sector overall? 
 
The third involves the implementation of the Flexible Margin Competition. 
 What do you think about the competition? 
 Can you tell me how it may impact the university? 
 What strategies have you put in place in terms of the FMC? 
 What impact do you feel it will have on the HE sector overall? 
 
The Government would also like to see universities produce timely and relevant 
information for students in the form of KIS. 
 In principle, what do you think about the idea of providing good information 
about the university and the university experience for students? 
 How has the university responded to the Government’s policy? 
 How do you feel about the sort of information that you are being asked to 
provide through KIS? 
 Imagining the Government’s perspective, what do you think has prompted the 
sort of information that they would like to see universities provide? 
 What do you feel is KEY for a student to know about the university?  
 Tell me about any strategies that the university is implementing other than KIS 
regarding its provision of information. 
 
Another aspect of the White Paper that is quite interesting is its emphasis on the 
student experience. 
 What is the general stance of the university towards the student experience? 
 Please tell be about any specific strategies you have regarding the SE 
 What are your personal views regarding the SE and how do you see it relating 
to policy? 
 
Are there any other aspects of current policy that you would like to discuss before 
we move onto Widening Participation? 
 
THROUGHOUT ALL OF THE ABOVE, LISTEN OUT FOR DISCOURSES 
REGARDING COMPETITION, EFFICIENCY, DEMAND AND VALUES. 
LISTEN ALSO FOR OTHER DISCOURSES ARISING FROM INTERVIEWEE 
TESTIMONIES – ALTERNATIVE REASONS AND MOTIVATIONS, 
INTERVIEWEE AND UNIVERSITY SPECIFIC PERSPECTIVES. 
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Widening Participation 
OK, so I’d like to explore the notion of widening participation or widening access. 
I know that the university has had to produce an access agreement in relation to 
your proposed fee structure, and this has been submitted to HEFCE. 
 
Firstly, tell me a bit about your access agreement – particularly in relation to 
bursaries and fee waivers. What does it involve and what was your rationale for 
structuring it in the way you have? 
 Listen/prompt for – What factors influenced the way it is structured (students, 
competitors, institutional values, university location/geographies, Government 
policies) 
 
Tell me a bit about your outreach programmes. 
 Listen/prompt for – Do they target specific areas, Are they local or further 
afield, Are they about recruitment and/or raising aspirations? 
 
What does it mean to the university to be involved in WP? 
 Listen/prompt for – The broad value of WP, Student identity, University 
values, actions and activities. 
 
Do you feel that there are any tensions or conflicts between the new funding 
structures for HE and the notion of WP? Either way, can you elaborate? 
 
OK. So you’ll be pleased to know that we are coming to the end of the interview 
now, so I’d just like to explore a couple of rounding off questions with you. 
 
So, just thinking about what we’ve discussed, what room do you feel you have to 
actually steer a course – decide a course – for the university given recent trends? 
 
Final Question from me. If you had a magic wand and could change HE in 
whatever way you wished, what would you do? 
 
Is there anything else you would like to add to what we’ve discussed today? 
 
Thanks for participation. 
What happens next in the research process. 
Would the interviewee like to see interview transcript or context of quotes? 
Keeping in touch – details on Information Sheet. 
 
